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OF

FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE;

BY

REV. E. V. GERHART, D. D. AND REV. P. SCHAFF, D. D.

Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.—*Anselm.*

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THE

MERCERSBURG REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1858.

ART. I.—THE EFFICACY OF BAPTISM.

THE CHILDREN OF THE CHURCH AND SEALING ORDINANCES. Art. I. Princeton Review. January, 1857.

NEGLECT OF INFANT BAPTISM. Art. IV. Princeton Review. January, 1857.

To find two articles on the subject of Baptism in one number of the Princeton Review, the leading organ of Presbyterian Theology in America, the one inquiring into the *status*, or real position of grace, held by baptized children in virtue of Baptism, and the other exposing the "great sin" that at least one-half, if not two-thirds, of the children of communicant Presbyterians remain unbaptized, is certainly significant. Considering the general silence and apparent comparative indifference to so important an aspect of the Sacrament of Baptism, the articles, as well as the works on which they are based, indicate to us the operation of some special cause. This line of discussion is not demanded by any unusual amount of opposition from those who hold theories in conflict with the Confession of Faith. There has been no formal attack made of late upon the Sacraments as administered in the Presbyterian Church. The Baptistic controversy has in a great measure subsided. It is not then from without, we think, that the discussion receives its impulse. The cause must be sought elsewhere.

The Presbyterian Quarterlies, and the Theological Seminaries, generally, if not uniformly, set their faces against high views of the Sacraments. The pulpits and the weekly periodicals take up and perpetuate the opposition; and the warfare is thus carried into every church and into all the families of the churches. The result of a long continued and general opposition is the prevalence of a new theory—a theory that does not involve simply an important modification of the old Reformed or Presbyterian doctrine concerning the Sacraments; but that rests upon a negation of them as possessing any intrinsic efficacy. The new theory is *negative.* It denies that, by means of the Sacraments themselves, the worthy recipient is made a partaker of the grace which the Sacraments represent. They are *signs*—outward forms or transactions setting forth the regeneration of the heart, the forgiveness of sins, and progressive sanctification, through the operation of the Holy Ghost. They are *seals* also. But the proper meaning of *seal* is denied of the term; or explained away to such an extent that *sign* and *seal* come to signify the same thing; at least it is difficult to say in what respect they differ essentially.* The Sacrament as a seal is not an effectual means of salvation, does not assure the recipient that he is a partaker of an inward saving grace as certainly and really as he receives the outward sign, but it confirms the promise of the forgiveness of sins through faith in Jesus Christ. The seal assures the recipient that he will be saved from sin and death through Christ, if he repent and believe. The same assurance is given by the word. In the one case it is written or spoken; in the other it is exhibited in a visible symbol. The benefits of Christ's work are applied by the operation of the Holy Ghost, who may be imparted in the Sacrament; yet the Sacrament and the Spirit have no necessary connection. The Spirit is given without reference to the Sacrament; with or without the

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* Ridgley acknowledges the difficulty without hesitation: "The Sacraments are also said to seal the blessings that they signify; and accordingly they are called, not only signs, but seals. It is a difficult matter to explain, and clearly to state the difference between these two words, or to show what is contained in a seal that is not in a sign." Ridgley's Body of Divinity. Vol. IV, p. 163.

Sacrament; before or after Baptism, or the Lord's Supper, is administered. The promise given in the word is good alike for all, for the unbaptized as well as for the baptized; the one having no less reason to look for the inward saving work of the Holy Ghost on the heart than the other; for the promise is fulfilled in answer to prayer through the preaching of the Gospel to the unbaptized in the same sense in which it is to the baptized. A sacrament viewed as a *seal* is to be regarded, accordingly, as a confirmation of the promise of salvation through repentance and faith—a promise to which a person may lay claim with equal advantage, with or without, before or after, the administration of the sealing ordinance.

To this effect Ridgley says: "A seal, according to the most common acceptation of the word, imports a confirming sign. Yet we must take heed that we do not, in compliance with custom, contain more in our ideas of this word, than is agreeable to the analogy of faith: Therefore, let it be considered, that the principal method God hath taken for the confirming our faith in the benefits of Christ's redemption, is, his own truth and faithfulness, whereby the heirs of salvation *have strong consolation*, Heb. 4: 17, 18, or else the internal testimony of the Spirit of God in our hearts. The former is an objective means of confirmation, and the latter a subjective; and this the Apostle calls our *being established in Christ, and sealed, having the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts.* 2 Cor. 1: 21, 23. This is not the sense in which we are to understand the word as applied to the sacraments; since if we call them confirming seals, we intend nothing else hereby, but that God has to the promises that are given to us in his word, added these ordinances; not only to bring to mind this great doctrine, that Christ has redeemed His people by His blood; but to assure them, that they who believe in Him, shall be made partakers of this blessing; so that these ordinances are a pledge thereof to them, in which respect God has set his seal, whereby, in an objective way, he gives believers to understand, that Christ, and His benefits, are theirs." (Body of Divinity, Vol. IV, p. 165.) According to Dr. Ridgley, the principal method by which God confirms our faith in the benefits of Christ's redemption has no connection with the Sacraments. The confirmation of faith is affected principally by the truth and faithfulness of God as set forth in the preaching of the Gospel, and by the internal work of the Spirit on the heart. The Sacraments are of far less account, and hold a lower place in the economy of redemption, than the preached word or the internal testimony of the Spirit. They are only outward pledges that God will accomplish what he promises in His word to those who repent and believe. But they are not the outward certification that Christ really conveys or makes over to the recipient in the act of Baptism or Communion the saving grace which the sign represents.

So we understand Dr. Ridgley. His view of the Sacraments is somewhat higher on the whole, we think, than that which at present obtains generally throughout the Presbyterian Church. Substantially, however, it is the same. The prevailing habit of thought repudiates the idea that the Sacraments are in themselves effectual means of salvation, or that they conduct us to the thing signified and efficaciously accomplish that which they represent.

The language of Dr. Dick expresses, we believe, the most prevalent opinion in the Presbyterian Church on the subject of the Sacraments. After quoting some of the strongest and most explicit passages on the intrinsic efficacy of Baptism, he says: "It is not to be inferred from these passages, that remission is inseparably connected with baptism any more than regeneration, so that every person to whom it is administered, is immediately delivered from a state of condemnation. The idea is unscriptural, and is adopted only by those who are grossly ignorant of the economy of grace, in which God reserves to himself a right to give or withhold spiritual blessings according to His pleasure. But we are plainly taught that it is a sign of remission, or that the application of the water to the body, is a symbol of the purification of the soul from guilt, by the atoning blood of Christ. It holds out in figure the means by which children are delivered from original sin, and adults from both original and actual. In the ark, 'a few, that is, eight souls, were saved by water; the like figure whereunto,' says Peter, 'even baptism doth also now save us, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.' (1 Peter 3: 21.) It is the symbol of salvation; and those to whom the blessing signified by it is imparted, shall as certainly escape the avenging wrath of God, as Noah and his family escaped the destruction of the flood." (Dick's Theology, Vol. II, Lect. 89, p. 338.) Dr. Dick's view of Baptism does not rise beyond the conception of a symbol or figure; and scarcely to the true conception even of that. For Baptism, as we interpret him, does not symbolize or exhibit a certain present spiritual blessing, but a blessing that may, or may not, be imparted through the atoning blood of Christ according to the secret counsel of God. It becomes thus an empty symbol—a symbol with which no corresponding meaning or force is objectively connected.

The natural tendencies of such low views of Baptism upon ministers and laymen—for we propose to limit our discussion to this Sacrament—have been two-fold. Those who hold the Confession of Faith and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms in good faith, as the authoritative exponents of the Holy Scriptures, and make earnest with the doctrines and order of the Presbyterian Church, are more or less sensible of a conflict between the teachings of their Symbols and the prevailing habit of thought in regard to this Sacrament. Sympathizing with current views and yet venerating the Symbols as teaching the truth, their position is unsatisfactory and painful. Too much under the influence of the prevailing unsacramental theology to yield a hearty assent to the Confession of Faith, and too much under the moulding influence of the Confession and the Catechism to ignore their theory of the Sacraments and be borne along unresistingly on the tide of the age, they hold no definite views respecting the benfits of Baptism; they do not know whether to regard baptized children as truly the lambs of the fold or not; whether to deal with them as the children of God, or as the children of the Devil. Unwilling or unprepared to take either horn of the dilemma, they enquire seriously: What *is* the *status* of a baptized child? "We have met many evangelical clergymen," says Dr. Atwater, the author of the article on *Sealing Ordinances*, "in precisely this state of mind, full believers in the divine institution of infant baptism, yet craving more light as to its precise import and efficacy, and urging us in our poor way to examine and discuss the subject. We have met with few who have reached a mode of apprehending the matter altogether satisfactory to themselves."

We may remark by the way, that we are gratified to find so free and full an acknowledgment of what we can not but believe to be the true state of the case. Yet what a sad and humiliating acknowledgment it is! Ordained ministers of the Gospel who have pursued a complete course of classical and theological preparation, and have been approved as well qualified to fill the pastoral office, do not know in what light to look upon the baptized children of the Church; do not know whether they belong to the Devil or to the Lord, whether they are in a state of condemnation or in a state of grace, whether they are in the kingdom of light or in the kingdom of darkness. These little ones are entrusted to the special care, guidance and protection of the ambassador of Christ. He is set for the express purpose of training them and nourishing them unto eternal life. They are the hope of the Church. But if he does not know what they are, how shall he be able to treat them properly? How shall he perform the duties of his office efficiently? He is a workman in the garden of the Lord. Are these little ones living plants or are they poisonous weeds? If he can not answer the question, how shall he go to work? Shall he cultivate them tenderly as possessing a life which is to be more fully unfolded, or shall he pluck them up by the roots because they are evil? The question lies at the very threshhold of the pastoral office; and we ask, how can a man take the first step intelligently and consistently who does not know what a baptized child is? What shall the husbandman do—what qualifications does he possess for his work, if when he sees young plants growing in his field he does not know whether they are *vines* or *weeds?* To be ignorant on this point is certainly as great a reproach to a minister as to have no definite views respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, or the doctrine of justification by faith.

The other natural tendency of low views of Baptism is to produce a neglect of the Sacrament; and neglect soon prepares the way for a total rejection of it. There may be few comparatively among laymen or ministers who draw legitimate inferences in a formal way from the principle, that there is no intrinsic efficacy in the Sacrament of Baptism. This, however, does not neutralize the force of the theory and hinder its natural result; for a principle works out its own proper results in practical life, whether the logical conclusion be deduced consciously from the premises or not. Though the people generally may not reason it out logically, they will come to *feel* at least, that if there be no real advantage derived to an infant from Baptism itself, it will suffer no real loss from the want of it. And they will, in consequence, not long continue to practice an empty form upon their children simply because they are taught to believe that God has commanded the observance of it. Baptists in principle, it requires but a short process of development until they become Baptists in practice. This effect will follow in the case of that class of Presbyterians who have not been thoroughly indoctrinated. The Confession of Faith, or the Catechism, has no strong hold upon them; and they cherish no strong attachment to it. Their religious character has been moulded by the theological tendencies of the age and by a corresponding style of preaching the Gospel, rather than by the patient and believing study of Presbyterian Symbols. They have, therefore, but a slight, if any, sense of conflict between the doctrines which they profess to hold and the current views with which they are imbued. There is no restraint. Baptism is but a lifeless and powerless ceremony; and they give it up. No one sounds the alarm for years; and the Church at length wakes up to find that one-half of her children are unbaptized.

Here, then, we find the cause of the more than ordinary interest which we rejoice to see evinced in the Sacrament of Baptism. The article on *The Children of the Church and Sealing Ordinances* gives expression to the one tendency to which we have referred, as following naturally from low views of Baptism in the Presbyterian Church, and seeks to solve the problem which can not but arise in the minds of the more earnest and thoughtful. The article on the *Neglect of Infant Baptism* shows to what an alarming extent the other tendency has already been developed among the people, and institutes an inquiry into the causes of so wide-spread a practical apostacy from the old faith. Both articles are timely and proper; they discuss questions which it is in the highest degree consistent for a conscientious Presbyterian to ask, in an interesting manner and with ability; and they indicate the presence of a healthful under-tone of sentiment in regard to the Sacraments, in the midst of predominant unsacramental and even anti-sacramental tendencies.

It is consistent for an earnest Presbyterian to put these questions and endeavor to solve them, because the Confession of Faith and the Catechisms of the Church inculcate high views on the necessity and efficacy of both Sacraments, and especially of Baptism. This position we have thus far assumed. We shall now endeavor to make it good; and then in the light of it examine these Articles on Baptism.

In answer to the question: *What is a Sacrament?* the Larger Catechism answers as follows: "A sacrament is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ in His Church, to signify, seal, and exhibit unto those that are within the covenant of grace, the benefits of His mediation: to strengthen and increase their faith and all other graces; to oblige them to obedience: to testify and cherish their love and communion one with another, and to distinguish them from those that are without." Q. 162.

"The parts of a sacrament are two: the one, an outward and sensible sign used according to Christ's own appointment; the other, an inward and spiritual grace thereby signified." Q. 163.

To complete this view we quote from the Confession of Faith, Chap. 27, Sec. 2. "There is in every sacrament a spiritual relation, or sacramental union, between the sign and the thing signified; whence it comes to pass that the names and effects of the one are attributed to the other."

Rightly understood, we are willing to accept this statement as a correct definition of a *Sacrament*. The statement involves several particulars: 1. A sacrament is an ordinance instituted by Christ; 2. It consists of two parts; the one, outward and sensible, the other inward and spiritual; 3. These two parts are united in the Sacrament. It is a union of the outward and the inward, of the sign and the thing signified.

These several particulars are comprehended in one expression: A Sacrament is a *sign* and *seal* of divine grace. The outward element is both the sign and the seal. As a *sign* it represents grace—a spiritual good. As a *seal* it gives the assurance of a real and present grace. The thing signified is bound objectively to the sign. The outward element becomes a seal in being a *true* sign. Did the outward element exist by itself; were the union of the thing signified with the sign not necessary and real, but arbitrary and possible only, then the outward element would be in no sense a seal; it would not signify something present and real, but something that might or might not be present, according to circumstances. But in not signifying a reality, the outward element would lose its character also as a sign; it would simply be itself—water, or bread and wine; as for any thing spiritual, in real connection with the sign, it would be unmeaning and untrustworthy. A sign which does not represent any unseen reality to be in certain connection with it, is properly no sign at all. Thus if we divest the outward element in a Sacrament of the character of a seal, it ceases also to possess the proper character of a sign. The two conceptions demand each other reciprocally.

What a Sacrament is as an Institution of Christ it is also in its use by those who worthily observe it; that is, the sacramental transaction signifies and seals divine grace to a proper subject of the Sacrament. The impartation of the outward element signifies the impartation of an inward grace. Under this view it is a sign. But the sacramental transaction is not an illusion of the senses. It is a real transaction. The infant is really washed with water, and the believer really eats bread and drinks wine at the table of the Lord. As a true sign, therefore, the application of the outward element represents a real communication of divine grace. As such it is a seal. The sacramental transaction assures the recipient that he participates in the inward grace as really as he participates in the outward element. It conveys and confirms what it signifies. The two, the sign and the thing signified, are united in the transaction as truly as in the institution. The sign completes itself in the seal. Were the present communication of the inward, to those for whom it is designed, not as real as the present communication of the outward, the transaction would be without any corresponding meaning. It would represent what does not take place. The outward would be certainly communicated, but the inward might as certainly be withheld. The outward would, in consequence, not be a true but a false or empty sign. If, therefore, the administration of a Sacrament be not a *sealing* transaction, if it do not make over and convey what it signifies, and the one as really as the other, it is not, strictly speaking, a sign. It is an outward ceremony, and no more—a ceremony of an unmeaning or delusive character.

It is in this sense that the Presbyterian Symbols hold a Sacrament to be both *a sign and a seal*. At least we see no evidence to believe that words are used without attaching to them their proper meaning, The Confession of Faith says: *There is in every Sacrament a spiritual relation or sacramental union between the sign and the thing signified.* Here we have a most important truth. It is the *union* of the outward with the inward, of the sign with the thing signified, that constitutes a Sacrament; not either part taken by itself. The sign, the outward element, though used according to divine appointment, is not a Sacrament. An external washing with water performed in the name of the Trinity by a minister of the Gospel, if it include nothing more than what is thus accessible to the senses, is but a formal washing of the body with water; it is not Baptism. The breaking of bread, the pouring out of wine, and the distribution of bread and wine to a number of persons who eat and drink sitting or standing together around a table, if not really connected with an efficacious supernatural power, make but a lifeless ceremony; these things, existing by themselves, do not constitute the Lord's Supper. Nor, on the contrary, is the inward, the unseen and the supernatural, unconnected with an outward representative form, a Sacrament. The efficacious operation of the Holy Ghost, renewing the heart in the image of Jesus Christ, is not Baptism. The intimate communion of Christ with the believer, and the quickening of his inner life and of all his spiritual graces, do not make the Lord's Supper. The two parts of the ordinance must be united. What God has joined together objectively, we dare not rend asunder in idea. We may not separate the soul from the body, nor the body from the soul; for the body is not a man, nor is the soul a man; but the organic union of the soul and the body make a real human being. So we dare not separate an invisible supernatural grace from a visible, natural symbol; we dare not separate an inward efficacious operation of Jesus Christ by the Holy Ghost from an outward transaction, in our conception of a Sacrament; but we must hold both parts as essential constituents of one concrete reality. Without either the inward or the outword, that which is called a Sacrament is no longer such really.

This fundamental truth may be viewed under two false aspects. Each one gives rise to a fundamental error; and each error is grounded in a corresponding generic method of thought. One error arises from a false view of the *connection* of the sign with the thing signified in a Sacrament. Instead of viewing the outward form and the inward grace as in real union, they are identified; the outward is transmuted into the inward; the sign disappears and is swallowed up in the thing signified; and the thing signified, the supernatural part or side of the Sacrament, becomes the whole reality. Thus arises the theory of Transubstantiation as taught, in regard to the Lord's Supper, by the Roman Catholic Church—a theory which destroys the conception of a Sacrament, because it destroys the integrity of the outward sign. It allows no proper reality to the outward element. Bread and wine are not real bread and real wine; each ceases to possess its peculiar distinctive properties; though they appear to be what they were originally, they are, nevertheless, substantially the very body and the very blood of Christ. There is thus no longer a real sign, and therefore no real Sacrament.

Transubstantiation is grounded in the Eutychean method of thinking. Eutycheanism denies that the unmixed peculiar attributes of humanity can be predicated of the person of Christ; and holds that the human is, in some sense, transmuted or absorbed into the divine nature. This theory destroys the proper conception of the incarnation; for how can Christ be truly incarnate—how can it be true that the Word was made *flesh*—, if Christ be not really and truly bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh? But what Eutycheanism is with regard to the person of Christ, that Transubstantiation is with regard to the Eucharist; both theories being fatal to the reality of the outward, visible, tangible side of a great mystery.

The other error arises from a false view of the *difference* between the sign and the thing signified. Instead of distinguishing properly between the outward and the inward, between the natural form and the supernatural grace, it separates the two parts and holds them entirely asunder. It does violence to the necessary objective connection which exists between the thing signified and the sign; the outward transaction may be performed with or without the presence and power of the inward grace. The sign does indeed represent grace, but a grace that is mechanically associated with the sign, rather than a part of the very constitution of a Sacrament. The separation may be so wide as to be equivalent to a direct denial of any objective connection whatever between effectual grace and the sacramental transaction; and the Sacrament then resolves itself into an empty sign—a merely commemorative ordinance—a lifeless form—a dead ritual service.

This false view is grounded in the Nestorian method of thinking. Nestorianism admits the reality of the divine and the human natures of Christ; but reacting against the confusion of substance which Eutycheanism teaches, it separates the one from the other; and thus denies the organic union of the two in the person of Christ. The two natures are held together outwardly, and not inwardly; they exist side by side and merely coöperate together in the work of redemption; but they are not integral parts of one mysterious constitution pervaded by the power of one life-principle. What Nestorianism is in relation to the person of Christ, that this dualistic error is in relation to the Sacrament of Baptism and the Lord's Supper; both theories negate the internal and necessary connection between the natural and the supernatural, and thus divorce two distinct things which God has joined together in a mysterious unity.

Nestorianism possesses strong affinities for Unitarianism; and one system may in consequence easily pass over into the other. Nestorianism, divorcing the divine nature from the human, holds the human as existing separately from the divine. It is but a natural development of such a false separation, first, to subordinate the divine to the human, and then to suppress it altogether, when the human nature becomes the proper personality of Jesus Christ; and we have the Unitarian theory. So does the dualistic view of the Sacraments possess strong affinities for the Socinian theory. Denying the internal and necessary connection between the thing signified and the sign, and thus divorcing the outward sacramental transaction from the inward supernatural grace which it exhibits, it is an easy transition to the denial of any real connection whatever of grace with forms or signs, and to the assumption that the visible part, or the sacramental transaction, is itself the whole Sacrament. Then we get the Socinian theory, namely, that there is no divine grace in the Sacraments; that Baptism possesses no intrinsic efficacy; and that the Lord's Supper is not a mystery, but only a most impressive memorial of the death and sufferings of Jesus Christ.

Such has been the actual process of development through which the prevailing Theology of America has passed. From a denial of grace being necessarily connected with, or really bound to, the sacramental transaction, it has passed on to the theory that the visible symbols and the orderly and reverential use of them, constitute the Sacrament. There is, therefore, no supernatural grace in the Sacrament itself. The inward is first divorced from the outward, the supernatural from the natural; then the outward is affirmed to be the whole Sacrament; and finally it is regarded as a self-evident proposition that the outward is not the inward, that the natural is not the supernatural, the visible not the invisible, that a mere external ceremony can possess no objective spiritual efficacy. Baptism can confer no grace. The Lord's Supper can communicate no spiritual nourishment to the believing communicant; for each is in itself but an empty though a solemn rite of Christian worship. The blessing derived from the rite is not communicated by the rite, but depends upon the state of heart and the spiritual exercises of the worshipper. A legitimate conclusion, we admit. But the course of reasoning is like taking a rich kernel out of a shell; calling the hollow shell a nut; and then regarding it as a grave error to attribute any nutritive properties to a nut.

This Socinian view of the Sacraments following naturally from the Nestorian method of thinking, is altogether consistent upon the Unitarian principle. To deny the divine personality of Jesus Christ, and to deny the intrinsic efficacy of the Sacraments or sacramental grace, is logical. The one leads legitimately to the other. Both doctrines are integral parts of but one system. But there is no room for the rejection of sacramental grace on the Reformed or Presbyterian principle, that Christ is the second person of the Godhead. To hold the divine personality of Jesus Christ, to hold the real union of the supernatural with the natural, of the infinite with the finite, of the divine with the human, in the person of our Lord, and deny the union of the supernatural with the natural in the Sacraments, is a logical contradiction. The two views presuppose and rest in opposite methods of thinking—an opposition that sooner or later must make itself felt, and produce a corresponding effect. There is no resemblance or affinity whatever between consistent Unitarianism and consistent Presbyterianism. Differing radically on what constitutes the fundamental principle of the whole Christian system, they must by necessary consequence be mutually exclusive also on all subordinate points of doctrine. The Christian consciousness of the Presbyterian Church can not, therefore, in the nature of the case, continue for a very long period in this state of self-contradiction—holding, not confessionally, but actually, the Unitarian theory concerning the Sacraments and rejecting the Unitarian theory concerning the person of Christ. If there be freedom of thought and speech, there must be a reaction in one direction or the other: a tendency to lower views of the person of Christ, or a tendency to higher views of the Sacraments. The one legitimate tendency is at work, we are sorry to believe, throughout many portions of the Congregational Church of New England; the other, judging from various indications, we have reason to think, is awaking in some parts of the Presbyterian Church. At least we indulge the hope that the reaction, which without any doubt must come under one form or the other, will be in the right direction, and result in restoring the teachings of the Confession of Faith on the Sacraments to their proper place in the faith and consciousness of those who, notwithstanding their present defection on this point from the creed of their fathers, still continue to hold it reverently as the authoritative exponent of the Sacred Scriptures.

As we must understand the Confession of Faith and the Catechisms of the Presbyterian Church, they exclude both the errors to which we have now referred. They neither transmute the sign into the nature of the thing signified, nor divorce from the sign the thing signified, and then deny its existence. But they maintain the reality of the sign, the reality of the thing signified, and the union of these two distinct things in the Sacrament; so that the names and effects of the one may properly be attributed to the other. A Sacrament is *a sign and a seal*—using both words in their true and full sense.

In accordance with this general view of a Sacrament, the nature of Baptism is defined by the Confession of Faith as follows: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church, but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life: which sacrament is, by Christ's own appointment, to be continued in his Church until the end of the world." Chap. 23, 1.

"The outward element to be used in this sacrament is water wherewith the party is to be baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, by a minister of the Gospel, lawfully called thereto." Sec. 2.

In order to apprehend clearly the full import of these statements we quote in connection with them the 163d Question of the Larger Catechism: "What are the parts of a sacrament? Answer. The parts of a sacrament are two; the one, an outward and sensible sign used according to Christ's own appointment; the other, an inward and spiritual grace thereby signified." Taking all these statements together we can determine the theory of Baptism as taught in the Symbols of the Presbyterian Church.

There are two parts in the Sacrament of Baptism; the one, an outward and sensible sign; the other, an inward and spiritual grace. The outward part is not Baptism; nor is the inward part Baptism; but that is Baptism which includes both; and the one as really and necessarily as the other. The outward and the inward are each an essential constituent of this Sacrament; and no transaction can, therefore, be affirmed to be Baptism in which a sensible sign and a spiritual grace are not united. To call the outward sign, separately considered, the Sacrament, is plainly a misnomer; it is as serious an error as to call the external human form, divorced in thought from the living soul, a real human being.

What the "outward sign" and the "spiritual grace" consist in, we learn from the Confession * as just quoted. The outward element or sign is water applied to the person baptized, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, by a minister of the Gospel lawfully called thereto. The thing signified, or the spiritual grace,

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* The Larger Catechism defines Baptism in nearly the same words as the Confession. In answer to the question: *What is Baptism?* it says:

"Baptism is a Sacrament of the New Testament, wherein Christ hath ordained the washing with water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to be a sign and a seal of ingrafting into Himself, of remission of sins by His blood, and regeneration by His Spirit; of adoption and resurrection unto everlasting life: and whereby the parties baptized are solemnly admitted into the visible Church, and enter into an open and professed engagement to be wholly and only the Lord's." Q. 165.

This definition is fuller and more explicit even than that given by the Thirty-Nine Articles: "Baptism is not only a sign of profession, and mark of difference, whereby Christian men are discerned from others which be not christened, but it is also a sign of Regeneration or New-Birth, whereby as by an instrument they that receive Baptism rightly are grafted into the Church; the promises of the forgiveness of sins, and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost, are visibly signed and sealed; Faith is confirmed, and Grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God." Art. 27. It is in the office for the administration of Baptism, as contained in the Book of Common Prayer, that the doctrine of the Episcopal Church concerning the efficacy of the Sacrament is most clearly brought out. The language of the Book of Common Prayer, however, is no less unambiguous than that of the Symbols of the Presbyterian Church.

is an ingrafting into Christ, regeneration, and remission of sins. These two things, the application of the water, and the accompanying work of the Spirit whereby the person baptized is ingrafted into Christ, are joined together in the baptismal transaction; for "there is in every sacrament a spiritual relation, or sacramental union, between the sign and the thing signified."

The Sacrament of Baptism has accordingly been ordained by Jesus Christ for a two-fold purpose: 1. For "the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church." But this is not the whole design of the Sacrament. It comprehends a great deal more. It is ordained "not only" for such solemn admission into the *visible* Church; but 2. It is to be unto the person baptized "a sign and seal of the covenant of grace"; that is, Baptism is ordained also for the admission of the person baptized into the *invisible* Church. This is evident from the accompanying explanation. A sign and seal "of the covenant of grace" is a sign and seal of "ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration and of remission of sins."

Here it is necessary to bear in mind the true import of the words *sign* and *seal.* Baptism is a *sign.* The outward application of water to the body represents or exhibits the inward work of the Holy Ghost upon the heart, by which the person is united to Christ, regenerated and pardoned. But the sign is not an empty, lifeless form. It does not represent something that is not done. It is a true sign. The thing signified is present, certain, and real. Hence the sign is also a *seal.* The baptismal transaction *assures* the person baptized, that the inward work of the Holy Ghost is as certain and real as the outward use of the sign. He is as certainly introduced into the covenant of grace, that is, he is as certainly ingrafted into Christ, regenerated by His Spirit, and forgiven through His blood, as he is externally washed with water. The thing signified is objectively connected and conferred with the sign, as truly and really, as the sign itself is used.

Nor is this an unusual meaning of the word *sign*; it is the very sense in which the word is employed in all the affairs of actual life. The joining of hands in the ceremony of marriage is a sign; a sign that the parties take each other in good faith as husband and wife. So far from being a mere form, it is regarded as the outward expression of what is actually done—the assurance of sincerity and truth. If a bridegroom do not as certainly and really give the affections of his heart to his bride, as he extends to her his right hand ; and if the outward transaction be not an assurance of his full determination to live with her in the state of matrimony according to the law of God ; the solemn act is condemned by all the good as a profane mockery of God and men. The sign of a merchant is the outward indication of his business ; but the business is as real and certain as the sign. If not, if the business is not really conducted at the time and place indicated, the sign is pronounced to be a base imposition upon the community ; or if not an imposition, it cannot be regarded as being intended as a sign. Those who deny that God has connected supernatural grace with the outward baptismal transaction, or that He as really confers the thing signified as the sign is administered, do not attribute as much validity or reality to the ordinances of Christ in His Church as they do to the conventional arrangements of dealers in merchandize.

That we have rightly interpreted the definition of Baptism given by the Confession of Faith, will appear from some of the succeeding Sections. "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance, yet grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed unto it, as that no person can be regenerated or saved without it, or that all that are baptized, are undoubtedly regenerated." (Chap. 28, Sec. 5.) Three points are to be noted in this Section. It teaches that salvation without Baptism is not an impossibility ; and that a person may be baptized without being regenerated and saved. Baptism is an effectual means of salvation to such only "as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will." It is the elect, not the non-elect, who are ingrafted into Christ by the

Holy Ghost in the administration of the ordinance. But this Section affirms also by implication—the principal point to which we call attention—that grace and salvation are *inseparably annexed* unto Baptism. This is in full accordance with the statement that there is a "sacramental union between the sign and the thing signified." The connection of grace and salvation with the ordinance is inseparable—the plain though indirect affirmation of the Confession; but the connection is not inseparable in such a sense that salvation is in all cases impossible without Baptism, or that every baptized person will undoubtedly be saved.

The language of the sixth Section is stronger still, and more direct. "The efficacy of Baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered; yet, notwithstanding, by the right use of this ordinance the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will, in his appointed time." We will endeavor to analyze this plain and forcible statement.

1. Baptism *possesses efficacy.* The efficacy is not predicated of the repentance and faith of the party baptized, nor of the nurture and admonition in which Christian parents bring up their children, nor yet of the independent operations of the Holy Ghost, but it is predicated of Baptism itself. The efficacy is objective, or *in* the Sacrament, in other words, it is an *intrinsic* efficacy. If not intrinsic, it is *extrinsic;* for we can not associate any efficacy with the ordinance that is neither the one nor the other. But an extrinsic efficacy of Baptism is no efficacy at all. It is a power that lies outside of the ordinance—a power that is exerted by something which is distinct and different from the ordinance; and must in consequence be predicated of that by which it is exerted, and not of Baptism. There is no room, therefore, to speak of *the efficacy of Baptism*, as the Confession does, unless it be conceded that that efficacy is *intrinsic*—in the proper administration of the ordinance itself.

2. The efficacy of Baptism *is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered.* The efficacy of the ordinance is indeed operative at the moment of time when it is administered; but not at that time exclusively. As according to an opinion of some of the Church Fathers, perpetuated for centuries in the history of the Church, Baptism availed only or chiefly for the remission of sins that were past, and not for the remission of such as were committed after the administration of the Sacrament, the Confession teaches, in opposition to such unscriptural limitation, that, beginning at the time when administered, the efficacy of Baptism extends over the whole of life and terminates in the resurrection from the dead; for it is a seal "of adoption, and resurrection unto everlasting life." (Lar. Cat. Q. 165.)

3. By the right use of this ordinance the grace promised is *offered* to such as that grace belongeth unto. Baptism bears or brings grace to those who are baptized, as that which belongs to them and is designed for their salvation.

4. The grace promised is *really exhibited.* Grace is not only borne or brought to the party baptized, but its nature and design are manifested, or set forth, in Baptism. As the application of water takes away the filth of the body, so does the grace of God, or the blood and Spirit of Christ, which is the thing signified in Baptism, cleanse the soul from the pollution of sin.

5. The grace promised is also *really conferred* by the Holy Ghost. For the adverb evidently qualifies both verbs. Grace is *really* exhibited and *really* conferred. It is both represented and actually communicated. A most unequivocal and forcible form of expression. The statement rises from the less to the greater truth, until it reaches the highest point of the climax, and brings out the intrinsic efficacy of Baptism with accumulated force. The efficacy is such that the grace promised is offered; it is at hand in the right use of the ordinance; not only offered but also exhibited; the party baptized sees in the visible transaction the nature and design of the ordinance to cleanse from sin, clearly set forth. But the grace promised is not only offered and exhibited,

but *really conferred* by the Holy Ghost; that is, the party baptized is made a partaker of the grace which is offered and exhibited. The grace promised is the thing signified; and the thing signified is an ingrafting into Christ, regeneration and remission of sins. As the grace promised is really conferred in Baptism, it follows that in the right use of this ordinance the party baptized is ingrafted into Christ, regenerated, and receives remission of sins, by the power of the Holy Ghost.

6. The grace promised is thus really conferred upon *such as that grace belongeth unto.* According to the doctrine of God's Decrees, (Chapter III,) that grace belongs to those who are predestinated and fore-ordained to everlasting life. The Sacrament of Baptism is, therefore, the ordinance in and through which the decree is operative effectually for the salvation of the elect. The elect are ingrafted into Christ, and made partakers of all His benefits, in virtue of the grace which is conferred on them in the right use of Baptism.

Such is the evident meaning of the explicit language of the Confession of Faith concerning the nature and efficacy of the sacrament of Baptism. We have endeavored to interpret its language fairly and consistently; and must regard the result as a legitimate conclusion.

We are well aware of an objection that may be raised against this conclusion on the ground of the 191st Question of the Larger Catechism. The Question is: "*How do the sacraments become effectual means of grace?*" To which the Answer is given: "The sacraments become effectual means of salvation, not by any power in themselves, or any virtue derived from the piety or intention of him by whom they are administered; but only by the working of the Holy Ghost, and the blessing of Christ by whom they are instituted." If, however, this answer is considered in connection with other portions of the Confession and the Catechism, it will appear that it can not sustain any objection which is valid.

One important point is admitted and taught, namely that the Sacraments *are effectual means* of salvation; and that they become such by the working of the Holy Ghost and the blessing of Christ. So far the 161st Answer is in agreement with the passages already cited on the efficacy of Baptism. But it teaches also that the Sacraments become effectual means of salvation *not by any power in themselves*. The other clause referring to the intention of him who administers the Sacrament does not affect the question at issue, and may, therefore, be dismissed. The precise import of the answer depends upon the meaning of the word *Sacraments*. It may be used either in its full and proper sense, or in a restricted and improper sense.

Under the first view, the answer teaches that the Sacraments have *no power* in themselves—a position that is in direct conflict with what the Symbols inculcate in other places. They teach, as we have seen, that a Sacrament is a sign and a seal of grace; that in a Sacrament there is the *union* of two parts, of the thing signified with the sign, of the grace promised, which is an ingrafting into Christ by the Holy Ghost, with the outward representation of it; and that, therefore, in the right use of the ordinance the grace promised is *conferred* as really as the outward transaction takes place. In other words, the Symbols elsewhere strictly affirm concerning the efficacy of a Sacrament what the 161st Answer denies.

But it is not necessary to take the word in its full and proper sense. Nor have we any disposition to charge the work of the Westminster Assembly of divines, for whose learning and piety we cherish profound respect, with being self-contradictory, unless there be no other alternative. The other view, we think, is the correct one. The word *Sacraments* is used in a restricted and improper sense. It denotes, not the Sacrament as the Symbols so carefully and unequivocally define them, but merely the external element and the external transaction, separately considered, which a Sacrament, properly speaking, includes. The Answer separates the working of the Holy Ghost from the Sacrament, and then denies of the visible ceremony what it attributes to the Holy Ghost and the blessing of Christ; whilst elsewhere the Symbols regard the thing signified, or the working of the Holy Ghost, as a constituent part of a Sacrament, disallow indirectly the application of the name even to a transaction which does not comprehend invisible grace, and consequently predicate intrinsic efficacy, or objective force, of the Sacrament itself. It is not, therefore, against the intrinsic efficacy of the Sacraments, rightly considered, but against the *opus operatum* theory of the Roman Catholic Church that this Answer is directed, according to which theory the performance of the external work itself confers grace; and it corresponds to the 72nd Question* of the Heidelberg Catechism. There is one important difference, however. Whilst the Larger Catechism denies here that there is any efficacy in the *Sacrament* itself, and thus seems to contradict what in other places it explicitly teaches; the Heidelberg Catechism denies intrinsic efficacy of the *external baptism with water*, but not of the Sacrament itself.

Whatever, now, we may think of the propriety of separating the sign from the thing signified, and then applying to the sign the name which belongs to the union of both, a method which the Scriptural idea of a Sacrament does not warrant, one thing is certain, namely, that no argument can consistently be derived from the 161st Answer against the interpretation we have given to the teaching of the Symbols concerning the efficacy of Baptism. Or, should such an argument be insisted on, it would involve the Symbols of the Presbyterian Church in a direct contradiction.

In order to establish the doctrine that grace is inseparably annexed to Baptism, and conferred upon the party baptized in the right use of the ordinance, the Confession and Catechism cite a number of passages bearing upon the subject, from the Sacred Scriptures. We will transfer several of them.

Rom. 4: 11, And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had, yet being uncircumcised; that righteousness might be imputed to them also. Compared with Col. 2: 11, 12. In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ; buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him, through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead.

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* Q. 72. Is then the external baptism with water, the washing away of sin itself? Answer. Not at all; for the blood of Jesus Christ only, and the Holy Ghost, cleanses us from all sin.—*Heidelberg Catechism.*

Acts 2: 38. Peter said unto them, Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins.

Acts 22: 16. Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins.

John 3: 5. Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God

1 Cor. 12: 13. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit.

Gal. 3: 27. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ.

Rom. 6: 3, 4. Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.

Titus 3: 5. Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost.

1 Peter 3: 21. The like figure whereunto, even baptism doth also now save us, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

We give these passages, taken from the Confession and the Catechism, without comment. They contain others of similar import; but these may suffice. A candid mind cannot but be struck with the pertinence of these quotations to the design of establishing the doctrine of the efficacy of Baptism; and with the correspondence between the explicit teaching of the Confession and the forcible language of the New Testament. It would be simply absurd to suppose that the Westminster Assembly could adopt such language, and quote such passages of Scripture, if after all they intended only to teach that Baptism is a figure of grace, but does not really confer or make over in the sacramental transaction what it represents; or that it is only a sign of the covenant, but does not introduce the party baptized into the covenant and make him a partaker of its spiritual benefits.

In accordance with the doctrine of baptismal grace taught by the Confession, the Directory for Worship assumes that baptized children are *Christians*, and prescribes the manner in which they are to be treated accordingly:

"Children, born within the pale of the visible Church, and dedicated to God in Baptism, are under the inspection and government of the Church; and are to be taught to read and repeat the Catechism, the Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer. They are to be taught to pray, to abhor sin, to fear God, and to obey the Lord Jesus Christ. And, when they come to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed it is their duty and their privilege to come to the Lord's Supper." (Chap. 9, 1.)

The Directory presumes that baptized children are in the covenant, or in a state of grace; and not in a state of nature—a state in which they were in virtue of their natural birth. They are, therefore, called *young Christians* (Chap. 9: 2.); and are to be taught to pray and obey the Lord Jesus Christ. It is presumed that, being taught to repeat the Catechism, the Apostles' Creed and the Lord's Prayer, and brought up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, they will grow up in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ; so that when they come to years of discretion they will be pious and possess sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body. If there be nothing to contradict this presumption—if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, they are to be informed by the minister, or officers, or parents, that it is their duty and privilege to come to the Lord's Supper. As they were baptized into Christ for the mortifying of sin and quickening of grace; as the grace promised was not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred on them by the Holy Ghost in the ordinance; as they were buried with Christ *by Baptism* into death; and as they who have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ; they are to be treated as those who are saved according to His mercy, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost; they are to be taught to walk in newness of life, like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father; and they are to be carefully instructed, watched over and prayed for, that they may not fall short of, or walk contrary to, the grace of Baptism, but that they may grow up to assurance of pardon of sin, and of all other blessings sealed to them in this Sacrament. (Vid. Lar. Cat. Q. 168.) When, therefore, baptized children have come to years of discretion, they are to be examined in order to ascertain whether they have improved the grace of Baptism, and if they have properly improved it, admitted to all the privileges of the Church.

Whether true or false, Scriptural or antiscriptural, such is evidently the confessional theory of the Presbyterian Church concerning the condition, character and treatment of baptized Children—a theory that gives no countenance whatever to the modern system of periodical excitements, a system which repudiates "the grace of baptism," looks upon the baptized and the unbaptized as alike out of grace and children of the Devil, and trusts to extraordinary operations of the Holy Ghost, that is, operations which are independent of, and unconnected with, the Sacraments, as the only hope of the Church.

In the seventeenth century, and especially during the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly (1688), no one uninspired man exerted so decided and controlling an influence upon the government, and upon the formation of the theological opinions of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, as John Calvin. As this is a historical fact, no one will gainsay it. It will be in place, therefore, to refer to what he says on the efficacy of Baptism. If his views contradict our interpretation of the Confession, there will be room for the presumption that there may be a flaw in the reasoning; but if he hold the theory which we find in the Symbols, he is to be regarded as bearing witness to the truth of the position which we have taken.

Opposing the opinion that Baptism is administered only for the remission of past sins, Calvin says: "We ought to conclude that at whatever time we are baptized, we are washed and purified for the whole of life. Whenever we have fallen, therefore, we must recur to the remembrance of baptism, and arm ourselves with the consideration of it, that we may be always certified and assured of the remission of our sins." (Inst. B. 4, Ch. 15, 3.)

Commenting upon Rom. 6 : 3, 4, he says: "In this passage he (Paul) does not merely exhort us to an imitation of Christ, as if he had said, that we are admonished by baptism, that after the example of his resurrection we should rise to righteousness; but he goes considerably further, and teaches us, that by baptism Christ has made us partakers of his death, in order that we may be ingrafted into it. And as the scion derives substance and nourishment from the root on which it is ingrafted, so they, who receive baptism with the faith they ought to receive it, truly experience the efficacy of Christ's death in the mortification of the flesh, and also the energy of his resurrection in the vivification of the spirit." (B. 4, Ch. 15, 5.)

The following passage is equally explicit: "The last advantage which our faith receives from baptism, is the certain testimony it affords us, that we are not only ingrafted into the life and death of Christ, but are so united as to be partakers of all His benefits. For this reason he dedicated and sanctified baptism in His own body, that He might have it in common with us, as a most firm bond of the union and society which he has condescended to form with us; so that Paul proves from it that we are the children of God, because we have put on Christ in Baptism." (Ch. 15, 6.)

Speaking of the relation of Baptism to original sin: "And therefore even infants themselves bring their own condemnation into the world with them, who, though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet have the seed of it within them, even their whole nature, is as it were, a seed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and abominable to God. By baptism, believers are certified that this condemnation is removed from them; since, as we said, the Lord promises us by this sign, that a full and entire remission is granted both of the guilt which is to be imputed to us, and of the punishment to be inflicted on account of that guilt; they also receive righteousness, such as the people of God may obtain in this life; that is, only by imputation, because the Lord, in His mercy, accepts them as righteous and innocent." (Ch. 15, 10.)

We make one quotation more: "Now as we have stated what was the design of our Lord in the institution of baptism, it is easy to judge in what manner we ought to use and receive it. For as it is given for the support, consolation, and confirmation of our faith, it requires to be received as from the hand of the Author Himself: we ought to consider it as beyond all doubt, that it is He who speaks to us by this sign; that it is He who purifies and cleanses us, and obliterates the remembrance of our sins; that it is He who makes us partakers of His death, who demolishes the kingdom of Satan, who weakens the power of our corrupt propensities, who even makes us one with Himself, that, being clothed with Him, we may be reckoned children of God; and that He as truly and certainly performs these things internally on our souls, as we see that our bodies are externally washed, immersed and inclosed in water. For this analogy or similitude is a most certain rule of sacraments; that in corporeal things we contemplate spiritual things, just as if they were placed before our eyes, as it has pleased God to represent them to us by such figures: not that such blessings are bound or enclosed in the sacrament,* or that it has the power to impart them to us; but only because it is a sign by which the Lord testifies His will, that He is determined to give us all these things: nor does it merely feed our eyes with a fair prospect of the symbols, but conducts us at the same time to the thing signified, and efficaciously accomplishes † that which it represents." (B. 4. Ch. 15, 14.)

The language of the great Reformer is direct and clear. If it teach any thing, it is, that, in the right use of Baptism, we put on Christ and become children of God; that we truly experience the efficacy of Christ's death in the mortification of the flesh, and the energy of His resurrection in the vivification of the spirit; and that the ordinance conducts us to the thing signified and efficaciously accomplishes that which it represents. Bearing in mind the close relation which Calvin sustained to the origin and development of the Presbyterian Church, these unequivocal statements of his views concerning the efficacy of Baptism ought to be regarded as the strongest collateral evidence of the truth of the interpretation which we have given to the Confession of Faith.

We have now carefully analyzed the Symbols of the Presbyterian Church on the efficacy of Baptism. The legitimate conclusion which we have drawn from them is, that they teach, that as a sign Baptism represents grace, and a seal assures the party baptized of being introduced into a state of grace; that it not only offers, but also really exhibits and confers that grace on those, whether of age or infants, to whom it belongs; in other words, that, in the right use of the ordinance, the *party baptized is ingrafted into Christ, is regenerated, and receives remission of sins, by the working of the Holy Ghost.* This conclusion is confirmed by the numerous passages which the Symbols quote from the Word of God ; by the rules, laid down in the Directory for Worship, for the training of baptized children and their admission to the Lord's Supper ; and by the unequivocal teachings of Calvin, than whom no man exerted a more decided formative influence upon the theological opinions as originally held in the Presbyterian Church. Indeed it is difficult to see how the Confession could have employed more explicit language, and given more apt quotations from the Scriptures, than it has, in order to teach and establish the doctrine of efficacious baptismal grace.

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* The word must certainly be employed here in a restricted sense; and the whole clause be directed against the Roman Catholic dogma, according to which a Sacrament is efficacious, *ex opere operato*. Otherwise Calvin would deny of baptism, in this passage, what he so positively and studiously affirms of it in other places, and even in this Section.

† Neque tantum nudo spectaculo pascit oculos: sed in rem presentem nos adducit, et quod figurat, efficaciter implet. Lib. IV. Cap. XV., 14.

In the light, now, of what must undoubtedly be regarded as the true Presbyterian theory concerning the nature and efficacy of Baptism, we proceed to examine the manner in which Dr. Atwater disposes of the Confession, the Catechism and the Directory, in his enquiry into the *status* of baptized children. The question which he proposes to answer is not : What is the *status* of children of believing parents in virtue of their natural birth ? nor, What is the *status* or position of children in virtue of the operations of the Holy Ghost ? The question is a very different one. From the introductory remarks we learn what has been the occasion of the article. Many "are wholly at a loss as to the precise *status* of baptized children, the manner and extent in which baptism either signifies, seals, or procures any advantage which they would not possess without it." (p. 4.) Speaking of those who desire to escape both "lifeless rationalism" and "equally lifeless formalism," he says: "Believing that there is both precious truth signified, and blessing sealed by infant baptism, and that it is of God, they would not surrender it for worlds. Yet they can not define its nature and effects fully to their own satisfaction, although they possess some dim and struggling conceptions of them." (p. 4.) Hence they crave more light as to the "precise import and efficacy" of Baptism, and urge the author "to examine and discuss the subject." The subject, then, is, *the nature and effects*, or *the precise import and efficacy* of baptism. The real question, accordingly, which he proposes to answer is: What is the status of baptized children *in virtue of Baptism?* And the conclusion at which Dr. Atwater arrives, must be regarded, in order to accord to him either candor or consistency—and we have not the least disposition to do any thing else—,as his answer to *this* question; and not as an answer to either one of the two other questions just stated. Indeed there is neither point nor propriety in the whole article unless we take the result of his discussion to be a statement of the precise import and efficacy of Baptism. We take pains to determine this point, not only because it is in place to do so, but because in the progress of discussion he fails, as we think, to hold one question steadily before his eye, sometimes seeming to discuss the position of children in virtue of Baptism, and at others their position in virtue of being born of believing parents.

In entering upon the discussion of the subject, Dr. Atwater says: "The catholic doctrine on this subject, as shown in the creeds of christendom, is, that the children of believers are members of the Church, and are to receive baptism as the badge of such membership, and seal of the duties and privileges pertaining to it. But great diversities of opinion and practice prevail in reference to the kind of membership involved, and the doctrinal and practical consequences which thence result." (p. 5.) We must dissent from the respected author at the threshhold of the argument. The creeds of Christendom do not teach that the children of believers are, as such, members of the Church, nor that Baptism is a badge of membership previously existing. They teach the reverse. The covenant is certainly designed for the children of believers as really as for themselves; in this sense children of believers are included in it; but they are not members of the covenant, nor of the Church, in virtue of their natural birth. Natural birth gives them the *right* to membership, but leaves them outside of the Church as long as they remain unbaptized. The male children of the Jews were included in the promise, and therefore had a right to circumcision, but they were excluded from all the privileges and blessings of members of the Church so long as they were uncircumcised. The Reformed Symbols proceed upon the same theory. Baptism is ordained "*for the solemn admission* of the party baptized into the visible Church," says the Confession, (Chap 28, 1), an authority which Dr. Atwater will not refuse to acknowledge. It is almost superfluous to add that, if by Baptism children are admitted into the Church, they are not, and can not be members so long as they are unbaptized. All that the Confession and the Catechisms say concerning the blessings conferred in the right use of the ordinance, involves the same principle. To the same effect the Heidelberg Catechism teaches that, by Baptism, as a sign of the covenant, infants must also be "admitted into the Christian Church, and be distinguished from the children of infidels." (Q. 74.) To multiply authorities is unnecessary.

The creeds of Christendom* teach accordingly that, whilst children of believers are included in the design of the covenant, they are not members of the Church in virtue of their natural birth, but become members in virtue of Baptism. The error of Dr. Atwater consists in confounding the *extent* of the covenant and the *right* of children of believers, with actual membership in the Church—an error which is traceable through the greater part of the whole article, and even renders ambiguous the final conclusion at which he arrives. Yet he is not always consistent even with himself. Discussing the practice of baptizing the children of non-communicants, he speaks of "parents being *by baptism* in the Church." (p. 17). If in the Church, or members of it, *by* Baptism, they are assuredly not members of it *without* Baptism. Without Baptism children of believers are in the world. Still the prevailing idea of his article is the one with which the author starts out.

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* No one certainly would say that the creeds of the Roman Catholic Church regard the unbaptized children of believing parents as members.

Having laid down this untenable position, Dr. Atwater passes on to consider several false views concerning the import of Baptism:

1. That "they are members only *quasi*, or in such a sense that the Church owes them no duties nor privileges, above the unbaptized." "Although they are born, in a sort, members, and as such have the seal of baptism, yet this is a token and pledge of nothing but of that Christian instruction and training, which all pious parents impart." (p. 6).

2. That baptized children "are members of the Church universal, but not of any particular organized Church." (p. 7). The theory held by Dr. Dwight and some other New England divines. With the consideration of this theory he connects a succinct history of Baptism among the Congregational Churches of New England, particularly of the *Half-way Covenant* practice.

These theories Dr. Atwater presents as false, and argues against them. Of course in doing so he implies that the truth lies in opposite propositions, to wit, that baptized children are not only *quasi*, but in some sense, real members; that Baptism is something more than a token and pledge of Christian instruction and training; and that children become members by Baptism of some particular organized Church. If the course of argument be relevant at all to the subject in hand, he must mean that the benefits which baptized children possess, denied by the theories rejected, but affirmed by implication by himself, are derived from Baptism. And it follows that Baptism must have some force or efficacy, and convey something. But if he wishes to imply only that in virtue of natural birth children of believers are, in some sense, real members of the Church and have a pledge of something more than Christian instruction, he commits two errors: he maintains what the Confession of Faith sets aside, and besides perpetrates a fallacy—a *mutatio elenchi*. For he is professedly discussing the precise import or efficacy, not of natural birth, but of Baptism.

To determine the true position of baptized children, the author refers to the Symbols; for they express the faith of the Presbyterian Church "with great precision," and "exhibit the truth in the premises intact and inviolate." He gives a number of extracts in full from the Confession, the Catechisms and the Directory, including those which we have quoted. Without attempting an analysis or exposition of these extracts, he proceeds immediately to say: "To preclude misconstruction in any quarter, we observe, at the outset, that these articles deny all intrinsic efficacy to the sacraments, as such." (p. 21). Deny all *intrinsic* efficacy! According to these very articles a Sacrament is the union of the thing signified with the sign; Baptism signifies and seals an ingrafting into Christ, regeneration and remission of sins, that is, assures or certifies that the thing signified is real and certain; grace and salvation are inseparably annexed to the ordinance; by the right use of the ordinance the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited *and conferred* by the Holy Ghost to such, whether of age or infants, as that grace belongeth unto; and they are *baptized into* Christ for the mortifying of sin and quickening of grace.

Yet directly in the face of such explicit language, teaching the faith of the Church "with great precision," Dr. Atwater says that the Symbols *deny* all intrinsic efficacy to the Sacraments. We are utterly at a loss to comprehend how a gentleman of candor and a Christian scholar can make such an assertion. If the efficacy of the Sacrament of Baptism is not intrinsic, what then is it? Is not efficacy in the very nature of the case intrinsic? Does it not lie in the subject of which it is predicated? If not, if it lies in something else, it is an evident impropriety to speak of *its* efficacy. If the efficacy of Baptism does not lie *in* baptism itself, where can it lie? In faith? But faith as such is not Baptism. In the Holy Ghost? But the working of the Holy Ghost as such is not Baptism. In prayer and instruction? But neither are these Christian duties Baptism. No matter where efficacy lies, if it does not lie in Baptism itself, it is wrong to affirm the efficacy of Baptism, for the ordinance has no efficacy. To affirm or admit the efficacy of Baptism, therefore, and yet mean nothing more than the efficacy of something which is not Baptism, is a direct contradiction of terms—a contradiction in which Dr. Atwater involves the Symbols, when he asserts that they deny all intrinsic efficacy to the Sacraments. With all the care they take to set forth explicitly, and define, the efficacy of this ordinance, they must be understood as referring to the efficacy of something else, of something which is not Baptism, and as teaching that Baptism itself has no efficacy at all!

But, with all due respect for his sincerity and intelligence, we must add that the author involves himself also in a logical contradiction. The whole discussion proceeds on the assumption of efficacy in Baptism, and aims at determining what its precise import, or that efficacy, is. Hence he argues against several theories, because they divest the Sacrament of all positive force. Hence, also, he quotes the Symbols as authority in the decision of the question, because they teach "with great precision," nay more, in so many words, that the grace promised is really conferred by the Holy Ghost in the right use of Baptism. But when he comes to define precisely what the efficacy taught by the Symbols is, he says: "These articles deny all intrinsic efficacy to the Sacraments." The "nature and effects" or "the precise import or efficacy" of Baptism, consists in this, that Baptism itself possesses no efficacy at all! Sacramental signs and seals of themselves convey nothing. (p. 24.)

Yet, paradoxical as it may be, what is to be taken as the final conclusion or result of the discussion, is inconsistent with his denial of intrinsic efficacy. He says: Those incapable of a credible "profession, may be visibly members of the Church, by virtue of God's revealed covenant or promise to be their God. This is precisely the case with infants and the ground of their baptism. But in either case, membership in the visible Church is founded on a *presumptive* membership in the invisible, until its subjects, by acts incompatible therewith, prove the contrary, and thus, to the eye of man, forfeit their standing among God's people." *Membership in the visible Church is founded on a presumptive membership in the invisible.* The rest of the article is devoted mainly to an argument in support of this proposition. Under one view, Dr. Atwater's position involves a great and profound truth. The outward is grounded in the inward, the visible in the invisible, the natural in the spiritual. The admission of an adult or infant into the Church implies real union with Christ, as the basis of all external relations.

But the precise import and bearing of the author's position depends upon the way or means by which, in his judgment, the membership of an infant in the invisible Church is constituted. The same questions meet us again. Does an infant become a member presumptively of the invisible Church, in virtue of *Baptism?* Or does it become such in virtue of *being born* of believing parents? According to the answer given to these questions, does his position acquire peculiar significance.

Membership in the invisible Church is vital union to Christ, or regeneration by the Holy Ghost. The word *presume* means to admit a thing to be, or to receive a thing as true, before it can be known as such from its phenomena or manifestations. To presume an infant to be a member of the invisible Church, is therefore to believe it to be ingrafted into Christ and regenerated, before it gives any ordinary evidences of the fact. If, now, the author means that the presumptive membership of an infant in the invisible Church is constituted by *Baptism*, his position harmonizes with the teachings of the Presbyterian Symbols. And that he wishes to be understood thus would be inferable from another carefully worded remark: "The administration of the seal is founded on the *presumption* that the things sealed will also be bestowed and accepted, till the contrary is shown. On no other ground can infant baptism have significance or propriety." (p. 24). In the previous statement, however, the *presumption* pertains to what precedes or attends, and, in this, to what follows, membership by Baptism in the visible Church. But we will not dwell on the inconsistency. He holds, therefore, that in the right use of Baptism an infant is ingrafted into Christ and regenerated by the Holy Spirit. Interpreted philologically,* and with logical propriety, it can mean nothing less than this. His language teaches the doctrine of baptismal regeneration with all needful plainness. But in doing so, he directly contradicts his assertion that the Symbols deny all intrinsic efficacy to the Sacraments, and that sacramental signs and seals of themselves convey nothing.

If, on the other hand, Dr. Atwater means that the presumptive membership of an infant in the invisible Church, or its vital union to Jesus Christ is effected, by *natural birth*, his position is entirely different. 1. He contradicts the Standards of the Presbyterian Church ; for, as we have already shown, Baptism is ordained, according to the Confession, *for the solemn admission* of the party baptized *into the visible Church.* 2. He teaches a very novel doctrine. "Our standards assert," he says, "that the children of believers are members of the visible Church—not *quasi*, but absolutely." But "membership in the visible Church is founded on a *presumptive* membership in the invisible." And presumptive membership in the invisible Church, is the belief of vital union to Jesus Christ by the Holy Ghost. On this principle of interpretation, it follows, then, that children of believers are ingrafted into Christ, or regenerated, by the Holy Ghost, in virtue of natural birth. A new doctrine for a *Presbyterian!* Natural generation is the channel of grace, and not the ordinances of the Church.

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* We have read the author's exposition of the word *presumptive* given in the *Presbyterian.* Whilst his effort to explain away the legitimate meaning of the word in order to disclaim the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, does not in the least break the force or affect the import of the language used, it shows very plainly, however, that he does not believe, and did not intend to teach, what his language clearly conveys.

3. He gives no answer to the question proposed for discussion. The nature and effects, or the precise import and efficacy, of Baptism, consists in this, that children of believers are presumptively members of the invisible Church in virtue of natural birth! We do not suppose that Dr. Atwater himself would say that such a conclusion has any connection with the premises.

Yet there is no escape from these consequences. The position of the author must be interpreted, if interpreted with any consistency at all, on one principle or the other. The alternative can not be avoided by asserting that the presumptive membership of infants in the invisible Church, or their vital union to Christ, is constituted by the working of the Holy Ghost. For in either case the only efficient agent is the Holy Ghost, whether the relation be constituted by Baptism or by natural birth.

Nor can the alternative be avoided by replying that the vital union of infants to Christ has no connection with either Baptism or natural birth. Grace flows through neither as its channel; but the children of believers are ingrafted into Christ by the Holy Ghost, operating independently of either birth or Baptism. What, then, has Dr. Atwater's conclusion to do, not only with the theme of the article, but with the whole discussion? Does not the significance of the whole argument hinge on the position of children who are born of believers, or of children who have received the solemn rite of Baptism? These are the main points in the enquiry. But if the proposed solution of the question, has no respect either to the benefits of natural birth or to the efficacy of Baptism, the whole discussion ends literally in nothing. A long and patient argument is conducted with a view to a certain end; but when we reach the end, when we come to what is proposed as a final conclusion, we have a proposition that has no connection at all either with the premises or with the argument. Certainly nothing else can follow, if both principles for interpreting his main conclusion are disallowed.

The inconsistencies and contradictions of Dr. Atwater—we speak respectfully, for we would not regard the author in any other light than as an earnest Christian scholar—arise from a persevering endeavor to perform an impossibility. The Symbols of the Presbyterian Church take high ground, as we have seen, on the subject of Baptism, as high as that of any other Protestant Symbol, that of the Episcopal Church not excepted; whilst Dr. Atwater may be regarded as expressing his own views when he says: "These articles deny all intrinsic efficacy to the Sacraments as such;" and, "Sacramental signs and seals of themselves convey nothing." Under these circumstances, he undertakes to determine the *status* of baptized children; and in doing so seeks to establish a theory which will reconcile the Symbols with the denial of the intrinsic efficacy of Baptism. As this is impossible, he swings from one point to another, and involves himself in self-contradictory positions. Unwilling to hold the plain doctrine concerning Baptism taught by the Symbols, yet unwilling to renounce their teachings entirely, he labors in vain to reach a conclusion which will avoid both alternatives; for there is no real middle ground between the doctrine of Sacramental grace, and the Socinian theory which resolves the Sacrament into an empty, lifeless form.

Thus we come back to the point from which we started out. The high views of Baptism inculcated by the Presbyterian Symbols are rejected by Dr. Atwater himself, as well as by those from whom he seems to differ, and whom he seeks to enlighten. We can see no essential difference between them. Both he and they deny the *intrinsic* efficacy of the ordinance. Sacramental signs and seals in themselves are but an external ceremony. Baptism can not convey or really confer any grace. Assigning to words their proper meaning, we may, therefore, resolve the author's theory into what he attributes to Evangelical Churches in general: "We are sure," he says, "it is no exaggeration, when we say, that in a considerable portion of our Evangelical Churches there is no recognition, no consciousness of any relation being held by baptized children, prior to conscious and professed conversion, other than that of *outsiders* to the Church, in common with the whole world lying in wickedness." (p. 6.) No views concerning the relation of baptized children to the Church, essentially different from these, can be held by those who deny all intrinsic efficacy to the Sacrament of Baptism.

Here we find the true cause of the extensive neglect of infant Baptism, over which the *Princeton Review* so justly laments. The estimate is based on a judicious comparison of the Statistical Tables extending from 1807 to 1856, and sustained by a patient collection of facts from various other sources. According to these Tables, there was a gradual increase of the ratio of infant baptisms to the number of communicant members, from 1807 to 1811; but since that time there has been a gradual decrease, the lowest ratio occurring in 1849. In 1811 there were at the rate of 198 baptisms for every 1000 members ; in 1849 not more than 49. "In 1811 there were only 23,639 communicants, and yet there were 4,677 baptisms. And yet, in 1856, with *ten times* as many members, we have only *twice* as many baptisms of children." (p. 84.) After making due allowance for the operation of special causes, and adopting the principle that there should be at least one baptism for every ten communicants, the author of the Article, comes to the conclusion, that "if there are in the Church more children than one for every ten members, it follows, that *more than half* * of the offspring of the Church are deprived of this ordinance." (p. 86.) The announcement of this estimate, as was to be expected, startled the whole Church, and called forth a number of communications on the subject in the weekly periodicals, nearly all of which, however, take the ground that there must be some error in the calculation, although no one has been able to discover it. One objection was thought to be unanswerable. According to the *Census* the increase of population by birth, per year, is less than one to ten; how then could there be *one* child in the Church for every *ten* communicants, not to speak of *one* for every *six?* But it must be remembered that the Census pertains only to the *nett* increase of population; whilst, in estimating the probable neglect of Baptism, the Church must take into account *all* the children of believing parents, one-fourth (or one-third) of whom, on an average, die during the period of infancy and childhood. Hence the Census Tables can furnish no basis of judgment as to the true ratio of baptisms. The Statistical Tables of the Presbyterian Church must furnish that basis; and according to these we can see no reason, painful as the fact may be, to doubt the correctness of the estimate.

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* "We must conclude that whilst there were but 205,041 children reported as baptized, during the last twenty years, the reports should have amounted to 618,339, leaving not less than 413,298 unbaptized. Thus have more than two-thirds of the children of the Church been 'cut off' from the people of God by their parents' sinful neglect, and by the Church's silent acquiescence therein! Is this indeed true? Is the one-half of it true? Then, indeed, is there not '*great sin*' resting on the Church."—*Princeton Review, Jan.* 1857, *p.* 86.

Various causes are assigned for such great neglect of infant Baptism, namely, the extraordinary efforts of the various anti-pedobaptist bodies to disseminate their views within the past thirty-five years—the neglect of pastors to give full and proper instructions to their people—the improper administration of the ordinance—the Church's failure to recognize baptized children as members after Baptism—neglect of family worship—the time and circumstances attending the administration of baptism, being such often as wholly to destroy the moral effect of the ordinance itself—and the influence of the "new measure" system. No doubt each cause assigned has had its influence. But all of them derive their force from a cause that lies far deeper. The Presbyterian Church has been drifting away from its Standards. The actual faith in regard to Baptism contradicts the faith which she professes. Hence the great practical defection. As Baptism is held to be but an outward ceremony, as *it* can convey no grace, both ministers and people must become comparatively indifferent to it, and then neglect it.

Here, we repeat, is the true cause. The *practice* of the

Presbyterian Church is founded on its original *faith*. The one is the legitimate consequence of the other. If, therefore, it renounce its *faith*, it must also, in the course of time, just as it has done, forsake its *practice*. If the doctrine of baptismal grace, so plainly taught in its Standards, be given up, infant Baptism will be given up too; for, reduced to an empty, inefficacious ceremony, the people will have no sufficient motive to perpetuate its observance. The effect is natural and necessary. And so long as the immense contradiction of its *actual* to its *professed* faith, in which the Presbyterian Church is at present involved, continues, the cause of the sinful neglect of infants must continue to operate also, and the effect will as naturally follow, despite all the efforts to the contrary. To restore its practice, the Church must return to its original faith. If the Church renounce her lifeless formalism; if she revive true spiritual views of the Sacraments, neither faithful ministers nor believing parents will any longer feel indifferent to the holy ordinance.

We are aware that our Presbyterian Brethren, for whom we cherish no other sentiment but that of affection and regard, pique themselves on their spiritual religion, and lament over and sometimes seem to pity, the spread of formalism, as they call it, in the German Reformed Church. But with what propriety? They observe a form as a form; they value and adhere to a mere outward ceremony, a ceremony which they believe possesses neither life nor power; and call this *spiritual* religion. Others observe a form, not as a lifeless form, but because it is a spiritual reality; they value a ceremony because there is in real union with it, a divine life and power; and our Brethren call this *formal* religion. Those, then, who believe in the form without the spirit; who observe a religious rite but deny its living power and efficacy, are spiritual Christians: but those who believe in the form with the spirit; who observe a religious rite, ordained by the great Head of the Church, as an effectual means of supernatural grace, are formalists! Novel logic! Do our Brethren reason thus on other points? Is a man a formalist who prays without ceasing, because he believes in the *efficacy* of prayer as a means of grace? Is a minister a formalist who preaches the Gospel in season and out of season, because he believes it to be the power of God, and the wisdom of God unto salvation? How, then, can he be a formalist who values and observes the holy Sacrament of Baptism, because it is a sign and seal of ingrafting into Christ? No; such reasoning, if it deserve the name, is simply ridiculous, our opponents themselves being the judges. Truth requires the judgment to be reversed. To have the form and deny the spirit, is lifeless formalism. To adhere to and practice a religious rite, which has neither life nor power, is dead ritualism. To administer infant Baptism as a mere outward ceremony, to maintain it and contend for it, as having in itself no efficacy, and coveying no grace, is to convert a spiritual institution into an unmeaning and delusive show.

Such a lifeless ceremony, such an unmeaning show, can not long command the approbation, the confidence and regard of pious, intelligent and reflecting men, whether ministers or laymen. Nor can any efforts to define the status of baptized children, to determine the positive spiritual good derived to an unconscious child from an inefficacious outward rite, either prove satisfactory to an earnest, enquiring mind, or avoid a process of reasoning that is self-contradictory and therefore self-destructive. Baptismal grace and infant Baptism go together; but infant Baptism and the denial of baptismal grace, cannot be conjoined logically in theory, nor perpetuated in practice.

E. V. G.

Art. II.—CONSERVATISM OF COLLEGES.*

It pleases me that it has fallen my task to address you, in a salutatory manner, at the opening of the Autumn session. The season in which it sets in is more delectable, it seems to me, than was even that of the Spring. Buds and blossoms and flowers are all good enough things in their time, and we enjoyed them while they lasted; but, after all, they were not wholly satisfying in their nature, and right glad am I, that we have reached at length the full fruition of the year; that the time of mellow apples, and juicy pears and delicious peaches has come, and that very soon, nay even now in some places, can be had, for the reaching, the purple clusters of the grapes. Over the landscape too, it charms me to feel, is now stealing softly a shade of sadness, an incipient mellowing, brought on by the cooler evenings, presaging to us, we are aware, the approach of frost and "the sear and yellow leaf," which, however, wakes in us no fears, but rather, falling in with our feelings, disposes us to repose or contentment or to quiet, pensive musings on the past. Our college buildings, after the same manner, it gratifies me to see, are no longer mere forms of hope and promise, but actual structures, finished, consecrated and taken possession of. Nay from them already, methinks, at any rate under the sober light of the season, is beginning to show forth a sort of ancient semblance. The main edifice, the college proper, with its antique towers, is fast putting on a venerable, weather-stained aspect, especially beneath the window sills, and the Society Halls, with their stained glass and Gothic work and Grecian figures painted inside, stand invested, though in their first bloom, with old and classic associations. Moreover, antecedent to the erection of these buildings our Institutions possess a history. Lying back in time before the consummation of the great consolidation, they have an age which they are fond to claim as their own. In their remote halls now deserted, amid the mountains of Mercersburg, were brought out that profound learning and philosophy which it makes us proud to think we are still bearing with us. This anterior time, we fancy, will be regarded ever, if not as the golden or fabulous, at any rate as the heroic period of our Institutions' history. Already indeed, by the old alumni who, at our Commencement festivals, favor us with their presence and sometimes charm us with their speeches, are remembered "with advantages" the enjoyments of those almost Arcadian times and the feats that were there performed; whose stories, of course, to successive classes, will be handed down with still greater embellishments, so that, in ages long hereafter, the admiring freshman or sophomore, drinking them in under the most marvelous enlargements they will then have come to assume, will be filled with amazement and say, as we read concerning the times before the Flood: "There were GIANTS in the earth in those days!"

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* Delivered before the students of Franklin and Marshall College at the opening of the Fall Term, September 17th, 1857.

Leaving, however, our own particular Institutions, we think, as a general thing, it belongs to colleges to make persons connected with them *conservative* in their modes of thinking. In the minds of those who come under their care or influence, they have the power of awakening up a warm regard for the past, a keen relish for the classical and the antique, an admiring respect for the ancient and the venerable.

In Europe, Institutions of learning and science, it is true, in the way of arousing up such feelings, have over those of our own country a decided advantage, on account of their far greater antiquity. Many of them were founded in the most ancient times. Some of them date back almost coequal with civilization itself. Around their buildings has gathered, in the course of years, a venerable grandeur.

Their antique towers, their vaulted domes, their sounding halls, their libraries replete with learned tomes, are redolent of the oldest associations; and their grounds overgrown with venerable trees, and walks once trodden by youthful feet of men afterwards renowned, have all become hallowed through years, and are pervaded throughout by a charming atmosphere not only classical but also romantic.

In our own country, of course, around our Institutions, being comparatively modern, are clustered fewer old associations. Still in these they are not wholly wanting. With those colleges founded in the first ages of her history are connected stories, less romantic, it may be, but certainly older than is even that of Rip Van Winkle or the renowned legend of Sleepy Hollow. During the Colonial times, corroborative of the worth and sound learning of the men educated in log colleges, then almost the only kind, many are the marvelous tales that are told; and during the Revolutionary war, when halls of learning more substantial and commodious had been erected, of the noble youths who went forth from them to do their country's service, valorous and mighty are the deeds recorded. Throwing aside their Virgils and their Homers and girding on their swords or seizing their rifles, from their quiet retreats they sallied forth and on the battle-field performed exploits in courage and daring equal almost to those of the renowned, classic heroes of whom they had been reading. With the academical buildings themselves of those times, independent of their students, is connected also often an interest on account of some memorable incidents having fallen out in their immediate neighborhoods. Who, for instance, has never heard of that renowned feat at Princeton performed by the valorous cannon ball, discharged we know not whether from a British or American twelve pounder, which, as if possessed with prophetic impulse or patriotic wrath, after having penetrated through the stone wall into the chapel of Nassau Hall, with its force still unexpended, from his bust there standing struck off the head of George the Third? And never afterwards was that head replaced, we are told, but, in its stead, when the war was over and our government established, as if being more deserving of future homage and respect, was set up the victorious head of General George Washington.

Still we are constrained to admit, that this power possessed by our colleges of awakening up a love for the past, has not been acquired from our own country. It was brought over from abroad. By the founders of our first colleges and by their teachers, who came, of course, from Europe, from their Almae Matres there, this sacred love for the ancient was brought along and placed by them, like a Vestal fire, in their new Institutions, where it has never since been suffered to go out, but rather made to multiply itself from having been communicated to all similar Institutions afterwards founded throughout our land; in most of which, notwithstanding their great number and variety, fed with its proper aliment, it is still kept burning. In the breasts of their students was this pious love first kindled and afterwards nourished by the learned lectures of the able professors from abroad, breathing of the ancient spirit, and then by the course of instruction pursued, which, with little variation, had also been imported, and, most of all, by the classic authors retained in this course, and still used to be read and studied in our colleges, most of which, we all very well know, sprang not at first from modern Europe, but preserved in libraries, monasteries and universities for ages with pious care, have come down to us even from the palmiest days of ancient Greece and Rome. From Europe too were brought over along, at the same time, it becomes me to mention by the way, many old forms and observances, which, notwithstanding our plainer republican manners, are, most of them, still religiously held on to, or if some of them have been sacrificed to the spirit of progression, it has been always done with great sorrow and reluctance. That fashion, once universally observed in our colleges by both students and professors, of wearing, on all public occasions, their long black gowns, is still stoutly maintained and preserved, we are pleased to know, at some of the oldest of them. At a few, indeed, the most conservative, on their Commencement festivals, the president while conferring the degrees, of course in classic Latin, always wears, as of old, not only his red velvet gown and band, but besides donned for the nonce, to give still greater importance to this crowning act of the day, his venerable, three-cornered cocked hat, which, throwing around his academical and clerical brows an almost officer-like sublimity, has always struck me as being most wonderfully grand and imposing.

While speaking, however, of the ancient charm which, notwithstanding their newness, is resting upon our colleges, and of their faculty still retained of cherishing a warm regard for what is past, we would by no means be thought to state that this power of theirs is ever exerted to the disparagement of what is new ; or that upon their scholars' minds their ancient learning is ever inculcated to the neglect of those arts and sciences which in after life can be turned to more practical account. While in them the liberal studies are thoroughly attended to, we are all aware, that the exact and scientific are very far from being neglected. In mechanics and the sciences, with their advancement in the world, the instruction imparted in our colleges always keeps ample pace, and indeed sometimes, from the previous scientific research of those who give it, goes often before in its disclosures and leads the way. Our Institutions of learning are not only conservative but also progressive. As is the case with all well constituted governments, so within themselves do they contain two equal but almost opposite forces ; each of which, acting by itself, might prove destructive ; but when combined, as they are in our colleges, they form together a resultant force ; which, in the new direction it imparts, is perfectly safe, and as happy even as is that which urges on the motion of a planet and keeps it in its proper course and sphere.

Of still keeping up, however, in our colleges this equality of forces, I am well aware, that by some persons now-a-days is denied the necessity and indeed called into question sometimes even the propriety. Living in an age that is eminently progressive and in a country which, notwithstanding its newness, by the grand achievements of its arts and sciences, has gone ahead of even the oldest nations, to make advancement still farther and faster in the same direction, ought we not, they inquire, to make it our chief aim and throw forth all our energies? With the spirit of our age should not our Institutions of learning breathe in full unison and with the genius of our country should not their course of instruction be made fully to correspond? Casting aside then the ancient classics and mythologies as the "worn out fancies of an elder world," should not our students be required to prosecute only those useful studies which in their after lives they can turn to the best practical account?

To such inquiries, thus confidently put, we are pleased to know that, by our wisest citizens and by such as we think understand best the genius and wants of our country, it has not been replied in the expected affirmative. While with our conquests in the practical arts and sciences already achieved they are highly gratified, and while, that in these our future doings will be as great, if not even more glorious, they feel confident, yet, to incite us to further efforts in this same direction, that we should neglect the other departments of learning they deem it by no means necessary. Of the two great branches of the arts, the useful and the polite, at the expense of the one to foster the other, in the course of years, they are inclined to think, would produce in any nation a one-sided, unnatural development. The same opinion with the old Athenians do they still maintain that to education it belongs to bring out and forward, in their full and equal proportions, all the faculties and feelings of our nature, and that no people by cherishing some of these to the neglect of others, can ever become permanently great and happy.

Did the classical studies pursued in our colleges call up in their students nothing more than a warm regard for ancient things and a disposition to hold on to long established usages, they would be doing for our country a highly important service. To the want of time-honored institutions and old castles and abbies and ruins in our land is perhaps partly to be attributed the well known fact that now-a-days many of our youths, having never come under the humanizing and moralizing influences of these, are too much disposed to be carried away wholly by every thing that is new or exciting. Their feelings are not sufficiently restrained by a proper respect for settled institutions. They hold in too low estimation the wisdom and experience of the past. Where no regard for ancient things is entertained, of course, no reverence is felt for what is pious and holy. Parents and persons in authority are less honored and religious duties less observed. Controlled by the prevailing spirit around them of Young Americanism, as it is called, under which they have fully come, when arrived at manhood, whether in public or private life, they dash forward often heedlessly and recklessly without any conscientious scruples, into daring schemes and speculations after wealth and honor, which, in the end, generally prove disastrous to themselves and involve others. Indeed so aspiring often grows this spirit, long indulged, that, at length, in its powers and soarings, it can not, by any "pent up Utica," be confined, or even by the whole territory of the United States, where in fact it might sometimes be too much constrained by existing law and order, but driving those possessed by it beyond the limits of these, it wafts them onward, to gratify their reachings after wealth and fame, into wild fillibustering expeditions abroad. Happy will it be then for our country if our colleges, at any rate, are in anywise calculated to modify or restrain this spirit; if the young men under their care and instruction, who, in after life, from the important positions they may attain to in government and society, will be likely to exert a powerful influence over the morals and feelings of the communities in which they will move, from the sound principles in which they have been indoctrinated, and especially from their veneration for established things, into which, by their liberal studies pursued at these colleges, they will have been humanized and charmed, will be disposed and able in any manner to withstand and correct the outbreakings of this spirit and turn them in a proper direction!

Besides calling up, however, for past or established things this useful veneration, the classical studies perform for us, at the same time, another essential service. Sometimes persons, we know, possess a passionate fondness for ancient things, while they are deficient in a corresponding taste to distinguish. They love them merely on account of their oldness or rarity. Antiquarians or virtuosoes are they but not connoisseurs. Of what is old, between the base and the valuable, the worthless and the worthy, they have no power to discriminate. To guard against this perversion these studies are abundantly qualified; for they bring also, at the same time, into full and active exercise the taste and the imaginative faculties. The analysing of words and sentences and selecting of suitable terms and modes of expression by which to render them into another language, quickens the natural tact, and wakens up a nice sense of propriety, a keen power of discrimination. By coming into communion, too, with the literature of a people who were so pervaded throughout by a delicate sense of the beautiful in art and nature, that they could not help showing it outwardly in all their works and creations, and who used a language in its construction so flexible and, in the many forms of which it was susceptible of being thrown into, so graceful and polished as to be capable of containing and setting forth, through the finest expression, every varied style of prose and verse, how can it ever be that, of the student who has thus been brought to fully appreciate its worth and feel its spirit, the imagination will not become improved and strengthened and the taste more cultivated and refined? If overcome by Grecian letters even the conquering Romans were subdued and chastened in their manners and induced to cultivate and cherish the liberal studies which they prosecuted afterwards so thoroughly, that at length they became distinguished for poets, orators and philosophers, certainly there is no nation now existing so wholly practical or utilitarian in its feelings and pursuits as to be utterly incapable of being touched by this same literature, and drawn by its influence into a warmer love for the humanities and the fine arts.

And let no one suppose that these studies and arts are less deserving, than those which are purely scientific or mechanical, of his care or pursuit, because they relate wholly to the beautiful and can not be turned to any practical account ; because they seek merely to give satisfaction and pleasure to the imagination, the taste and the feelings, and do not, like the mechanical arts, exert themselves on material things for the attainment of what is deemed some more important ultimate object ; because they save no labor and make no money, and do nothing whatever towards the driving onward of the shining car of Improvement ; because they throw forth no inventions to be secured by patent right, and are wholly useless towards the overcoming of time and distance by subjugating to their control the natural forces and applying them to the rapid conveyance of travelers and merchandize, and, in that greatest of all modern achievements, to the transmitting to the remotest places, even through the ocean,—for the failure of the Atlantic telegraph is not conclusive—quicker than a flash, unseen intelligence ; all of which things have been brought about by modern Science alone, we are free to admit, and the liberal arts can boast no share in their accomplishment. While, however, feeling justly proud of these great results, most of which have been brought out by our own intelligent and enterprising countrymen, and glad on account of the benefits thus being conferred on mankind, and while anticipating still greater conquests in the same direction, let us not, however, in our admiration of Science and the useful arts be carried beyond all bounds, so as to be led to pronounce them all-efficient. Of course, in their operations, they are confined to their own appropriate domains; and in the human breast are feelings and aspirations which, with all their blessings, they can never be made to reach or satisfy.

Though by their discoveries and inventions and improvements has much pain been alleviated, and labor saved and sorrow soothed, and many indeed are the conveniencies and comforts which have been thrown by them around our social and domestic life, and though to contrive their workmanship and bring out their results, the highest powers of intellect are required, still, in their benefits, it must be conceded, they reach generally but little further than to the supplying or satisfying of our sensual wants. Some of the nobler faculties and feelings of nature that they may be made also in some measure to subserve, we are willing to admit, but to bring them into this more important service, altogether necessary is it that these same faculties and feelings have, in the first place, themselves been properly cultivated and refined in the community and their worth known and justly appreciated. This preparation too, of course, must necessarily have been effected by other agencies. By no means are we of the opinion of those who imagine that by Science and the useful arts alone all physical and moral evil can be overcome and the millenium finally brought about; that by the laws of mechanics and physics being thoroughly investigated and understood and their forces brought to bear, and by the true system of government being reached and practically adopted, society can be disenthralled from all sin and sorrow and restored to its primal, normal condition, or brought into the full enjoyment of a modern Utopia or Elysium. Of a State's being advanced to the highest condition of improvement within the powers of Science and these arts to bestow, and yet being nothing bettered in its morals, but rather made a great deal worse, we can easily conceive. Even in our own country, with all our boasted improvements in farming and manufactures, and in our facilities for travelling and transportation, have we in a corresponding, or indeed any manner, been advanced likewise as citizens, in our propriety of spirit and conduct? Are we now-a-days in any thing the more just, and honest, and honorable, than we used to be in those good old times, slow, but sure, still fondly remembered by some of us, ere by locomotives had been usurped the place of horses, and by rail-road cars and telegraphic wires were performed the labors of stage-coaches and Pitt and Conestoga wagons? Is there less corruption now in our legislative halls and courts of justice? Is public credit as good? Of frauds and embezzlements, of burglaries and arsons, of robberies and murders are now our ears less frequently pained with the reports than they used to be? Do infidelity and wordliness and superstition appear now to be less in the ascendant than they were in those simple times?

To constitute a nation truly great and happy the virtues must be cultivated. Not only must be brought out its physical forces and resources, but also its moral wealth. With respect also to ourselves, as individuals, to insure the promotion of our own usefulness and happiness in the world, not sufficient is it in any wise, that merely our intellectual faculties be cultivated. Of our whole being that the fair proportions may be preserved, equal, if not greater, attention must be paid also to the furthering of the full expansion of the moral and spiritual side of our nature.

To explain the principles of morality and the attributes of our spiritual nature belongs properly, I need not tell you, to the province of the chair of Psychology and Ethics, and to call them into wholesome exercise, to that of the sacred desk of the chapel. Taste, and the imagination, and perhaps even, to some extent, the feelings, form not themselves, we know, inseparable component parts of morals and religion, but along side of these they are naturally set and with them they are associated and connected as intimately as is the vine with the elm, ever loving to be throwing around them their clusters and foliage. To the fairer portion of our being they properly belong, and from the virtues they can not well be torn asunder at any time without violence and serious injury being done to them both. The cherishing of these, and the promoting of their full growth and vigor, is brought about especially, we fancy, by the study of the Humanities.

Over the affections even Science at times may exert a humanizing influence, and while analysing the blossoms or searching into earth's mysteries or surveying and measuring with her instruments the heavens, she may dispose the Imagination to spread her wings and she may send her into fiery kingdoms, which the ken of her own microscope can not detect; or into aerial regions which the reach of her own telescope can not take in. Still, to do this, falls not properly within her sphere. It is by the studies of the Humanities or polite literature, as we have just remarked, that the feelings and the imaginative faculties are the best cherished, and the taste the most cultivated and refined. This department, we know, is not confined to its ancient authors. It takes in also the moderns; but the former it becomes us to study in the first place for the sake of order. Independent of that excellent mental training, they make us go through with to master them, and their own intrinsic beauties to lure us on, we should study them, at any rate, first, on account of the place they hold. For our further improvement and entertainment, of our attention our best modern poets and writers may claim their full and appropriate share afterwards. Fully to understand these and appreciate their beauties, if on account of nothing more than their frequent and fine classical allusions, of the ancients a previous knowledge is absolutely necessary. We must begin always at the fountain heads. This, reason teaches us; and, in the present case, we can follow the plan with pleasure, for sweeter by far than the waters of "the Tiber, the Thames or the Mississippi," when we have reached Helicon, do we find those which gush from Hippocrene and more refreshing to the muses. So necessary, indeed, is order in reading or study, that even in Grecian letters themselves to enjoy in full the later ancient tragedies and lyrics of Athens, very familiar must we have made ourselves, in the first place, with those earliest poems, considered almost sacred by the ancients and still revered by us, the two charming epics of the blind bard of Chios. "If," says Gladstone, "the words of Homer are to letters and to human learning what the early books of Scripture are to the entire Bible and the spiritual life of man—if in them lie the beginnings of the intellectual life of the world—then we must still recollect that that life, to be rightly understood, should be studied in its beginnings, where we may see, in simple forms, what afterwards grew complex, and in clear light what afterwards became obscure, and where we may obtain starting points from which to measure progress and decay along all the lines upon which our nature moves."

Thus, my young friends, in a rambling way, have I reached at length the application of my subject, which, after all, amounts to little more than a recommendation of the practice pursued by Pamphilus, as mentioned in the Andria of Terence:

> Horum ille nihil egregie praeter caetera
> Studebat; et tamen omnia haec.

Like him, prosecute none of your studies extravagantly to the neglect of others. Cultivate your hearts as well as your heads. While at your hands are receiving their merited attention the sciences, philosophy and history, at the same time, their appropriate share also be pleased to afford to the Humanities. Especially be not induced by any shallow sophistry to set aside or slight, as if at the present advanced stage of civilization and progress their prosecution were no longer required, the studies of the Grecian classics; but rather, as an antidote to the too utilitarian tendencies of the times, bestow on these your especial love. From their clear perennial fountains take deep draughts so that the fairer portions of your humanity may be refreshed and your hearts strengthened. We know that the Liberal arts may be perverted in their use; that painting, music and poetry may be cultivated by their votaries merely for their own enjoyment, and in that case, these will be rendered by their pursuit only the more sensuous—refinedly sensuous. By some sterner virtues must they always be supported. Like the vine, unless flinging their branches around the elm, they will fall to the earth and become groveling.

"Seek ye first" then, of course, "the kingdom of God and his righteousness." Drink ye deep also of Siloa's brook. Cultivate above all things the Christian virtues; yet, at the same time, by close application to your classical studies, cultivate also your taste and finer faculties with which to adorn those virtues. Then, when you go forth into the world, you will be well fitted for performing your duties as citizens, whether in public or private life, and for promoting, in the best manner possible, the interests of society, having always access to those sources of consolation and happiness, which not having been wrought out merely by intellectual appliances, but being connected most intimately with your spiritual natures, will not be so much liable to disaster or limited to time, but, being more than perennial, will outlast with you even the "wreck of matter and the crush of worlds."

W. M. N.

ART. III.—REFORMED DOGMATICS.

[CONCLUDED.]

The Period of Separation into different Schools in the Reformed Church.

THE different points of view, and modes of treatment growing out of the three principal elements in the Reformed Church, and discoverable, as we have seen, in its Dogmatics from the first, led to a sort of spiritual fermentation, from which the original tendencies came forth purified as particular schools. The non-predestination could not be kept quiet by the side of the predestination school. The first sought to enlarge its borders and this met with opposition in Holland. The expulsion of the non-predestinarians, as the immediate result of the controversy, may be regarded as unfortunate, but it must be admitted, if carefully considered, that Arminianism was a poor champion in opposition to absolute predestinationism. To say nothing of the political elements mixed up with it, it was deficient in a sound anthropological view of the Gospel, and fluctuated between a false supernaturalism and a moderate rationalism. It rejected predestinationism; but it also denied doctrines which were unquestionably true; and the God of Arminianism, to say the least, was as much a being of caprice and accident as the God of strict Calvinism.

The Arminian theory originated with Simon Episcopius, professor at Leyden, who was born at Amsterdam in 1583. He managed the cause of the Arminians at Dort in 1618, and drew up their Confession in 1621. He was afterwards Professor of Theology at Amsterdam, and there wrote his *Institutiones Theologicae*, which was published after his death in an unfinished state. In the writings of Episcopius, we still have a sound anthropological element, and so also in the *Theses theolog. et histor. of Gor. John Vossii.* On the other hand, the latent rationalism of Arminianism appears in the apologetic work of *Hugo Grotius, de Veritate religionis christianae*, and in his Dogmatic disputations. Finally, an abstract supernaturalism, closely allied to Socinianism is very prominent in the *Theologia Christiana* of the otherwise vigorous and scholastically acute Phil. von Limborch.

In the expulsion of Arminianism by the Synod of Dort, the Calvinistic predestinarian interest unquestionably achieved a victory, or at least obtained an ascendancy over the German Reformed and Evangelical Switzer element so far at least, that in Germany and Switzerland, the doctrine of absolute predestination was regarded to be indispensable to Reformed orthodoxy. But this outward show of victory was really a defeat; for that which was really true in Arminianism still survived, and was silently restored with increased vigor in the heart of the Reformed Church. In England and Brandenburg, the decisions of Dort were not acknowledged. In other countries, the doctrine of predestination was received, it is true, and the theologians were required to teach it, and were not permitted to pass it by, but for this very reason, they did it in such a way as to strip it of all force. It was spun over again and so modified and conditioned that it was harmless. But even this was not all. In the first place, in opposition to the Scholastic school, the avowed advocate of orthodoxy, which referred every thing to the *eternal purpose* of God, there also arose, particularly in Holland, the *Federalistic school*, in which great account was made of historical human development, and the pure-Reformed biblical tendency was opposed as a corrective to the systematizing tendency of Reformed Dogmatics. In the second place, in opposition to this Scholastic school, there arose also, the Cartesian school, in which the *philosophical* element came to its right, and a strenuous effort was made to combine theology with natural science. In the third place, *Amyraldism* in France openly opposed absolute predestination; and although the Theologians of Geneva and Zurich had the advantage in the discussion, it proved, after all, as they were unable to maintain their ground, little better than a defeat. Thus the whole development of Reformed Dogmatics resulted in this, that predestinarianism, after its apparent triumph at Dort, gradually declined in inward strength, until at last, during the period of *Wolfianism*, it became extinct.

The Scholastic school derived its principal support from the Holland Universities, (Utrecht, Leyden, Gröningen, &c.) *Alsteds Theologia didactica vel scholastica*, a strict and acute development of particular Dogmas by the application of established categories, was soon imitated by others. *Samuel Maresius*, professor in Sedan and Gröningen, a pupil of Gomar, prominent in the opposition to Arminianism in 1652, wrote his *Foederatum Belgium Orthodoxium, sive confessionis ecclesiarum Belgicarum exegesis*, a scholastic commentary upon the Belgic Confession, in which the whole system of Church Dogmatics is strictly elaborated. But even here, the doctrine of absolute predestination is treated with extreme caution. Fatalism, and every inference prejudicial to the idea of the freedom of the will, and of moral accountability, are entirely excluded, abstruse questions are avoided, and a sound, satisfactory exposition of the Confessio Belgica is given. *Maresius* afterwards, in 1659, brought out his *Systema Theologiae*, in which he takes decided ground against Popery; and, at the same time, regrets the controversy between the Lutherans and the Reformed, convinced as he was of the fundamental unity of the two Confessions. An accomplished scholastic, and a true type of the school, was the strict infralapsarian professor, *Marcus Fred. Wendelin*, of Anhalt. He wrote *Christianae theologiae systema majus*, published in 1556, after his death at Cassel. Wendelin is less profound, but more acute than *Wollebius*. Of still greater consequence than *Wendelin* and his associates, *Makowsky* in Francken, *Gomar* in Saumer, and Gröningen, *Alting* in Heidelberg, and others, was the distinguished *Gisbert Voetius*, professor in Utrecht, †1676. In him the Reformed Scholastics reached their culminating point and greatest perfection, although not in their original form. The investigation on every point was so minute, and with every positive explanation, there were connected so many problems and questions, that the limits of a theological system no longer sufficed, and the form of a *disputatio* was resorted to in its place. In this way every particular dogma, and every particular connected with the dogma (for instance, *de atheismo*, *de jure et justitia Dei*, *de adoratione Christi qua mediatoris*, &c.), was thoroughly discussed, and for the most part, upon the ground of some actual controversy. Thus Gisbert published five thick quarto volumes, under the title of *Gisbert Voetii, theologiae in Acad. Ultrajectina professoris, selectarum disputationum, pars* I. II, etc. They embody a most elaborate system of Reformed Dogmatics and Ethics, and no one should think of writing a Ref. Dogmatic, without carefully studying this finished production. That it should be written in fine flowing style, is not to be expected. The language is the scholastic Latin of the Middle Ages, and such terms as *futuritio*, *futuribilitas*, *privatio privans* and *privatio privata*, are found, not only on every page, but almost in every sentence. Gisbert is besides an ingenious and very decided Aristotelian. His questions frequently run into the essentially abstruse, for instance: Is the world *corruptibilis?* The answer is: Nature was not *essentialiter*, but *accidentaliter*, changed by sin. Again: Whether poisonous plants were created before the fall? The answer is: *Si non actu, saltem causaliter et virtualiter.* Still they are questions to which the system actually conducts. Questions of pure curiosity, such as whether the angels were divided into orders from the first, or whether it was done subsequently to the fall; whether these orders will continue after the day of judgment; whether the higher orders *per species magis universales intelligant*, than the lower, Gisbert himself condemns and silently passes by as *curiosae et vanae disceptationes.* We must take the trouble, however, of searching for *important dogmatic* truths, as we would for diamonds in a dirt heap. The trouble will be richly repaid with such an exhibition of Reformed doctrinal views, as is no where else to be had. The doctrine of predestination especially is so admirably defined by Gisbert, that the whole idea of *determinism*, which Schweitzer holds up as a Reformed doctrine, is here expressly excluded in all its possible forms—if absolute predestination is even in reality taught.

In opposition to this eminent Scholastic, losing himself frequently, it is true, in abstractions, but always again exciting our just admiration by his great industry, and critical acumen and accuracy, at length appeared *John Cocceius*, properly *Koch*, †1669. He was professor at Leyden, and wrote a *Summa doctrinae de foedere et testamento Dei.* The object was, as he says, "*Auditoribus nostris praeire ad explicationem praecipui argumenti theologici de foedere et testamento Dei.* That a Reformed Dogmatic should be brought out and developed fresh from the Scripture, and that it is not for the Church alone, as an ecclesiastical court (as a council) to determine what is Church doctrine, but that the Church system itself should also be examined in a *free theo-*

logico-churchly scientific way, and be brought again and again to the test of Scripture, is purely Reformed. It never was the practice of the Reformed Church to proceed from a dogma to the Bible, but from the Bible to the system, and from the system to the dogma. It necessarily followed that the *healthy condition* and *vigorous strength* of the Reformed Church should react against the external authority of the existing predestinarian scholasticism. But for this very reason, the opposition was not simply *formal*, but *material.* The pure-biblico-*anthropologico-soteriological* mode of considering Christianity as the Gospel, for the solace and pardon of poor sinners came to its right. If the Scholastics regarded the whole history of revelation, and the whole historical development of each particular part, as a bird's eye perspective of the unchangeable decree of God, in which the historical evolution of a large portion lost its significance, and was reduced to a mere test of comparison: Cocceius, on the other hand, took the ground of the anthropological stand-point. With him it was precisely the historical development of Redemption which was important, and it was precisely in the diversity of the institutions of religion, in which God always suited himself to man's capacity for salvation, that he saw disclosed the wisdom and love of God. Cocceius, accordingly, may be considered, 1.) as the father of a pure biblical theology, and 2.) as having brought the anthropologico-historical stand-point in the Reformed Church again to its proper right.

As to his system, he proposed not simply to derive the material of his rubrics from the Scriptures, but the principle and order of their arrangement. He properly and profoundly saw in the very idea of the *foedus Dei* the principal basis of biblical theology. In this idea of the *foedus Dei* there was included, in the first place, not just the anthropological aspect, as perhaps in the idea of *justificatio*, nor merely the theological, as in the *decretum*, but that twofold aspect of the fundamental idea of all religion, which Zuingle already had brought out. In the second place, it included also the idea of religion, not in its subjective, but purely Reformed, its objective aspect. (Comp. the *Eccles. Dei* of Hyperius, which, by the way, is a far less significant, far narrower expression than that of the *foedus Dei*). In the third place, it in like manner included an idea, comprehending, not only the eternal contents of the dogma, but, at the same time, its biblico-historical development. This last was with Cocceius, this most zealous and productive Reformed Dogmatic, the ground of his divisions. He first unfolds the biblical idea of the *foedus Dei*, and shows that it was not a contract, in which there were *wants* on *both* sides, but a compact, in which God throughout is the giver, and man exclusively the receiver. And for this reason it is the fundamental law for man, that he *should* maintain his receptive relation towards God, and not, in a sinful perverse desire for independency, separate himself from God. To this end, man was made, and created a *rational*, *free* and *holy* being. The decalogue is nothing more than an external expression of this internal immanent law of mankind.* And this is now the *original covenant and original relation to God, identical with the nature of man*, and for this reason a *foedus naturale*, consisting on the part of man in *duty*, the *rule* of which is the *law of God*, and on the part of God, in the *promise* that man, in the free fulfilment of his duty, should attain to the *haereditas*, that is to a *status confirmationis*, of holiness and happiness, that would never be lost.† By man's own free will this natural covenant, or covenant of works, was broken by sin, and by this one sided violation of this absolute, legal compact, on the part of the feeble creature, he brought upon himself the *threatened curse*, with all its consequences, (thoroughly anti-predestinarian.) But as the compact was violated only on one side, man is still bound to fulfil *all things required, as well by the law of nature as the law of God*, that is; he is bound to obedience, just as he was before; to submission to punishment for his disobedience, and at the same time, to *faith*, if it should please God to extend to him the hand of reconciliation; for the fundamental law, to maintain himself as *receptive* towards God, remains in all its force. And inasmuch as God never denies his nature, his free-communicating love, so has he, *on his part*, revoked the covenant, *quoad damnationem*, already abolished on the *part of man*, *quoad possibilitatem vivificandi*, by substituting for it another covenant, the *covenant of grace*, resting, however, upon the same fundamental law, that God remains in the relation of freely giving, and man as willingly receiving. This *covenant of grace* rests upon the mission of Jesus Christ. The *revelation and promulgation* of this method of salvation embraces three periods; the *oeconomia ante legem*, in which, we have the law of conscience, and the patriarchal protevangelists; the *oeconomia sub lege*, in which we have the law of Moses, and the ritual as types of Christ, and the prophets, and the *oeconomia post legem*, when Christ himself appears as the perfect *personal* law, and redeemer. The *effects* or *consequences* of the *foedus gratiae* are finally, *a*) the *salvation of the individual*, by which the *foedus naturale* is revoked *quoad efficaciam metus mortis*, *b*) the *change* of *bodily* death from a punishment into a deliverance, by which the *foedus naturale* is abolished, *quoad luctam cum peccato*, and *c*) the *resurrectio*, by which the *foedus naturale* is abolished *quoad effecta omnia*. It is perfectly evident that the whole of this admirable system is un- and anti-predestinarian; God does not appear as predestinating, much less as absolutely determining, and man as absolutely limited; but God as graciously bestowing, and man as willingly receiving; and it is only when he *will* not receive, that he is betrayed into an *unfree*, *constrained* dependence upon God. The *beneplac. Dei appears* in the previous appointment of *Christ* as the Redeemer, and in the *electio* of those in Christ who *will* to accept of salvation.

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* We at once perceive here an anthropological *moral* dependence, not a mechanical deterministic one—a dependence, in which man is *free to choose*, whether he *will* maintain himself in his receptive relation to God, and be free and happy; or whether he will separate himself from God, and *then* feel his dependence as constraint.

† A purely *moral* apprehension of the idea of salvation.

The system of Cocceius, the system of the Foederalists, was perfected by his pupils, Momma, †1677, (*de varia condi-*

tione et statu ecclesiae Dei sub triplici oeconomia patriarcharum ac testamenti veteris denique novi, 1653), FRANZ BURMAN, professor in Utrecht, †1681, (*Synopsis theologiae ac speciatim oeconomiae foederum Dei ab initio seculorum usque ad consummationem eorum*, Utrecht, 1671), JOHN BRAUN, professor in Gröningen, (*Doctrina foederum sive systema theol. did. et clencht.* Amst. 1688), VAN DER WAEIJEN, professor in Francken (*Summa* theol. chr. 1689, Euchin.), and HERMAN WITSIUS, professor in Francken, Utrecht and Leyden, †1708 (*oeconomia foederum Dei cum huminibus*, 1685). As any system may be carried to an extreme, so was it done with this. The pupils, less ingenious than their master, sought their desert in drawing parallels between the *foedus naturale* and the economies of the *foedus gratiae*, and in showing, for instance, that there were two sacraments before the fall and two between the fall and the giving of the law, &c. In this way they were betrayed occasionally into intellectual sport, which, however, is often improperly attributed to them; especially by those who are not thoroughly acquainted with their system in all its magnitude. Burman was unquestionably a man of genial spirit, remarkable for his biblio-theological expositions, upon the basis of which he was accustomed to enter into the scholastic questions of his day, with great scholastic ability and mental acuteness, and satisfactorily solved, indeed, points of controversy, and corrected and completed many dogmatic propositions. Witsius was less intellectual and less acute, but was frequently distinguished by a *hearty* appreciation of his object; for instance, the regeneration of little children, and the relation of the freedom of the will to grace. It was the Foederalists, principally, who wrote the *Commentaries* upon the Catechisms, particularly the Heidelberg. In this, Cocceius himself led the way. Another celebrated work of the same kind originated with *Melchior Leydecker*, the Utrecht professor, who, although not a Foederalist, in the strict sense, was, nevertheless, in spirit, of the same tendency. Besides this, Leydecker was the author of a Dogmatic, in which it was his purpose to carry out and perfect the foederal system, by referring the *oeconomiae foederis gratiae* to the three persons of the Trinity—placing, at its ground, of course, as did Calvin, the Trinity of revelation;—the Father exercising the office of Judge; the Son that of Mediator, and the Holy Ghost that of Comforter:—the Father, in his office, unfolds the righteousness of God, and exercised the office, mainly under the Old Testament dispensation; the Son, as Mediator, exhibits the mercy of God, and exercised the office in the days of his flesh; the Holy Ghost, as Comforter, exhibits the omnipotence of God, and now exercises this office since the day of Pentecost. This grouping, however, is evidently artificial. The division of the three attributes among the three persons will not do, and the confounding of the Old Testament and the *oeconomia legis* with the office of Judge, and the ignoring of the Gospel along side of the law in the Old Testament, is a great mistake, and a retrocession in comparison with the accurate and profound views of the real Foederalists. As it regards the Foederalists, they were not considered heterodox. The Reformed Church did not reject them; they were not just tolerated; but although there was a sort of discussion between them and the Scholastics, the necessity of such a complement was so felt, that it was the practice in the universities of Holland always to place at least one Foederalist along side of the Scholastics.

With this opposition between the Foederalists and Scholastics, in reference to the relation of the Bible to the teachings of the Church, was closely allied the opposition which sprung up at the same time, between the Scholastics and the *Cartesians*, who recognized the relation of revealed to natural truth, and especially of Christian doctrine to the discoveries of natural science. Cartesius, in Holland, brought his mathematics and philosophy both to bear upon theology. Whilst the Scholastics abruptly condemned the newly discovered Copernican system as unchristian, other theologians, (mostly Foederalists, although some were Cartesians) undertook to show that the Copernican system was reconcilable to Christianity, and in this way sought to honor the scientific *elastic* spirit of the Reformed Church.

The opposition, however, had reference not just to this point, but also to the relation of revealed truth, to the possibility of a natural knowledge of divine truths generally. Calvin indeed taught (Instit. 1. 3, 3.),—not in the way Schweitzer holds *a cognitio Dei innata*—that the truth, that there is an invisible God, as well as the moral law, is seated in the human soul, and can be proved to man from *a priori* principles, from the facts of consciousness. At the same time Calvin was careful to state, that this abstract possibility of the knowledge of God *a priori*, never is actualized in unconverted men; unless with the assistance of divine revelation, and its bearers from without. Besides, the perverseness of the will is in the way, so that the possibility of the knowledge of God never is actualized. A *theologia naturalis* along side of, or rather before a *revelata*, was accordingly justified in this sense, that it did not construct a knowledge of God, *a priori*, as one unknown, but simply directed to God, as made known by revelation, and as one also proved to us by the facts of consciousness. In this sense, the Scholastics also admitted a *theol. natur. Mares. orat. inaug. Revelatio supernaturalis praesupponit in homine lumen naturae et usum rationis.* But: *absit a nobis, ut revelationem subjiciamus rationi cum revelationis sit, corrigere et erigere supra sphaeram activitatis suae nativae.* Gisbert Voet. expresses himself in a similar way. He maintains the *innata Dei cogn.* against the Arminians, who hold that the *intellectus hominis* is *instar tabulae rasae.* (Comp. Eb. Dissertation *de cogn. Dei innata*, Erlangen, 1841.) This, however, was first perfected and made use of in the construction of the system, by the Cartesian school. Cartesius commenced his philosophical system in scepticism in a good sense. He first placed the idea of a development of knowledge over against the scholastic exhibition of the finished material furnished to hand. This idea was introduced in theology; and here we saw at once that there was occasion for the question, how and in what way does the theologian obtain his matter, of what is he certain from the first, and what is there that depends upon other propositions. As the

Foederalists rejected the *theological material in its* OBJECTIVE *development* (*in the history of the revelation of God to mankind*), *so had the Cartesians to do with the* SUBJECTIVE *development of theological* knowledge (*how the* INDIVIDUAL *came to the knowledge of Christianity?*) This method also had its right. At the same time, there must be a distinction made between the way in which we become a Christian, and the way in which we become a *theologian*; it must be seen that the immediate synthesis of the *obscurely felt* subjective need of redemption with the *felt* truth of the objective fact of redemption is the *first*, and the knowledge of Christ and his Father, is the *second*, and that the philosophical reconstruction of the aprioristic part of consciousness (self and divine knowledge) can only follow as the *third*, inasmuch as man must first have known God, before he could have known himself. But here it failed. It is true, Burman admirably distinguishes both. But with Latin divines, the *immediate consciousness* of a God is directly identified with the aprioristic *knowledge* of God, and a *theologia naturalis* so understood, as if it was in the power of every natural man, without ever having come into contact with the revelation of God in Christ to construct it for himself, and it is placed as the first part, before the *theologia revelata*, as the second part. In a more decided way, than with Burman, who never makes the division into *theol. nat.* and *revelata the* ground of his division, but, as already remarked, only acknowledges the existence of a *religio nat.*, and on the other hand, shows with great penetration that *theol. systematica* (theology in our sense) can only and exclusively proceed from *theol. habitualis*, the knowledge *in* faith, the immediate inward synthesis of the need of redemption and the fact of redemption, (*Ille ergo Theologus proprie dicitur qui cum in mysterio Evangelii salutariter sapit, donis spiritualibus insuper catenus est instructus, ut possit alios ejusdem mysterii cognitione imbuere, ad gloriam Dei et laudem gratiae Christi*)—Cartesianism was exhibited by *Ab. Heidanus* in his *Corpus theologia*, Leyden 1687, who, at the same time, connected a strict predestinarianism with his system. In opposition to Cartesianism we meet particularly with the Scholastic, *Peter von Mastricht*, professor in Utrecht, †1706, *Theoretico-practica theologia.*) After a full expression of the points in dispute on both sides, a sort of reconciliation was effected by one of the most accomplised Reformed dogmatics, *Sol. Van Til*, professor in Dort and Leyden, †1713, in his *Theologia utriusque compendium tum naturalis, tum revelatae.* Van Til was led to prepare his compendium by a decree of the State's general, that such questions, as could only be solved by an appeal to revelation, should be discussed exclusively by theologians. He accordingly distinguished between, *a*) *articuli puri*, such doctrines as could neither be constructed *a priori*, nor yet be proved from philosophical principles; *b*) *articuli mixti*, such truths as have first received their full light and power from revelation, but were still innate in the mind and could be philosophically made out. The same distinction was made by *Benedict Pictet*, in his *Dissertationes de consensu et dissensu inter reformatos et Augustanae confessionis fratres vindiciae*). *Van Til* teaches admirably and conclusively that there is a *theol. natur.*; its *existence* he maintains against the Socinians; its *convenientia cum veritate revelata* against the Lutherans; but its *insufficientia ad salutem*, he asserts against the Pelagians. Besides this larger compendium, Van Til also published a smaller, entitled: *῾Υποτυπωσις των υγιαινοντων λογων, sive compendium theologiae viri reverendi ac clarissimi*, Sol. Van Til. This smaller compendium is most convenient for ascertaining the Reformed dogmatics, and supplies the want of a *Hutter. redivivus.* It presents indeed very properly the ripe fruit, the pure product of the Holland school, an organic union of Scholasticism, Foederalism and Cartesianism. With Van Til is also to be compared *Campejus Vitringa*, professor in Francken, †1722, *doctrina christ. rel. per aphorismos summatim descripta*, 1690. *J. Mark*, professor in Leyden, †1731, *Compend. theol. christ. didactico-elenchticum.*

If the strength of the doctrine of predestination was indirectly broken by Foederalism, the Amyraldists of the

Reformed Academy at Saumur, by introducing another historico-anthropological method of treatment, ventured directly to assail it. *Cameron*, and particularly his pupil *Amyrant*, (*cf. form Cons. Helo. can.* 6) taught: That God certainly has not, solely for the purpose of revealing his righteousness, predestinated from the mass of natural men, a certain number, no worse than the rest, to be lost, and for this reason, has either altogether withheld from them the gift of the Holy Ghost, or granted it to them, only for a short time ; but that *amore electioni praevio motus*, or *misericordia prima*, he desires sincerely the happiness of all men, upon the condition of their faith. He accordingly has appointed Christ to be the Saviour of all ; and has chosen those whom he foresaw from eternity, that they would believe, *non simpliciter ut peccatores in Adamo primo, sed ut redemptos in Adamo secundo ;* from those, however, whom he foresaw, that, if even the Holy Ghost were given to them, they would not believe, he withheld the gift. In this a *gratia resistibilis* is admitted. It is substantially the true Lutheran view ; only that it is an external, unnecessary and unjust concession to predestinarianism, to say that God withholds the Holy Ghost from those whom he foresaw would not believe, for the purpose of preserving the *appearance* of a predestination.

There was also a captious sort of disputation by *La Place*, upon the question, whether Adam forfeited salvation for the race, as the Scholastics profoundly maintained, or only for himself, and that mankind was deprived of salvation, by original sin, as *La Place* less learnedly held, inasmuch as original sin is a consequence of Adam's fall. In opposition to the Amyraldists, the Scholastic school of Switzerland rose up, and all intercourse with Saumur was broken off by Geneva and Zurich. Amongst the opponents of Saumur, *Joh. Henry Heidegger*, of Zurich, was particularly conspicuous, who not only revived the old predestination system in all its strictness, in his *Medulla Theologiae* (Zurich, 1696,) his *Medulla medullae*, 1697, and his *Corpus theologiae*, 1700, but was very active also in the compilation of a new symbolical book, the renowned *Consensus Helveticus.* Here Amyrant's propositions were rejected, and in opposition to *La Place,* it was maintained, in entire misapprehension of the Scholastic view, that the natural man is condemned with Adam, not just *on account* of original sin, but altogether *aside* from it. Finally, in opposition to Capellus, the inspirations of the masoretic points in the Hebrew text were declared to be matter of fact. But the brilliant victory was soon changed into a rather ignoble defeat. By means of the public authorities, an unsuccessful attempt was made to introduce the *Cons. Helv.*, as of symbolical validity in several of the Cantons. In Neufchatel and Vaud it utterly failed, and in Zurich, Bern, Schaffhausen, Basel and Geneva, it succeeded only for a short time. In 1686, the Reformed Church of Brandenburg protested against it; Basel and Geneva worked it out of the way, and it was not very long before it was nowhere acknowledged.

The eighteenth century brought out the *Reformed dogmatics purified from predestination.* There no longer existed different schools, but the several schools of the seventeenth century were fused into one. The sound kernel of scholastic terminology was retained; the ground idea of Foederalism was in the ascendant; and the proper free position of philosophy was acknowledged. Thus the Reformed dogmatics acknowledged the influence of *Leibnitz,* the greatest of Christian philosophers. Leibnitz had brought out the idea of the concrete personality, and had placed it at the ground of his system. This idea passed gradually over into Reformed dogmatics and protected them against a return to a predestinarianism resting upon abstract conceptions. It is true, the influence of the *dark sides* of the Leibnitz school, as they appear particularly with his pupil Wolf, was also felt. On the one hand, there was no distinction made between personality and individuality. Accordingly God is represented, not as pure personality, but also as individuality, as anthropopathically choosing between different possibilities (thus the shallow notion of the possibility of other worlds which God might have made, and of which he chose the best). On the other hand, the attempt to construct every thing *a priori*, or to prove every thing from rational principles, which although it is here only referred to the *Art. mixti*, still conducts to the mistake of some of the old Cartesians, that it was not sufficient to *refer* the truth derived from the *Artic. mixti*, acknowledged in revelation, to the facts of consciousness, but they must be proved directly *a priori* from reason. By not observing the influence of a guilty conscience upon the understanding, we fall over into *Intellectualism*.

If we now review the best of Christian Dogmatics of the eighteenth century, we will findthat *Fr. Turretin* of Geneva, is the first in the transition to a new period. His *institutiones theol.* were reproduced by *Leonard Rypenius*, professor in Deventer, and appeared at Berne, under the title: *Rypenii summa theologiae didactico-elenchticae ex celeberrimorum theologorum scriptis, praecipue Francisci Turretini institutionibus theologcis.* Again we have *Werenfels* (*Dissertationes theologicae*). Properly *Wolfians*, were *H. W. Bernsau*, professor in Francken, †1763; *John F. Stapfer*, professor in Berne, †1775; *Daniel Wittenbach*, professor in Marburg, †1779. Influenced by Wolfianism were both the last two distinguished Reformed Dogmatics: *John Christoph Beck*, professor in Basel, and *Samuel Endeman*, professor in Marburg, †1789. Besides these there was a school formed in Bremen, (Lampe and Menken, which acquired a very great and very happy influence. Free from Wolfianism, inclined to Foederalism, and combining with it the element of a profound and pure mysticism, it constructed the doctrine of the importance of the corporeity, and was efficient in promoting a deeper apprehension of the doctrine of the holy sacrament. In addition to this, Menken had a peculiar one-sided anthropological, but impressive and affecting doctrine of the atonement. Menken was influenced by the Lutheran physician, *Samuel Collenbusch*, and the Wurtemburg divines, Bengel and Oetinger. Not satisfied with the orthodox view that God was necessarily obliged to *punish*, and that Christ endured the *punishment* in our stead, and thus reconciled God to us, he taught, that Christ reconciled men to God; that man by reason was unable to love God, and that he purchased for him the psychological ability again to love him. But he did not see that this ability consisted in the removal of the *sense* of guilt; (he sought it simply in the removal of sin by the *trials* he endured). He did not see that *his* doctrine, properly considered, was nothing more than the *anthropological aspect of the orthodox doctrine itself.*

In the Church of the Lutheran Confession, Dogmatics had to pass through a different course. To Melancthon's *loci* were attached the *loci* of Chemnitz and Gerhard. Here the dogmas were treated separately and afterwards externally put together. *Hutter* belongs to this class. *Calov* first commenced a systematic development; and introduced Scholasticism in the Lutheran Confession, which was perpetuated by *König*, *Quenstedt*, *Baier* and *Hollaz*, already pietistically affected. The Lutheran Dogmatics, as to form, took precisely the course opposite to that of the Reformed. In Reformed Dogmatics, the systematic process was first pursued—the dogma was developed from the system—and then the local treatment was adopted first by the Scholastics. In the Lutheran, the local treatment was practised at first—each dogma was treated separately, and the systematic was afterwards introduced by the Scholastics. In the one case, the system was original, inferential and synthetic; in the other it was superinduced by the Scholastics and was analytic. They were alike, however, in this, that in both Confessions, very important contradictions sprung up in the course of the seventeenth century, only with this difference, that in the Reformed Church, these contradictions, for the most part, were taken up and settled, whilst in the Lutheran, this was not the case. In this way, the so-called Syncretism of Calixt, and the Helmstadt school, was repressed and kept down. Calixt desired in fact to revive the Philippistic tendency in the Lutheran Church; but the real Lutherans, those who interpreted the Augsburg Confession in the Form of Concord sense, maintained their ascendancy, and kept Philippism out. The consequence was the triumph of a stiff Scholastic orthodoxy, stripped of all ethical elements—a triumph resulting in the almost utter extinction of the life of the Church. The little of life that remained passed over, in the form of opposition to the dogmas of the theologians, into the *pietistic* school of *Spener ;* but this emancipation of the congregation was essentially a Reformed, a foreign element. A violent controversy was kept up against the pietists, while in Holland, the Foederalists were peacefully tolerated along side of the Scholastics. This already was so far unfortunate that it brought out no theological science as a corrective to scholisticism ; that which did exist proceeded from the congregation in opposition to the Theologians. For *Franke* and *Spener* were simply practical ministers, without any pretensions to learning ; and the scientific men, who fell in with them, did less to introduce the life of pietism into science, than to carry science into the sphere of popular piety. Amongst these, we may reckon, *Joach. Just. Birthaupt*, *Joh. Joach. Lange*, and *Dannhauer*, the last of whom represents Dogmatics under the figure of a journey. A few, such as Buddeus and Christ. Matt. Pfaff and Wiseman, enjoyed the reputation of being scientific men. As a general fact, science and living piety became widely separated.

After that Quenstadt and Baier already had borrowed the doctrine of the *articulis mixtis* from the Reformed Dogmatics, the Lutheran Wolfians, *Reinbeck*, *Carpow*, *Reusch* and *Ribow* made such free use of it, that they soon were prepared to prove that even in the *artic. puris* there was nothing contradictory to reason. Thus reason seemed to be the highest criterion of the dogma. This unfortunately came to be the case, just in proportion as this dry, lifeless Wolfian orthodoxy was withdrawn from the life of the congregation, and the more it was separated from its living source, the power of a living faith, the less finally was the life of the congregation nourished and regulated. Thus we can very readily conceive that the result of the rigid exclusion of the Lutheran theologians from the congregation, and from the influence of the life of the congregation, would be that Lutheran theology would in the end, fall a victim to Rationalism ; and it is just as easily to be seen how the Reformed theology, owing to its elasticity, and the readiness with which it receives and submits to correcting influences, and especially to its connection with the *congregation*, the Rationalist scarcely had a single representative amongst Reformed Dogmatics. At best we might mention, *H. D. Stosch*, professor in Frankfort, the junior *Stapfer*, otherwise a very cautious Kantian, and Mursinna, professor in Halle. The Congregations would *permit* no Rationalism in the Reformed Church, when it existed and could exert its influence without restraint. To the Reformed Confession belonged the last efficient defenders of the old faith, Hess, Lavater, Stilling, Gessner, and so also the first champions of the revived faith, Neander, Tholuck, Schwartz, Sack, Krafft, and by descent also Hengstenberg, joining hands with each other.

As the first attacks upon Christianity plainly proceeded from the English deists, the Reformed theology kept deism aloof, and combatted it successfully. When, however, it was transplanted to Germany, in reckless opposition to Christianity, the Lutheran theology assumed a very different position. Once accustomed to prove Christian doctrine by rational arguments, the attempt was made to do this gradually in such a way that it would harmonize with and be agreeable to the so-called "reason," subjective and without contents as it was. *Semler*, and *Reinhart*, and *Hermes*, silently suffer the fundamental Christian doctrine of redemption to fall into the background, divest it of its objective significance, although they still think it very appropriate on account of its influence in a moral point of view. The Eudamonists, *Teller*, *Krug*, *Eberhard* and *Steinbart* identified their exceedingly shallow senseless moral systems with "reason," and explained every thing in Christianity transcending it, as of secondary importance, as popular superstitions and accommodation. This was the sense in which *Wegscheider*, *Eckerman* and *Henke* wrote their Dogmatics. The *Kantians*, ignoring the substance of Christianity as redemption, identified it also with the moral law, only that it was more profoundly apprehended. So *Stäudlin*, *Ch. F. Ammon* and *Tieftrunk*. *Bretschneider*, in his rationalistic-supernaturalistic Dogmatic took a position more like that of Semler; he gave himself no concern about dogmas—he disparaged them as accidental, uncertain and without significance.

Thus far the so-called reason maintained a destructive position towards the Christian dogma. With the introduction of the more profound philosophy of [Fichte, Jacobi and Hegel], a new period was commenced. It was conceived, that to be rational was not, in the neglect of all historical development, to deduce a few propositions from an arbitrarily chosen principle, but that reason was the *perception* of the contents of nature and history. In this way respect was again cherished for the *history* of Christianity. It was required that Christianity should be regarded as a historical phenomenon, a historical power. And Christianity was actually so considered, but it was also thought that evil in like manner pertained to objective rationality, i. e., was a necessary element with a view to future good. (Ethical Pantheism=to every thing actual, is *divine*.) In a little while, it was farther inferred, that as the world-process absolutely fell in with the phenomenal nature of God, God was the truth of the world, and the world was the actuality of God. (Intellectual pantheism=to actuality, is *God*.) Thus in failing to accept of history as it is, and constructing it *a priori*, we are betrayed into subjectivism. We desire to find again a subjective pantheistic system in Christianity, and thus are led to construct Christianity itself *a priori*, i. e., we change its form, a redemption founded in fact, to an element in the development-process of an idea, i. e., of the spirit of our common humanity. The commencement was made by *Schleiermacher* in his "Glaubenslehre." He occupies as yet the subjective stand-point, inasmuch as he develops the dogma from the expressions of the pious consciousness. It is true, that with him, the pious consciousness is that which is defined by the historical Jesus of Nazareth, and by the communion which he established, and also by the historical power of Christianity. But as he appreciates only *the* particular aspects of history which are reflected as feelings in the subjective consciousness, he moves with peculiar hesitation between subjectivity and objectivity. His subjective philosophical view, influenced at one time by Fichte, and at another by Jacobi, is at last that of ethical pantheism, and is of no little importance. He derives sin, as *necessary* from the opposition of like and dislike, which naturally belongs to the pious consciousness. The more distinctly, however, that this influence of the new philosophy was to be seen in him, the less ground is there for the notion of Alex. Schweitzer, that he was influenced by the old Reformed Dogmatics (with whom Schleiermacher was not acquainted) and that Schleiermacher's modern Pantheism is similar to the supposed determinism of the old Reformed Scholastics, a notion, which professor Baur, in Tübingen, allied to him in spirit, takes care to correct. Schleiermacher's subjective sense of dependence has very little resemblance to the objective decree of the old Reformed Dogmatics. In his anthropological subjectivism, he is substantially much more closely allied to the Lutheran standpoint, than to the Reformed.

More consequent than Schleiermacher, the Hegelian *Marheinecke* sought to reconstruct the objective Christian dogma as a necessary development, in such way indeed, that sin, *contrary* to reason, as it is, would necessarily be included as reasonable, and that ethical pantheism also is made prominently to appear. It was not long before the Hegelian school passed over from ethical to intellectual pantheism, and again appeared in *opposition* to Christianity, and as destructive to its dogmas. *Strauss*, in his well known Dogmatics, apprehends Christianity simply, as historical development, and not as a historical divine fact of eternal significance; and not even as a development absolutely, but only as a subordinate element of the same, that must be surmounted from the stand-point of absolute *knowledge*, and accordingly not as eternally permanent, but as a surmounted element in the development of humanity. Here, as in the older Rationalism, there is the radical *defect*, that Christianity is apprehended, not as the redemption and reconciliation of sinners, by the grace of God, but, *either in a Pelagianising* way as a moral law (as if the mere law would be of any avail, and as if sin was not an enslaving power in humanity), *or in a pantheistic way*, as an element in the development process of an idea, by means of which the ethical is simply a subordinate consideration.

With the revival of faith, and of a believing theology, the Dogmatic was reproduced, and at the same time so as to recur constantly to the old Dogmatics, and more also in the way of historical representation. A productive, independent Dogmatic of this kind, is that of *Twesten*, and also the "System of Christian doctrine," by *Nitzsch*. We also have very valuable monographs, for instance, "der Lehre von der Sünde," by Julius Müller. In the Reformed Church, during the period of Rationalism, with the exception of the younger Stapfer and Mursinna, there appeared no Dogmatic. During the time of revived faith, the deceased Krafft prepared his, but it is still unprinted.

Remark.—The so-called "Glaubenslehre der evang. Reformed Church," by Al. Schweitzer, is altogether useless. Under the pretense of giving a representation of the old Reformed dogmatics, he endeavors rather to smuggle modern Pantheism into the Reformed dogmatics, and to identify Schleiermacher's sense of dependence, as *deterministically* apprehended by himself, with the *old predestination doctrine*. The most remarkable *errors*, pervading the work, are: 1) Schweitzer derives the *doctrine of absolute predestination* in the Reformed dogmatics from a *theological* principle. It proceeds from the idea of God as absolutely determining all things, upon whom every resolution of the human will is absolutely dependent, and from this, subsequently comes to the conclusion, that belief or unbelief, and of course salvation or damnation, is dependent upon the predetermining appointment of God, and not upon the free decision of man. But this is evidently a historical untruth, as was shown already by Schneckenburger (Studien and Kritiken, 1847). That Zuingle's predestinarian expressions, which with him from the first were connected with *theological* premises, were altogether without any influence upon the Reformed dogmatics, and that the proper origin of the Reformed doctrine of predestination is to be sought with Calvin, we have already seen. But with Calvin, as Schweitzer himself admits, the doctrine rests upon anthropological ground. And this is the fact. It was not from any previously entertained idea of God, but from the doctrines strictly carried out, that the sinner of himself was utterly unable to embrace the salvation in Christ, or even *preserve it*, that Calvin came, through a misunderstanding of several passages of the Bible, to the doctrine, that if any one held and cherished faith, it followed that God, through the Holy Ghost, had granted him *faith* and *perseverance*, and if any one was without faith, or again fell away, it must be the case that God had withheld *faith* from him, or at least *perseverance.* But that this, as Schweitzer improperly maintains, was not the common doctrine of the Reformed Church, and still less the principle of the Reformed dogmatics, we have already seen, and that the consequences of the same in reference to the doctrine of the being of God and his relation to the human will was never drawn, we will most clearly see hereafter. 2) Schweitzer identifies the subjective feeling of dependence in Schleiermacher's sense, that is, the fact of the consciousness, that man with all his power of thinking, still finds a world around him, that has not just come to exist so and so, by his subjective peculiar will, with the doctrine of the *decretum Dei*, as held by the old Reformed dogmatics. How senseless this is, *Baur* has shown in Zeller's Jahrbuch, 1847. 3) Schweitzer confounds in a singular way the *theol. naturalis* of the *Cartesians* with the *foedus naturale* of *Cocceius*. He forgets entirely that the Foederalists distinguish *objective-historical* consecutive periods of the objective kingdom of God, and call the period before the fall, *foedus naturale*, and on the other hand, that the Cartesians, proceeding from the *subjective* consciousness of the fallen man, call that, which he still retains as a part of consciousness, *theol. naturalis*, and in this way gives us a wonderful *quid pro quo*. He distinguishes in the *foedus natur.* as do the Foederalists in the *foed. grat. three oeconomies*, i. e., one "taken exclusively from natural life," one "demanded by the ethical consciousness"—and one "the knowledge of God" advanced to full development by means of revelation." As if these were not merely three subjective moments! and as if these three moments previous to the fall, had followed in historical succession, and not much more in immediate unity! If he now changed the *phenomenal historical objective* part of the *foed. nat.* into the *subjective element of knowledge*, why should not the whole *foed. nat.* be changed from a *historical existing state*, into an element remaining after the fall, a *human* disposition analogous to the *destiny* of *man*. Again, he asserts that the only difference between the *foed. nat.* and *grat.* is this, that the last is a religion of redemption, and the only difference between *theol. nat.* and *evang.*, in like manner is that redemption is *revealed*. Very perverted; for the Trinity and other doctrines are also *revealed*. Finally, he confounds the antithesis between law and gospel as "Lutheran" (!!) with that between the *foed. nat.* and *grat.* (as if it did not correspond with that between the *oec. sub lege* and *post legem*!) and from this interminable confusion, he finally draws the conclusion: that the Reformed Dogmatics first construct all religion from the natural life; it is then elevated by means of the moral consciousness, and finally by revelation, it is brought up to perfect life, by the *immediate elevation of the divine in the disposition*. Real nonsense! Mere potentialities of the natural life, and mere elements of the moral life, so long as they appear intermixed as the life of man, and are not yet directed to God, are by no means religion. Besides, the definition of revelation, as the "immediate elevation of the divine in disposition," is monstrous. Alex. Schweitzer may understand revelation to be this; the Reformed Dogmatics understand by it something very different, something objective. The whole affair is nothing better than an ineffectual effort, under cover of dialectic confusion, to introduce pantheistic Rationalism into the Reformed Dogmatics. It is true, that *theol. nat.* is able *a priori*, to know no more than the immanent law, in the fulfilment of which, the *foed. nat.* consists. But it is not true, that, on the other hand, the *foed. nat.* contained nothing more than the propositions of *theol. nat.* Schweitzer's whole proceeding is nothing more than an attempt to do away with the objective original state of man before the fall, and to change it into a new *disposition* existing in all men, even in sinners, to the good and the true. There is, however, no sense in his assertion, "that natural religion is by no means merely *foedus operum*, but at the same time is also the *oecon. ante legem et sub lege foederis gratiae.*" As if one would say: "the perspective is not merely that of the moon, but also of the planets." A single glance into Burman or Heidanus might have taught him how *unreformed* all this confusion was!—4) The proposition, that sin is negative, i. e., a disturbance of the divinely appointed development, by means of the impotent will of the creature in conflict with God, is admitted, but precisely in the *contrary* sense: sin is *no* positive disturbance of human development, but simply the not yet perfected existence of good—(negative in the sense of limitation) that is, it is a necessary element of future good. 5) Schweitzer asserts that the Reformed Confessional writings are not the sources of the Reformed Dogmatics, inasmuch as they do not exhibit the pure Reformed system of doctrine. A very natural admission! Schweitzer's Reformed system they certainly do not exhibit. The old symbols, for the most part, are also far from the doctrines of absolute predestination in Calvin's sense. Besides, Schweitzer betrays great ignorance of the Reformed symbolics. 6) The citations he makes from the old Dogmas, express, for the most part, in their true connexion, a very different sense from that given to them by Schweitzer. He often grossly perverts their meaning by false interpretations. The most distinguished Dogmatics, such as Gisb. Voet, and the Commentators on the Catechism, he *seldom* uses, and has *never* studied. He says very *naively* that he preferred small compends to large works. Thus it came, that he frequently interpreted the brief and less definite expressions of the smaller compends in such a way as to contradict the more accurate propositions of larger dogmatical works; and that he takes up precisely the apprehension which is there brought out as *false* and *objectionable.*

B. C. W.

Art. IV.—LAYING ON OF HANDS.

The subject indicated by the above caption, is one which is frequently referred to, as we shall see more fully in the course of this article, in the Scriptures of Divine Revelation. That it is not more frequently dwelt upon and seriously regarded by the Church of the present age, is only another of the significant "signs of the times," which shows how far, and yet apparently, how unconsciously, we have traveled away from that true Church life by which we were once so peculiarly distinguished. This very fact should be sufficient to induce the most earnest and candid reflection in regard to it.

The *Laying on of Hands* may appear to some minds as a very small matter to be made the subject of an article in a grave literary and theological Review. We suggest, however, that all minds possessed of this tendency, allow themselves to study long, seriously and profoundly, before they permit a real judgment of this character to pass from them. It is not a trivial matter to judge in regard to the things of God: and remembering the natural tendency of the heart, because of its sinful nature, to depreciate the things that are spiritual, and to magnify those that are carnal, we should be extremely careful, before we commit our feelings by any judgment, to ponder the subject seriously and deeply, just in the form in which it is presented by the Spirit in the word of divine truth. Upon spiritual things we are always disposed to look as through the microscope, which induces the sense of diminutiveness, whilst upon the world and carnal objects generally, we turn the telescope with its fullest power, and then exclaim—how great! how glorious!!

The smallest acts, according to our carnal judgment, are often, as we find in after experience, productive of the greatest results, both in relation to ourselves and others. The world, with all its acknowledged greatness, either in a physical or moral view, is the result of a single fiat on the part of the Almighty. "God spake, and it was done: God commanded and it stood fast." The eating of the forbidden fruit on the part of Eve, and the handing of it to her husband, who did likewise, was certainly, in itself considered, a very trivial and insignificant act, but as it stood related to the commandment of God which it violated, it was an act at once prolific of every evil both to body and soul, which has since afflicted the world. Where—when—will its dreadful power come to an end. And among the most potent agencies of recovering the mighty ruins of the fall, we are not directed to the fire, the earthquake or the storm, as emblems, but to the calm, quiet and soothing breeze—the type of the still small voice—the Spirit that from chaos produced the Cosmos with all its magnitude of proportion, harmony and beauty. "It is not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord."

When God's ordaining authority is interwoven with any ceremony, ordinance, or rite, then it is plainly not for the human mind to judge independently as to its importance or unimportance, as to its greatness or its insignificance; for, after all, it is and remains just what God has made it, and our judgment, for or against, can not affect or change its objective character in the least, either one way or the other. It is a matter which lies wholly above and beyond us; and if a child-like piety which is the result of a true faith in Christ, be in our hearts and pervade our being, mental and moral, we shall gladly yield our carnal judgment in reference to all the institutions of God, and earnestly seek to regard them just in the light in which he has revealed them.

With this spirit we shall not regard any thing small, insignificant or unimportant, which is clearly the product of his ordaining power, especially as we know that God's peculiar plan is, by the weak things to confound those that are mighty.

The Laying on of Hands is indeed a small thing in itself considered, (and this is the only light in which we fear too many consider it) but connected, interwoven, as it evidently is, with the substantial system of redemption itself, we can have no authority, except in the case of a special divine grant, to look upon it as a thing of small moment. By the position and relations given to this rite by the uniform custom of those who acted under the direct inspiration of God, it evidently stands forth as an object of faith, just as every other fact growing out of the general system of grace, is an object of faith; and as such, we are of course exclusively dependent upon the Divine Word. We can properly have no thoughts of our own in regard to it, as it comes purely from God's ordaining grace, and must carry with it just the force which he designed it should carry; and what can we know in regard to the nature and object of a divine creature, or the spiritual power it may carry in it, except that, and that only, which God may see good to reveal to us, either in his word or through the creature itself? Just *as* he reveals it, *so* it is.

This being, in our view, the true form in which this rite meets us and challenges our regard, we shall now seek to direct attention, 1. *To the Biblical History of this rite*, and 2. *To its significance, or the doctrine which it involves for faith.*

I. The History of the rite. In regard to this point, we may not expect of course to find facts in consecutive order, systematically connected and arranged, and fully developed at all points. The Bible presents no great doctrine in this form ; it is rather like a widely extending and beautiful landscape, dotted all over with infinite variety, exhibiting indeed the same general growths in different localities, but always peculiarly modified, and never in the order of a scientific system. In this, as in all other respects, the Bible is unique—it stands alone in the free possession and clear evidence of its divinity.

The first intimation which we find of what afterwards became a general custom in the Church—the laying on of hands—is contained in the first book of the Bible. The rite has its origin in an early age—in times of comparative simplicity and purity—when God spake to man face to face, and when man lived in God. We love those days because of their spiritual, though simple associations, and feel sacredly attached to all the customs by which they were distinguished, because we know that amidst the child-like artlessness which then prevailed, there could have been nothing *formal*, as such, but that every thing was *real* and substantial.

Like a beautiful plant of affection, we find the rite growing up among the old patriarchs, whose rich spiritual fragrance was destined to descend to their children, and childrens' children to the end of time, that through all the successive ages, the eye beholding its simple beauty and the heart touched by its gentle power, might be turned back to the " days of old "—the simple days of their fathers.

The first great feeling which it is found to enshrine and represent, is the tender affection of a father for his child or children, which led him, especially at the end of his days, to invoke, in this impressive manner, the blessing of God upon them. In the 48th and 49th chapters of Genesis we have a touching and specific instance of this character, in the case of Jacob blessing his children and grand-children. In the case of Ephraim and Manasseh—the two sons of Joseph—the *form* of this blessing is indicated very minutely: "And Israel stretched out his right hand, and laid it upon Ephraim's head, who was the younger, and his left hand upon Manasseh's, guiding his hands wittingly; for Manasseh was the first born."

No one, with any degree of real sympathy with this age, on reading this simple account, can fail to be impressed with the peculiar care that was taken by the patriarch in regard to this form of blessing his children. To his mind there does not seem to have been any thing arbitrary about it. Each hand seemed to have contained its own peculiar blessing, and the whole, by father and children, was felt to be a solemn reality—a reality fixing destiny.

The same form was used also for other and different purposes. The Levites were required to lay their hands upon the animals which were to be slain as an offering for sin. (Num. 8 : 14.)

Hands were also laid upon individuals when they were set apart to a sacred office. Thus we read in the case of Moses, the divinely constituted leader of God's people Israel, that, having been warned of his death before he should have conducted the sons of Jacob into the land of promise, he took Joshua, according to divine direction, and, setting him before Eleazar the priest and the whole congregation, "he laid his hands upon him, and gave him a charge, as the Lord commanded." (Num. 27 : 18–23.)

Now in these respects, connected with some others, this rite is found to have been observed and practised during the whole period of the old dispensation.

In the New Economy the same form is observed from the very start. It was the habit of the Saviour, when parents, prompted by love to their children and faith in him, would bring their children to him that he should heal them, to lay his hands on them. (Matth. 19 : 15.) He did the same when they were brought simply to receive his blessing. It is said that "he laid his hands on them and departed thence." (Matth. 19 : 15.) When he raised the daughter of Jairus from the dead, it is recorded that "He took the damsel by the hand and said unto her, arise." (Matth. 5: 41.) Thus he illustrates his own declaration—"I came not to destroy the law or the prophets, but to fulfil." John, in the Apocalypse, speaking of the *last things*—the state of the Church and the glory of Christ at his second coming, says: "And when I saw him, I fell at his feet as dead; and he *laid his right hand upon me*, saying unto me, Fear not; I am the first and the last." (Rev. 1: 17.)

The Laying on of Hands was also the general form in which the Saviour and his apostles wrought miracles. When on a certain occasion, the Saviour 'could do no mighty works among the people because of their unbelief,' an exception is made in these significant words: "Save that he laid his hands on a few sick folk, and healed them." (Mark 6: 5.) While he was in the house of one Simon by name, after he had cured his wife's mother of a raging fever, and the evening having arrived, all those who had any sick in the whole community, brought them to him, it is stated that "he laid his hands on *every one of them*, and healed them. (Luke 4: 38–40.) Jesus having risen from the dead because it was not possible for him to be held by the grave, gave the same power to his apostles—aye, and even greater miracles than these shall ye do, because I go unto my Father. "And these signs shall follow them that believe: In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall *lay hands on the sick*, and they shall recover." (Mark 16: 17, 18.)

It may be convenient for unbelief to confine all this to the apostles and their age, but we utterly fail to discover any Scripture reason for it. Following the great commission to preach the gospel and spread the ordinances of the kingdom throughout the whole world, these were the signs that were to follow in all time, evidencing the presence of Christ and the supernatural power of his kingdom.

Paul laid his hands on the father of Publius, who was seriously ill, and healed him, (Acts 28: 8); and Paul himself, after he had been stricken to the ground by the power of Christ and blinded by his glory, was restored to sight again by Ananias, through the laying on of his hands. (Acts 9: 12). And in the 5th chapter of Acts and 12th verse, it is thus emphatically declared: "And by the hands of the apostles were many signs and wonders wrought among the people."

The Laying on of Hands was also observed in the new dispensation in setting individuals apart to sacred offices. Saul and Barnabas were thus set apart, (Acts 13: 3); and thus also were Stephen, Philip, Prochorus, Nicanor, Timon, Parmenas and Nicolas, the proselyte of Antioch, set apart and consecrated to a holy work. (Acts 6: 5, 6). Timothy was set apart in the same way, as we see from 1 Tim. 4: 14, and he, in turn, laid hands on others, and thereby imparted the same grace or gift. (1 Tim. 5: 22).

This was also the usual mode of communicating the Holy Ghost. The gift of the Holy Spirit was connected with that of sight, in the case of Saul, when Ananias laid hands upon him. He received his sight and the Holy Ghost. (Acts 9: 17.) Two remarkable passages occur in the 8th and 19th chapters of Acts. The first refers to some believers in Samaria, who had received the word of God, were baptized, and were leading outwardly correct Christian lives, but who had not yet received the Holy Ghost. Peter and John having been sent to them by the other apostles, laid their hands upon them, and they received the Spirit. The second refers to twelve persons at Ephesus, who had been gathered and baptized by John the Baptist. Paul meeting them, asked—"Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed?" They answered: "We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost." "Unto what then were ye baptized?" They answered, "Unto John's baptism." Here Paul explained to them the specific sense and design of John's baptism—as pointing to Christ—securing repentance and preparing the way for saving faith in his person. "When they heard this, they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus; and when Paul had laid his hands upon them, the Holy Ghost came on them ; and they spake with new tongues and prophesied."

Now this may suffice as a brief biblical history of this rite, to show the prominence in which it was held, and the purposes for which it was used. Many other instances might be referred to, but these are sufficient to show that the Laying on of Hands is a significant rite, running through the entire history of the Church, first under the old dispensation, and second under the new; and we are all familiar with the same form as it has come down to us, in all the different applications of it as presented in the sacred Scriptures.

Having said thus much in regard to the biblical history of this rite, we now turn,

II. To its significance, or the doctrine which it involves. That it has a spiritual meaning no one can reasonably doubt, seeing the divine circumstances under which it arose, the general and solemn uses to which it has been applied, and the consequences which have resulted from it.

It has a meaning already in the *natural* aspect of the case. There is a force or power in actual *contact*, which no simply moral affinities or sympathetic relations can possibly generate. To stand at the sick bed and lay your hands upon the fevered brow of the afflicted, is felt to be a great deal more than mere verbal sympathy, without real contact. A real hearty pressure of the hands, accompanied by genuine marks of interest in the countenance, carries with it more force than any words separately regarded, or than any interest manifested in any other way. There is more humanity about it; and in the case of the Christian, there is more Christian humanity.

There are forces connected with our nature which can not pass from us to others through wholly moral mediums, whilst these forces themselves are of a moral nature, and intimately connected with the life of religion and piety.

"None of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself." Our existence is not that of abstract isolation, each one standing upon his own bottom, to work out the high end of his being the best way he can; but it is that of organic connexion, by which we live in, and from, and by each other, and on the ground of which we are always affecting others, and in turn, being affected by them. Through the medium of this organic relation each to the other, there are thousands of influences passing, both when the mind is active and when it is passive, by which we are continually moulding the destinies of each other.

Christ was incarnated in human *flesh*—not in the human spirit simply—but in the flesh; and a new life, a higher instinct, so to speak, and more spiritual powers have, in consequence, been wakened up within the more carnal part of our nature. These are constantly affecting us more or less even in our natural state; for humanity generally has been placed in a substantially salvable state by the incarnation of Christ. But when these new forces are permitted to penetrate our persons actually through the exercise of a living faith in the Redeemer, or by a personal and higher contact with him as the gloriously constituted Saviour of the world, "our bodies"—in the strong language of Scripture—"become the temples of the Holy Ghost." They become pervaded with a higher and a heavenly influence, which in turn is ready at all times to pass forth into others as soon as the necessary vital medium is formed by the association of congenial souls.

Contact—real contact, is not only the medium of electric influences, but also of that real spiritual communion, in which we express our faith, when we say, each for himself: "I believe in the communion of saints"—not of *spirits* only, but of saints, including body and soul.

We are so constituted that we can never witness the repetition of the old patriarchal rite without being deeply and solemnly impressed, even under its natural form. When we see the hoary headed sire, of the past generation, rising up and placing his hands upon the head of the little helpless one, saying in the act—God bless thee, my child—we instinctively feel that there is more signified in this, both for the head and the heart, than could be expressed by an ordinary wish or prayer without the act.

Many persons—some now in the gospel ministry—have traced their earliest feelings of interest on the subject of religion, and their subsequent real change of nature, to prayers expressed in this form on the part of pious friends.

It was the touch of the Saviour's garment that cured the diseased woman in the crowd. "Somebody hath touched me," said Christ, "for I perceive that virtue hath passed from me." And it was the application of the Saviour's hand that brought back the spirit of the damsel who was lying in the cold embrace of death.

"Weep not," was the seemingly harsh injunction of Christ to a poor widowed woman as she was following the corpse of her only son to the grave, at Nain. But it was not cruel; for he meant to enable her to do with ease just what he had commanded her; and he moved quietly up to the bier, touched the lid of the coffin, and the young man revived, rose up to greet his Lord, and to dry the tears of his mother.

If we would really encourage the distressed and dispirited—if we would effectually disperse the heavy gloom of melancholy which is wont to settle upon souls of the finest texture—and if we would indeed throw the sunbeams of spiritual joy and gladness into their being, it will not do for us to stand off at a Pharisaical blue distance, and say: "Be of good cheer, friends," but we must approach them, identify ourselves with them, lay our hands upon their heads, wipe away the falling tear, and thus they will feel what neither they nor we can utter in the way of relief and comfort.

But to confine the significance of this rite wholly within any simply natural limits, would be, as we must all readily perceive, to contradict the whole spirit as well as letter of the Scriptures in regard to it. It involves more than the merely natural under any view. It is clearly a divine rite, and as such, carries with it, in addition to the natural, a divinely substantial force or power. The history of it, as already presented, very conclusively establishes this, and does it in such a form that no mind can avoid seeing the fact.

It is the medium through which something spiritual is communicated. This something is variously denominated in the Scriptures. In some places it is called a "gift." In other places it is called "healing grace," "a blessing," the "Holy Ghost," and so on. In every case it is something of a spiritual order or nature, which was not possessed before; which shows the rite, not only to be a medium of grace, but also a *distinctive* medium, communicating *peculiar* grace.

This much is clear and patent upon its face: and yet the substantial force of the act is not to be regarded as in every instance precisely the same. It is not the same, nor yet is it at any time substantially different. When Christ laid his hands upon the little children and blessed them, it did not signify the same thing precisely as the "gift" communicated to Timothy by the laying on of the hands of Paul; and yet we would not say that the grace imparted by Christ to little children was less really grace than that which was communicated through Paul to Timothy. Still the children thus blessed, were not qualified by the blessing, to act in the same capacity, or to discharge the same duties with Timothy. There is a substantial sameness, and yet an official difference in the grace imparted, so that whilst the same hands are laid upon different persons, or even the same persons at different times, the inward effect is different.

It is not, therefore, a full and satisfactory explanation of this act, to say that thereby a gift is imparted. This is the great fact, to be sure, for our faith, but a fact which needs to be analyzed and thus understood in its different significations, in the case of different persons, or the same persons at different times and under different circumstances.

When an individual is confirmed, hands are laid on him, but he is not thereby qualified to act as elder in the Church; and when the same person is set apart as elder, or deacon, by a repetition of the rite, he is not thereby qualified to act as minister. Though hands have been laid on him twice, and though he received a real gift each time, yet he is not a Timothy, nor is he qualified to discharge any function that belongs legitimately to the minister of Jesus Christ.

The Laying on of Hands implies, therefore, clearly a *grade of meaning*. It may be looked upon as the same grace *intrinsically*, looking to different ends *extrinsically*, to be accomplished in the kingdom of God, in which it holds. The life in the tree, produces first the leaf, then the bud, then the flower, and finally the fruit. Neither one of these is precisely of the nature of the other, but they are all produced by the same power pervading them. Thus it is with the grace imparted by this rite. It has its own ends within its own nature, to which it adapts itself with the readiness and precision of inspiration.

The Laying on of Hands is a divine act by which God solemnly claims for himself all upon whom the act has or may pass. This is no doubt its primary sense. To lay hands upon a thing is to set up a claim, and to say distinctly, "this is mine." It is the placing upon the object the seal of ownership. Thus God solemnly appropriates to himself and his service all those upon whom he commissions his servants to lay their hands in his name.

When we were received into the Church by confirmation, which was the completing act of our baptism, and therefore, although not a sacrament, still sacramental in its nature, we were thus claimed by the Almighty. From that hour we were no longer our own, but belonged to God. When we became elders by the same means, we were claimed in like manner for a definite sphere of Christian duty ; and when by the same rite we were ordained to the holy office of the ministry, we felt that it was God's hand upon our heads, and God's voice saying—*ye are mine.* This claim on the part of God, sealed by his own sacred rite, can never, in its own nature, cease or change. We are his, in the particular sphere to which he has thus appropriated us, as long as we live and make his word the rule of our faith and conduct.

Moreover, we are qualified to discharge the duties of the station to which we are thus appointed through the same rite by which we are outwardly claimed for it and set apart to it. Through the same hands that seize hold of us thus in God's name, by which we are claimed as his, and led in to some department of Christian duty and responsibility, is communicated the inward and divine gift by which we become fitted to the station, whatever it may be. God never claims an individual outwardly for a position in his kingdom, to whom he does not impart the grace qualifying him to fill it agreeably to his will. Through the same hands by which God says, "thou art mine," he says at the same time, "and I am thine—thy grace, wisdom and strength—thine in every needed particular, in the fulfilment of your call and discharge of your official or other duties."

When Moses, by divine direction, constituted Joshua his successor by the laying on of hands, he became qualified in the very act to fill the office to which he had been called. It is thus recorded, "that Joshua, the son of Nun, was full of the spirit of wisdom"—Why?—"*for Moses has laid his hands upon him.*" (Deut. 34 : 5.) Here, plainly, the laying on of hands is specifically referred to as the medium through which Joshua received grace adapting him to the position to which he had been called ; and this is the case always where there is genuine faith answering seriously to the outward call, and inducing a willingness and desire on the part of individuals, to be numbered with the divinely constituted agencies in accomplishing the great work of God in the world: and even where there lurks the presence of inward wickedness, unseen to the eye of the Church, preventing the entrance of the spiritual gift in its full divine power, still, even there, an official position is reached, rendering his acts, as such, valid and binding.

This qualifying grace received by the laying on of hands, always intensifies itself in proportion as the office is high, arduous and responsible. To all—as members of the Church—as deacons and elders—and as ministers—this grace is given through this simple rite, qualifying each for the duty of his station, and assuring each, that, as his day is, so shall his strength be.

Now—this is what we regard as the great doctrine of this evidently divine though simple rite.

It finds its reality—not in any outward, formal and mechanical theory of divine succession, but in the true historical sense of the Holy Catholic Church, the mystical body of Christ, the real and perpetual bearer of his Spirit, grace and salvation to the children of men. The Church, as a divine organization, filled with divine and heavenly contents, permeated with the saving presence of the Holy Ghost, developing itself in a strictly historical way in the world, is enough of succession to meet all serious demands in regard to that point. This rite, holding in the life of this organization, can never be formal, as such, but must be substantially significant in all its applications; and it must be substantially significant at all times and in all localities; for the Church is ever and at all places substantially the same. Real progress is never eliminating so far as any real element of grace is concerned—never weakening—but, as in the case of natural growth, always strengthening, expanding—becoming more real and consolidated. The Church is the same now as it was in the days of the Apostles, making due allowance for its legitimate growth, or development; and the rite is used now just as and for the purposes it was then. Why, therefore, should it not signify the same? In the case of the believers at Samaria, and the twelve disciples at Ephesus, the laying on of hands was the *completion* of their baptism and the impartation of the Holy Ghost. Why should not Confirmation now be regarded in the same light? Why should not all entering the Church in this sacramental way, believe in the real presence of grace, qualifying them from that time forth, for every duty which may be legitimately required at their hands? Let the Church of Christ and her sacred rites stand out trembling with their own heavenly fullness and divine power, and we shall require nothing to effect the greatest results, but the still small voice—the silent flow of grace through her regular ordinances, from him who is her centre and life—mighty to save—her all and in all—to whom be glory, world without end.

This whole subject, as now considered, has a direct and most practical application to all who bear upon them the Christian profession, and upon whom hands have been laid in the name of Christ.

It speaks to the ordinary membership of the Christian Church in a way that should excite the most serious reflection and vital concern. Hands have been laid upon them, by the appointment of Christ, when they first presented themselves at the altar to respond practically to the call of God and confess the name of his Son. They were then fully initiated into his great spiritual kingdom by the sacred rite of confirmation, and by it set apart to a holy sphere of activity and Christian duty, and received at the same time a gift or grace to qualify them to meet and satisfy properly every spiritual demand, whether arising from the Church, the family, or the world, which may be made upon them. Ability was imparted through this holy rite, which they are ever after bound to cultivate and increase, to shun the world under its sinful forms, to resist temptation, and to perform all those positive duties, in regard to themselves and their fellow-men, which are fairly implied in their solemn vows and required in the word of God. This grace imparted through the same divine rite by which they were claimed and sealed for God and the spiritual purposes in his Church, removes at once every ground of excuse arising from natural weakness, or from any unfavorable or opposing circumstances in which it may be their lot providentially to be placed. God is their strength, as in the case of Moses when he was called to undertake the leadership of his ancient people Israel, and this strength, thus received through his own holy rite, and which is increased by every subsequent and earnest effort to comply with the call of duty, is sacredly pledged to make them equal to all legitimate demands, and superior to all the trials which they may meet, as followers of Jesus Christ. Recognizing the true inward significance of this holy rite, which is always as substantially real as their motives and purposes are pure and holy, their duty is to go forward, nerved spiritually with the sense of a divine commission, and depend at every step upon the grace of God, letting their light so shine before the world around them, that others, seeing the supernatural style of their character and spiritual results of their activity, may be induced likewise to glorify their Father which is in heaven. Thus the Church would show its divine attributes and resources, her members being "living epistles, read and known by all men."

Then, in a still higher sense and more sacred manner, if possible, does this whole subject address itself to the Elders and Deacons in the Church of Jesus Christ. Hands have been laid on them the second time ; and by this they have been elevated to high and responsible offices. They have not in this second act, become officially exempted from the duties and privileges which were implied in the first. These continue to hold in all their original significance. The higher, in every legitimate process or gradation, always includes the lower ; so that whilst the first act remains in all its force, they are, by the second, in addition to the first, set apart to, and qualified for, peculiar and distinctive duties. These duties are of a spiritual and sacred character, and are distinguished often by very slight shades from those which peculiarly belong to the ambassador of Jesus Christ. This is particularly so in the case of Elders, whose sphere is entirely and purely spiritual. In their office they stand almost side by side with the minister, and both have reference directly to the spiritual interests of the congregation over which they have thus sacredly been placed. Nor is it substantially different in the case of the Deacons. Although they are specially called to preside over the *temporal* concerns of the Church, yet these temporal concerns are not to be regarded as standing opposed to the higher and spiritual interests of the same. The poor are to be supplied with the necessaries of the present life, but the duty which makes this binding upon the deacons in their official character, is a spiritual duty, and not carnal. The mere fact that it brings money, &c., into view, does not, in any way, affect the office, as spiritual. It is the spiritual office seizing hold of the things of time, and applying them in a sacred way to the temporal necessities of God's people, with a view to comply with a divine command and to accomplish, through the receivers, a spiritual and holy purpose. The Elders and Deacons are the two official heads of the Church, so to speak, by which she meets the two-fold demand of her members arising from soul and body, both which she comprehends and sanctifies. The office of the Elder looks directly to the soul, whilst that of the Deacon looks to the soul indirectly, through the body. Both are purely spiritual in their nature, and both alike require a supernatural gift or grace to render them effectual in the benefits to which they have regard.

If these offices and office-bearers were to stand out now in their divine significance as they did in the earlier days of the Christian Church, as the bearers of heavenly blessings to men, and as the medium through which even the temporal things of the present life are made to carry a spiritual meaning and power, how differently would they be regarded, and how much greater and more healthful would be their general and specific influence! Then would they not be the mere nominal appendages to the Christian ministry, in the one case, and the mere drones in the Church of Christ, in the other, which they are now, alas, too often found to be; but the offices themselves would stand forth with the solemnity of the divinity, and authority by which they were instituted, and the office-bearers would realize a divine commission, which they would seek to carry out practically in the fear of God.

Finally: The subject as now discussed, appeals with special point and force to the Ministry. They are the Timothies to whom the Apostle speaks directly, putting them solemnly in remembrance, that they stir up the gift of God which is in them, which they have received by the putting

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on of hands, in the sacred rite of ordination. (2 Tim. 1: 6.) The Apostle would have them to look definitely to this gift or grace, as constituting their central, specific and only spiritual qualification for the great work to which they have been called.

Learning is important—eloquence is important—a pleasing, winning address is important; but all these combined, brilliant, varied and profound as they may be, do not constitute the minister of Jesus Christ. No human endowments of the rarest character, though they may even vie with those of angels, and no human acquirements, however marvellous in their nature or extensive in their application, can possibly fit an individual for a divine office and spiritual functions. Nothing but the presence of the divine can do this; and this divine, not simply in the form of general piety, for piety never so great and undoubted, makes no man a minister of Christ in the official and full sense of that term; but the divine, under a specific form, as this is imparted by the laying on of hands, in the name of Jesus Christ. This power raises the man beyond his mere individual life, and places him in a divine office, thus making him an *officer* in the kingdom of God in the world. This involves more, in every sphere, than the mere individual. The acts of a civil officer, as such, comprehend always far more than the acts simply of the individual. They carry with them a general authority, which can not be resisted or trampled upon in any way with impunity. One such individual may have more power than the whole nation besides; for he is the representative and executor of the nation, to whom this power has been officially delegated. Now it is difficult to conceive how we can have any other views of the officers legitimately appointed in the kingdom of God, unless our faith be of such an indifferent character, as to lead us to regard the kingdom of God in the world, as existing only in the way of name or appearance, comprehending and bearing with it no divine significance and supernatural power. And yet we are every where taught that no form of authority is so real and substantially founded as that of Christ and his kingdom. It is the basis of all other orders of power and influence. "All power"—said Christ just before he left the world—"All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, *therefore*, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." (Matth. 28: 18, 19, 20.) Here is the presence of a great kingdom, with Christ as its centre, comprehending all power in heaven and on earth, commissioning his servants to go forth and act in his name and by his power, bearing in their own persons officially, authority to teach and communicate, through his own ordinances, the grace of spiritual life and salvation. As the officers in this kingdom and acting in the legitimate fulfilment of their assigned duty, ministers have an authority which is felt both in heaven and on earth. When they preach, they do it in this character, having a message from God; when they baptize or administer the holy sacrament of the Supper, they do it as those vested with this divine authority; when, by the order of Christ and in imitation of the example of the early Church, they lay their hands upon the heads of men, whether in confirmation or ordination, they do it in the name of the Great Head of this kingdom, Jesus Christ, and they are bound to believe that He, through them, communicates the grace which the acts themselves, by divine arrangement, are made to adumbrate in the way of outward type. When all these officers, in their official capacity, act together in the name of Christ and of His kingdom, the result is to be regarded as that flowing from the efficient judgment of Christ himself; for what is thus bound on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and what is loosed on earth, shall be loosed in heaven.

This is the deep significance of the officer in the kingdom of Christ, especially of the ambassador who, in a peculiar sense, being the highest, stands in the place of Christ, laboring in his stead; and this peculiar significance is imparted through the laying on of hands. This is the power which is weak and despicable in the eyes of the world, but sublime in the estimation of God, by which he confounds those that are regarded as mighty. This is the grace borne and exhibited in earthen vessels, and communicated by an apparently insignificant rite, in order that the power and the glory of it may be of God and not of man. The more this inward, spiritual and altogether gracious qualification in the minister of Christ is looked to and depended on, in vital connection with the regular ordinances of the "Church which is His Body," the more deeply spiritual will be the piety among men, and the more true and lasting will be the prosperity of Zion. What a deeply humiliating effect this true view of the case would have upon the minister at the altar! How it would prevent that swelling of pride, because, perhaps, of the possession of eloquence or learning, or the graces of a pleasing and captivating address! While it would impart to the men of God true and solid dignity, how radically would it sweep away every cause which leads so many to glory in the flesh —in the power which they may wield as individuals, and in the effects which they are able to produce by agencies foreign to those which have been divinely appointed! How different would be the attributes of excellence by which he would be distinguished and esteemed! and how much more divinely glorious would be the results of his labors! Ministers in connection with the ordinances of the Church would be the divinely constituted organs through which God in Christ by the Holy Ghost would reconcile men to Himself, and the whole work and effect, from beginning to end, would be spiritual and divine.

D. G.

ART. V.—THE LORD'S SUPPER.

A Disputation concerning the Lord's Supper, by ANTHONY THYSIUS, Doctor and Professor of Theology in the University of Leyden.—A. D., 1724.

Discrepancy with regard to the Lord's Supper evidently prevails, even among those in the Reformed Church, whose Fathers harmonized on that subject, and were termed by their opponents sacramentarians, because of the signification they attached to it. Without entering into controversy, truth could not, perhaps, be better subserved than by inviting attention to what obtained more than a century ago. Comparison may determine that, to a certain extent, ancient landmarks have been lost sight of, and thus facilitate that happy agreement and Christian unity, which once characterized the Reformed in France and Switzerland, in Germany and Holland, in Europe and America. What could be more desirable, in the present period of alienation, so rampant from various causes throughout our land, sundering North and South, East and West, embroiling, in some instances, those of the same household of faith? And, is it not attainable? Who does not devoutly pray that these divisions, these bleeding, dangerous wounds in the body of Christ, may be speedily and soundly healed—that we may be "perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment?"

For that end, without adopting the mode usually pursued by a reviewer, further preliminary apart, a careful, and, what on the whole, will be found to be a correct, although from that very circumstance, a somewhat inelegant translation, pertaining to the subject matter, is respectfully submitted.

Lancaster, Pa. I. S. D.

A DISPUTATION CONCERNING THE LORD'S SUPPER.

Baptism, the sacrament of regeneration, repentance, faith, and, therefore, of the putting on of Christ and of initiation, having been examined, we next come to *the Lord's Supper*, the sacrament of nutrition, and, as the Fathers termed it, the Mystery of perfection.

Scriptures and the Fathers assign it various appellations.

It is called in Scripture: 1. *the Lord's Supper* (1 Cor. 11: 20)—from the circumstance of time, since it was an evening feast—and from its author and design, having been instituted by the Lord that he might be remembered—an end absurdly restricted by the Jesuits to the love-feasts: 2. *the Lord's table*, (1 Cor. 10: 21,) and, absolutely, *table* (Acts 6: 2) by metonomy used for this sacred feast. Yet it seems these (1 Cor. 10: 21), however, are to be referred to the bread, since the cup of the Lord is also mentioned: 3. The bread which is broken, and the cup of blessing (1 Cor. 10: 16): 4. This bread and this cup of the Lord, and absolutely, bread and cup (1 Cor. 11: 27, 28): 5. Bread (1 Cor. 10: 17) and also drink, agreeably to the derivation of the word (1 Cor. 12: 13) by synecdoche: 6. Meat and drink, spiritual (1 Cor. 10: 3, 4): 7. breaking of bread (Acts 2: 42 and 20: 7). The phrase sometimes signifies any domestic feast among the Jews, but here that which is not common: 8. the Lord's body (1 Cor. 11: 39) by metonomy: 9, and in fine, feast of charity (2 Peter 2: 13. Jude 12), that is, a sacred feast instituted to testify and preserve love and to comprehend this sacrament as its most important part.

It is, moreover, called, particularly by the Grecian Fathers: 1. *συναξις*, *coming together*, since it was wont to be celebrated in the assemblies of the church (Acts 20: 7 and 1 Cor. 11: 18–32): 2. *Ευχαρισια*, *giving thanks*, or *Ευλογια*, *blessing*, doubtless from the previous action of Christ and its design—done and ordered to be done by Christ with a solemn act of thanks for his death and its benefits (1 Cor. 10: 16. Matth. 26: 26, 27): 3. *κοινωνια*, *communion* or *communication*, from Paul, who attributes to the bread and wine the appellation of the communion and participation of the body and blood of Christ (1 Cor. 10: 16, 17, 21): 4. *Προσφορα*, *oblation* or *that which has been presented*, from the bringing of the bread and wine by the faithful (believing) people for the celebration of the Agape and Eucharist to the bishop, who, in turn, restored the offering to the communicating people, (the former was called *δωρον*, the latter, *αντιδωρον*); it was also wont to be offered to God by the whole Church with an act of praise and thanks; but not as if an offering was made of Christ crucified by the priests to God, except by way of trope: 5. *θυσια*, *sacrifice* or *victim*, but improperly, as it appears from the prayers and giving of thanks, as also from its being the commemoration of the one expiatory sacrifice once offered for us on the cross; not properly as Romanists contend, for a eucharist and also for an expiation of sins which they nevertheless affirm to be bloodless. The ancients indicated this sacred rite by other names, but for the most part, the above are their descriptions, commendations and epithets of so great a mystery.

It is, moreover, called ,*Λειτουργια*, or from *ληιτος*, *pertaining* to the people, universally denoting a *public*, and in the church a sacred *function*, or transaction, by which is signified the entire sacred service of the divine word, but particularly the administration of the Lord's Supper, (*λειτουργουντες* accordingly, denotes not sacrificing, as Erasmus has rendered it, Acts 14; but attending to sacred things, as he himself elsewhere interprets it). By some it is more especially called *ιερουργια*, or *service of sacred things*, which also is metaphorically employed relative to the preaching of the gospel. (Rom. 15: 16.)

Among the Latins it began to be called Mass, about four hundred years after Christ—not, as some, without reason, affirm after Reuchlin and Genebrard, from the Hebrew MAS tribute, whence MISSA, (Deut. 16 : 10) that is, *offering*, as in the first verse of that chapter, or *substitute* (sufficientia), as the Seventy translate it, which rather would take its name from MASSA, relating to the tempting of God—nor, from the adjective feminine Missa, an offering to God, as Pontificians commonly assert—but, from the substantive Missa, used instead of missio, as collecta, oblata, remissa and the like, were used in the age of Tertullian for collectio, oblatio, remissio. It is so called, either from the sending (missione) of the things offered by the faithful, or from the beginning of the celebration of the mysteries which was made by the dismission (missa for missione) of the Catechumens and Penitents, or from the close, (the sacred things having been attended to), when a missa (missio) dismission was made to the faithful, that they might depart, with this solemn form, *Ite missa est*, that is, missio est, it is dismission. It is also called in a more deteriorated age, the Sacrament of the altar, which appellation Luther even, for what reason I am ignorant, thought he ought to continue.

Moreover, the Lord's Supper is the other sacrament pertaining to spiritual nutrition, of the new covenant or testament, instituted by Christ our Lord for the faithful, by which with broken bread and effused wine, Christ, as having suffered and died, or his broken body and shed blood for the remission of sins, is signified, and by their participation and communion, is offered for spiritual food and drink to the recipients and given to the faithful. It must be used for the remembrance of Christ with the showing forth of his death, and for union and communion with Christ, the head over the true mystic body—redounding to the glory of the grace of God and to the greater certainty of eternal life for the faithful.

The efficient cause of the institution is, unquestionably, the Lord Jesus, author of the new covenant of grace and mediator and testator of the new Testament, and therefore the sole institutor of the symbol. For that is an act of the greatest power, and it is his prerogative to add the signs of grace to whom it belongs to give grace, and to show and effect that which the signs exhibit and promise; but that which pertains to a servant of Christ is to deliver to the Church, and preserve faultless what he has received from the Lord, faithfully, without diminution, addition, or any alteration (Matth. 28 : 20. 1 Cor. 11 : 23).

The efficient cause of the exhibition is properly the same Christ who indeed first through himself by his own authority exhibits the symbols, and afterward through the ministers of his word, with whom he is present and whom he commissioned. The above is external, but internally, through the Holy Spirit, he conveys to the faithful the very thing.

The Lord Jesus, founder of this sacred feast, instituted and exhibited it the night in which he was betrayed, the Sabbath evening of the sixth day or the first of the paschal week of unleavened bread, according to the custom of the Jews, beginning the day from the evening, that by this circumstance of time he might the more commend the supper to "his own," and so by this last supper establish a monument of the covenant and testament about to be ratified by death :—and as to the place, in the city of Jerusalem, in a large upper room and upon a great table spread and made ready, where the Passover also was prepared.

And indeed it was instituted and exhibited *after he had supped* (Luke 22 : 20) the legal supper of the Paschal lamb with his disciples—not according to Jewish tradition, but the command of the law concerning it. (Mark 14 : 12. Luke 22 : 7.) This legal supper was the type of Christ, (1 Cor. 5 : 7,) and, under the remembrance of deliverance out of Egypt, was designating the spirit and antitype of this Lord's Supper, inasmuch as it was that which also was designed to point to that Lamb of God (1 Cor. 5 : 7). It was thus purposely arranged that the completion of the old sacrament might be indicated by the succession of the new. With respect to that Christ says: "With desire have I desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer."

Nay more, as many desire, it was instituted and exhibited with a previous *washing of feet.* For Supper having been ended (John 13 : 2), rising from supper (4), he washed the feet of "his own," according to the oriental custom (Luke 7 : 44), that by his own act and example he might precede them in humility and love and testify his benevolence to "his own," that he truly was the one who washes "his own" from their defilements (John 13 : 8, 9, 10, 14) and by a similitude, not by a sacrament, teach them what manner of persons it became them to be to approach these holy rites. The occidental Church, notwithstanding, here used that washing, apart from the Supper, and sometimes not without abuse, for a sacrament.

It was besides instituted and exhibited by Christ, *sitting down again* or *reclining* (John 13: 12), after the manner then in vogue among the people of God, since it was their custom to take their food, not sitting, but reclining on small lounges, their heads arranged within, but their feet without, so that they who followed could commonly recline on the bosoms of those who preceded, (John 13: 23, 25), that a feast might be signified, not a sacrifice, as Pontificians would have it, who here introduced altars by an unwarrantable imitation that is Jewish and Gentile; for a sacrifice would have gone standing to the altar.

And indeed, as an ancient interpreter judges, it was instituted and exhibited with the twelve disciples or apostles then eating or supping the supper that was common and much used, to indicate a public feast, not a private repast. It was connected with the rite of the breaking of bread and the blessing of the wine, for the remembrance of their redemption out of Egypt (Luke 22: 18) as is clear from the ritual books of the Jews, which, as well as the usual washings in baptism, the Agape and this Supper of the Lord would appear to have succeeded.

Christ, therefore, then prepared that supper for his own guests, *the apostles*, and in their person for all the faithful, since the apostle supposes the existence of faith. For what was done relating to the apostles, the apostle afterward referred not only to the pastors but also to the rest of the Church (1 Cor. 11); and they themselves here have the position not of administering but receiving. The supper is, therefore, for those who are in a state of piety, as far as men can judge, secret things being left to God, but not for catechumens who have not been baptized, nor for backsliders, or for those accounted among the repenting. Whence the apostle says, "let each one examine himself."

And this enjoined individual examination does not permit the supper to be withheld from any pastor or any one belonging to the Church. And whether the traitor Judas was present at the supper or not, may be inquired out of Matthew and Mark compared with Luke and John.

Nevertheless, neither the circumstance of time, evening or night, or of the sixth day of the week, or of the anniversary, the third day before the resurrection—nor the circumstance of place that was private—nor also that the supper was administered to those who supped, reclining, their feet having been washed, and twelve in number (some of which peculiarities obtained for a time in the primitive Church)—no one of these imposes a rule necessary to be observed.

And these were the preambles of the Lord's Supper. Itself wholly consists in the mystic *doings* and *sayings* of Christ, and in the *obedience* of the disciples, of the faithful, suitably answering these sayings and doings and in the *giving of thanks* that followed. The causes of the mystery are comprised in these particulars.

Among the *sacramental deeds* of Christ, pendent upon his institution and entire action, and so performed that they might strike the senses—be done by sensual things and announce something spiritual to the mind, is, First, (what was set before the eyes of the apostles) *λαβων*, that is, bread having been taken (accepta pane) or, when he had taken bread (quum accepisset panem), and afterward the cup into his hands after the manner of the father of a household. Here we have the beginning of the institution and its performance, and especially the act of setting apart for a particular use. And what is more, by taking them into his hands he gave us a sign of his voluntary death—since to take, put, have, carry, bear one's self in life is, by Hebraism, to encounter or undergo extreme danger to life (Judg. 12 : 3. 1 Sam. 19 : 5, and 28 : 21. Job 13 : 14. Psalms 119 : 109).

The external matter of this mystery consists, moreover, in these very representations that were taken, which are indeed two and diverse, but not truly and properly two Sacraments (as some of the ancients are wont to speak) since they concur to one end, a complete sacred feast and refection. He, therefore, took them separately—that he might signify his bloodless body and his blood, as if then poured forth without the veins—and that he might testify his whole self to be aliment and refection for us. (John 6 : 53, etc.)

Whence truly Papists most seriously violate the integrity of the sacrament, and in that matter are sacrilegious, since they withhold the cup, the other part of the sacrament, from the faithful Laity, under some pretext of human prudence and of concomitance, and respect for the glorious body. Such violation is mere outrage against the Lord. It is contrary to the act and order of Christ, (Luke 22 : 19. 1 Cor. 11 : 25,) to apostolic practice, (1 Cor. 11 : 26, 27, 29,) to all antiquity, and to the universal Church of God every where, except the recent one of Rome.

Besides, he used true, household bread, flat and not thick in form and suitable on that account for breaking, as the custom of that people prescribed; entire and one, moreover, unleavened or unfermented, from mere accident on account of the legal circumstance of the first day of unleavened bread. Otherwise, he would have used what was common. Accordingly, Christ (John 6) takes a similitude from common bread, and the apostle speaking of the Supper merely makes mention of such bread as was used by the Corinthians—unleavened bread having been abolished along with the Paschal lamb and the rest of the ceremonies. In other respects, if you disallow the necessity of that which is unleavened, it is truly a matter of indifference. Vain, therefore, the contention between the Grecians and the Latins about this thing.

In like manner he used drink from the product (genimine), or fruit of the vine, (Matth. 26 : 29) that is, wine : but, whether reddish, such as pertains to that region, (Prov. 23 : 31, whence also it is called the blood of the grape, Gen. 49 : 11), or diluted, which is called a mixture, from a custom in those warmer places of tempering the wine (Prov.

9: 25 and 23: 30)—is doubtful. Justinus declares that the cup which was used was tempered with water and wine. Nevertheless, as to religion and mystery that can be of no moment, and the same assertion may be made with regard to the form of the cup, whether a chalice or not, and of its material, whether it should be wood, or silver, or gold.

The reason he took bread and wine—common articles and selected from what was present among them (demedio), for mysteries is, on account of the striking similitude and analogy of the properties and effects of each, since they are primary elements and eminently necessary for nutrition and thus truly suitable for the things signified, the body and blood of the Lord.

Whence certainly the Pontificians, and others, emulous of them, sin not lightly who use bread that is not bread, that is, morsels, mere little substitutes (nummulariis ?), of most attenuated form and shadowy lightness, undeserving of that name and destitute of nutritious power, being wafers (obliis ?) or hosts (oblatis ?) as they call them: and also unfermented, as if necessary to the sacrament, pleading the example of Christ. They also sin because they use diluted wine for the sake of mystery—with regard to which, certain ancients, as Cyprian and others, too subtilely philosophized.

If, however, there should be a place where bread and wine are not in use, or where a supply (copia) cannot be had, that may be taken which answers to bread and wine, and is analogous to them among that people.

The *second deed* of Christ, (which was perceptible to the ears of the apostles) is his address to God contained in the *Ευλογγησας*, *και* being understood, which is expressed by Mark and Luke, answering to, *and when he had blessed*, as Matthew and Mark have it in the former clause, but in the letter about the cup *Ευχαριστησας*, that is, *when he had given thanks*, which with Luke and Paul is in both clauses, so that they may be promiscuously used and must be in this place, unless we would maintain the bread only and not the cup, to have been consecrated. So they are elsewhere taken for the same in a common feast (Matth. 14: 19 and 15: 36. Mark 6: 40 and 8: 6. Luke 9: 16. John 6: 11 and 23. Acts 27: 35.) So also the Hebrew words BORECH, that is, blessed, wished well, and IODHA, confessed, praised, celebrated, gave thanks, are mutually interchanged. You must have understood, *looking up to heaven*, which gesture of praying was elsewhere used by Christ (Matth. 14: 19); and that too, *before all* (Acts 27 : 35) *he gave thanks* or *blessed* God the Father, as it is there (Rom. 14: 6). The same address was used—when particular reference was made to bread and wine as gifts of the divine beneficence—and when more especially it related to the benefit of Redemption.

And more than that—by the term of giving of thanks, that is of invocation and supplication, this entire sacred operation, and, therefore, the consecration itself, of which that is only a part, is synedochically understood. Yea, the language of blessing—with the fourth case of the subject—related in common to the bread and wine (the like phrase of which is in Luke 9 : 16) the more strongly indicates that. By this language—these things, which were ordinary and common provisions for the body, sanctified by the word of God and prayer that they might be holily used by the faithful (which is done when they are taken from the liberal hand of God, holily and soberly enjoyed and made to refer to the glory of God, 1 Tim, 4 : 3, 4, 5. 1 Cor. 10, 31), the Son of God prepared, designed, appointed, dedicated, or sanctified and consecrated, moreover to a sacred end and spiritual function, to serve for nutriment to the soul—that they might be the mystic symbols of his body and blood: not by a change of nature but of condition, made by the divine institute and ordination of him who operated, and by solemn prayer and right use. So the language of blessing in relation to subjects is generally taken (Gen. 2: 3). In this sense it is said by the apostle, *the cup of blessing which we bless* (1 Cor. 10 : 16).

But, what form of blessing and giving of thanks Christ here used is not disclosed. Yet he accomodated the usual one of the ancient Synagogue when the passover was eaten to his purpose, and antique liturgies demonstrate that the ancient Church had their prayer in the consecration. Whence Romanists superstitiously place the form in making crosses in the air and in certain conceived and succeeding wodrs,—these four, or five, as an ancient interpreter judges, by having "For" added; *For this is my body*, faintly muttered. To this form they also ascribe a certain operative, hidden, yea, magical efficacy, which can miraculously change the substance. Since the words were delivered in the first person of Christ, by which the consecration then made is shown, but not in the third person of a servant by which that afterward to be made is shown: nor are these words of mutation, properly so, but of the declaration of that which was done. Because the preceding giving and receiving evince these which are of that which was done—not which ought to be done. For the use of a thing is posterior to it.

The third deed (which likewise was done for the eyes) is that *he broke* the bread taken and afterward blessed, since the Aorist tenses demand this order of the words of Christ. But he broke the bread after the manner of the orientals and not of the occidentals, by whom it is cut, it being of such a form, not thick but spread out and made like to a cake—that it might readily be broken. Likewise, also, the wine was poured out into the cup. And since it was the prerogative of the Father of a family first to taste and afterward distribute in the customary and indispensable rite, both peculiarities were observed. Nor did he break into parts only for distribution—nor was it poured out and poured in alone for drinking, but for a mystery and sacramental ceremony, as that by which his body may be signified, not indeed cut into pieces (John 19: 33, 36); but metaphorically broken by mental and bodily tortures: yea, indeed, lacerated by scourging, by the pricking of the thorny crown, by the nailing of the hands and feet—by the piercing of the side: and in fine—divided and dead by the shedding of his blood and the separation of the soul from the body. Whence by a metonymic change of words in both the breaking is ascribed to the body and shedding to the blood.

Wherefore Romanists and those who follow them in the distribution of the Eucharist, giving something entire in their little round wafers, have truly taken away, not without a violation of the sacrament, the rite of the breaking (of bread) thence from Christ and the apostles (1 Cor. 10: 17) continued in the primitive Church, as well as maintained among the orientals: that only having been retained by the Priests in their sacrifice of the Mass. Even Lutherans, who please themselves with the idea that to break, here means distribute, give an absurd interpretation, since it immediately follows, *and he gave unto them.*

The *fourth* deed (which relates to the touch) is, *and he gave to his disciples.* For he had taken and broken, that he might give, that is, he offered, he presented, both the bread and the cup to the hands, not the mouth, of his disciples. For food is not immediately conveyed to the mouth, save of the impotent. Receiving answers to this giving; and the apostle (1 Cor. 11) includes the omitted giving. And here the apostles occupy the place, not of pastors, but of the whole Church, since Christ is said to have given to them all: otherwise, if it is spoken with reference to the apostles alone, by what right has the Lord's Supper been made common to all?

Moreover, by this giving it is declared, that all sacraments, and therefore, this one, consist not only in their signification, but also in their application and use, and that by these sacred signs Christ is presented and given by God to be received and conferred by faith. But whilst he is said to have given to them, he thereby offered no sacrifice, for that is to give to God.

Whence it is truly manifest, that the sacrilege of Pontificians in the Mass is great, to feed the faithful by nothing more than a beholding of the bread and wine, which the Mass makers allow to themselves alone, and so make private what was instituted for the whole Church: Yea, verily, it is also idolatrous to elevate these for adoration.

To his deeds Christ also enjoined his *words* to the apostles, which are *προσαστιϰα*, that is, *preceptive*, *οριστιϰα*, that is, *indicative*, as also *νομοθετιϰα*, *legislative*, fixing the law, for all Christianity in every age, and declaring the use and the end, of this sacrament.

And he said (which pertains to the ears) *to his disciples*, is firstly spoken in general, as to the things that followed, by which the design of his acting might become known. For sacraments and sacramental actions, inasmuch as they grow out of the design, would be representations altogether insignificant and useless, unless connected. But he spoke intelligently, openly and clearly, using language not foreign but paternal and customary, that these things might be understood and perceived by all. In another respect this muttering would have been to no purpose. Indeed, the voice of speaking—having relation to the mandate that followed, according to the Hebrew idiom, especially avails the same thing as he ordered, he proclaimed.

Therefore, Papists, who, after the manner of magicians and charmers, mutter these words, *Hoc est enim corpus meum*, towards the bread and cup—that are insensible creatures and incapable of being spoken to—and utter these silently and in an unknown tongue, contrary to the apostle (1 Cor. 14: 6, &c.), do any thing rather than perform this sacred mystery.

In the next place he orders (what regards the touch) *Take*—including them all—both this bread and this cup which I hold in my hand and give you into your hands—not likewise by the mouth. Because the propriety of the word *take* necessarily requires the receiving of the thing offered with the hand, just as *eat*, *drink*, relate to that receiving which is made by the mouth. Besides the method of putting into the mouth is not suitable for adults—nor the form of reclining, by which he could not conveniently come to the mouths of those lying around in a circle. It is not accordant with the practice of the ancient Church, nor of the modern, out of the Roman. But it is not a sacrifice, since they were offered to be received by the apostles and were not offered to God. And yet in this command made to the faithful about taking, is as it were, the conveying of Christ into the power of the hands and also the perception of Christ by faith, which is the hand of the soul. (John 1: 11, 12.)

Therefore Papalists do superstitiously, who introduce private masses, when the sacrificer standing by the altar alone eats and drinks—in opposition to Christ and antiquity. As also they papalize with them who deny to the hands of the faithful what they put to their mouth: as if the hands are more impure than the mouth, which are in the faithful equally sanctified (Matth. 15 : 18. James 3 : 10): and, as if the hands of those who administer were purer than those of the rest of the Church. They thus very much obscure the operation of faith. Moreover whilst they determine it is a sacrifice, what else is that than not to distinguish between to give and receive?

Afterward he says, (what concerns the smell and taste) *eat and drink ye all of it*—that is to say, he commanded them to take that they might eat the bread and drink the wine. The sense is, put it in the mouth, chew, masticate and mash it with the teeth; and put the cup to the mouth, drink the wine and commit them to the stomach for digestion and nourishment. By this their innermost use is designed and signified—that Christ, to believing souls, or those receiving him by faith, as by a hand, and as it were, eating and drinking him in their mouth (which metaphor the Holy Spirit uses in different places, John 4: 14 and 6: 51, 53), serves for spiritual and heavenly meat and drink, as truly as that on which we feed serves to nourish, cherish, strengthen and increase the body.

Besides, all these plurals, *take*, *eat*, *drink*, and expressly of the cup *drink ye all of it*, which analogically also is to be understood of the bread, except that that which is spoken of the bread as it is divided, is spoken of the cup as one which allows no division except according to each one's draught, by the common command, denote equal communion of each element, and not the private, but the public necessity of the receiving of each, and expressly of the cup.

This bread, therefore, contrary to the use divinely prescribed, and the ancient Church, is not to be elevated for adoration, as if it were some divinity, to be included in a bowl (*ciborio ?*), to be kept in a chest or a small idolatrous closet, among shows (Monstratiis ?) as they call them, made of gold and silver to be exhibited, and to be publicly carried about in parades, after the Persian manner, or conveyed around the fields, as Papalists do. Moreover, private masses, one apart by himself devouring, and the withholding of the cup from the Laity, and the conveyance of its benefit even to the dead, to whom it belongs not to eat or drink—are so many abuses and profanations of the Lord's Supper.

The obedience of the disciples responds and succeeds to this command, in the taking of the bread and wine, as well as in their assumption or eating and drinking, which is included in the command, and Mark shows in the cup, when he says, *they all drank of it*, which in like manner is to be understood of the bread, that there the taking implies the command of drinking. And these words Mark relates as spoken before those, *This is the blood of the New Testament*, &c., but that is not unusual that mystic actions should be performed before it is understood or explained what they mean, as we see was done in the washing of feet. (John 13 : 4, 12.) Whatever it is, whether the order of the words is here right, or a hysterology is in them, matters little or nothing as to the subject matter.

Subjoined to these words of Christ, are those that are *οριστικα* indicative, or declaring and defining the thing signified, and the promise added to the external symbols, in which is the internal matter of the Lord's Supper, when he says, *This is my body*, to which Luke adds, *which is given for you*, and Paul, *which is broken for you :* and to *this* (hoc or hic) (for which Luke has *this cup*, and also Paul) Matthew adds, *for*, which also is understood in the preceding clause, *my blood of the New Testament*, or, as Luke and Paul, *the New Testament in my blood.* Matthew and Mark add, *which for many*, Luke has it, *for you*, is shed; Matthew, besides, *for* the remission of sins.

By the above deeds and orders, whilst he was taking that bread and cup—the one broken but the other poured out and was offering them to be taken and received by the disciples, is declared what mystery Christ would have intended by the external elements and actions, that is, what other thing is to be considered by the mind and faith—that his broken body and shed blood are to be taken and received for spiritual food and drink. So that the sense is, as if it had been in so many words enunciated. This bread, which I have broken, is my broken body, and the cup or that which is in the cup is my shed blood, and so what I have given you and ye are commanded to take, to eat and drink, is to give and take, to eat and drink my body and blood.

These words, moreover, because they may be obscured by various interpretations, some, hence, extracting *συνουσιαν*, consubstantiation, others, *μετουσιαν*, transubstantiation, are to be the more carefully considered as to the simple truth which they assert. And first, *the subject* of that which is enunciated, that is, *this*, then, that which is the predicate, namely *the body and blood* and what is declared of each; thirdly, the copula or chain, *is;* fourthly, *the whole enunciation;* lastly, the ratiocinative *particle, for*, and the connexion of these words with the preceding.

The subject, therefore, is *τουτο*, *this*, a demonstrative adjective; which marks the thing, as truly existing and present, as if with a pointed finger; of the neuter gender which requires a substantive to which it is related, and often has one adjoined, as *this passover*, *this fruit of the vine.* (Matth. 26.) But since *ουτος* is not spoken with the former member relating to bread, (panis), but *τουτο*—it can be rendered in each member, *τουτο*, *is my flesh* or *body*, and *τουτο*, *is my blood.* For as the Greeks and Latins put neuters absolutely, so also do the Hebrews feminines, and after the manner of demonstratives, as for instance, what would be expressed in Latin, *haec res.* And it chiefly has this use since besides being demonstrative, it is also a relative to the antecedent noun or fact, as Ex. 8 : 18, *this is the finger of God.* 1 Pet. 2 : 19.

This is the grace of God, (Luke 22 : 17,) *Take this*, and 19, *Do this*—the neuter τουτο, being used in each instance ; or they refer suppositum, ad oppositum, in the same gender, as grammarians say, as also the Hebrews do. Virgil, sed revocare gradum, &c., hoc opus, hic labor est; (John 17,) to know the only true God, haec vita æterna est. So also it can be said, hoc est corpus meum, hic est sanguis meus. The Hebrews also here use often, in place of a demonstrative pronoun a demonstrative adverb, HEN and HINNE, that is *lo* and *behold*. So Paul, (Heb. 9 : 20), interprets that of Moses, (Ex. 24 : 8., Behold the blood of the covenant.) This is the blood of the testament. So (John 19), Behold thy mother, behold thy son, that is, this (Mary) is thy mother, this (John) is thy son.

Therefore, τουτο, (this in the neuter) signifies the same as *haec res*, (this thing expressed by the Latins in the feminine) of which mention was before made, that is to say, hic panis and hoc vinum, this bread and this wine—the hic and the hoc, or the this and this having relation to the bread and wine and serving to indicate them as with a pointed finger. For at the very first Luke and the apostle expressly say, *hoc poculum*, this cup, so nevertheless that the containing is used for the contained, after a manner of speaking trite and common in all languages ; for it is said, Drink ye all of it, and I will not drink of the fruit of the vine.

Hence that is understood which Jesus took into his hands, blessed, with an accusative case, Hebraically, broke, gave to the disciples, and which he ordered to be taken and imbibed : but that was bread and wine; as grammatic construction facts. For all those verbs are of transitive signification, demand the fourth case and produce that which in that place is not another. Fixed logical reason accedes. The proposition is, ye ought to eat and drink *this*, *in the fourth case*, that is, the bread and wine, (panem et vinum), because *this* is my body and blood. Otherwise, the ratiocination which is indicated by the particle *for*, could not be proper, if it might be referred to any thing else, nor could there be a connexion of the terms. Finally, Paul (1 Cor. 10), takes away all controversy whilst he says, The bread which we break and the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the body and blood of Christ, for we being many are one bread, one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread, and (1 Cor. 11), as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup. By these passages it is evinced that bread and wine, and indeed true bread and wine, are pointed out by the demonstrations *hoc et hic*.*

It is foolish, therefore, because it is not *ουτος*, but *τουτο*, to refer that, as Carolstadt imagined, to *σωμα*, the body reclining at the table and which the apostles were perceiving with their eyes, since it is afterward said, This cup is the New Testament, &c. This would be nothing else than to overthrow the reason (rationem), peculiar to a subject or sacrament. In like manner, it is a perversion of the terms, because of the article *το*, added to *σωμα*, which marks the subject (as John 1: 1, *θεος ην ο λογος* and 4: 16, *πνευμα ο θεος*, so to construct the words with Swenkfeld, *my body is this*, that is to say, what the bread broken and eaten up is, or, in other words, spiritual and heavenly meat—so that it does not point to the external bread, nor does it show what the bread is, but what the body of Christ is, which construction this passage of John 6, serves to strengthen, the bread which I will give unto you is my flesh, and my flesh is meat indeed, &c. For the article *τουτο*, includes the bread, and in the following member of the sentence, it is, *τουτο το ποτηριον*, *this cup*, with the article *το*. But in John the word bread is to be metaphorically taken. Yet we deny not that even here in the word bread, a metaphor is comprehended, although not immediately; and in truth these propositions are reciprocal.

Neither, as Thomas wills, is to be understood with Pontificians, Transubstantiators by *Hoc* an indefinite inseparable something. For *Hoc* points out something certain and present. Or, something particular or individual of a more general substance, which may produce the same with what is predicated, or be substituted for the same, as Scotus speaks, so that the things which are signified by the subject and the attribute, may not differ from one another, except by the various reason (ratione) of conceiving, so that the sense is, This that is contained under the appearances of the bread and wine is my body and blood. For so the ennunciation would be identical with the subject itself (re ipsa) and an overthrowing of the sign. Or, even that which the bread and wine were before. For the words having at length been uttered, the bread and wine are made and so are the body and blood of the Lord—according to the prevailing sentiment of Pontificians. Nor finally, are the appearances or accidents of bread and wine, the color, the smell, the taste, the figure, to be understood, for that is in very deed to take away the verity of signs and substitute what are phantastical and delusory—denying that the substance remains, and having them dangling in the air.

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* Answering to the English this, in the masculine and neuter genders.

Nor with Consubstantiatists or Impanatists (to which sentiment very many Scholastics incline, such as Scotus and Aliaco, &c., being about to embrace it, had not the authority of the Lateran Synod, held in the year 1215, restrained them ; whence also Luther borrowed it) by *hoc* shall be signified, in, with, or under this, or *hic*, that is, the bread and body, the wine and the blood : since bread is not suitable for taking up into it the body, nor can the body go under it, each being compact and unlike, and the wine is not something under which another liquid can lie concealed, each one occupying its own limit and mingling with itself. Further, because the comprehension of the thing under another, is not here borne in mind, but its signification and exhibition, that is, not where, or under what, is the body and blood of the Lord, which is to make a predicate out of the subject, but what is that bread and wine.

The attribute is the body and blood of Christ, that is, his flesh and gore, which are dead, as in John 6. The Syrian every where renders it PAGRA, that is, cadaver, a dead body. And here indeed, it is said, of the Testament or covenant. A testament being put for a covenant according to the interpretation of the Seventy, as the compound word *διατιθεσθαι*, is used for, to covenant (Luke 22: 29, 30), although here a testamental covenant is understood—to each of which death takes place for the confirmation of each—there, of the victim, (whence it is said to strike a covenant)—here of the Testator, to which the apostle alludes. (Heb. 9: 16.) And it is said, *of the new*, the old being put in opposition to it: that of the new consisting in the reconciliation of an offended God and of miserable men and the saving promise through the proper blood of Christ set forth, not another blood, as was that of the Old Testament. Therefore, the blood of the New Testament is that by which it was agreed to and ratified. Or it is said, *the New Testament in the blood of Christ*, as Luke and Paul have it, by the same, that is, by the customary mode of speaking among the Hebrews, in which the particle *in* notes the instrument and mode, that is to say, as having been established by blood: and these are promiscuously used by the evangelists, because blood and the New Testament are most intimately conjoined.

Moreover, this is added to the blood rather than to the body, by way of efficiency (for it is not said the body of the New Testament, or the New Testament in the body), not that each does not concur with regard to the reason of the New Testament. For a covenant was also ratified by the immolation of the body, but because the extreme passion, death, of Christ, is the more evident in the shedding of his blood. And truly allusion was made to the words of Moses, (Ex. 24) repeated by Paul (Heb. 9: 20). *Behold the blood of the covenant which God hath enjoined unto you.*

An *exegesis*, or *explication*, is added to each attribute; concerning the body indeed, *which is given for you*, that is delivered up as (John 6: 51) (the present being used for the paulopost future, for the purpose of indicating the time as at hand, as also the certainty of the affair and of faith, by the usual kind of speaking, John 10: 17. Luke 22: 22),—

that is to say, unto death, and as Paul, is *broken*, metaphorically, that is, will be affixed, immolated, slain, by a separation of the soul from the body: in which there is an allusion to the breaking of bread. But concerning the blood, *which is shed for you*, by the same enallage of tense—that is to say, on the cross, not in the cup, although the words of Luke, if you look at the construction, refer to the cup, but if you consider the very thing, they refer to the blood, so that it is a manifest solecism, which Hebraism is not unusual in Scripture (as Luke 5: 10, &c.); and that too, *for you and many*, that is to say, for those who were about to believe in future, for without shedding of blood there is no remission (Heb. 9: 22). And, for like reason, that asserted is also to be transferred from this member to the other.

Therefore, truly, *the natural body* which reclined at the table with the disciples, about to be seized, crucified, delivered up to death, and the blood which was then in the veins and after a little time to be shed, is, each, understood. Not, therefore, a body, metaphorical, incircumscribed, phantastic, spiritual, invisible, impalpable, illocal, yea, as consubstantialists wish, ubiquitous and impanated, and as transubstantiators would maintain, transubstantiated out of bread—that is a body not a body.

But although in sacred Scripture, body and blood, (blood being taken for the life which is in the blood, Gen. 9: 4), are sometimes taken for the whole man, (Heb. 2: 14), yea, synecdochically for the incarnate Son of God, or for the person of the Son of God, (John 6: 53,) (by which will be signified that whole Christ sets forth his whole self to us and that our whole selves have communion with him), nevertheless, this is not the only nor the proper end of his manner of speaking. Verily then the body and blood, as parts of a whole, are considered conjunctly and not disjunctively, as is done in this place.

Therefore, *Christ* here is considered not simply and absolutely as *man*, also he is to be considered as God-man, but under a certain acceptation and condition, that is to say, as a man in a low estate and indeed in an extreme stage of lowness, that is as crucified and dead; but not as alive and glorious, that is, obnoxious to no afflictions and mundane affections and death, any more, and so not to be called down from above to these beggarly elements of the world. (Rom. 10 : 6.)

That, moreover, is verified by these evident reasons: 1. Because the species—the bread, and that not moistened by dipping, but dry, and the wine—naturally separated—are taken by Christ from their position and use—to designate the separation of his body and blood: 2. Because that both the body and blood thus separated are set forth, which in a living and glorious state are united: 3. Because it is said of the body itself, *which is given and broken for you*, as also of the blood, *which is shed*, so that the bloodless body is indicated, and the blood without the veins—which are called by the Latins flesh and gore: 4. Because it is called the *blood of the Testament or covenant*, or the Testament or covenant or blood, inasmuch as it is confirmed by the shedding of blood and by death: 5. Because it is considered as a sacrifice, which relates to the killing in sacrifice and death of a living creature: 6. Because flesh and blood are here afforded for a complete feast, consisting in spiritual eating and drinking. For it is said of the bread, which he called his body, *Eat*, and, of the wine, which he called his blood, *Drink.* But truly no one eats a perfect or living animal, but that which is dead, nor does any one drink blood that is in the veins, but at least that which has been shed. And, finally, because Christ orders it to be done to his *remembrance*, which the apostle interprets of his death, (1 Cor. 11 : 26). The death, he says, of the Lord ye will show till he comes.

Wherefore Pontificians, and others, over and above, and contrary to the mind of Christ, here consider Christ promiscuously, humble as well as glorious; inasmuch as it is not suitable to the glorious state to bring Christ back again to earth and the beggarly elements of the world. Moreover by their own act they contradict themselves, since they impress upon their wafers or hosts, an image of Christ crucified.

Thus, in fine, *Christ himself*, and indeed humble, and dead, is understood, that together with himself *the merits of his death*, his benefits and gifts, virtue, efficacy, that is to say, remission of sins, righteousness and eternal life, may be comprehended. (John 6 : 51, 52, 53, 54.) Whence it is subjoined, *which is given and broken and shed for the remission of sins*, and thus, (Matth. 26 : 29. Luke 22 : 29, 30.) For these three things must be inseparably conjoined, Christ —his death and promised benefits—and their efficacy. Whence they do not deliver the truth with sufficient fulness who interpret by the body and blood, the merit and efficacy only.

The *copula* or link by which the predicate is connected with the subject, is the substantive verb *εστι*, *is*. The Hebrews, since they are destitute of a present participle in the HAIA, which is to them in the place of the present verb, except that they sometimes use IESCII, have that understood, or they use pronouns in its place, and for the third person, HU, *ipse*—that is to say, this itself my body, which is equivalent to is. Luke also, in the other clause concerning the cup, omits the same word, which also prevails among the Latins when a demonstrative word is placed first. But Paul has it in full. And since its use is to conjoin the subject with the predicate in a proposition, as well as to show after what manner they are mutually affected, it is in this manner, and not tropically, to be understood. But it by the present tense indicates what the *subject matter* (res) is, and its present existence, not what it may be made, not any action or undergoing (passionem) of the subject matter : which is indicated by, let it be made, or be it, and it was made (Matth. 4 : 3. John 2 : 9) ; so that it is, *the bread is, that is,* truly *exists* my body, &c.

Wherefore truly, Pontificians act irrationally who attribute to the word *is* a practical or energetical, that is, operative efficacy : and, in very fact, they interpret *is*, is transubstantiated : and others, is consubstantiated, or conjoined or sacramentally united, which they will have it to be, not only really, but also substantially : inasmuch as the language is about that which is—not about that which is made (de esse non de fieri).

So much about the several words out of which *these propositions* rise: these are moreover those, as far as the external discourse is considered, which are *figurative* or *tropical*, as appears from the connexion of the predicate with the subject. Not that the trope is in the whole sentence (for the trope pertains to a word) but that it relates to the whole sentence. For words, of themselves, are not tropical, but conjoined into a sentence, where results the trope. For the cause of a trope is one thing—its seat another. These three things are to be considered: First, whether there is a trope in those words of the Lord: Next, where it is, or what is the seat of the trope: and finally, what it is and of what sort.

That there is indeed *a trope*, is confirmed from the cause of a trope, and First, from the reason (ratione) of the subject. For bread and wine are the subject, not the body or blood of the Lord under those species, as Papists claim, or under, with, in, bread and wine, as Luther (ex Cameracensi); as was before proved, of which it cannot properly be said, that they are the body and blood of Christ, since a contradiction would be involved. For they are different; of which the one cannot be the other, no, not indeed by the omnipotence of God, as Scotus says, and of which it may be affirmed that they cannot properly be mutually predicated of each other.

In the next place, from that which has been predicated, for the body and blood here are the broken body and shed blood, that is Christ humble and dead, and indeed in a state such as was not yet, and now is no more, nor can be. But truly nothing can be changed into that, or substantially conjoined with that, and for that cause be properly called, what in very fact it was not yet, nor any more is, nor can be. Otherwise a contradiction would be involved. For his same self would be such like, and not such like, that is to say, humble and glorious, dead and alive. Wherefore the mode of speaking is improper, and true, to them, a view of the subject-matter as about to be, to us, by a remembrance of it as past.

Moreover, that there is a trope is confirmed, because the cup, that is, that which is in the cup, is called Testament or covenant, or Testamental covenant in blood, which cannot be said of the chalice or wine, moreover of the blood indeed, inasmuch as that it is properly a testament or covenant: for they belong to different categories. In like manner by a similar reason (ratione) of speaking the apostle (1 Cor. 10) calls the bread and wine the communion of the body and blood of Christ, and, For we being many are one bread and one body. Therefore there is a manifest Trope.

It answers to a trope, because Christ orders that to be done to his remembrance and memory, and the apostle, ye do show forth the death of the Lord till he comes, which could not be truly said, if the bread and wine were properly and substantially, or under their species, the body and blood of the Lord; since it is not the memory of a subject-matter present—nor could he be said to be about to come, who is substantially present.

Finally, this tropical phraseology is very common in Sacraments. So it is said, Circumcision is a covenant of God, which presently is a token of the covenant, (Gen. 17) and by Paul it is called a seal of the righteousness of faith, (Rom 4). The lamb killed is the passover, (Ex. 12). The rock of which the Israelites drank was Christ, (1 Cor. 10), where a comparison is instituted with the Lord's Supper, &c.

We here have the Fathers agreeing with us, who say, that the bread and wine,—*suo more,* in a manner peculiar to itself, Prosp. in Sentent. quodammodo, Augustin in Psal. 33 juxta quendam modum, after a certain manner, Idem epist. 33, ad Bonif. quasi and tanquam, as if, as it were, —are the body and blood, Chrysost. de Eucharistia in Encaen, and Homil. 34 in Johan. and mystery or sacrament, Chrysost., in an unfinished work, Homil. II., not the true body, but the mystery of the body, he says, August. ad Bonif. 23, Epist. the type or figure, Tertull. against Marc., book 4, August. ad Psal. 3, Ambros. de. Sacram. lib. 4, cap. 5, antitype or pattern, Nazianz. in Apolog. Basil in Anaphore Syra. Maca. Hom. 27, Symbol. Dionysius, Clemens Alexand. Origen. Theod. Dial. 1., sign. August. cont. Adlimant. c. 12, image and likeness, Gelas cont. Eutych, pledge, Hier. in ad, 1 Cor. 11, of the body and blood of the Lord. Moreover, that it is the body and blood in a mystery, Prosp. in Sentet., not, he says, in the verity of the subject-matter, but in a mystery signifying it, in a sign, or through a sign, August. contra. Adim. c. 12, in signification or by signification, August. in Levitic. 9 : 57, by similitude, Ambros. de Sacram. lib. 4, c. 5, by appellation, Chrysost. ad Caesar. Morach. Besides, that they sign or signify Ambros. ad 1 Cor. 11, that they represent, Tertull. con. Marc. lib. 4. The body and blood, &c. and Augustinus elegantly l. 3. c. 16, de Doctr. Christ., and other Fathers, as Clemens Alexand. August. de Doctr. Christ., say that it is a Figurative and allegoric mode of speaking.

Concerning the seat of the trope, there is a variety of sentiments among the Orthodox, although they generally accord in the principal point of the subject-matter. Some will have it that there is a trope in no part, neither in the subject, nor in the predicate, nor in the copula. For these severally are to be properly understood. But, that the predication is Figurative. So Beza after Zanchius. Crellius opposes a Logical figurative proposition to that which is Rhetorical and places that in the whole enunciation, this in the word. But since the Logical belongs to the mind and internal reason, not to the language, there is no figurative predication of it, but only the figure of a Rhetorical mode of speaking, And although its cause is from the attribution, its seat, nevertheless, is in some or other and certain part.

Others, therefore, place the trope in the subject, or in the demonstrative word *Hoc this*, as Bucer, so that by this is signified the bread with the body, and the wine with the blood, on account of a sacramental union, by which means, however, it is not nececessary that both the one and the other should be constituted substantially present, but only really, so that the bread and the wine may be demonstrated to the sense, the body and blood of the Lord to the mind. And they say that it is so done in all modes of speaking by which imperceptible and absent things are promised and set forth by signs—therefore the sense may have been; *Hoc*, *this*, which I give you by this sign, is my body, &c. But there is no mention of the body before made, as is shown by *Hoc*, *this*, and the declaration of that union is first made by these words.

Others put the trope in the word *is*, taken for signifies—doing so after the Batavian Honius, whom Zuinglius preceded as to this sentiment. And truly *is*, among other significations, is not seldom understood for signifies, as when interpreting words from one tongue into another we say, *that is*, what avails the same, signifies. (Matth 1: 23.) And it is understood of things, the seven ears and the seven kine are seven years, (Gen. 40: 13, 19, and 41: 26), the seed is the word of God, the field is the world, (Matth. 13: 37, 38), the seven stars are the seven angels, &c., the many waters are many people, (Rev. 1: 20, and 17: 15.) Also, it is taken for to be like, as I am that bread, the true vine, the door. John is Elias, Herod is a Fox. In these places a metaphor is in the predicate. Under this head also they refer those sacramental modes of speaking, Circumcision is the Covenant, the Lamb is the Passover, the Rock was Christ, the Cup is the New Testament. Nevertheless these convey not only signification and similitude, but obsignation and exhibition. But *is*, has in part the rationem (reason) of the predicate, in part that of the copula, when such is the case, as is evident from a resolution of the word.

Others, finally, place the trope with Oecolampadius, in the word of body and blood, and then *is*, will only be a vinculum, and the sense will be, bread and wine is the symbol, the seal, the obsignation, pledge, earnest, representation, of the body and blood. This sentiment is corroborated by this very firm argument: Into whatever part the analysis or resolution of the tropical mode of speaking falls into that which is proper, in that is the trope: But that truly falls into the words of body and blood, the nominative case being changed, not the oblique. For as Circumcision is the covenant, is resolved into that it is the sign of the covenant, so bread and wine is the body and blood, is resolved into that proper part, it is the communion of the body and blood of the Lord, not whereby bread has, but whereby the faithful have communion with the body of Christ. Therefore the trope is rightly placed in the predicate.

It does not, however, thence follow, that the verity of the body and blood of Christ is taken away from the Supper—and that a tropical and symbolical body and blood are introduced, contrary to that, This is my body which is broken for you, this is my blood which is shed for you, which argument indeed, after Scotus, Pontificians, and they who follow Luther, urge as deserving to bear the palm. But it is one thing, that there is a trope in the word of body, and another that the body is tropical; the symbol of a body is one thing—and a symbolical body is another thing. That leaves the verity of the body—this takes it away. And truly by a trope of this kind is not denied what is, but another thing besides is added to it, as signifying, and each is included. Whence Cajatanus against Thomas rightly answers to an argument of Scotus: But the true body is not taken away although a trope is accounted to have its place, as when it is said, the Rock was Christ, that is, a symbol of the true Christ, about to be born in future of the Virgin Mary, to be crucified, to be slain, &c. So also here, for it is one thing to inquire what the predicate is, and another, after what manner that is in the subject.

But it is hence also clear that the *kind of trope* is, so to speak, a metonomy, which also Augustin acknowledges, the thing signified being moreover put for the sign, and indeed being analogical, that is, sustaining a proportionated likeness to the thing signified. For, as Augustin says, unless sacraments should have a likeness of those things of which they are sacraments, they would not truly be sacraments. Nor that alone, but they are signs of this sort with which the body and blood of the Lord, the things signified are present, conjoined and united after a manner that is peculiar (suo modo) (sacramentally it is granted, that is, really indeed, to wit, *χελιxως*, *respectively*, agreeably to a peculiar constitution, but not substantially); yea are changed, as the Fathers speak, not in their very substance and nature, but in their condition, use and function. Moreover, they are, as it were, vehicles, instruments, through which is exhibited or offered to all, but is conveyed to the believing, is given and by the faithful is taken the very body and blood of Christ; which is proper and natural to a sacrament. In a phrase of the same kind the apostle says, the gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one who believeth, and the bread which we break, that is the breaking and eating of the bread, is the communion of the body of Christ.

Whence Christ, instead of being disposed to use the proper kind of speaking, preferred to say, This is my body, and this is my blood, improperly attributing to the bread and wine the name of body and blood, and of the latter *in it* which is something, as if the enunciation was essential, to wit, for clear signification, on account of the great likeness and analogy of these signs to the thing signified, for the sake of the sealing, confirmation, certainty, greater certainty, setting forth and giving of the thing signified by these signs (for these words have the included promise of the thing made by God added to the external signs, which from God's part is offered to all, on our part is received by faith) which emphasis and energy of sentence no proper enunciation whatever distantly approaches. And in this sacramental *σχεσει* and habitude, the essential form of the dominical supper consists.

On which account, Pontificial transubstantiators and others, who are consubstantialists, asserting these things to have been properly enunciated, are grievously deceived.

Nor do they themselves truly say that which Scripture says, as their interpretation shows. For it is not inquired what is made out of the bread, or where the body is or hides and where the blood of Christ, whether under the naked appearances, whether under the bread and wine, which in very deed is to make subjects out of predicates. And then since by *this* they understand either the external appearances of bread and wine, as the former or the latter, bread and wine, and comprehend the body and blood of the Lord as contained under them—necessarily they both introduce into the subject the trope of synecdoche. And finally since to these very things they besides attribute the reason of the signs, without which nothing is a sacrament, which cannot be done without certain words of the institution (for the signs are from what is instituted) which words declare the act of him who signifies, which are not other even out of their own mind than, This is my body, this is my blood, that the reason of the predicate may be suitable to the subject, willing or unwilling, they have necessarily to acknowledge a metonomy in the predicate, unless they overturn the whole manner of a sacrament and sign.

Finally in these words of Christ is *αιτιολογια*, a connexion of these enunciations with the preceding command, which is explained by the ratiocinative particle *for:* which indeed is omitted in what is previously enunciated of the bread, but is expressed in the other concerning the cup, whence also there it is to be supplied, as the translator has done. Christ had said, eat this bread and drink this wine, or *this*, in the accusative case, because *this* in the nominative case, is my body and blood, where *this*, in both places notes the same thing, that it may be the connexion of the terms in the syllogism: and for that cause, eat and drink this, because to eat and drink this, is to eat and drink my body. And thus the sublimity of this mystery is declared and its necessity.

What however they thence infer—therefore the body of the Lord is eaten with the mouth and his blood drunk (because an oral eating and drinking of that is commanded, which is the body and blood of the Lord, which is the chief argument for oral eating and drinking—by no means follows, but this only—that the bread is eaten and the wine drunk (as syntax demands that; for there is no other accusative case with which, eat ye, can be construed) which are after a manner peculiar to themselves (suo modo) the Lord's body and blood. Moreover as to all those acts of Christ and such as have been prescribed by the disciples, one thing is metaphorically and synedochically intended and ordered for the sense, another for the mind. For as bread is called the body and wine the blood of Christ, so to take, to eat this bread and to drink this wine, they are so to be corporally received, that they also may be spiritually understood.

What remains is *Νομοθεσια*, the legislation, made for the Universal Church to the end of time, and ratified into a perpetual law, in these words: This do in remembrance of me, which Luke has as to the former enunciation, and Paul as to both—adding besides to the latter, as oft as ye drink; whence as to the former it should likewise be supplied, as oft as ye eat.

Christ, moreover, in that sacred action, addresses the apostles as pastors and dispensers of his mysteries, and representing his person, as well as representing the whole assembly of the faithful, because he commands, This do, where This is not referred to the body and blood, and to that which he had said he would suffer; but to all that which the Lord had done about the bread and cup; to the whole, I say, that preceded, to wit, what you have here seen me, the founder of the feast do, that also I command to be done by you, the guests.

Therefore, as my ministers, do ye this, that is, by a perpetual rite, take the bread, bless the bread, or invoke a blessing upon it, and break it, give and say in my name, This is my body, or Christ's; also the cup, &c. In like manner, ye that commune, do ye this, that is, take, eat, drink, which is manifest from this that Paul accommodates these things not to pastors alone, but chiefly to the whole Church of the Corinthians, so that to do is interpreted, eat, and drink, whilst he thus relates the words of Christ, This also as oft as ye drink, &c., and *αναλογως*, as oft as ye eat. The same is the more evident from the added aetiology, For as often as ye eat and drink, &c. And it is clear from the conclusion, Therefore whosoever shall eat and drink, &c., where the necessity of obedience is made imperative upon all the faithful, and the liberty of the Church is shown in the frequentation of the Dominical Supper.

Whence it is truly apparent how foolishly Papalists talk, who place in these words the foundation of the Missatic sacrifice, taking to do for the sacrifice, because it is so taken both by the Greeks (*ποιειν θυσιαν*) and by the Latins (facere seu operari) as, Cum faciam vitulâ, &c. Virg. But then it is joined with the ablative of the thing: whereas, by the Hebrews, it is connected with the accusative case of the thing which is offered for a sacrifice (Num. 28 : 6), and that too with the design annexed—for a sacrifice. But this phraseology, This do, is never taken in that sense, but always demonstrates the action going before, to wit, what ye see me do. And truly Christ did not then offer himself under the appearances of bread and wine, but said that he must be offered up. Otherwise he had twice offered himself, once in the bread and wine, and again on the altar of the cross: which is absurd.

To this command, furthermore, is added the universal *end* of the Dominical Supper, as it must be administered and used, in commemoration or remembrance of me, which Paul interprets, in memory of my death, For, he says, as oft as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye will show forth the Lord's death, that is, ye will celebrate with the profession of faith and the giving of thanks, till he come, that is, again appear to judge the quick and dead. By this last advent he limits the duration of the age, and declares that the use of the Dominical Supper will be perpetual. With this end also, another very illustrious one is to be conjoined, namely, union and communion with Christ, and the participation of all his benefits, which Paul opens (1 Cor. 10 : 16, 17), for, he says, we being many are one bread, one body; (12: 13) And have all been made to drink into one spirit.

But as this remembrance and showing forth of Christ's death is its end, so by the apostle Paul, its worthy use is limited by a preceding probation of each one for himself, that is to say, whether he is in the faith (2 Cor. 13 : 5) and is affected with a serious repentance, according to that of Paul, But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup. By this private exploration of himself—his public one is not taken away from others, but is established. On the contrary, abuse exists, and he eats and drinks unworthily, who discerns not the body (and therefore also the blood) of the Lord (29), that is, does not distinguish both symbols, this bread and this cup, which are, by sacramental *σχεσει*, (habitude), the body of the Lord and his blood, from common bread and wine, does not distinguish the taking of them, between the one and the other, that is to say, the sacred from the profane, according to that verse (34), And if any man hunger let him eat at home, that ye come not together unto condemnation: and on that account despises and affects with ignominy the body itself which is truly offered; and accordingly on account of the atrocious injury thus brought upon Christ, becomes guilty of the body and blood of the Lord, (27) and eats and drinks judgment to himself, that is, procures for himself the penalty of judgment in the scourges of God and in death itself, (29, 30.)

Thence from Matthew and Mark is added the notice of Christ about his departure and the new celestial life in which he was about to have them as partakers, whilst he says, But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom. These words in Luke are referred to the Paschal feast. Whether they are recited in their order and place by them, or twice repeated by Christ, is uncertain. At least they must be referred in common and analogically to each, both the Paschal and Sacramental feast.

What here in Matthew and Mark is *but*, in Luke is *for*, as a reason is given why he represents that cup as abolished (*απολυτικον*). By *fruit of the vine* wine is paraphrastically understood, after which manner it is here called even after consecration and reception. And more than that, the same is also analogically understood of the bread, as is evident from Luke. Besides he says that he will no more eat and drink of this (specifically) in common from the subsequent word, *with you*, repeated. Therefore himself had drunk with them and previously tasted before that he offered them to his own. For himself so willed to initiate and consecrate in himself this sacrament, as before in the instance of Baptism. And this also had a peculiar signification in it, to wit, that of death. (Matth. 20 : 22, and 26: 39.) He next places a limit of that abstinence, whilst he says, *from this time* or *any more.* He indeed drank, after the resurrection, with the apostles, (Acts 1: 4, and 10 : 41), but economically, not after the customary manner of the present life, but for the purpose of producing faith in the resurrection. The repitition he truly indicates whilst he says, until I shall drink that new—that is, another. So new tongues. (Mark 16: 17.) Luke calls other or different from the customary. But it is understood like to that, and passes over from the proper to the metaphorical, so that it is the same and not the same, as Christ often does. (John 3: 13, and 6: 27, 32, &c.) It is added *with you*—they having been taken into the same condition and fruition of blessedness signified by drinking; and that too, *in the kingdom of my Father*, withdrawing them from the kingdom of grace to the kingdom of glory, and declaring *the ultimate end* of this Sacrament. (Luke 22: 29, 30.)

Finally, giving of thanks is subjoined, and when he had sung a hymn, they went out unto the Mount of Olives. Understand, Christ leading and the apostles uniting in the song. What that hymn may have been is not related. Burgensis notes it to have been the 113th Psalm, with the five following, which are called by the Hebrews, even at the present day, the great Halleluja, that is, great hymn, which, in their yearly festivals, especially those of the passover, they were wont to chant. What if we may refer to that illustrious supplication (John 17)? Truly Christ, both beginning and ending this sacred performance, by the giving of thanks, has left an example to the Church in the action or use of this Sacrament.

And this is our plain and full sentiment about the Lord's Supper out of the word of God, in which we have unfolded and asserted the integrity and verity of the signs and the thing signified, their characteristic (*σχετιηνιν*) association (conjunctionem) and union, also their use and efficacy. These things can suffice modest capacities, serve for the consolation of the faithful, and put bounds to controversy among brethren; if prejudice is absent and the desire of contending—which evils, the Church of God has not (1 Cor. 11; 16) and become not the pious, (Philip. 2: 3).

Clemens Alexand. in Paedag. lib. 2 c. 2. Himself also used wine, for himself also was man; and he blessed the wine, when he said, Take, drink, this is my blood. The Word, the blood of the vine, which is shed for many for the remission of sins, allegorically signifies a holy flowing of joy. And presently: But what the wine was, which was blessed, he again showed, saying to the disciples, I will not drink of the fruit of this vine, until I shall have drunk it with you in the kingdom of my Father.

Cyprianus in Sermone de Unct. Christi. The Lord gave on the table on which he participated of the last feast with the apostles, with his own hands the bread and wine, but the body he delivered to the hands of the soldiers to be wounded on the cross, that the sincere verity having been impressed upon the apostles and the true sincerity might each be shown to the nations, how wine and bread might be flesh and blood, and for what reasons the causes might answer to the effects and different names or appearances (species) be limited to one essence, and the signifying and the signified things be expressed by words of the same sort.

Chrysost. ad Caeser. Monach. Before the bread is sanctified, we call it bread, but divine grace sanctifying it, the priest consecrating, it has indeed been freed from the appellation of bread and has become accounted worthy of the appellation of the Lord's body, although the nature of bread has continued in itself.

Balanus Manus de Institut. Cleric. lib. 1, cap. 31.

The Lord preferred the sacraments of his body and blood to be perceived by the mouth of the faithful and conducive to their food, that by the visible performance the invisible effect might be shown. For as outward, material food nourishes the body and makes it grow, so also the word of the Lord within nourishes and strengthens the soul. And presently, the Sacrament is perceived by the mouth, by virtue of the sacrament the inner man is sated, the Sacrament is turned into the aliment of the body, but by the virtue of the Sacrament the dignity of eternal life is obtained, &c. As, therefore, that is converted into us when we eat and drink it, so we also are converted into the body of Christ whilst we live obediently and piously, &c. Therefore, because bread strengthens the heart of the body, so that is called the body of Christ: but because wine operates on the blood in the flesh, so it is referred to the blood of Christ.

Christianus Danthmarus in Matth.

The Lord gave to his disciples the Sacrament of his body for the remission of sins and for the preservation of charity, that mindful always of that which had been done, they should do this after a figure, which was about to be given for them, and not be forgetful of this charity. This is my body, that is, in the Sacrament, &c.

ART. VI.—SCIENCE FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES.

THE CHEMISTRY OF COMMON LIFE, by James F. W. Johnston, M. A., F. R. SS. L. & E., &c. Author of Lectures on Agricultural Chemistry and Geology, &c. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburg and London, 1854. 2 Vols.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON LIFE; or the Science of Health, by John Scoffern, M. B., London, Late Prof. of Chemistry and Medical Jurisprudence at the Aldersgate School of Medicine. London: Ward & Lock, 158, Fleet Street. 1857.

THE HAND-BOOK OF HOUSEHOLD SCIENCE. A popular accouut of Heat, Light, Air, Aliment, and Cleansing, in their scientific principles and domestic applications. With illustrative diagrams. By Edward L. Youmans, Author of "The Class-Book of Chemistry," &c., &c. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1857.

WHO has not been interested, as well as amused, by Schiller's poem, Pegasus in Harness? The fruitless efforts, made to degrade the steed that, Mythology teaches us, had been tamed alone by Minerva's hand and donated by her for the uses of the Goddesses of the Fine Arts—the Muses, show us that the superior can never be *degraded* to an inferior position without losing every thing implied in the idea of degradation. We are not to conclude, that the benefits of Poetry and Aesthetic culture are intended to be confined to a small and select class of human beings, but that they are world-wide in their applications, requiring, however, an elevation of the human mind to appreciate them, which elevation, indeed, their very presence tends to accomplish, and that they must not be levelled *down* to the condition of the prosaic and vulgar. All efforts to put Pegasus in the harness, so that he shall drag the plough or draw the cart will be ineffective, but let him be mounted by the aspiring son of earth and the winged steed will bear his burden aloft through regions of beauty and grandeur. He is to be employed *in* his proper sphere, and not compelled to work *out* of it.

The same idea may be applied with considerable truth in looking at the proper mode of studying, or rather of using, the discoveries of Physical or Natural Science. These are truths, the results of immutable laws framed by unerring Wisdom. They are necessarily of a character to command the respect and the admiration of man. But they must not be solely considered in an utilitarian point of view, lest we lose the ability of commanding them in their loftiest flights, and find, although we have gained a second rate plough-horse, we have lost a steed of truest mettle. The course of wisdom obviously is to employ Science in *its* proper sphere, when we shall see that while it unfolds more and more of the true secrets of nature—affording us means to apply all these to our daily wants—it, at the same time, enlarges our mental vision and teaches us to appreciate the grandeur of God's creation. Thus we shall get more practical benefit from Science than if we had cramped it in our workshops, enslaved it in our kitchens or enshackled it in our sewers.

Men are always apt to be extremists,—some absolutely theoretical abjure all applications of their theories, and others purely practical, as they improperly style themselves, exhibit absolute contempt for all theory. Schiller has accurately defined the different extremes in his distich on Wissenschaft,

Einem ist sie die hohe, die himmlische Göttin, dem Andern
Eine tüchtige Kuh, die ihn mit Butter versorgt.

Now we hold that both are wrong and both are right,—the error on either side consisting in not recognizing the other. Science is eminently practical, but she is also far above mere questions of dollars and cents. The practical benefits are showered on all sides upon his head who reads her laws aright and respects her Mission. She works for his good without being put in harness, and does nothing for him when degraded to such a position. It is interesting to glance at the lights she brings to the illumination of daily problems in domestic life,—to see how she can clear up difficulties and aid in their being surmounted as well in the kitchen as in the workshop,—as well in the routine of daily home life as abroad amid the puffing of steam and the clicking of telegraphic instruments.

We propose to occupy a few of our pages with some general considerations on the employment of Natural Science for Domestic Purposes, looking at the subject as the result of discoveries which are by no means confined to such applications, but are embodiments of grand and expressive truths, and basing our considerations upon the three treatises, whose titles constitute the rubric of this article. We trust that our article may not be considered out of place amid the theological and philosophical discussions with which the Review is mostly occupied, as we seek "as far as possible to adapt the latter, in style and in the variety of its contents, to the wants and tastes of different classes of readers."

It is noteworthy, how few of the rising generation seem to have profited by the scientific instruction which has been furnished them in the academic curriculum. The theoretical course has been adopted to so great an extent that they have forgotten, if they ever knew, that the laws of science are demonstrating their truth on all sides around them. Hence when an every-day fact is pointed out as illustrative of a scientific law they are in the predicament of Moliére's Mons. Jourdain, whose astonishment was very great when he found *il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose, sans que j'en susse rien.* Now, however, the time has come when every one can master the philosophy of common life with ease, because it has been reduced to a system, and his ignorance becomes, with each day, less and less excusable. The three authors, Johnston, Scoffern and Youmans, have, with great zeal and commendable carefulness, endeavored to present the applications of Science to the uses and things of common life, so as to be grasped by the comprehension of every one, although they have brought the most abstruse laws at times into requisition for the illustration of some point. Their books show an immense advance over the loose and unscientific statements which filled the pages of school books, as late as twenty-five years ago, when children were taught that there were but *four* elements, and when Sandford and Morton constituted quite a Repository of Science for the young. Of the three, Johnston has been called to another world when he was acquiring a high position in this world's esteem for his scientific attainments; Scoffern has used his pen largely for the popularization of scientific facts, and Youmans is known to his countrymen as an excellent, enthusiastic lecturer and good teacher of his favorite specialité—Chemistry. The first has written with great zeal, about "the air we breathe and the water we drink," the cultivation of the soil with the nature of the vegetables it may produce for aliment, the liquors, narcotics and sweets which we from time to time employ, the nature and needs of digestion, as well as the chemical functions of the body. He has freely laid Natural History under heavy contributions to furnish him information, which, with a wonderfully interesting style, he has invested with all the charms of romance and furnished a book—the first of its kind. Scoffern has rather labored, with the view of exhibiting the relations of external things to the life and health of the human being, showing how "violations to the immutable laws of public health, may be reduced to the three sources of—ignorance, accident, and crime." The two first mentioned, are treated of at some length, avoiding all considerations connected with the last source as more peculiarly connected with a treatise on legal Hygiene. He has not brought the amount of genius, the extent of knowledge, and the charm of style to the production of his book, of which traces are to be seen all through Johnston. Youmans has confined himself within narrower limits than either of his co-laborers, only attempting to show in a popular way, what is the science of Heat, Light, Air, Food and Cleansing, and how all this science is really beneficial for Domestic purposes. The attempt has been very successful, resulting in a book which should find a place wherever a thinking man wishes to know the nature of the physical conditions that are essential to his life. But does this kind of knowledge lead to materialistic views? Are we, as some think, prone to lose sight of the grand primal cause while we become cognizant of the secondary causes which He has established in connection with natural phenomena? We believe such views are *not* the inevitable result of this kind of study. Such a result will follow the study of any department of human knowledge, if the mind is allowed to wander off from thoughts connected with its duty to the Creator and His Laws. It is a fallacious argument to claim, because one has become an infidel during his study of any subject, that hence the subject itself leads to infidelity or materialism from its very nature. True logic would require us to show that such is the inevitable consequence—the tendency given the mind by the subject, and that no other tendency could possibly be preserved by any mind devoted to its examination. Admit the force of the common argument, that every thing must be materialistic which numbers materialists among its cultivators, and some of the most interesting and important branches of human knowledge would be entitled to the contempt of the good and the wise. Be a man, in his inmost soul, a scoffer at religion, and all the knowledge in the world will not make him devout. Give him an open ear to the truths of the former and the facts of the latter, opening up so much that exhibits marks of design and wisdom, will make him all the more devout and reverential for the knowledge he has thus acquired.

There can be no doubt as to the enlarged views which man acquires from the teachings of Science, learning through the labors of a Galileo "a plan of the heavens so appalling in amplitude that imagination itself falters in the survey;" through the zeal and eloquence of Miller how to read "the handwriting of God upon the rocks, revealing the history of our planet and its inhabitants through durations of which the mind had never before even presumed to dream;" and gaining by the labors of Ehrenberg and others, a sight of "a new world of order and beauty in all the commonest and vulgarest forms of matter, below the former reach of eye or thought." But when we glance at the subjects which elucidate Domestic Science, we shall find that the same effects are produced on the mind by the most *intimate* relation we establish with its separate truths, as we feel when viewing them from a distant stand-point as a whole.

The light which comes streaming down to us from the sun at a velocity of one hundred and ninety-two thousand miles per second, when analyzed by the physicist, is not only so much the better understood for this analysis, so that the laws of vision become clearer to man's comprehension and he is enabled to apply compensating measures for defective sight, but a world of greater wonders is opened up for his admiration than ever poet dreamed of. He has not only learned that this light may be decomposed into seven primary colors, and these again resolved into three out of which all possible shades may be formed. He has not only learned how to combine colors so as to produce the most beautiful effects, to furnish beauty with adornments which will show the exquisite taste of woman, to minister to the extortionate demands of fashion, and to prevent monstrous combinations that would shock the eye attuned to harmonious combinations. He has not only learned why it is that certain colors are complementary of others, or, when combined with them, will produce the most pleasing effects, as when orange is contrasted with blue, violet with yellow, or red with green, because such combinations really are required to produce white. He has not only acquired the knowledge that would suggest to the brunette, that with yellow colors her complexion will become brighter and fresher, and to the blonde, that with blue, her white complexion and light flesh tints will be improved. If this were all, the results would indeed be merely *material* benefits. But the grandeur of his study becomes a real ministering agent to his reverence for the great First cause, whose word spoke Light into existence, when he examines into the mathematical conditions required for the formation of colors. In every inch of red light there are forty thousand waves, and in the whole length of the red ray four hundred and eighty millions of millions of waves; and as this ray enters the eye in one second, and the retina pulsates once for each of these waves, we arrive at the astonishing conclusion, that when we behold a red object the membrane of the eye trembles at the rate of *four hundred and eighty millions of millions of times* between every two ticks of a common clock. Of yellow light five hundred and thirty-five millions of millions of waves enter the eye, and beat against the nerve of vision in the sixtieth part of a minute." These are the miracles which every second witnesses, and which show that Creation is a continuous process, dating from the beginning, but continuing with unerring accuracy to the end of Time. The difference between the rapidity of the movements of the different colors would lead us to believe, that there must be some difference also in the heating effects produced by them on the eye, as we know that increased mechanical action always produces increase of heat in matter, however attenuated and apparently intangible this may seem to our senses. Hence we understand the truth of the popular notion, which considers "blue a very soft, cool, *retiring* color; that green is cool, though less so than blue, yellow is warmer and *advancing*, orange still warmer, and red *fiery*, *harsh* and *exciting*."

But Domestic Science opens up still greater marvels when we consider the physical conditions of organic growth. One of these is the necessity of sun light for the development of woody tissue in the plant. The bright glimmer of the sun's rays conceals a chemic power which evolves solid substances out of the carbonic acid that the leaves of plants have absorbed from the atmosphere. This miraculous power results in the formation of wood, destined to be consumed for the production of heat that enables man to withstand the inclemencies of winter's cheerless cold; or perhaps, as geologists tell us, has occurred centuries and centuries ago, this same wood shall be metamorphosed into coal, that man's ingenuity will convert not only into fuel for diffusing warmth around the fire-side, but also into a gaseous substance that shall diffuse an artificial light when the rays of the same sun no longer light up our dwellings. The benefits of the sun light that gently brings forth the little plant from its seed, do not thus end with the formation of its woody tissue, but in other days, distant and remote from those in which its rays first lighted up the face of nature, aid in the production of artificial day. Who could conceive of the influence of one beam of sun light, thus vibrating influences of the most genial and heart-cheering character, through thousands of years, or rather through periods of time beyond the reach of our calculation ?

Do we look at the atmosphere and its uses,—the same two-fold consequences must result from its reverential contemplation,—we are enabled the better to understand the physical necessity which requires that animals should be supplied with pure air, and that our dwellings should be adequately ventilated; and our impressions of the wondrous Wisdom that created the atmosphere and established its laws, are, at the same time, made deeper and more lasting. "The whole architecture and physiology of trees, shrubs and plants, are conformed to atmospheric nutrition, so that in literal truth the forests are but embodied and solidified air, * * * * active life, the vital union of body and spirit, and all the powers and susceptibilities of our earthly being are only maintained by the action of air in our systems. There is an awful life-import in these never-ceasing rhythmic movements of inspiration and expiration, this tidal flux and reflux of the gaseous ocean through animal mechanism. Shall we question that it is for an exalted purpose ? Science has many things to say of the relations of air to life, but it can add nothing to the simple grandeur of the primeval statement, that the Creator breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Thus speaks Youmans, in the introduction to his article on the properties and composition of the atmosphere, and we have quoted the extract to show that the reverence of the writer keeps him from materialism, even when dwelling upon the material benefits that result from a natural agent. We like him much better here, than when led away by his respect for one of our most prominent Chemists—Draper—he quotes the idea that we possess the wonderful "capacity of comprehending *all* the conditions of our life," and that there is nothing in the structure and functions of the body that we shall not at last explain. This language is, in our opinion, capable of being contorted into meaning considerably more than the general spirit of our author would seem to show as his own views of human knowledge. We have no right to assume that, in any particular object of study, we have gained, or are likely to gain, sufficient knowledge to imply an exhaustion of the subject, or that indeed we have done more than Newton thought he had effected—gathered some few little pebbles which the great ocean of knowledge—wide and illimitable so far as human measure is concerned—had dashed, with its inflowing tides, on the beach before us. There never can be an Alexander in science, whose tears, prompted by an unsatiated ambition, shall flow because the whole world has been conquered, and nothing more remains to be acquired. This is true, not only as regards Science in general, but of every particular department. It is the solace of the student, as he pores over other men's labors and makes their discoveries his own. He does not despair because their gleanings may have been great; that therefore the field will no longer yield a reward for his own toil. There is an inward assurance that the laborer here always will have a reward.

The direct relations of man to the atmosphere are principally established by means of the lungs. In these organs a system of exchanges is ever taking place during life. The material which is no longer available for the animal is exchanged for that which his system requires. How few are at all cognizant of the great necessity that this exchange should be carried on so that each inspiration shall be not only supplied with the gas that stimulates to action, but be devoid of any deleterious particles. The six hundred millions of cells of the lungs, forming an area of about one hundred and sixty square yards of thin cell wall, must be supplied with sufficient oxygen to feed the microscopic blood vessels that inosculate around them, and must not contain any poisonous material to contaminate the life current of blood. On the perfection with which this process of respiration is carried on depends the maintenance of animal life and the production of the very substance that constitutes the essential food of the leaves of plants.

But the artificial tastes derived from luxury make certain artificial odors when used, specially delightful to our organs of smell. Such scents are derived both from the vegetable and the animal kingdoms. Johnston discourses pleasantly, as is his custom in all his writings, on the principal of these, from the costly attar of roses, produced in the rose-gardens of Ghazepore, down to the oil of peppermint of our country, and, indeed on all "the odors which we enjoy." These are of varying grades commercially—some costing as much as £10 sterling per rupee, (about 176 grains) and others of very small value. The volatile oils are mingled together so as to produce new odors, such as singly are not met with in nature ; and we find that this commingling is like that which the composer employs to produce harmony, We can only employ certain notes to produce a perfect accordant tone in music,—and the perfumer finds that some odors will "blend easily and naturally with each other, producing a harmonious impression, as it were, on the sense of smell. By the skilful admixture, in kind and quantity, of odors producing a similar impression, the most delicate and unchangeable fragrances are manufactured. * * When they are not mixed upon this principle, perfumes are often spoken of as becoming *sickly* or *faint*, after they have been a short time in use." How delicate must be the organ which can so infallibly judge of the combination of odors that in themselves are unlike and yet may produce either *harmony* or *discord* by their admixture. Are we not admitted, by a knowledge of these facts, into a closer view of the wonderful harmony that pervades all Creation? Science for domestic purposes can thus administer to the aesthetic delights of man, and, while supplying his luxurious habits and desires with those odors that custom has made agreeable, can show that there is nothing arbitrary in their combination, but that this must be governed by unchanging laws. It is true that education and habit may make agreeable to one person what is intolerable to another, and the anecdote of the Spartan lady who visited Berenice with so much discomfort, because forsooth one was odoriferous with butter and the other with sweet ointment, which were by no means agreeable in either case to the party not using them, can be readily acknowledged, without any contradiction of the laws laid down on the subject. There are, however, certain odors, with regard to which mankind are united in asserting their dislike, and domestic science, while it teaches us that such may be masked or concealed by those which are more fragrant, yet if they naturally possess deleterious qualities, such concealment of their presence does not prevent their noxious action.

To prevent the collection of contaminating substances in the atmosphere, is the duty of every good citizen of our towns. It becomes his duty because the lives of his neighbors are endangered, as well as his own. A thorough knowledge of their origin and the modes of preventing and destroying them should constitute a portion of his education. He cannot live in the world and be so enwrapped in objects of study, as to become proof against the injurious effects of changes in the normal constitution of the physical conditions of health and life. He is entitled to pure air, and however absorbing his pursuits may be, it is of first importance that he should assert his claims to this blessing. Johnston suggests that the nauseous odors which abound in Cologne, may be "at once the parent and grand consumer of its artificial rivers of scented water." It will be recollected how Coleridge writes, that he

> counted two-and-seventy stenches,
> All well defined and several stinks,

in the town of Cologne.

To destroy the contaminating materials, whatever they may be, in the air, is of far more importance than to disguise their presence. So long as the nose is informed of their presence, man is somewhat on his guard with reference to their probable injurious effects. The value of disinfection depends on such destruction of offensive and lethal odors, that they shall be absolutely removed *as such* from the atmosphere. Substances are furnished by chemistry that will ensure the required destruction without the formation of new compounds possessing any injurious tendency.

We hardly think it necessary to occupy any space by dwelling on the value of the knowledge mentioned in the last paragraph. The connection between the mind and body is so intimate that whatever materially impedes the action of one, also injures the other. The mere student will never feel his mind so bright under the depressing influences of impure air, as when he is inhaling the pure and balmy breezes which come across the verdant plain, or is occupying a chamber in whose construction the admission of pure air from without has been properly provided for. His mental acumen, power of perception and deduction will in the one case be far inferior to the other. Again; what man has the right homicidally to immolate his family upon the altar of his ignorance by suffering them to occupy rooms where they are forced to inhale air saturated with pestilential effluvia from stagnant pools, piles of putrescent animal or vegetable garbage, or unventilated cellars, where moisture and mould, reacting on each other, beget vile gaseous compounds? Do not the emaciated forms of his children, the haggard and anxious look of his wife,—the exsanguine, sickly countenances of his whole family—show him that a secret poison is working out the most pernicious results? Let but the epidemic disease present itself within the neighborhood of his family,—and their broken down constitutions invite its presence, furnishing material on which it can employ its most deadly powers. The history of all epidemics shows that, where filth and bad ventilation are found, there they revel and death holds his court in the most hideous form. A wise Providence has furnished man with means of ameliorating many of the evils that surround him, and if he culpably neglects to acquire or use this knowledge, may not the deadly plague, in the mysterious workings of that same Providence, be sent to remind him of his duty? Carlyle has illustrated this in, we think, one of his Latter day pamphlets, by showing how a poor girl laboring under the first symptoms of a contagious disease, being thrust, in a most unnatural manner, from the door, where she had asked charity, might yet show that she was of the *same* human family with the unsympathizing rich, by lighting up in a neighborhood disease that would bring to the portals of eternity the fortunate and prosperous along with the despised and wretched.

Next to the requirements of the animal system for unlimited supplies of pure and unadulterated air, are those for nutriment obtained from the exterior world and prepared by the process of digestion for the upbuilding of tissues. Here, Domestic Science finds an ample field for the exercise of the highest order of talent in examining into the sources of the different alimentary substances, their frequent adulterations and their relative value in furnishing the body with its proper nutriment. While it may administer to the expensive tastes of the extravagant and preside over the table where Lucullus eats with Lucullus, claiming as its devotees many a follower who would proudly write himself *sus Epicuro grege*, yet its highest duties are not comprised in such labors. Proper nutriment is most important indeed for man. When suffering from a want of food,—his mind cannot be applied with any force to the investigation of an abstruse subject, no more than the full muscular vigor of his body can be brought into requisition for the accomplishment of a task requiring bodily strength. Each moment that he lives—some portion of his body dies,—and it dies in order that he may live. Life is made up of a continuous series of deaths of living particles,—their place supplied by others, that have received a temporary vitality from the mysterious principle,—which in turn give way to others and thus we have a continuous series of deaths following each other from the first origin of the living being on to the end, when the death of the whole organic body occurs synchronously with the departure of its undying soul. Investigations into this mysterious series of changes cannot produce materialism with those students who have learned to look upon all Nature as the work of one Power.

But these changes, if they take place continually in the body and all through its various parts, must produce from time to time a collection of material particles that are absolutely different from the collections that made up the body at an antecedent period. The materials forming the structure must change and yet the personal identity of the body evidently remains unchanged,—the same, as it feebly crawls over the nursery floor, gaily trips along the road to school, contends with giant force on the battle field, or totters down the hill of life in extreme old age. What is the extent of these changes? How do they affect personal identity? These questions may be examined from the stand-point of Domestic Science.

What is the extent of the changes that every instant produces in the structure of the human body? We shall employ in the answer to this question the facts that Youmans and Johnston have collected. The medium for the conveyance of nutrient material to the system is the blood, and the same liquid current acts as the scavenger for the removal of effete substances. This passes through the lungs, in portions, with each pulsation of the heart, that is, once in a second, and the whole quantity (taking the body as of the weight of 140 lbs.), from twenty to thirty pounds, is forced through the lungs about twenty times in an hour. But when slight exertion is made the rapidity of the movement is much accelerated, and at times the whole amount may be forced through the lungs in half a minute. It seems not at all unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that this passage through the lungs of the whole amount of blood is from six hundred to seven hundred times in a day, which would be equal to "a total movement through the heart" of from twelve thousand to fourteen thousand pounds of blood in twenty-four hours. Now there is lost by perspiration two and a half pounds of water, and there escapes in other directions about two and a quarter pounds of matter." This loss of four and three quarter pounds must be made up by the ingesta,—so that we have the substances composing the body necessarily undergoing a change in about thirty days. With each month the body is made up of different particles from those which constituted its totality the preceding month, or that will constitute it at the end of the thirty succeeding days. Here is change in the most startling form the mind can represent,—change that staggers credulity were the statement not based upon strict mathematical calculation,—change such as no man would credit unless he could be furnished the premises that lead to this astonishing conclusion. It will be understood that this change takes place in every portion of the body, in the solid bones, the reticulated structure of the cellular tissue, the fibrous muscles, the vessels through which the liquids continually flow, and in the very organ devoted to the purposes of thought itself. While we pen this article, and while our readers are reading its sentences, the brain structure, of both writer and reader, is undergoing destruction, decay and death, and is being renovated by new material from without through the mysterious power of vitality. Notwithstanding this change of constitution, yet we are not conscious of any impairment of the mental faculties. The train of thought is carried out to its legitimate end without any break or interruption. The mind is not suffering from this continuous series of destruction and reformation, no more than the exterior appearance of the body. In the adult the reparative and destructive processes go on *pari passu*, and even the test of weight shows very little difference at different portions of the day. In the earlier stages of existence, the formative process must be greater than the destructive, and of this fact we have proof in alteration of form and weight. In those days when age shows that the race of life is nearly run, the opposite is the case, and the destructive process is more rapid than the other,—the antagonism of the two is not preserved in equilibrio, and even should disease not exercise its destroying effects on the wasting form, the inevitable tendency of the destructive process will be death.

In what consists personal identity if this unceasing change is taking place in the living body? We do not propose to consider this question affirmatively, but negatively, desiring to show that if the material constitution of the body is continually changing, *personal* identity must be something more than mere identity of *material* particles. Butler has shown that the reason why a vegetable growth, as a tree, is ordinarily recognized as the *same* from year to year, is not because it is composed of the same particles, during the course of many years, but because ordinarily we recognize the sameness as consisting in a continuation of the same life in the same organization, and yet this very explanation uses the word same in different senses, since its signification as an adjective prefixed to life and organization is different from that when applied to matter. He avoids a definition, and shows how, nevertheless, there can be no difficulty in getting at the idea, which arises from a comparison of ourselves at any two moments in existence. But we can do no more towards furnishing a definition than was done by the learned Bishop,—although our discoveries satisfy us that material particles have nothing to do with the idea of personal identity. The body is ever changing and yet it remains the same,—amenable to punishments by human law for its misdeeds, although not a material particle of the culprit shall exist when the punishment is inflicted,—entitled to rewards for certain acts of philanthropy or bravery, although not an atom of the material which constituted it when the brave or philanthropic deed was performed may be retained at the time when the reward is conferred.

Unless Science satisfied us of this continual change, we should be forced to confine our definition of personal identity to material sameness. The idea would be gross and sensuous, and yet it would be the natural conclusion to which the uninformed would arrive, deprived of the aid of scientific research. We find, that with the aid of the latter, we are led to a higher and more exalted view of this subject, and a higher idea, also, of the body itself, as something requiring material particles for the performance of its functions on earth, but independent, in one sense, of these, since it is always changing, yet remaining itself the same. Youmans has employed some illustrations which will aptly show an analogy in the sphere of inanimate nature. "A waterfall is permanent, and may present the same aspect of identity and unchangeableness from generation to generation; but who does not know that it is certainly made up of particles in a state of swift transition; the cataract is only a *form* resulting from the definite course which the changing particles pursue. The flame of a lamp presents to us for a long time the same appearance; but its constancy of aspect is caused by a ceaseless change in the place and condition of the chemical atoms which carry on combustion." Now the body is not, as our author would claim, merely an unvarying *form*, unless we give to this word a definition, which will include both external shape and the entire essence. We are not able to define the idea of body, as in the case of personal identity, *in totidem verbis*, but we are forced to the conclusion that it must be in some way independent of material particles and yet confined to them during its career on earth. The *natural* body must indeed be something very different from that spiritual body, into which it shall be converted at the end of time. In restless activity must the body have its existence while tenanted by the spirit, and its material particles have no release from change until the fitful career of life is over. They proceed on their incessant round of duty and amid all changes, the identity of the person is unaffected.

It was the opinion of old commentators on the Creed, that in order to recognize in full force the meaning of the article relating to the Resurrection of the body, we must believe in the Resurrection of the material particles. Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed, dwells upon the necessity that "the same flesh which was separated from the Soul at the day of death, should be united to the Soul at the last day." He quotes the passage from Job, "Though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my *flesh* shall I see God." Ursinus* says also on this subject, "The bodies which shal rise, shal be not only humane bodies, but even the self same also which we now in our life-time carry about with us. * * If then the bodies which have sinned shal receive accordingly, not other bodies but the same shal rise. * * * The justice of God requireth that the flesh of the saints which have fought the field should also be crowned; and the flesh of the wicked, which hath blasphemed against God should be tormented." If either of these learned divines meant that the identical *material* particles with which the body was clothed at the period of death, should invest it at the period of the Resurrection, the facts of Domestic Science must show that they were led to fallacious conclusions. Our knowledge of the laws of matter,—and it is about matter they are reasoning—show us the thing is impossible unless an entire subversion of these laws should be produced, and a miracle of most astounding nature be exhibited. "The matter which forms our body, when we are laid in the grave, and which, after a brief residence there, makes its way, through some nutritive plant, into the body of another man, and forms part of his body still when *he* is buried—this matter which is neither his nor mine, has already been "slave to thousands," and may be buried with ten thousand bodies more, before the resurrection comes,"†—must we believe that a miracle shall be performed so that it shall form the material of these ten thousand bodies at the last great day, in order to show our credence in this important article of our faith? Does the idea of sameness *require* such an explanation, in order that it shall exist uninjured by materialistic views? The analogy which arises from the contemplation of the body in its earthly career, ever changing its material clothing and yet retaining its identity, must apply here to the resurrection. The self-same bodies shall rise—they can be flesh, to use the language of Job, they can be natural bodies raised into the condition of spiritual bodies, they can be constituted of flesh and blood, but it must be in a glorified condition, as corruption cannot inherit incorruption,—all this may be and will be, but we are obliged to deny that the self-same material particles will constitute the resurrected body.

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* The Summe of Christian Religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus. Translated into English by Dr. Henrie Parry. Oxford. 1601.

† Johnston's Chem. of Com. Life. II. 443.

The argument arising from the idea that "the *flesh* of the saints that have fought the field," and that of "the wicked which hath blasphemed against God," should be respectively crowned and tormented, cannot hold in favor of the resurrection of the *same material particles*, because the latter have ever been changing. Twelve times in a year have the bodies been reconstructed, their flesh been formed of new and foreign particles. But yet these bodies have remained the same, and will in their *identical* substance, whatever it may be, (and we believe the answer to this is beyond human intelligence) receive their reward,—will put on immortaility at the will of the great Creator.

These conclusions, springing necessarily from the facts and laws of Domestic Science, are stated with a firm and decided recognition of the truths of Revelation, and the binding force of the Apostles' Creed, and, furthermore, with the belief that they give us a higher and more wonderful appreciation of the idea of the Resurrection, by exhibiting its perfect accordance with the analogy of what is taking place daily in the human body. Wherever Science seems to contradict Revelation, we should labor to find the cause of the contradiction. It will show itself in our inability to read the two aright. But when both *are* read aright, then the former will lend its feeble light to increase the splendor of the glorious truths which the latter has stored up for man. Our conclusions here seem to us really not of a conflicting character with the quotations from Ambrose and Augustine which Ursinus employs,—nor indeed with the whole article of the latter, entitled—"What bodies shall rise."

Baltimore, Md. L. H. S.

ART. VII.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE NORSE-FOLK; or a Visit to the Homes of Norway and Sweden. By *Charles Loring Brace.* New York: Charles Scribner. 1857.

A peculiar interest still attaches to old Norway, the original home of the Norman, who, together with the Saxon, constitutes the bone and sinew of the Anglo-American race. It is a strange, wild, mountainous country with its midsummer night's sun and long winter darkness, its great bosses of snow-fields, its lake-like fjords, its steep promontories, its endless pine forests, and that jagged, furrowed coast-line which stretches above a thousand miles from the regions of eternal ice down to a genial latitude of wheat lands and flowers. It is the brow of the earth, the forehead of Europe, as the Scalds loved to call it in their songs. Add to this the hardy peasantry, the shepherd's life in the Saeters, the wandering nomade Laps and their encampments, the bear hunts, the poetical legends and romantic superstitions coming down from the times of the Edda and still lingering in the secluded valleys, and finally the Protestant religion of the people just now awaking from the sleep of indifferentism and rationalism and beginning to throb with warm life-blood. We still remember with what intense interest and delight we read, when a student, the stirring descriptions of Scandinavian life and scenery in Steffen's Malcolm, and the Four Norwegians.

The Rev. Mr. Brace, of New York, gives us in this book the impressions of a recent trip to Scandinavia, especially to Norway and Sweden. The first we read of his pen was a series of letters he wrote six or seven years ago from Berlin, Prague, and Vienna, for the columns of the "Independent." We liked them for their freshness, candor, impartiality of spirit, and the desire to get at the "history of fire-sides," as Daniel Webster called it, or at the "home-life" of Germany. We thought them much superior to most of the newspaper correspondence of American travellers in Europe, who very often retail only the outside information contained in the common hand books of tourists.

The present volume partakes of the same characteristics. The author shows a considerable talent of observation, freedom from prejudice, and succeeds well, as every book of travels should do, in combining instruction with entertainment. The first sixteen chapters relating to Norway we like best. As to Denmark, he gives us only an outline sketch of Copenhagen, with some esthetic remarks on the works of the celebrated sculptor, Thorwaldsen.

On Sweden Mr. Brace dwells more at length, but gives rather an unfavorable view of the present moral and religious condition of the Lutheran Church in that country. He derives its evils mainly from the close connection with the State. He thinks that this union will probably be dissolved before the close of this century, and that the Baptists and Methodists, "who have thus far suffered persecution, banishment and reproach, and yet gain each day a stronger hold on the hearts of the people," will hasten this end. "The Swedish nature," he says, "is one that cannot rest content with mere skepticism or with rationalism unlighted by religion. It is inclined to religious faith and consolation. . . The present clergy will become to the peasants as did the hierarchy of England to the Puritans of the Revolution. They will abhor and renounce them; and when the change comes, one of the great things done will be the utter sweeping away of the House of Clergy and all political powers belonging thereto. The Church will be left to rest where it should, on the personal relations of pastor and people, on the affection of the one, and the abilities and self-sacrifice and piety of the other."

It is very natural that an American of the Puritan order should entertain such views and hopes. But all men are not alike, and Sweden has a different destination from that of New England, nor is it impossible that it may attain to a better state of religion by gradual reforms without passing through a violent revolution. It is a significant sign that the present King openly favors the principle of religious liberty, and his counsels may yet prevail over the strong prejudices of the clergy, the nobility and the peasantry.

P. S.

THE POOR BOY AND MERCHANT PRINCE; or Elements of Success drawn from the Life and Character of the late *Amos Lawrence.* By *William M. Thayer.* Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1857.

A very useful little volume for young men who want to get rich by fair means, and for old and young men who are rich.

It is no disgrace to be poor. Christ was poor, the apostles, the early martyrs, the missionaries, the reformers and the majority of the great men and benefactors of the race were poor, or at least in moderate circumstances. So on the other hand, it is no honor to be rich. Neither money, nor dress, nor profession, but character makes the man. A rich miser is of no more use to society than a mail bag or an old iron chest in some corner of the garret. But while the mere possession of wealth can add nothing to a man's real value or happiness, and may even materially diminish or destroy both, the *right use* of wealth is a virtue and a source of enjoyment. This constitutes the morale of the above book in the form of a living example that speaks louder than words.

The late Amos Lawrence, of Boston, rose by good sense, industry and perseverance from poverty to a princely fortune. For all that he might have lived and died without a true friend, without sympathy and without fame. But with the art of getting rich he learned the more important art of doing good, which is the first and last object of life. As he prospered in business and grew in wealth, he remembered the poor and grew in liberality to churches, schools and colleges. The more he gave away, the richer he became in turn, thus proving the old proverb: "Charity gives itself rich; covetousness hoards itself poor." He contributed about seven hundred thousand dollars to various benevolent objects, not with the stiffened hand of bequest, but with the living palm and with the full sympathies and affections of a husband and father. This is it what gave him a national reputation, collected crowds of mourning friends, widows and orphans around his grave, and reared a monument to his name more enduring than marble or gold. He was economical, in order that he might practice benevolence. He followed the excellent rule of Wesley: "Make all you can; save all you can; give all you can." To give, was to him the greatest luxury. He knew from experience, that "it is more blessed to give than to receive."

He brought his children up to the same virtue. "I hope," he wrote to his son, "you will have one day the delightful conscience of using a portion of your means in a way to give you as much pleasure as I have experienced. Your wants may be brought within a very moderate compass; and I hope you will never feel yourself at liberty to waste on yourself such means, as, by system and right principles, may be beneficially applied to the good of those around you. Our first duty is to those of our own household, then extending to kindred, friends, neighbors (and the term neighbors may, in its broadest sense, take in the whole human family), citizens of our State, then of our country, then of other countries of the world." In another letter, quoting from some writer, he says: "The good there is in riches lieth altogether in their use, like the woman's box of ointment; if it be not broken and the contents poured out for the refreshment of Jesus Christ, in his distressed members, they lose their worth; the covetous man may, therefore, truly write upon his rusting heaps: These are good for nothing. He is not rich who *lays up* much, but he who *lays out* much; for it is all one not to have, as not to use. I will, therefore, be the richer by charitably laying out, while the worldling will be poorer by his covetous hoarding up."

Such a man deserves to be held up, as is done in this book, as an example for the young men of our country. Few have as much to give away, as Amos Lawrence. But every one can, in proportion to his means, however limited, practice the same virtue, realize the same pleasure during his life, and reap the same reward after his death, in the gratitude of posterity and at the judgment seat of Him who noticed the widow's mite and promised to remember even a cup of cold water given to the least of his disciples in the time of need.

P. S.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. With an Outline Treatise on *Logic*. By the Rev. E. V. Gerhart, D. D., President of Franklin and Marshall College. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858.

This book falls in with what has been styled—right or wrong—the Mercersburg movement, and is a legitimate application of it to metaphysical speculation. The Mercersburg system aims at a philosophical theology and a Christian philosophy, that has for its vital principle Jesus Christ, as the highest revelation of both God and man, and is based upon the historical life of the Church as Christ's body and the organ of his presence in the world. About one half of Dr. Gerhart's volume is a free and somewhat amplified translation of Beck's Logic, and is admirably suited for a text-book. The other half is an original introduction to the study of philosophy in general. Its object is to show the necessary inward connection of true philosophy with the revelation of God in Christ, as the author of that religion which is not simply one among other religions, but the absolute and universal religion, answering to, and satisfying, the deepest moral and intellectual wants of the race and reconciling the whole man, his reason and will, to God. This object Dr. Gerhart has carried out within the small limits allowed him, in a clear and vigorous manner that must command the respectful attention of earnest thinkers, and will increase confidence in him as a sound and safe teacher of Christian philosophy in the important literary institution over which Providence has placed him.

P. S.

HISTORY AND LIFE OF THE REV. DOCTOR JOHN TAULER, of Strassbourg; with twenty-five of his Sermons. Translated from the German by Susanna Winkworth; and a Preface by the Rev. Charles Kingsley. With an Introduction by the Rev. Rosswell D. Hitchcock, D. D., Washburn Prof. of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. New York: Wily & Halsted. 1850.

A mediaeval book in mediaeval style; the glory of the hidden life of God revealing itself in a monastic cell; mystic twilight from the dark ages announcing the morning of the Reformation; the spirit of freedom struggling for deliverance from legal bondage; a voice crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way to the Lord. A most interesting and charming book, not for the many, but for the appreciating few, whose number is increasing every day, who delight in seeking and adoring the Saviour in all ages of the Church to which he has pledged his unbroken presence; in all forms of piety, in which his holy and blessed image is reflected as the light in so many colors; in the humblest followers in whom he has condescended to dwell. "The more traces we find of our Master's image in any, and in all, of the Christian centuries, the better will it be, at once for ourselves, and for the cause we serve."

"Mysticism," says our friend, the American editor of this beautiful volume, "mysticism has become in our day a term of indiscriminate and undeserved reproach. If we mean by it that enthusiastic reverence for the inner light, which, as in Quakerism, overrides the authority of Scripture, and repudiates the ordinances and sacraments of the Church, then we do well to denounce it, and the more vigorously the better. But if, in a wider latitude of usage, we mean by it only a special prominence and emphasis of the Johannean type of Christian life and doctrine, then, surely, we ought not to denounce, and had better not be very jealous of it. This introverted, brooding, meditative sort of piety has indeed its special perils. Exaggeration and excesses in this direction are extremely easy; the intense inward experience of divine things being peculiarly liable to divorce itself from established formulas of doctrine, from the ordinary means of grace, and from outward duty. But the germ and roots of this development are undoubtedly in the Scriptures. Not the Platonic John alone, who has been hailed as the spiritual father of the mystics, but the Aristotelian Paul also, discourses fervently of this hidden life of the Spirit, setting forth Christ as so formed within us, that the man himself expires. "I am crucified," he says, "with Christ. Nevertheless, I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." While our Lord himself has declared that the kingdom of God is within us."

Tauler (died 1361) was one of the humblest and most pious of monks, one of the deepest and most practical of mystics, one of the most earnest and impressive of preachers, and altogether one of the most remarkable men in that middle period which connects our modern Christianity and civilization with that of the ancient Church. The imitation of the lowly life of Jesus was his ruling thought and passion. His Sermons resemble much in spirit that inimitable Imitation of Christ by Thomas a Kempis, and deserve a place beside it. They exerted much influence upon the training of Luther from monastic asceticism to evangelical freedom and thus helped to prepare the way for the Reformation. The history of his life, and especially his interesting connection with a mysterious layman, Nicolas of Basle, one of the "Friends of God," has recently been more fully brought to light by Prof. Schmidt of Strassbourg.

It was a happy idea of Miss Susanna Winkworth, an English lady of the highest cultivation and refined taste, whose agreeable acquaintance we made some years ago in the hospitable house of her particular friend, the Chevalier Dr. Bunsen, to present to the English public a translation of the select sermons of Tauler, with an account of his life and labors. For this task she was admirably qualified by her mastery of the German language and her previous translation of the "Theologia Germanica," one of the most remarkable productions of mediaeval mysticism, and of German hymns.

Prof. Hitchcock now introduces this work to the American reader, in a style almost as elegant as the English editon, though offered at one-third the price, and reflecting credit upon American enterprize and taste. He has enriched it with a lucid historical introduction, which, in connection with his Inaugural Address, and an able essay on Development, gives him at once an honorable place among the rising American Church historians, who, by combining English and German learning and mode of thought, are destined to fill a new page in the historiography of Christianity.

P. S.

Gnomon of the New Testament, by John Albert Bengel. Vol. I. Matthew and Mark. Translated by the Rev. James Bandinel and Rev. Andrew Fausset. Vol. III. Romans and 1 Corinthians. Translated by the Rev. James Bryce. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark. 1857.

Commentary on the Books of Kings. By Karl Friedrich Keil. Translated by James Murphy. Supplemented by *Commentary on the Books of Chronicles*. By Ernst Bertheau. Translated by James Martin. 2 Vols. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark. 1857.

One German book after another finds its way in an English dress to Great Britain and the United States. So rapid has been the increase of this kind of literature within the last ten years that we will soon have a complete Anglo-German library on Exegesis and Church History, circulating more widely than in the land of their birth. Whatever our theological "Know-nothings" may say and do, it is altogether too late at this hour of the day to stop the importation of Teutonic learning and thought either in Scotland, or in England, or in this country. It is becoming more and more bone of our bones and flesh of our flesh and will make itself increasingly felt at every successive stage of English and American theology.

We are especially pleased to see *Bengel's Gnomon* included in Clark's valuable series of continental theology. This book has long since been in its Latin dress a standard work among critical students of the New Testament. Since its first appearance exegesis has indeed made great progress. But, like all truly classical productions, it can never be superseded. In profound reverence for the Word of the living God, in critical sagacity, felicitous brevity, terse condensation, and suggestive pregnancy, Bengel still stands out "facile princeps" among older and modern commentators. John Wesley believed him "the most pious, the most judicious, and the most laborious" of all the modern expounders of the New Testament, and made large use of him in his own Notes. His brevity is indeed sometimes enigmatic, and it may be said of him: "Brevis esse laborans, obscurus fit." But it is equally true what, I believe, the late archdeacon Hare remarked of his Gnomon, that it often condenses more matter into one line than can be extracted from many pages of other writers. His exegetical principle: "Totum te applica ad textum; textum totum applica ad te," is a most excellent one, and was carried out by him with the most conscientious fidelity. His notes are at once edifying and instructive and introduce into the very marrow of the Bible which he called "the greatest of all the gifts of God."

The translation, as far as we can judge from a hasty comparison with the original Latin, seems to have been executed with great care and accuracy, indeed more so than many of the Edinburgh translations of German works are said to be. Three more volumes will complete this first English edition of Bengel's Gnomon.

The above works, and all the other volumes constituting Clark's "Foreign Theological Library," can be had at the cheap bookstore of Messrs. Smith & English, Sixth St., Philadelphia.

P. S.

A LITURGY: OR ORDER OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP. Prepared and published by the direction and for the use of the German Reformed Church in the United States of America. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858. Price $1.00.

The Publishers introduce this long looked for liturgy with the following notice:

"The work herewith offered to the Christian public is designed as a directory and help to public and private worship; and is the result of several years' earnest and prayerful labor. This labor, however, was not devoted to the composition of original forms, so much as to the digesting and reproduction of evangelical forms and services already at hand, both ancient and modern, with such modifications in the mode of expression and other minor details, as a change of time and of circumstance, seemed, to a conservative judgment, to demand. Whilst the book, therefore, it is believed, will be found redolent of the sweetest liturgical devotions of earlier times, it will also be found savory of the freshness of an original production. The spirit which predominated in its preparation, was that of filial regard for everything good and true in past ages, joined to the spirit of genuine Christian liberty. But in all cases in which older forms are used, the original Greek or Latin sources were consulted and followed.

"As stated in the advertisement, this Liturgy has been prepared with primary reference to the Reformed Church in this country. At the same time, a mere glance at its contents will show that the book is wholly free from anything strictly denominational. Even the name of the Church under whose auspices it is published, occurs only on the title-page and in the advertisement; no other denominational allusions are found except in the few forms in which the doctrinal standard of the Reformed Church, the Heidelberg Catechism, had to be named. In this view, therefore, the new Liturgy commends itself to general favor and use. Any Christian clergyman, not hostile to all such forms, will find it offering to his hand helps of which he may most profitable avail himself. And in Christian families it is calculated to serve as a book of social and private devotion, suited to all the ordinary seasons and services of the Christian year."

Room forbids us to add any thing at this time. But for the April number we hope to furnish a history and analysis of the new German Reformed Liturgy which is likely to be received with a considerable degree of interest beyond the limits of the denomination for whose provisional use it was more immediately prepared. We are happy to learn that the first edition of a thousand copies was already sold (mostly to outsiders, it seems) within three weeks after its issue from the press.

THE PRINCIPLE OF VIRTUE, AND VIRTUE OF PRINCIPLE: An Address delivered at the dedication of the New Hall of the Diagnothian Literary Society, Lancaster, Pa., July 28th, 1857, by Rev. George B. Russell, A. M.

Opening with an appropriate and beautiful introduction, the author proceeds to discuss the Principle of Virtue, and the Virtue of Principle, the subject being suggested by the motto of the Society : *Στεφει τιμωντας αυτην αρετη.* The Principle of Virtue is that in which virtue, or a morally right life, consists; and the Virtue of Principle is the strength and firmness of such a morally right life. Of the one he says very correctly, that "its first embodiment is found in the person of Him who was the Truth, uniting in one the two factors of which we have spoken, the fixed and the variable, the absolute and the finite, the Divine and the human in the God-man. So far as these are brought into subjective activity, realizing the harmony of law and freedom in the personality of any man, is he truly virtuous. Virtue is then that quality of the soul which exercises its activities freely and yet withstands the soliciting power of temptation to transgress law, under whatever form it may confront the human will through the avenues of the appetites, desires and senses." A lucid and definite statement of the truth of all ethical truth.

The Virtue of Principle he finds "in the rewards and punishments of the law controlling and conditioning man's conduct." "From this general ground springs the power of the principle that disposes to Virtue." We would rather say that the power of the Principle is *in* the Principle; that the *virtue* of Virtue is in virtue itself; just as we would affirm the power or virtue of a germ to be, not in its conditions nor yet in the good or bad fruit of the developed tree, but in the nature of the germ itself; that is to say, the *virtue* of Principle is in the true ground of personality with which the man, when right, is in living communion and harmony, and therefore in harmony also with all the relations of his being, and able to be active according to the law of God in opposition to the soliciting power to transgress law. Rewards are the necessary state and consequences of virtue in principle and action, and belong to the wholeness of a virtuous man's life. As a part of the wholeness of a virtuous life, they react directly on the whole man, and serve thus to strengthen the power or virtue of Principle; just as the normal activity of any organ of the body, whilst deriving this activity from the principle of natural life, reacts upon and increases the vigor of the general life itself.

The Address is philosophical yet practical; rich in thought and compact, yet not obscure; suggestive, yet a full discussion; logical in arrangement, yet free and easy in its style; and merits, therefore, not only a cursory reading, but careful study.

E. V. G.

HINTS FOR RELIEF, By a General Law to Protect and Promote Amicable Arrangements for Extension and Compromise betwixt Debtor and Creditor. By Charles M. Ellis. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1857.

Assuming that Congress, under the article of the Federal Constitution which authorizes it "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," has full power to enact a permanent national system, by which settlements betwixt debtors and creditors throughout the States and Territories might be legalized and facilitated; the author proceeds to show the many evils arising from the operation of the defective and conflicting laws on insolvency as at present existing in the different States, and then argues in favor of a general law or system, "whereby insolvent persons might be facilitated, in effecting full, cheap and instant settlements with their creditors, in such form as to secure the best interests of themselves and their creditors, and the equitable and speedy division of the estates and the just release of those debtors who might be unable so to arrange, with efficient checks to fraud and waste." Thus he would lessen, and often cure, two of the greatest evils attending times of great commercial depression, namely, the necessity of temporary or permanent stoppage of business, and extended and protracted litigation.

The Tract is conceived in the spirit of humanity, prosecutes the argument under the direction of a sound judgment, and evinces a familiar acquaintance with the history of legislation on this subject in England and America; though it is somewhat deficient in logical arrangement, and therefore somewhat also in perspicuity and force.

E. V. G.

AN ADDRESS at the Dedication of the Second Hall of the Gœthean Literary Society of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa., July 28, 1857, by Lewis H. Steiner, A. M., M. D.

That was indeed a joyous day—a day long to be remembered—when the College from her own lofty abode could look down, like a queen, upon the beautiful palaces, reared on either hand by her twin daughters, who are equally near and equally dear, and behold her sons come thronging from afar to witness the solemnity of their dedication. The Hall on the south side, which bears the great name of Gœthe, had chosen for her orator on that occasion one of her own distinguished sons, and well did he fulfill his task. The address lies before us. It breathes the ancient spirit and exhibits the ripened fruits of former training. It sets forth with admirable skill the high claims of literature, philosophy and science, but makes them all, as of right they should, culminate in the religion of Jesus Christ, as the absolute truth. Science in particular is defended from the attacks of her enemies and the reproaches of her lukewarm friends. Those who regard her teachings as hostile to the Christian revelation are met and answered, and it is clearly shown, that if sceptics and infidels do wrest them from their true and proper meaning and use them as weapons wherewith to assail the Ark of the Covenant, they cannot be overcome by blind denunciation, but by disarming them and turning these same weapons against themselves, by showing that the book of nature and the book of God, instead of standing in flat contradiction, are really in full harmony with each other. Utterances like these are greatly needed at the present time, and we are glad, therefore, to hear one voice more in favor of the only ground, which can be taken with safety, and maintained against the enemies of the truth. *Philosophia obiter libata abducit a Deo, penitus hausta reducit ad eundem.*

P.

DARKNESS IN THE FLOWERY LAND; or Religious Notions and Popular Superstitions in North China. By the Rev. M. Simpson Culbertson, of the Shanghae Mission of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church. New York: Charles Scribner, 377 and 379 Broadway. 1857. pp. 235.

It has been our privilege to peruse several works on China; but never one, in which the same amount of information, in regard to the religious notions and popular superstitions of a particular section of that interesting country, was embraced in so small a compass, as in this volume. It contains many particulars, which are altogether new to us. The style is clean and forcible. "The sole object of the book is to promote the work of missions among the Chinese, by presenting such information as is calculated to awaken a deeper interest in their behalf, among those whose duty it is to send them the Gospel, which alone can deliver them from their present bondage, and from eternal death;" and in this object, we think, the writer has admirably succeeded.

F.

THE

MERCERSBURG REVIEW.

APRIL, 1858.

ART. I.—THOUGHTS ON THE CHURCH.

THOUGHTS; not formal argument or discussion. What the case requires, is not immediately and first of all a full regular construction or theory of the doctrine of the Church; much less a direct plea for any existing church organization. Back of all this lies the region of first principles and elementary ideas, by whose right determination alone it can ever be possible to bring any such theory or scheme to fair and proper trial. Of what account can it be to dispute concerning the power of the sacraments, or about points of ecclesiastical order, where the parties in controversy have no common conception whatever of the nature of the Church itself, but set out in their thinking with regard to it from wholly different points of observation? The great matter, in every such case, is to get attention fixed on first truths, without regard for the time to the polemical issues with which they may be concerned in actual life. There must be of course always an intimate living connection between what is first here and what is secondary; the practical issues involve necessarily their own theoretical principles, the ideal elements out of which they grow. But still the two things, as all may easily perceive, are not by any means the same. They are capable of full separation at least for thought. Many hold their practical notions with great zeal, without seeing at all the theoretical first truths which lie at the ground of them, and without having courage it may be to own the authority of any such truths when confronted with them face to face. Their principles are for their thinking implicit rather than explicit; in the mind, if we may so distinguish, but not in the understanding. And just so, on the other hand, it is possible to make ideas and principles here the subject of thoughtful contemplation, without running them out at once into any particular practical system. We do not mean to say, that the ideas themselves may cease to be practical. They are no metaphysical abstractions. They go at once into the depths of the Christian life; and to commune with them at all in a real way, is to have necessarily the most solemn and profound sense of their practical importance. But this does not preclude the possibility of their earnest consideration, as a separate preliminary and preparation for their being carried forward subsequently to any results in which they may find their proper practical conclusion. And just such preparation it is most of all, we may say, that is needed to open the way towards the true and right settlement of any of these results.

Thoughts, we say again; not words merely for the indolent, nor dreams for the sentimental, nor empty speculation for the curious. Thoughts for the *thoughtful;* for such as have a will to think, and at the same time some power to think; for such as know the solemnity of the subject, and feel the necessity of looking at it with an earnest and manly spirit; for such as have their mind set on real things in the world of religion, more than upon names simply and outward traditional forms. What such need in any case, is not so much full discussion as fruitful suggestion, hints for reflection, material for silent personal meditation. They take not their thinking at second hand, but are ready nevertheless to honor and welcome any thought which may serve as an occasion to put them on thinking for themselves in the right direction. A single idea with such may be of more account, than a whole volume of elaborate argument with many; because it shall be found to carry with it a truly creative force in their minds, giving rise to other ideas, and gradually making room for the presence of a new spiritual world. Our present article is for this class of persons. We write for the religiously thoughtful; not as offering to take the work of thought out of their own hands; nor yet as pretending to set before them any particular church scheme, rounded at all points and ready for their use; but only for the purpose of assisting and guiding their own thoughtfulness on that great subject under consideration, that it may be exercised to the best purpose and with the best effect.

The Question of the Church is in its ground and principle *One.* To a superficial thinker this may not be at once apparent. On first view, there might seem to be rather a number of church questions meeting in no common ground. At one time, the matter in dispute is Episcopacy; at another time, it is the power of the Sacraments; then again, it may be the use of a Liturgy, the observance of the Church Year, or the stress which it is proper to lay on the forms and ceremonies generally of religious Worship. It soon becomes evident, however, on serious consideration, that all these points, different as they may seem, involve here in some way the presence of a thought or idea more general than themselves, through the power of which they come together at last in the form of a single great question. These are after all subordinate and secondary issues only, the whole significance of which lies in the sense of a far deeper and more comprehensive issue that continually conditions them from behind. The sense of this may be indeed more an instinct, than any clear apprehension; still it is always at hand, where any true interest is taken in these subordinate questions. Hence it is never difficult to know, how the parties on any one such question will form themselves, when the subject for consideration comes to be another. The lines are still drawn always as between the same churchly and unchurchly tendencies; and no one is at a loss to anticipate in each case beforehand in what way the distinction must fall. This distinction, therefore, is not made by any of these subordinate issues, nor yet by all of them taken together; but it forms the rule and measure rather by which *they* come to exist. It is not a particular view of the sacraments that makes a man to be churchly or unchurchly; but it is his sense of the Church, on the contrary, that gives complexion and character to the view he may have of the sacraments. The church feeling thus is older and deeper in the order of nature than the sacramental, or the liturgical, or any other of like partial kind and form. The partial interest in each case refers itself spontaneously to the general interest in which it is comprehended, and bears witness in doing so to the unity of the whole subject. There is, accordingly, on all sides, a sort of intuitional sense of such ultimate unity or oneness reaching through the various questions that are agitated in regard to the Church, which may be said to go much beyond what is generally clear for the understanding. All these questions are felt to resolve themselves finally into one, which is the *Church Question*, in the full and proper sense of the term.

This general issue, in which all secondary questions in regard to the Church come finally together, is not imaginary only and unreal, or of only slight and unsignificant account. Some affect at times to look upon it in this light, making it to be at best a question of mere forms, or a controversy about empty fancies and dreams. They will have it, that it argues both a want of religious earnestness, and a want of sound judgment and good sense, to take much interest in the subject, or to have any serious difficulty whatever with its pretensions and claims. But this style of thinking can never satisfy long any truly thoughtful mind. It cannot be said to satisfy really the class of persons by whom it is assumed as a convenient affectation; for they show always an instinctive sense of the significance of the Church Question, which is not to be silenced or kept down by any judgment of this sort. If the case were in truth even for themselves what they pretend to make it, they would not be so easily moved as they are by what they consider its provocations. The question is felt all round to involve far more than any dispute concerning mere names and outward forms. However near the surface of Christianity the immediate matter of debate may seem to be in any particular case, the parties in controversy have the sense really of a general interest at stake which reaches ultimately to the very ground of the Christian life itself, and is held sufficient to justify a measure of zeal and intolerance that would bear no sort of proportion otherwise to the occasion calling it forth. Only in this way can we understand the spirit, which is found to rule in general the agitation of the Church Question, and which comes into view more or less in the discussion of every topic that runs into it as its necessary end. Difference here is felt to imply a deeper and more radical separation, than any which results from the ordinary theological divisions of the Christian world, and one that is more readily resented as a sort of direct antagonism allowing no compromise or reconciliation. The relation of the two opposing interests is one of broad, open exclusiveness and intolerance. It is such as leaves no room for mutual sympathy or common understanding. In this respect it goes beyond the distinction of mere sect in its usual form, and is felt to carry with it a deeper and wider meaning than is comprehended in the occasions and causes by which our religious sects generally are held apart. It is not co-ordinate and parallel simply with the difference that holds for instance between Calvinists and Arminians, between Congregationalists and Presbyterians, or between Methodists and Baptists. The questions and interests that divide such sects, however important they may seem to be when separately considered, are all felt to be of less fundamental moment than the issue which is brought into view by the idea of the Church, and are readily made to give way when it is felt necessary to take common ground over against its claims. All this goes to show the radical nature and multitudinous bearings of the Church Question. It enters necessarily into the very conception we form of Christianity, and may be said to exercise a moulding influence, and conditioning power, over the whole structure of the Christian faith.

Some proper sense of the true character of the Church Question in the view now stated, some power to perceive and acknowledge in a fair manner its claims to respect, must be considered to be an indispensable preliminary condition to any right inquiry or just judgment concerning its merits one way or another. The want of such appreciation, the absence of such positive insight into the reality and magnitude and true religious earnestness of the problem to be here solved and settled, is an argument at once, wherever found, of full disqualification for the task of taking it in hand; and goes with good reason, we may add, to create a presumption of wrong against the cause in whose service it appears. For in the nature of the case, the disqualification must be *moral*, and not simply natural. Not to be able to see at all the solemn interest of the subject, is necessarily in some degree also not to be willing to see it. There is a measure of insincerity and affectation always, we have reason to believe, in any such assumed posture of indifference or contempt towards what all feel notwithstanding to be of the deepest meaning for Christianity. Children feel it; it enters as an instinctive sentiment into all unsophisticated piety; the sense of it reveals itself, as we have already seen, even in those who pretend to make light of it, by the intemperate spirit with which they are sure to meet the subject wherever it comes in their way. There is that in their interior consciousness here, which gives the lie palpably to what they say with their lips and try to think in their hearts. Such being the case, we repeat, they are not qualified to sit in judgment on what they undertake thus magisterially to condemn. They lack the conditions of the hearing ear and the seeing eye. We have a right to distrust their cause, for the very reason that it allows, and seems to favor, a spiritual posture which we may easily know to be so dishonest and false.

Paganism in its first conflict with Christianity, affected in this way an entire superiority to the whole question which this last offered for its consideration. It could not condescend to meet it in any earnest and serious style. The story of the Gospel was treated as a Jewish dream, too foolish and absurd to deserve the least respectful attention; and the religion of those who embraced it was held to be a fair occasion for unbounded mockery and scorn, as being fit only for such as had taken leave of their senses. So Paganism talked; and so, no doubt, Paganism tried also to believe, persuading itself that its view of things was the fruit of actual knowledge and conviction. But it is easy to see now that this was not the case; and that for a thoughtful mind even then there might have been found a strong presumption for the Christian cause in the very posture and spirit of the unbelieving power by which it was thus superciliously opposed. For Paganism had no power to sustain itself quietly and steadily in this affectation of contempt towards Christianity; as it might surely have been able to do, if the new religion had been in fact so worthy of being laughed at as it pretended to think. There was that in its own consciousness, which after all gave the lie to its professed indifference, and compelled it in spite of itself to feel that it was at issue in this case with a force which threatened nothing less than its own destruction. However particular points of the Christian controversy might seem to offer easy and fair opportunity for caricature and overwhelming explosion, for biting wit or triumphant sneer, there was still an evident feeling all the time that the subject did not end in any such points, that all these particular questions resolved themselves mysteriously into the presence of a deeper general question lying behind, and that this had to do in truth with the universal life of the world as it then stood, Paganism knew in this blind way at least, in the midst of all its levity, that Christianity was a great power, an earnest power, a power that had a right to challenge its solemn apprehension and dread. It was the sense of this precisely, which made it impossible for it to treat

Christianity in the way it could treat other religions. They might be tolerated, even where they were despised. But for Christianity there could be no toleration. Over against its claims, there was no room for equanimity or patience. Hence the strange spectacle of that which was ridiculed as the most unmeaning of all religions, being the most ready object nevertheless of wrath and persecution on the part of those who made themselves superior to it in such style. No one can consider such a relation, without perceiving at once that it implied weakness and wrong on the side of Paganism, and a lack of power to cope fairly with the strength of the interest it sought to crush. Its want of ability to meet the claims of Christianity in an earnest and serious manner, its superficial levity in a case whose profound interest at the same time it was compelled to confess in the secret depths of its own mind, made it certain in the circumstances that it could do no justice to the Christian argument, and that any judgment it might pronounce upon it was far more likely to be wrong than right.

And so in any case, where a deep moral interest is involved, where a question of momentous practical bearings is to be settled, there must be some proper sense of the true earnestness of the subject, some sympathy with it, and some power to perceive and appreciate its claims to respect, before there can be any fitness or right to sit in judgment upon it; and no verdict or conclusion reached in regard to it without such previous qualification, can ever deserve to be held of any account.

The case now before us comes fully within the scope of this rule. Where there is no power, because at bottom there may be no will, to see and acknowledge the true solemnity of the issues involved in the Church Question, there can be no right to make them the subject of judgment, no title to be heard respectfully in pronouncing upon them any opinion or sentence. Those who think to dispose of the whole subject by any summary process of contempt, as though it were without all reason and sense and fit only for derision or condescending pity, do but betray the intrinsic weakness of their own position, and give room for a just presumption against the cause they represent. Their levity and frivolity here are out of character and out of place. Whether they choose to know it or not, the matter under consideration is both profound and earnest; and it argues religious unsoundness, to approach it, or to touch it, in any other than the most thoughtful and serious way.

The presumption against all such easy and wholesale judgment becomes still stronger, when it is considered that the views, which are thus summarily charged with madness and folly, have exercised in fact the widest and most powerful influence in the Christian world through all ages. One would suppose it might serve to tame somewhat the confident tone of those who allow themselves to think and talk in this way, only to know that by far the largest part of Christendom at the present time is ruled, both practically and theoretically, by the authority of just that system of ideas in regard to the Church, which they are accustomed to revile and deride as resting on no ground of reason whatever. But the case becomes a great deal stronger, when it is remembered that the same system of thought has in fact prevailed, with overwhelming authority, in every age of the Church from the beginning. There is no mistake with regard to this point. It is just as plain as it is possible for it to be made by the evidence of history. We read the full proof of it in all the movements of Christian antiquity. Right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, the very idea of the Church which is now denounced in the quarter of which we are speaking as no better than a silly dream, is that precisely which is found to pervade the reigning mind of the Church catholic from the century of the Apostles down to the century of the Reformation. It meets us in the old Creeds; it speaks to us from every page of the Christian Fathers; it breathes through all the ancient Liturgies; it enters into the universal scheme of the early Christian Faith. The very points in it which strike the party in question as most grossly obnoxious to vilification and reproach, were admitted and proclaimed without the least feeling of reserve. Points, for example, that such a man as Mr. Spurgeon, the popular juvenile preacher of London, can find no terms too strong to stigmatize as the perfection of brainless puerility, had power notwithstanding to command the reverence of entire ecumenical synods, and were received everywhere with unquestioning faith by the wisest and best men. What is with him a subject only for heartfelt mockery, was a solemn heavenly mystery to the mind of an Augustine or a Chrysostom. He finds it easy to wade, where an Origen or a Jerome found ample room to swim.

We do not mean to say, that this sort of authority should of itself settle the question on which it is brought to bear. We are not pleading now the argument of prescription and use, in Tertullian's style, in favor either of the Church system as a whole, or of any point which may be comprised in it as a part. The question is not, whether baptismal regeneration, (in the old Christian sense as distinguished from the modern Puritanic confusion of terms,) is to be held true, because it was notoriously the doctrine of St. Augustine, and of all the Fathers before him and after him; nor whether the idea of a real oblation of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament of the altar is to be owned and accepted, because it most manifestly enters into all the ancient Liturgies; nor whether the article of "one holy catholic Church," in its original historical meaning, is to be considered a necessary object of faith, because it was made to be so, as every body knows, in the primitive Creeds. Nothing of this sort is before us at present. All that we now mean to say is simply this: that let it fare with these great points as it may, the mere fact of their being so circumstanced as they show themselves to be in the view now mentioned, ought of itself to shield them from the flippant, not to say ribald tone and style, in which they are too often approached by the class of thinkers who find it most easy to dispose of them at the present time. Their method of resolving and settling this whole question, whose issues are so vast and great, without the least regard for the judgment of other ages, without the smallest respect for the opinion of hundreds and thousands of Christian men quite as wise and good, to say the least, as themselves, is altogether too sweeping, too presumptuously dogmatic, to be at all satisfactory to any earnest mind. Where the case *can* be disposed of in such style, there is reason at once to apprehend that it has never yet come to be rightly understood, or that the right moral conditions are not at hand for treating it with any sort of justice.

The presumption of wrong against this easy and light way of meeting the subject becomes still greater, when it is considered that the views which go to form the church system of Christianity, and which have such a weight of outward authority in their favor, find a wide and profound sanction also in the common religious nature and constitution of men. We have full evidence of this at once in the fact that they have been able, in the way we have just seen, to master the faith of the Christian world to so great an extent through all ages, drawing all doctrines and instructions in their own direction ; a fact which is only made the more striking, if we allow it to be assumed that the true Christian scheme, in its original Apostolical form, was something wholly different from all this, diametrically opposed to it indeed, and that these views forced themselves into the Church therefore as an actual apostacy or falling away from that original scheme, against the will of Christ, and in full contradiction to the clear sense of the Scriptures. So much the enemies of the church system themselves are constrained to see and confess ; and they try, accordingly, to turn the fact, in their shallow way, to the advantage of their own cause. Human nature, we are reminded, is carnal and corrupt, and always more ready to embrace a lie than the truth ; and so, after the fashion of the somewhat famous *dictum*, "Every man is born an Arminian," it may be said also, Every man is born with a proclivity to the notions which go to make up the church system as distinguished from Christianity in its proper spiritual and evangelical form. It is easy to see, however, that this amounts to no just solution of the difficulty whatever. The movement of Christianity in the direction now considered shows itself of quite too broad and profound a character, to be satisfactorily accounted for in this way. To understand it at all, we must refer it to a far deeper ground of life than any which is brought to view in the vanity and corruption merely of our fallen nature; which after all does not represent to us the deepest and last sense of our souls even in their present state. Such a fact as that which is offered to us in the almost universal reign of the church system, commencing so far back and reaching so far forward, bearing all things in its own direction, carrying along with it the deepest forces of the Christian life, hallowed by the prayers and sanctified by the sufferings of the best Christian ages, honored by the zeal of martyrs and the learning of fathers, conquering nations to the law of Christ and building into form the whole structure of their worship and faith —such a fact as this, we say, can never be rationally construed without recourse to the idea of a much deeper reason for it in the nature of man, than any which is found simply in its perversion through the power of sin. The whole phenomenon is of such an order, that in view of it we are bound to acknowledge a mysterious correspondence in some way between this style of religion and the inmost religious wants and impulses of the soul.

So much is apparent also, we may add, sufficiently so at least for all thoughtful persons, from the power it is found to exercise over many in modern times, under circumstances that might seem to be the most unfavorable to its influence. The reigning temper of Protestantism, in its present Puritanic form, is against it, not only having no sympathy with it, but absolutely intolerant of its presence. And yet in the bosom of this Protestantism itself, it seems to be a spirit which can never be effectually and finally laid. It is ever ready, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, to raise its unpopular head, and enter its solemn protest, more or less loudly, against what it conceives to be the downward tendencies of the predominant unchurchly interest. In almost every denomination we have, if not an open, at least a sort of quiet and silent war, going forward between the less churchly and the more churchly, the point of controversy being the question of retaining or parting with some idea, or some practice, involving still as far as it may reach the old conception of the Holy Catholic Church. But in some cases, the issue reveals itself in a far bolder and much more earnest form. Of this sort is the Anglo-catholic movement in the Church of England, and the Old Lutheran movement in the German Church. Nothing can well be more superficial, than the style in which it is pretended too often to account for such manifestations of the church spirit; nothing more inwardly helpless and imbecile, than the way in which it is attempted in most cases to meet them and put them down. Our business now, however, is not to speak in their direct defence; we leave them severally to their several merits whatever these may be. But so much at least we have a right to say: the circumstances under which they come into view are such as absolutely preclude the idea of their being the product of ignorance, pride, self-will, dislike to spiritual religion, or any other bad natural power of this sort, and make it certain on the contrary that they stand connected with the inmost religious wants, and most earnest spiritual longings, of our general human life. Affectation, sentimentalism, and pedantry, may indeed join themselves to such a movement, and be carried along with it in a sort of outward way; caricaturing the true sense of it, and making it offensive or ridiculous; as they may do, and have a tendency to do, in the case of any great religious movement whatever. But the true ruling force of the stream must be sought in depths far more profound.

It requires indeed only some proper communion with the subject in our own spirits, to perceive the truth of the general thought which we have now in hand. It is wonderful with what power church ideas make their appeal to the soul, when it is brought into the right posture and habit for perceiving their force. And this habit is anything but such as it might be supposed to be, on the theory of those who seek to resolve all sentiments of the sort into worldly and unspiritual motives. It does not come of logic. It is no fruit of the mere understanding. It owns no sympathy with the noise and rush of material interests, the common outward life of the present world. It is a habit rather, in which the mind is brought to fall back upon the depths of its own nature, and to converse with the spiritual things, not so much in the way of outward reflection, as in the way of inward intuition.

In some such style it is, that the unperverted thoughts of childhood are accustomed to go out towards the realities of the world unseen and eternal; and children, as we have had occasion to say before, have a natural receptivity for all churchly ideas; a truth which any one can easily verify, by remembering the experience of his own childhood, or by observing the childhood of others. What true child ever had any difficulty in admitting the idea of baptismal grace, or in acknowledging the mystical force of the Lord's Supper? So at every point children are peculiarly open to just those views and sentiments in religion, which enter into what may be termed the objective churchly side of Christianity, as we have it developed in the old Catholic Church. The only true order of faith for them is always the Apostles' Creed. No symbol, no catechism, ever speaks to them like that. They are disposed to believe in saints, and, to hold in reverence the memory of confessors and martyrs. They have an active sense for the liturgical in religion, for the mystical, for the priestly and sacramental. It costs no trouble to bend their first religious thoughts this way. Their earliest piety will not flow smoothly in any other channel.

And thus it is through life, where the child is allowed to remain still "father to the man," in any right sense, and where opportunity is still found for the religious sensibilities to work in their proper primitive form. The "testimony of the soul," on which Tertullian lays so much stress, as being on the side of all religion, and as bearing witness in particular to the claims of Christianity the absolutely true religion, goes unquestionably in favor also of Christianity under the churchly view, and lends countenance to the whole circle of thoughts and feelings in which this view may be said to have its natural and proper home. There is that in the inmost depths of our religious being, which echoes responsively to the voice of this special form of the Christian faith, wherever there is room for it to be rightly and fairly heard. Is it not here, in truth, we reach the ground and foundation of all religious art? All such art is churchly by its very constitution, and ceases to be intelligible where some sense of the Church comes not in as a key to explain its meaning. Puritanic ideas are for the understanding; Catholic ideas speak more directly to the heart.

Here again, however, we do not mean to make the voice of nature in this form an argument at once for the truth of every particular point of opinion or belief, that may be found entering into the general order of faith which is thus commended to our regard. As the testimony of the soul in favor of Christianity at large cannot be held sufficient to accredit all views that prevail in the name of Christianity; as many such views may be superstitious, fantastic, exaggerated and false, even while they seem to fall back upon that general witness, and to find in it their natural encouragement and support; so ought it not to be considered strange certainly if the same testimony of the soul, uttered in favor of the Church, should appear improperly used in many cases to recommend like superstitions and errors prevailing in the name of the Church. Opinions may belong to a certain order of thought, and find in it their easy natural home, without being for this reason after all any part of its legitimate life. There may be, we have a right to suppose, wrong interpretations of Catholic feeling, false ways of carrying out the applications of Catholic truth, just as we know there is room for like misconstruction and misapplication where other spheres also, whether of sentiment or principle, are concerned. We are not called upon here to discriminate between the true and the false in single particulars. Our argument is not now in behalf of any certain points. What we mean to assert is simply the authority of the church system in its general and whole view, its title to respect, its right to be acknowledged as a necessary side of the Christian faith.

The sense of the Church, as an article of faith, shows what power it carries with it for the interior life of the soul, by the way in which it is accustomed to work and make itself felt where it has once begun to prevail. It is then no barren opinion merely, no mechanical tradition simply, but the power of a living *idea*, which is not so much apprehended by the mind, as it seems itself rather to apprehend this, and to bear it along irresistibly in its own direction. The idea may not start at the centre; is more likely indeed to begin with some point in the general circumference of that great circle of thoughts which it pervades with its presence; but let the force of it be felt where it may first, it has a tendency always to grow and spread, reaching from one point to another, and settling itself always more widely and firmly in the mind. This serves to show the vitality of the idea. Those who have no sense for it, and with whom the consciousness of religion holds only in the unchurchly form, may look upon it, and speak of it, as a whim or caprice without any proper spiritual root in the soul; but the actual subjects of its power know better. They know it to be in themselves something both deep and living; it has for them the force of a real inward awakening; it is not so much an opinion with them as an experience; and the more it comes to prevail within them, the more impossible it becomes for them to rid themselves of its presence. Especially impossible is it for them to be engaged to any thing of this sort, at the bidding of such as show plainly that they have never really known in their own minds the nature and meaning of that which they oppose. The case is felt to be one, in which no such purely outside judgment can deserve to be held of any weight.

A great argument for the idea of the Church appears in the fact, that all Christian sects find themselves compelled to do homage to it, indirectly at least if not directly, in spite even of their own natural disposition too often drawing them the other way. Sects are in their own nature hostile to the true conception of the Church; the sect spirit is constitutionally an unchurchly spirit. But notwithstanding this, we find among all properly Christian denominations some practical acknowledgment of the church system, as being necessary in some way to carry out and complete the full sense of the Gospel. There would seem to be in fact no escape from this, short of the giving up of Christianity altogether, and the resolution of it into merely natural religion. Christianity has no power, it would seem, to divest itself absolutely of that form of existence we call the Church. Hence no sect can avoid altogether the assumption of some church character, and the assertion of some of the elements of a true church life in its own favor. There is a difference of course in the case; some sects go much farther than others in the unchurchly direction; while all of them, in their various ways, fall short of the full conception of the Church, thus laboring under inconsistency and contradiction. But none of these is able to ignore and repudiate the conception as a whole. The most unchurchly among them is under the power of a law here which is too mighty to be cast off entirely, and with however bad a grace must conform in some part to the demands of the very system against which it claims to be an earnest uncompromising protest. Every sect has to be, whether it will or not, some sort of a *church*. Even the Baptists hold themselves to be something more in this view than the American Bible Society or Tract Society; and the most rank Congregational Independency will not allow itself to be just of one order with a city Young Men's Association or a Village Lyceum. Every sect in its way sets itself up for a reliable and sufficient guide in the things of religion, an authorized exponent of the Divine will, the bearer of a true heavenly commission for the exercise of spiritual powers to which it would be nothing short of blasphemy to think of laying claim in any other view. Every sect arrogates to itself, in its own denominational range at least, religious functions that are in their very nature catholic; prophetical functions, priestly functions, kingly functions; the right of mediating between man and his Maker; the power of the keys; rights and powers generally, such as to be legitimate can flow only from a Divine commission, and such as cannot be honestly acknowledged at all therefore without being allowed to be as broad and universal as Christianity itself. The nearest approximation to a full and complete denial of the Church under the show of Christianity, comes to view among the Quakers; but even with them some poor remains of the idea have been found necessary all along to preserve this show; and the elimination of these now more and more from their system, is the sure signal of its speedy resolution everywhere into thin air. Rightly considered, nothing can well be of more force to establish the maxim, "No Church, no Christianity," than this compulsory witness in its favor on the part of the whole sect world, which may be considered in full conspiracy against it, and whose very life would seem to depend on its successful contradiction.

In view of these manifold relations to the idea of the Church, and the power it is found to exert over the conception of Christianity in such various ways, it becomes the more important that we should be able to fix our minds on what may be considered the fundamental form of this idea, as distinguished from its operations and effects under a derivative and merely secondary view. In all religious bodies we meet with the idea of the Church, expressed in some elements which owe to it clearly all their meaning and force; while it is no less plain, that in many cases at least such elements are at hand only in an isolated and fragmentary way, without reaching to the unity of a true church system, and without being referred to their own necessary ground and principle, the idea of the Church itself. We are bound, therefore, to distinguish in the case between what is derivative and what is original and fontal, and to look steadily through the first, if possible, back to the last, ; and it is plain also, that in doing this our inquiry ought to be concerned primarily not with particular organizations claiming to be churches, the Presbyterian, for instance, the Episcopal, or the Roman Catholic, but with the thought of the Church itself, its purely ideal nature, as something lying back of all such organizations, and seeking actualization through them in some way answerable to its own essential requirements and demands.

The true sense of the Church Question, in this view, that which forms its proper nerve and gist, is not found really in those points around which the controversy is most commonly made to revolve. The first matter needing to be settled is not the right of any outward historical organization to be considered the Church or a part of the Church, but what the Church itself must be held to be in theory or idea; not the force and value of any institution or usage or order which may be set forward in any quarter as evidencing the presence of the Church, but what this presence in any case must be taken actually to involve and mean. If men have no common notion or conception of the Church, some taking it to mean much and others taking it to mean very little or almost nothing at all, it can never be more than a waste of time for them to dispute concerning the modes of its being or the proper methods of its action. Only when the *idea* of the Church has been first brought to some clear determination, can the way be said to be at all open for discussing either intelligibly or profitably such questions as relate only to the manner in which the idea should be, or actually may be anywhere, carried out in practice. That is always a most heartless sort of controversy about church points, where the parties at issue agree at bottom in disowning, or not perceiving, what forms in fact the true core of the subject in debate, and thus show themselves to be contending for an empty form and nothing more; as when the Baptist insists on the obligation of the sacraments against the Quaker, or the Congregationalist defends the baptism of infants against the Baptist, without any faith on either side in the old doctrine of sacramental grace; or as when the Episcopalian is violent for bishops, or for the use of a liturgy, against the Presbyterian, while for both alike all resolves itself into a question of mere outward appointment, and neither the Christian ministry nor Christian worship mean a particle more for the one than they mean for the other. Such questions, belonging to the periphery of the church system are of course important; but only as they are viewed in connection with the centre of the sphere in which they have their place. Disjoined from this in thought, they cease to have any meaning or force. What earnest mind can make much account of the question of infant baptism, if the whole sacrament be considered an outward sign merely without any sort of objective force? To what can the question of Episcopacy amount for any such mind, where the ministry is not held to be of strictly divine right, and the necessary channel of God's grace in the Church? It may be something relatively churchly to uphold the authority of the sacraments in opposition to the Quakers, to be in favor of infant baptism in contradiction to the Baptists, to go for Presbyterianism instead of Independency and Congregationalism, to press the distinguishing points of Anglican or American Episcopacy against all other denominations; but no such distinctions are sufficient of themselves to bring into view the absolute sense of the quality which is applied to them by the term churchly. To reach this, we must go farther back. The fundamental question is not of the sacraments, nor of a liturgy, nor of the church year, nor of ordination and apostolical succession, nor of presbyters, bishops, or popes; but, as we have said, of the nature of the Church itself, considered in its ideal character, and as an object of thought anterior to every such revelation of its presence in an outward way.

Is the Church really and truly a constituent part of Christianity, the necessary form of its existence or being in the world? Does it belong to the "mystery of godliness," the constitution of grace, in such a sense that this must stand or fall with its presence? This, if we look at it rightly, is the question of questions for the subject before us, that on which turns the whole significance of the controversy concerning the Church. This is that last profound issue, towards which, whether with full consciousness or not, all other issues in the minds of men on the subject of the Church flow naturally as to their proper end, and in the bosom of which alone it is possible for them to be brought to any final and full solution. Accordingly as this question may be either affirmed or denied, all other questions appertaining to the church system will be found to retain or lose their interest. If the question be affirmed, and the only true and proper idea of the Church is held to be that which is expressed by such answer, it is easy to see how at once all points flowing from it, or depending upon it in any way, must acquire a corresponding solemnity of sense; how they must be considered no longer as things of curious and vain speculation merely, but as matters of deep practical import; how it must be felt, that instead of bearing to Christianity the relation simply of outward accidents or adiaphorous forms, they reach in truth to its inmost heart, and have to do with the deepest spiritualities of its life. Let the answer, on the contrary, fall the other way, so that the Church shall he held to be no necessary constituent of Christianity, but only an arrangement joined to it from without, and it becomes then just as easy to see, how at once all points connected with it must be shorn, to a corresponding extent, of their meaning and interest, and how it can never be any thing more than pedantry at best to lay any great stress upon them, or to make them the subject of earnest strife one way or another. It is a poor business surely to stickle for forms, where the whole idea is disowned which can make them to be of any force. Without faith in the mystery of the Church, as being the real bearer of heavenly and supernatural powers, to what can it amount to be zealous for the mere modes of its action, the mere circumstantials of its constitution? Then indeed to be churchly, is to be at the same time formal and superstitious, narrow and pedantic. Then the more men pretend to lean this way, the worse; since their religion in any such form must appear only the greater sham. The most ghastly of all shams is that which takes upon itself in fullest measure the form and show of what it pretends to be, without having in itself still the power of the central idea which is needed to breathe through the whole its proper life. What is the Christian ministry, what is ordination, what are sacraments, without the old conception of the Christian Church? Presbyterianism, without this conception, is a sham over against Congregationalism; as this itself is also over against the still more unchurchly position of Baptists and Quakers. But Episcopalianism without it must be held a worse sham than all.

No one can be said to know at all the meaning of the Church Question, no one is prepared to speak of it intelligibly or to purpose, who has not been confronted with it face to face in the radical form now mentioned, and who has not felt it necessary to meet it in this form with some definite and distinct answer. All dispute about the out ward organization of the Church, about its proper rights and powers, about its historical movement, and its actual presence in the world under any particular profession and title at a given time, must be in a great measure unmeaning and profitless without this. The question, *What is the Church?* is older in the order of nature than the question, *Where is the Church?* and must be brought to some steady determination for our thinking, before we can have any right at all to pronounce in regard to this last any judgment whatever

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What is the Church? What is the true idea or conception of it, in the economy of the Christian salvation? Does it belong to the essence of Christianity; or is it something accidental only to its proper being, a constitution made to inclose it in an outward way, and capable of being separated from it without serious damage to its life?

This, we say, is the true *Church Question*, the root of that great controversy concerning the Church, whose ramifications reach so far, and whose multitudinous bearings are found to cover at last the entire field both of Christian doctrine and Christian practice. Here is the fountain head of the difference, which like some mighty stream divides throughout the churchly system of religion from the unchurchly. Here is the beginning of the great gulf fixed between them, which serves to place them as it were in two opposite worlds. No other issue, within the Christian sphere itself, descends so deep or reaches so far. It enters into the very idea of faith, affects the sense of all worship, conditions the universal scheme of theology, and moulds and shapes the religious life at every point. It gives rise to two phases of Christianity, which are so different as to seem at last indeed, in their full development, more like two Christianities than one.

Is the Church of the essence of Christianity, the necessary form of its presence, the only medium of its grace, the true organ of its power, in the world? Whatever difficulty there may be about the proper answer to this question in modern times, for the Christian world in the first ages there was none. They answered the question at once in the affirmative, and considered it treason to the Christian faith to think of answering it in any other way.

The full evidence of this lies before us in the Apostles' Creed; or rather, we should say, in all the primitive Creeds, For the Creeds of the early Church are in truth one; any differences among them being variations simply of the same theme, that touch not in the least the true unity of its sense. This theme takes in everywhere the idea of the Church; takes it in also under the very aspect of which we are now speaking, as being of the essence of Christianity, and not simply one of its outward adjuncts. The doctrine or fact of the Church is not in the Creed by accident. It is there, just as the fact of Christ's glorification is there, in virtue of its belonging really and truly to the movement or progress of the general mystery of godliness, which it is the purpose of the Creed to present as the great object of the Christian faith. In no other view could it have a place in the Creed at all, if we suppose this to be a true organic representation of what Christianity is in its fundamental conception, and not a loose throwing together simply of particular opinions without inward law or reason. The article of the Church is in the Creed, not just by wilful determination on the part of the framers of the symbol, but by the constitutional necessities of the Creed itself. It is the necessary outbirth of the Christian faith, keeping pace with the progress of its glorious object, just at the point where it comes into view. As Christ's glorification makes room for the mission of the Holy Ghost, so the mission of the Holy Ghost unfolds itself with necessary consequence in the constitution of the Holy Catholic Church. Blot out that article, and the whole Creed is mutilated and bro-broken in its sense.

It may help us to appreciate the force of the article in this view, if we allow ourselves to suppose some other article made to stand in its place. Take, for example, the doctrine of the authority of the Bible, as being the inspired word of God and the only infallible rule of faith and practice. Suppose the Creed to run: "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, &c." It is very easy to see, that this would not fall in with the true organism of the symbol at all. The coming of the Holy Ghost, was not in order to the publication of the Holy Scriptures primarily, but in order to the founding of the Holy Catholic Church. For the thinking of the early Christian world, therefore, it was not possible to place the Bible before the Church in the order of faith. The Church was for them a fact deeper, and wider, and nearer to the proper life of Christianity, than the Bible. Not with any feeling of disrespect for the Bible of course; and not from any doubt of its being the inspired word of God, but because their sense of Christianity was such as to require this order rather than any other.

There is no room for any mistake in regard to the sense, in which the Church is made to be an article of faith in the Creed. This is determined by its connexions, as well as by the whole aim and purpose of the formulary itself. The Creed is intended to set forth the true fundamental facts of the world of grace, as it has come to be established in the midst of the world of nature. These facts in such view are all mysteries, objects for faith as distinguished from natural understanding. The Church thus is made to be a mystery, the presence of a supernatural fact in the world, which men are required to acknowledge as a necessary part of the Christian faith. It is made to be this, moreover, in such a way as to carry along with it, in its own place, the full power of the Christian salvation. The Church, in the Creed, stands out manifestly as the connecting medium between all that goes before and all that follows after. The grace which starts in Christ's birth, and flows onward through his life, his death upon the cross, his descent to hades, his resurrection, his ascension to the right hand of God, and the sending of the Holy Ghost, is the same that then discharges its full stream into the bosom of the Church, and that is poured forth from this again in the benefits of redemption, from the remission of sins onward to the life everlasting. Beyond all question, the Creed means to affirm the being of the Church, as an indispensable link in the scheme of salvation, and as something not accidental merely but essential to the constitution of Christianity.

In this view, it defines itself and fixes its own attributes. It is necessarily one, holy, catholic, and apostolical. It can be no real object of faith at all, except in this character and form. Its ministry is of divine right. Its sacraments convey grace. The scheme of the Creed, in a word, is churchly throughout; and it is not possible to understand it, or to have any sympathy with it, except from the posture of a true churchly faith. For the strictly Puritanic mind, it can never seem to carry a right sound.

If there could be any doubt concerning the proper sense of the Creed here, separately considered, it must disappear immediately in view of what may easily be known in other ways to have been the general faith of the early Church on this subject. As all the variations of the Creed proceed in one and the same strain, so also is this found to be in full harmony at the same time with the universal religious thinking of the time to which they belong. No one who has taken the least serious pains to qualify himself for an intelligent opinion in the case, can make any question in regard to this point. The idea of the Church which meets us in the Epistles of Ignatius, is the same that rules the polemics of Irenaeus, animates the zeal of Cyprian, and comes to its full systematic development at last in the theology of the great Augustine. It is the idea, by which all institutions and arrangements, all offices and sacraments, all forms and rubrics, belonging to the Church, are made to be something subordinate to the living constitution of the Church itself, in virtue of which only they can be supposed to carry with them either grace or power. Faith in the Church, with these Fathers, was not just faith in bishops, or in an altar, or in the use of a liturgy; for bishops, and altars, and liturgies, were common among such as were held notwithstanding to have neither part nor lot in the true commonwealth of Christ. It terminated on what the Church was supposed to be as a divine mystery, back of episcopacy, and behind all sacraments, symbols, and forms, the force of which must turn necessarily at last on its own nature. The peculiarity of this old church faith is, that it goes right to the heart of the true Church Question, where many are altogether unwilling to follow it, who still affect to make great account of it for other points; infant baptism, for instance, baptismal grace, the mystical power of the Lord's Supper, or the three orders of the ministry ; without perceiving that such points in fact mean nothing, save in union with the central life of the system to which they belong. The old faith went hand in hand with the Creed; saw in the Church the presence of a new order of life in the world, flowing from Christ's exaltation and the sending of the Holy Ghost; owned it for the body of Christ, and the home of the Spirit; ascribed to it for this reason heavenly prerogatives and powers; and found no difficulty accordingly in speaking of it as the ark of salvation, in whose bosom alone men might hope to outride safely the perils of their present life, and to be borne finally into the haven of eternal rest.

We speak not now of the merits of this faith. We ask not, whether it was right or wrong. All we wish is to hold it up to view steadily as a historical fact. In this light at least, it deserves our solemn attention; and no one certainly can be supposed to deal fairly and honestly with the Church Question, who is not willing to look the fact full in the face, or who does not feel it necessary to come to some right understanding with it in his own mind. Take it as we may, we find no Puritanism in the ancient Church; but touches of it only among heretical bodies on the outside. We can hardly read a page of the old ecclesiastical literature, Greek or Latin, without falling on something, the proper sense of which involves necessarily, if it does not directly affirm, the churchly view of religion. The authority of the church system is felt to stretch itself over the whole field of thought and life. Strange, is it not, if it should have been after all as brainless and heartless, as it is the fashion with some to make it in these last days!

A still farther argument for what we have seen to be the sense of the Creed in reference to the Church might be found, if it were needed, in the notorious unpopularity of the symbol among all unchurchly religious bodies, in proportion precisely to the measure of their alienation from the old idea of the Church. Here we have a fact again, make out of it what we may, which admits of no dispute, Puritanism has no sympathy with the Creed; no taste for it; no power to make any honest use of it as a symbol of faith. Its notion of Christianity runs not naturally into any such form, but left to itself seeks always a different course of expression. The Creed does not sit easily upon it; finds no hearty and full echo in its soul; is allowed by it, therefore, to fall quietly into general neglect. Why is it that our Protestant sects commonly, at this time, make no use of the Creed either publicly or privately? The question surely deserves some consideration. Such indifference to the oldest formulary of the Christian faith can not be without profound significance in some way. The Baptists of course have nothing to do with it; the Methodists make no account of it; New England Congregationalists consider it the fossil relic only of a by-gone age; Presbyterians, as a general thing, regard it with suspicion, or else ignore it altogether. Can this be merely accidental? Could it be at all, if there were not at bottom, in all these cases, a material variation from the system of religious thought in which the Creed is constructed?

The nature of the variation may easily be understood. It turns upon the conception of the Church, which enters essentially into the structure of the Creed, and conditions both the form and spirit of it throughout. The article of the Church is not in the Creed as a loose separate particular only, joined to its other articles in a purely outward way. It holds its place there, by virtue of its own intrinsic right to be considered a necessary part of the system of faith which is embodied in the symbol. The order of this faith, the evolution of its proper organic sense, is such as imperiously to require the presence of the article just where it comes into view. The whole Creed, thus, moves in the power of the church system; all its articles have a churchly tone; and it is not possible for them to find a hearty and full response, where the Puritanic unchurchly spirit has come generally to prevail. This is the reason that it is so little popular with most of our religious sects at the present time. They can have no sympathy, as sects, with the old idea of the Church. Hence, consciously or unconsciously, their indifference, if not positive dislike, to a symbol which is felt to be mysteriously full of it from beginning to end.

It would be a curious and interesting experiment, to try what would be the effect of the Creed upon the unchurchly habit of religion, if it were brought into use again where it is now thus unhappily forgotten or disowned. Let its authority be revived in the midst of any Puritanic sect. Let earnest be made with the use of it, for the purposes of religious instruction and worship. Let its old familiar voice be heard once more, in the family and in the great congregation. Let it be publicly honored in the sanctuary, at the altar and in the pulpit. Could the unchurchly habit of religion endure any such test? We feel very sure that it could not. It would be ready in the first place, to resent it as the coming in of a spirit dangerous to the interests of evangelical religion, an insidious tendency towards Puseyism or Popery. It must be forced in the next place, should the trial still go steadily forward, to bend gradually to the new order of thought thus pressed upon it, and to give up its unchurchliness in some measure at least in favor of the opposite style of Christianity. Puritanism and the Creed can never reign in full force together. The introduction of the Creed into general use in New England, would be the sure signal at once of a general revolution in its whole theological and ecclesiastical life.

Looking at things as we have seen them to be, it must seem strange certainly to find the representatives of this unchurchly Christianity—who have no power to frame their lips to a sincere pronunciation of the Apostles' Creed—boldly arrogating to themselves the highest style of evangelical orthodoxy, and denouncing as seriously in error all who refuse to be governed by their private rule and measure. What then is orthodoxy? Has the Christian world been mistaken all along, in supposing it to be rightly set forth, first of all, in the articles of the old Christian Creeds? Whatever else it may embrace in the way of true confessional development, must it start at least in this form of sound words, and grow forth from it organically as its unchanging root? Can any later Confession, Catechism, or Creed, deserve to be considered of force, except as it may be taken to unfold and carry out what was here proclaimed to be the only order of faith in the beginning? Is the *Symbolum Apostolicum* to be regarded still as the primary, fundamental symbol of Christianity; or is it not? Let this question be answered. Let men look at it, and answer it fairly and distinctly in their own minds. Let our sects answer it to themselves, and to one another. Then we shall know all round, where we are, and what we mean. In this whole controversy concerning the Church, the first preliminary requiring to be settled would appear to meet us just here. There can be no meaning in it, if the parties in debate have no common faith in the Creed. When church principles, therefore, are called in question, or opposed in any quarter, it is but fair to ask first of all whether those who set their face against them are believers or unbelievers in Christianity as we have it defined in this primitive catholic symbol. No such unbeliever deserves to be considered respectfully in the case. What right can any one have to set himself up as a critic or judge of orthodoxy here, who is so grossly at fault in the quality of his own faith? To what can it amount, that the idea of the Church is disowned by those, who at the same time disown the idea of the Creed?

Windsor Place, Lancaster co., Pa. J. W. N.

ART. II.—THE NEW LITURGY.

A LITURGY; or, ORDER OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP. Prepared by the direction and for the use of the *German Reformed Church* in the United States of America. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858. (Third edition.)

NEXT to the Word of God, which stands in unapproachable majesty far above all human creeds and confessions, fathers and reformers, popes and councils, there are no religious books of greater practical importance and influence than catechisms, hymn books, and liturgies. They shape the moral and religious sentiments in early youth; they feed the devotions in old age; they are the faithful companions of the most solemn hours in the house of God, around the family altar and in the silent closet; they give utterance to the deepest emotions, the purest thoughts, the highest aspirations; they urge to duty and every good work; they comfort in affliction, and point to heaven at the approach of death. Even the ripe scholar delights to return from time to time, if not daily, to the first question of his Catechism, or a familiar verse, or the simple Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, which his pious mother taught him when a child, on his knees, and derives more solid wisdom and substantial comfort from them than from a whole library of learned volumes. They embody his earliest and his deepest impressions; they remind him of his best moments; they are his sacred things "which doubt has never dimmed and controversy never soiled;" they teach him his "only comfort in life and in death." Luther did more good by his little Catechism and few hymns than by all his twenty-four large quartos, save only his translation of the book of books. The authors of the Heidelberg and the Westminster Catechisms exerted greater influence upon their age and subsequent generations, than all the schoolmen of the middle age by their subtle commentaries on Aristotle and Peter the Lombard. The author of the simple verse, "Now

I lay me down to sleep," etc., was one of the greatest benefactors of children, and through them of the race.

It is difficult to say which of these three nurseries of the Church occupies the first rank. National and denominational differences must here be allowed their due weight. In Protestant Germany, which produced the richest hymnology in the world, and still adheres to the practice of congregational singing as an essential element of public worship, hymns have a power and influence as in no other land. The Presbyterian and Puritan Churches would no doubt at once give the Catechism and Confession the preference, and look upon liturgies with suspicion as tending to formalism. In the Episcopal Church, the "Common Prayer Book" has probably done more to keep her together, to preserve her faith, to nourish her piety, to attach her membership and to attract a certain class of foreign material, than all her bishops, priests and deacons. The best state of things would perhaps require the equal excellency and harmonious coöperation of the doctrinal and devotional standards. But we know of no denomination which may claim to have at once the best catechism, the best hymnbook and the best liturgy.

The German or Evangelical Reformed Church of this country has undertaken the difficult and responsible task of providing for its membership a new Liturgy or Directory of public and private worship. She did not seek it, but was providentially prepared for, and led into it. The book is now before the public, but simply as an experiment and for provisional use. The Committee which prepared it, have no wish whatever of seeing it introduced into any congregation without their free and full consent. All they ask for their work, is a fair examination and trial. In their final report, they requested Synod not to take any action at present either for or against the book. Its merits or defects can only be properly tested by practical experience in the family and the church. It may require several years to settle the question of its adaptedness to the wants of the denomination for whose use it has been prepared.

This is indeed a new method of introducing a Liturgy, and its practicability may be doubted. But if it be wrong, its fault lies not in the Romanizing, but in the Protestant direction, and should, therefore, give at least no alarm to any body on that score. It makes full account of the general priesthood of believers. It may be called a republican and even a democratic method, or an application of the popular sovereignty-principle to church movements. If the ministers and congregations do not want the new prayer book, all they have to do is, to vote it down, and either to refer it back to the old committee for revision, or to order the preparation of a new liturgy on a different plan, or to drop the subject altogether and settle upon the exclusive system of extemporaneous prayer in the house of God as well as in the family.

But whatever may be the ultimate fate of this provisional liturgy as a public standard of worship, it has some significance even as an experiment. It is certainly one of the most important works which the German Reformed Church has attempted in this country. It represents a piece of her present spiritual life. It forms a chapter of her inner history and development. It is the practical result of a theological movement which has agitated her for a number of years past. It may have considerable influence even beyond the pale of the denomination that gave it birth. For this liturgy, although defective and admitting no doubt of considerable improvement, is by no means a mere compilation or patchwork, but something of an organic growth. The stones are old, but the building itself is new. The book has a life and spirit of its own. It is an American product, grown up on American soil and intended for American use. It is at least an earnest effort to solve the vital question of the best mode of conducting public and private worship for the wants of the present age ; and that question will have to be met sooner or later by every Protestant denomination of this great and future-pregnant country.

These considerations will fully justify a more extended article on the work which is now before the Church for its inspection and experimental use. We propose to furnish a key for its proper understanding and thus to contribute our share towards the final settlement of the practical question of its adoption, rejection, or modification. We will endeavor, if possible, to review it objectively, as if we had no connection with its composition.

We shall first present a full *history* of the preparation of the new Reformed Liturgy, and then give a short *analysis* of its contents with critical remarks on what we regard as deficient in its present provisional form. The members of the committee will easily understand that I can have no disposition here to censure any one of them more than myself. And as to the reader, I would ask him from the start to lay aside personal considerations and to hold the committee as a *whole* responsible for the defects as well as the merits which he may discover in the book. This is the best way, I think, to reach a satisfactory practical result in this important matter.

HISTORY OF THE LITURGY.

The proper history of a book, if it have any—for most books, it must be admitted, fall still-born from the press, or die in early infancy—commences with its publication. But it has also a previous subjective history in the mind of the author from its conception to its birth, and in its relation to the wants of the time or denomination which call it into existence. This preparatory history, as far as it may justify the publication and interest the reader, is generally brought out in the Preface. The Liturgy under consideration appeared without a preface, as well as without a name, because it was thought best to let it speak for itself and to disconnect it as much as possible from all personal associations.

The German Reformed Church, like all the Churches of the Reformation, is originally liturgical. Zwingli, Calvin, Bucer, and even John Knox, as well as Luther and Melanchthon, Cranmer, Latimer and Ridley, were all in favor of a fixed and settled order of public worship that should serve as a guide to the minister and secure decency, dignity and harmony to the exercises of the sanctuary. Their object was not to overthrow, but to purify, to simplify and to adapt the ancient devotional forms which had been handed down from the previous life of the Church, to transfer them from the Latin into the vernacular tongues, and to enrich them with new forms that should embody and perpetuate the peculiar spirit of evangelical Protestantism. Hence the great number of liturgies and sacred hymns which sprung up in the sixteenth century during and after the pentecostal days of the Reformation.

But while agreed as to the liturgical principle even on ordinary occasions, the Protestants differed from the beginning as to the extent to which it should be carried. The Lutheran and the Anglican Churches adhered more closely to the traditional Catholic order of worship and allowed less room for free prayer in public than the Calvinistic Churches. A few extreme branches of Calvinism, namely, Presbyterianism in Scotland and Puritanism in England, with their large offshoots in America, have, during the seventeenth century, dropped the public use of prayer-books almost entirely. This can be easily accounted for, by their extreme antagonism to the Church of England, by the unsatisfactory character of Knox's liturgy which never took proper root, and by the unwise and tyrannical attempts of archbishop Laud and the Stuarts to force the Anglican service upon the reluctant Scotch nation. In the course of time the anti-liturgical prejudices have in these ecclesiastical bodies assumed the power of tradition which it is very difficult to overcome, especially in this country. But we have no room here to enter into a general argument in favor of liturgies against their opponents.

The Protestant Churches of the Continent are without exception liturgical to this day, and make use of prescribed forms in every service in connection with more or less extemporaneous prayer. But they have too many liturgies and consequently too little unity and harmony in worship. These liturgies, moreover, are intended as guides and helps simply to the ministers, and not for the use of the people, like the catechism and hymn book. And yet the Protestant doctrine of the general priesthood of believers should lead to some active coöperation of the congregation with the pastor in praying as well as in singing. Here are some of the reasons why none of the Continental liturgies, either Lutheran or Reformed, has been able to take very deep root in the popular heart and to prove as successful as the Common Prayer Book. For the latter is truly a national institution, as strong and powerful as Parliament itself; it has stood the test of three hundred years without serious alteration; it is now as popular as ever, and extends further than ever.

The German branch of the Reformed Church uses a considerable number of liturgies in Germany and Switzerland, where almost every canton has one of its own. Some of them are excellent in many respects, especially those which date whole or in part from the sixteenth century. But none of them, not even the old Palatinate Liturgy, can be called at all equal in depth, fervor and power to the Heidelberg Catechism. None of them combines those merits which constitute a truly popular church-book, and exempt it from the necessity of a revision in almost every generation. But the same holds true of the Lutheran Church, which has as many, or more, liturgies in Germany as Germany has independent sovereignties.

This is one of the causes of the unsatisfactory liturgical condition of the German Reformed Church in America. The missionary fathers of the last century brought with them the different liturgies then in use in those sections of Germany, Switzerland or Holland from which they emigrated. None of them ever received, as far as we know, the exclusive sanction of the Synod. Each minister was left to help himself as well as he could, and this is in point of fact the case still. The Palatinate Liturgy was used more extensively perhaps than any other. But it was superseded in Germany itself, and never republished in this country. Hence only a few copies of the original are to be found even in East Pennsylvania. Several older ministers in that section of the Church have manuscript copies of some of the old Palatinate forms and use them to this day, while a few others prefer the German translation of Dr. Mayer's Liturgy. In addition to these, there are in use, especially among our foreign German congregations, several Swiss Liturgies of Berne, Basel, Zurich, Coire, and Ebrard's Reformirtes Kirchenbuch. Such a diversity and arbitrary freedom in public worship is certainly undesirable in one and the same denomination and leads to confusion.

In the course of the present century our Church was gradually anglicanized and in the same proportion also presbyterianized and puritanized to a very considerable extent. This influence showed itself in public worship by the gradual introduction of the free prayer-system in the *regular* services of the Lord's day. It gradually gained the ascendency and prevails now almost without exception in our English congregations. But the Church never prohibited, of course, the use of liturgies even on ordinary Sundays, and always adhered to the liturgical principle for all special occasions, and sacramental transactions. Here the same loose practice and arbitrary freedom prevailed to this day, as in the German congregations. Some use the translation of portions of the Palatinate liturgy as appended to the hymn book of the Dutch Reformed Church; others, Dr. Mayer's; others, portions of the Episcopal Common Prayer Book; others, prefer to compile from various sources their own forms for the sacramental occasions, for confirmation, marriage and the burial of the dead; while still others go the full length of the Puritan principle and depend altogether upon their individual resources and the inspiration of the moment for all these solemn occasions.

This is the state of things which the Church has long in vain tried to correct and to regulate. For the last thirty or forty years the Synod has agitated from time to time the liturgical question, with the view to do away with this loose practice and to introduce a settled and uniform system of public worship, both in the English and German congregations under its jurisdiction, through means of a liturgy that should breathe the spirit of its doctrinal standard, the Heidelberg Catechism, and yet be adapted in arrangement and style to the wants of the Church at the present day and in this country in midst of Anglo-American relations. This will appear from the following historical statement, which our esteemed colleague, the Rev. Dr. Wolff, has kindly prepared for us from the minutes of the earlier meetings of Synod, in nearly all of which he took part, first as lay delegate and subsequently as one of the leading ministers.

"It might be supposed from one unacquainted with its history, that the Liturgy, recently prepared and published by a Committee appointed for the purpose, by the Synod of the German Reformed Church, was the product of some precipitate and uncongenial movement, and as such was sprung upon the Church in an uncalled for way. A greater mistake can scarcely be imaginined than any supposition of the kind. The want of a Liturgy, adapted to the condition of the Church, appears to have been felt at an early period. At the Synod of Hagerstown, in 1820—the first delegated Synod that met after the division into Classes—a request was sent up from the Maryland Classis to make a revision of the Church *Agenda*, with a view to their publication in both the English and German languages. A Committee was appointed in accordance with their request, consisting of the Rev. Messrs. *Hendel, Hinsch, S. Helfenstein, Rahauser and Becker.* The Committee was continued from year to year until the Synod of Bedford, in 1824, when they submitted a report, which was referred to a special Committee for examination; at whose request the whole subject was deferred until the next meeting of Synod. At the ensuing Synod, which met at Philadelphia, another Committee of examination was appointed; but there is nothing upon record to show that the report at Bedford was ever acted upon. The difficulties connected with the establishment of the Theological Seminary, and its subsequent removal from Carlise, were so serious and absorbing as to throw every thing of minor consideration into the back ground. Another cause probably was, that the older ministers interested in the preparation of a Liturgy, after the Synod at Bedford, began to yield their places in the councils of the Church to others. The consequence was, that the subject was lost sight of, until at the Synod of Hagerstown, in 1830, it was again brought up by the Maryland Classis, in the form of a request, to have the Liturgy printed and bound up with the comtemplated English hymn book. A Committee was appointed to attend to the duty; but the Liturgy never appeared.

At Pittsburg, in 1834, the attention of Synod was again directed to the subject by an action from the Classis of Susquehanna for "the appointment of a committee to prepare an improved Liturgy to be submitted to the next Synod." A committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of Drs. *Mayer*, *Rauch*, *Hoffeditz*, and the Rev. Messrs. *Fries*, *Geiger* and *Hacke*. Three years after, in 1837, the chairman of the committee transmitted the draft of a Liturgy for examination to the Synod of Sunbury, which, after "having been read and referred to several committees, was sent down to the Classes for their action." At the ensuing Synod at Lancaster, it appeared that a majority of the Classes were in favor of its adoption; but Synod deemed it best to submit it again for revision. The committee appointed to attend to this duty never met, and at the Synod of Philadelphia was superseded by another made up of the Rev. Messrs. *Smaltz*, *J. Helfenstein*, *Schneck*, *Cares* and the Elder *J. C. Bucher*, who submitted the original draft, with alterations and amendments, to the Synod of Greencastle, in 1840, when it was adopted, and ordered to be printed, in the form in which it is now before the churches. Dr. Mayer's liturgy appeared in 1841, in both languages, but never reached a second edition, although the number of copies printed was very small.

The Church generally was not satisfied with the work. In many of the charges it was never used. At the Synod of Lancaster, in 1847, the Classis of East Pennsylvania openly expressed its dissatisfaction, and requested that "the old Liturgy should be reprinted, or a new one prepared more congenial to the spirit of the Heidelberg Catechism." The whole subject "of the revision of the Liturgy so as to secure one which is adapted to the wants of the whole Church, and the general use of which can be enforced," was referred to the consideration of the several Classes, and at the next Synod at Hagerstown, it appeared, that all the Classes, with the exception of North Carolina, had expressed themselves in their minutes in favor of a new Liturgy."

This brings us to the very threshold of the last stage of the liturgical movement in the German Reformed Church, which utimately resulted in the present book.

In the mean time, since the year 1844, this body began to be strongly agitated by a theological controversy known as the "Mercersburg" movement. It referred to the church question under its theoretical and practical aspect. It commenced with the discussion of the original and fundamental principles of Protestantism in its relations to Roman Catholicism, on the one hand, and to rationalism, and sectarianism on the other, and extended gradually over a considerable number of important historical and doctrinal topics, including the sacraments, the ministry and the nature of public worship. It led to serious synodical discussions since the meeting at York, 1845, where the members of the new liturgical committee have in part occupied very different ground. As this movement is not yet closed, but in active, though more silent and peaceful progress, it would be premature to pass a final judgment on its merits. The best in it is unquestionably its *providential* character which justifies the hope that it will lead ultimately to good reresults in and out of the denomination in whose bosom it was first started. We are here merely concerned with its bearing upon the new liturgy. The Mercersburg controversy did evidently not originate the liturgical movement in the German Reformed body, as appears from the preceding statement, but it gave it a new impulse and direction and carried it to a practical result that differed very widely from what was originally contemplated. It called attention to the liturgies of the age of the Reformation and of the primitive Catholic Church, which had been almost entirely lost sight of in this country, and recommended them as the general basis on which the new work should be constructed. It placed, moreover, the defense of liturgical service on different grounds. It viewed it not simply in the light of convenience, decency and propriety, but as a sacred bond of union between the different ages of Christ's Church, as a guarantee against excesses of arbitrary freedom, as a conservative power in doctrine and discipline, as the organ for the exercise of the *general* priesthood, and as the artistic form which the very spirit of social worship instinctively assumes and which will characterize even the worship of the redeemed in heaven as a complete harmony of united thanksgiving and praise. The friends of that system deprecated the idea of a liturgy that should be either a purely subjective and narrow denominational production, or a mechanical compilation from other sources without principle and vitality. Such a book would hardly deserve the name and not be worth the trouble of preparation. They called for a free reproduction and adaptation of the time-honored devotions of the purest ages to our particular age and country. In one word, they desired a truly *scriptural, historical, evangelical catholic,* and *artistic* liturgy for the *people* as well as the ministry. Whether this aim be at all attained in the new book, is an altogether different question. For, from the ideal to the real, from theory to practice, there is more than one step, and many of the noblest aims of mortal men remain *pia desideria* in this world of imperfections.

The new phase of the liturgical movement then commenced, as far as the corporate action of the German Reformed Church is concerned, at the Synod of Hagerstown, Md., in the year 1848. From want of time, and from prudential considerations the subject was not discussed in that meeting, but referred to a committee, consisting of the Rev. John H. A. Bomberger, Daniel Zacharias, D. D., John F. Mesick, and Elders George Besore and W. Cameron, to report at the next annual meeting. (Minutes for 1848, p. 75.)

At the Synod of Norristown, Pa., in October, 1849, this committee submitted a majority report, which, after some amendments, was adopted, as follows:

> " *The primary object* of Christians in 'assembling themselves together,' is, according to the Scriptures, and should therefore be in practice, *to worship God.* The ancient sanctuary was known to the most evangelical of the Prophets, chiefly as *a house of prayer.* (Is. 56 : 7.) And this sentiment has the express sanction of our Lord himself, in his quotation of it in defence of the zeal exhibited in driving the money-changers from the temple. The prevalence of this view is also exhibited in the entire public devotions of the Jews under the old covenant—(their attachment to which, as well as their rigid perseverance in it, is proven by their public religious ceremonies at the present day.) Their gathering together on Sabbaths, and new moons, and solemn feasts, was emphatically and almost exclusively for the purpose of worshipping God, by uniting in public acts of devotion. Whatever time or place may have been given to other duties, such as the reading of the law and exhortation, their devotional ceremonies always occupied the chief place in their services and the larger portion of their time. And *all this was by explicit divine appointment.*

Neither was the precedent, thus divinely set, wholly abolished, either in principle or practice, at the introduction of the later dispensation. Zealously as the Lord urged his disciples, both by command and example, to preach the Gospel of the kingdom he had come to found, there is nothing in all his teaching or conduct, that evinces the least purpose of having this preaching supersede the acts and duties of ancient worship. In the nature of the case more time and effort had to be given to the proclamation of the kingdom about to be set up. But no sooner were its principles made known, and companies of believers gathered in different places, than we find them uniting in the formation of Christian societies (of churches), meeting statedly for mutual edification by means of public worship, and adapting the ancient form of worship to the peculiar spirit and principles of the remodeled order of things. For whilst the peculiar form of their devotional acts differed wholly from that of the preceding dispensation, yet the spirit and principle were retained. There was indeed no altar smoking with incense,

> " No bleeding bird, nor bleeding beast,
> No hysop branch nor sprinkling priest,"

no Sion or Gerizim to which their devotions were confined. But whilst the mere outward accidents of their old ritual were abrogated, there was neither an abolition nor demolition of the thing itself. The times of types and shadows, had indeed passed by, but they were gone because the anti-type and substance had come to take their place. There was still an altar, an incense, and a sacrifice—and external forms in which these existed. Only they were more spiritual in their character. The Christian Church was far from being a society formed upon the principles and after the heartless asceticism of the exclusive Essenes—but exhibited that intimate relation to the order of things which preceded its institution, which at once proved it to be the offspring of the same mind and heart—a continuation and completion of the old in a higher and fuller form—the old things passing away, by all becoming new.

And now to aid them in their worship, and to secure the desired uniformity and edification in their devotions, the earliest Church organizations of whose history any authentic traditions have reached us—at once availed themselves of set forms of devotional hymns and prayers, which were in part transferred from the Jewish Church, and in part framed expressly for the latter, by those to whom their superintendence was committed. And these acts of devotion, their singing and praying, and reading of the Scriptures, constituted an important element, and occupied a large portion of time, in all their public worship. *This again was by divine appointment, and under apostolical sanction.*

Of the gradual perversion of the spirituality and simplicity which originally characterized the worship of the Christian Church, of the corruptions which crept in with the various elements that were mingled with it, in the course of its progress and extension—and of which so dark a picture is exhibited in the history of the Papacy, and especially in its professedly devotional ceremonies, and of the fearful prevalence of these during the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, the committee need say nothing.

With the opening of the following century came agitations and changes which characterized the great Reformation. But amidst all these the thought of abrogating all forms of Church worship was never once cherished. At first those forms previously employed were continued in use, with such omissions and modifications as were thought necessary. And as soon as circumstances permitted, both branches of the Protestant Church set themselves diligently to the work of preparing suitable Liturgies—and the use of such in all public acts of worship has always continued to characterize the German Reformed and Lutheran Churches of Germany to the present day. Thus the Churches of the Reformation have ever conformed with the example set by the earliest ages—in making acts of worship the great business of the sanctuary—and making suitable provision for this. The result of this provision we possess in the old and excellent Liturgy of the Palatinate—which obtained general approbation in our Churches in Germany and which was sent over to the Church in this country with our Missionary Fathers—and is known among us both in the original language and a translation of large portions of it found attached to most Reformed Dutch Hymn Books.

In view of these facts your committee suggest

1. That the use of Liturgical forms of church worship, as recognized by our forefathers, has the clear sanction of the practice and peculiar genius of the original protestant Churches.

2. That there is nothing in the present circumstances of our Church in this country to call for or justify a total departure from this ancient and long-established usage.

3. That the Liturgy now authorized and partially used by the Church, is inadequate to our wants, inasmuch as apart from other deficiencies which may be found in it, it makes *no provision for ordinary occasions of public worship.*

4. That whilst the older Liturgies of the Church, and especially that of the Palatinate, are of such a character as to commend the greater portions of them for adoption, there is still need of various modifications in order to adapt them fully to our wants and circumstances.

5. That the present would be as favorable a time for making the requisite provision in the case, as any which may be anticipated in the future.

6. That Synod, therefore, proceed to make such arrangements as it may in its wisdom think best for the securing of this object.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN H. A. BOMBERGER, *Chairman.*"

This report gave rise to a lengthy and earnest discussion on the general subject of the liturgy, which was continued throughout several sessions, and excited a great deal of interest in the religious community of the place at the time. As the Minutes of Synod contain no speeches, we have to draw here upon our memory as one of the participants in the debate. The question then was: Liturgy, or no liturgy. The modern Puritan spirit which had gradually crept into the Church made a vigorous effort to defeat the object of the report altogether. One member of the committee, who became also a member of the final committee, had prepared an elaborate argument against all forms of prayer, as interfering more or less with the freedom, fervor and spirituality of devotion, and quoted Justin Martyr's well known *οση δυναμις αυτω*, and Tertullian's "*ex proprio ingenio*," concerning the public prayers in the second century. But he was evidently influenced by ill-founded apprehensions of Romanizing tendencies, and did injustice to his own churchly instincts and deep-rooted German Reformed sympathies. His objections were respectfully met by arguments from the Scriptures, from history, from considerations of order, respectability, unity and practical usefulness, which it would take us too long to give in full. Another speaker embodied his anti-liturgical prejudices in the lines:

"Prayer is the simplest form of speech
That infant lips can try."

But he was promptly silenced by the quotation of what immediately follows, in the same hymn of Montgomery, who as a Moravian, was certainly in favor of liturgical worship:

"Prayer the sublimest strains that reach
The majesty on high."

A third opponent of the report asked the question: "If I read another man's prayer, is it I who prays, or the one who wrote it?" He was effectually answered by another question: "If you sing a hymn, is it you that sings, or the man who composed it; or must you make both the poetry and the music in order to use it as an act of worship?" The last speech, as far as I recollect, was made by Dr. J. W. Nevin, with his usual solemnity and earnestness. He stated frankly, that the study of the church question had wrought a complete theological revolution in his mind and entirely removed his inherited Presbyterian prejudices against liturgies, and then went on to show the necessary connection of liturgical worship with the idea of the Church as the body of Christ, of the communion of saints as a present reality enjoyed in the public devotions, of the sacraments as means of grace, and of the nature of true worship as a united act of the whole congregation.

The great majority of Synod was evidently in favor of a liturgy, and seemed to appreciate also more or less its true character, as rising far above all merely utilitarian considerations. After the adoption of the report, it was resolved, on motion of Dr. B. S. Schneck, to appoint a committee with instructions to examine thoroughly the liturgical literature of the Reformed Churches, and to prepare for the next meeting of Synod a plan or outline of the proposed liturgy, with some specimens, old or new, as they might see fit.

This committee, as appointed by the President, (the Rev. J. Rebaugh) consisted of the Rev. Dr. John W. Nevin, Philip Schaff, Barnard C. Wolff, Elias Heiner, John H. A. Bomberger, Henry Harbaugh, Joseph F. Berg, and the Elders William Heyser, John C. Bucher, Dr. Caspar Schæffer and George C. Welker.

The individual members of the committee kept the subject before their mind and bestowed upon it such attention as their many engagements would permit. During the next Synodical year, Dr. Wolff translated the instructive introduction to Dr. Ebrard's "Reformirtes Kirchenbuch," on the Reformed Liturgies of the sixteenth century. Dr.

Bomberger brought out in an English dress, several parts of the Palatinate liturgy from a German copy of 1684. Both these contributions appeared in the second volume of the Mercersburg Review for 1850, and were followed by other communications on the same topic in subsequent volumes of this quarterly. But the committee held no meeting and thought it prudent indefinitely to postpone the whole work, for which the Church seemed not yet sufficiently prepared. Hence the following report in the Minutes of the Synod of 1850, held at Martinsburg, Va.:

> "The committee appointed to commence the preparation of a new Liturgy, respectfully report, that after such attention as they have been able to give to the subject, and in view of the general posture of the Church at the present time, they have not considered it expedient as yet to go forward with the work. Should it be felt necessary on the part of Synod to bring out at once a new formulary for public use, it is believed that the most advisable course for the present would be to give a translation simply of the old Liturgy of the Palatinate; although the Committee are by no means of the mind, that this would be the best ultimate form in which to provide for the great interest here in question. Altogether it is felt, however, that other questions of vital moment now before the Church need first to be settled, in order that it may become important really to bestow any full and final care on this question of a new Liturgy
>
> Respectfully submitted,
>
> JOHN W. NEVIN, *Chairman.*"

In the year 1851 the Church was so engrossed with preparations for the removal of her literary institutions from Mercersburg to Lancaster, with the theological discussion of the Church question, which now assumed a more solemn and critical aspect than ever, and with the withdrawal of Dr. Nevin from active service in the Theological Seminary, that the liturgical question, although never lost sight of altogether, was thrown into the back ground by questions of more urgent and immediate interest, which seemed to involve almost the very existence of the German Reformed Church as a separate denomination. For this body was just then shaken to its very base by attacks from without and agitation from within. The contemplated removal of the literary institutions, too, seemed for some time doomed to a humiliating and disastrous failure. The prospects were dark and gloomy indeed, and yet not without promise and hope to the eye of faith. It is now evident that the apprehensions were groundless, and that the organized persecution to the German Reformed Church for real or supposed heresy, instead of tending to her dissolution, resulted in her consolidation. But the delay of action on the side of the liturgy committee was altogether judicious and wise under the circumstances. The work itself only gained by it in the end.

At the next annual meeting of Synod held at Lancaster, in October, 1851, Dr. Nevin resigned his theological professorship in the Seminary, and with it also his chairmanship of the committee on the liturgy, and proposed his colleague, being the second on the list, in his place. The request was granted with the instruction that the committee should report to Synod as soon as possible. Besides this, the composition of the committee appointed at Norristown underwent gradually several other changes by the death of some (Judge Bucher, Dr. Schæfer), and the withdrawal of other members (Dr. Berg, etc.), who were replaced at subsequent meetings of Synod. One or two members were added for special reasons. Thus Dr. Gerhart, after his removal from Ohio, was elected at the synodical meeting of Chambersburg in 1855, with the view to represent the interests of the Western Synod, as the former chairman of the Western liturgical committee, which was appointed to coöperate with that of the Eastern Synod as far as practicable.

The committee on the Liturgy, as it finally stood, since October, 1855, and is alone responsible for the work as actually prepared and published, consisted of ten ministers and four elders, viz: Philip Schaff, John W. Nevin, B. C. Wolff, J. H. A. Bomberger, Henry Harbaugh, Elias Heiner, Daniel Zacharias, Thomas C. Porter, E. V. Gerhart, Samuel R. Fisher, and elders William Heyser, John Rodenmeyer, George Schæfer, George C. Welker.

These names represent pretty well the various sections and interests of the German Reformed Church, and include even its theological extremes, having often met on opposite sides in the discussion of important questions on the floor of Synod. And yet upon the whole they got along very harmoniously with the task, although it involved directly or indirectly almost every point of dispute between them. To them it has been a work of peace and reconciliation rather than of strife and division. This is one of the most encouraging features in this movement. May the book as published have the same effect at last for the whole German Reformed Church and prove to it a bond of unity and peace!

Of the fourteen members about four took no part in any of the meetings held. But this was owing to modesty or sickness or unavoidable engagements, and to no want of sympathy with the movement itself of which they heartily approve, as far as I know. The remaining members all coöperated in furnishing selections or original contributions. But all contributions were submitted, before their adoption, to a thorough revision of the committee at their several meetings, and a large number of them were laid aside or superseded. Every chapter of the Liturgy proper, as now published, even to the rubrics and notes, became in this way more or less the work of the whole committee. The only partial exception to this is the appended selection of hymns, for whose examination in detail by the committee as a whole, there was no time left. For this reason the new Liturgy can and should never be baptized with the name of any individual, like the one which preceded it in the German Reformed Church. The comparative freedom from subjectivity and individuality we regard as a decided recommendation to a church-book, provided it do not destroy its unity and harmony.

Soon after the Synod of Lancaster the proper execution of the work itself was seriously commenced. The members of the committee residing at Mercersburg held weekly meetings during the summer of 1852 and prepared a general plan, also four forms for the regular service on the Lord's day, two baptismal services, a form for the solemnization of matrimony, and a part of the Scripture lessons and collects for the ecclesiastical year. These labors were approved by a general meeting of the committee, and then laid before the Synod convened in the city of Baltimore, October, 1852. The following report, embracing the plan of the work, was adopted at that Synod:

"The Committee on the Liturgy beg leave to submit the following report:

Soon after the last meeting of Synod at Lancaster, the Committee gave the subject entrusted to their care such attention as their time and regular duties would allow. Those members who reside at Mercersburg, held weekly meetings of conference and consultation during last summer, while the other members were requested to prepare, in the mean time, certain portions of the proposed Liturgy, and to submit them afterwards to the revision of the whole Committee. The further they proceeded in the work, and the more they made themselves acquainted with the liturgical literature of ancient and modern times, the more they felt the importance, difficulty and responsibility of the task committed to their hands. Next to the confession of faith, no book, not even the hymn book excepted, is calculated to exert so much influence in forming the peculiar religious character of a Church, as a liturgy which should embody its whole devotional life. The difficulties are increased in this case by the great number and variety of such works issued before and after the Reformation, which makes the selection sometimes more embarrassing than the original production; also by the reigning tone of piety in the Protestant denominations of this country, which, with a few exceptions, are more or less, however unjustly, prejudiced against the whole system of liturgical worship as tending to formalism; and, finally, by the peculiar position of our own communion, which seems to be just now in a state of transition. In view of these considerations, it might seem prudent for Synod indefinitely to postpone the work, until the liturgical reforms, which are just now agitated in various evangelical churches of Germany, both Reformed and Lutheran, shall come to definite results, and until perhaps similar movements in other sections of our American Protestantism, which may be expected to take place at no distant day, shall facilitate its execution.

But, on the other hand, there can be no doubt, that our Church, which, in common with all the Churches of the Reformation, has at all times, to a greater or less extent, approved of stated forms of public worship without excluding thereby the right use of extemporaneous prayer, is entirely dissatisfied with its present liturgy, and calls loudly for a book of public devotion which should embrace the best portions of older works of the kind, and be adapted, at the same time, to the peculiar wants of its present condition. Besides, the power of your Committee, according to the Minutes of the Synod at Norristown, A. D., 1849, which first brought up the subject in a definite form, does not extend, for the present, beyond proposing a general *plan* and presenting a few *specimens* of liturgical forms. It is, therefore, only a preparatory work which we are expected to bring before Synod at this time, and it is hoped that your further advice and more definite instructions will greatly facilitate the continuation and final consummation of the task, to whomsoever it may be hereafter entrusted.

With this expectation your Committee would bring before your reverend body :

I. *A plan of the proposed Liturgy.*

It is designed to make provision for the following heads, which are generally comprehended in a full and regular Liturgy in the proper sense of the term :

I. The regular Service on the Lord's Day.
II. The Festival Seasons, especially Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, and Trinity Sunday.
III. Prayers for Miscellaneous Occasions.
IV. The Administration of Infant and Adult Baptism.
V. The Order of Confirmation.
VI. The Holy Communion.
VII. The Visitation and Communion of the Sick.
VIII. The Visitation of Prisoners.
IX. The Solemnization of Matrimony.
X. The Ordination and Installation of Ministers, Elders and Deacons.
XI. The Laying of a Corner Stone.
XII. The Consecration of a Church.
XIII. The Burial of the Dead.
XIV. The Family Liturgy, or Prayers to be used in Morning and Evening Devotions, and on special occasions.
XV. A Table of the Lessons of the Holy Scriptures to be read in the Church throughout the year, and a similar Table for the private use of the Scripture.

II. *The principles on which the new Liturgy is to be constructed.*

1.) The liturgical worship of the *Primitive Church*, as far as it can be ascertained from the Holy Scriptures, the oldest ecclesiastical writers, and the Liturgies of the Greek and Latin Churches of the third and fourth centuries, ought to be made, as much as possible, the *general basis* of the proposed Liturgy; the more so, as they are in fact also the source from which the best portions of the various Liturgies of the sixteenth century were derived, such as the forms of confession and absolution, the litanies, the creeds, the Te Deum, the Gloria in excelsis, the collects, the doxologies, &c. For the merit of the Reformation in the department of worship, if we except the hymnology, which has been very materially enriched, especially by the evangelical Churches of Germany, does not so much consist in producing new forms of devotion, as in transferring those handed down from former ages into the vernacular tongues, in purifying them from certain additions, in reducing them to greater simplicity, and in subordinating them to the preaching of the Gospel, as the principal part of Protestant worship.

2.) Among the later Liturgies special reference ought to be had to the old *Palatinate* and other *Reformed* Liturgies of the *sixteenth* century.

3.) Neither the ancient Catholic nor the Reformed Liturgies, however, ought to be copied slavishly, but reproduced rather in *a free evangelical spirit and adapted to the peculiar wants of our age and denomination;* inasmuch as these Liturgies themselves exhibit to us a considerable variety with essential unity, and as every age of the Church has the promise of the Spirit and a peculiar mission to fulfil. For the same reason, *new* forms may be prepared also, where it may seem desirable, but in keeping always with the devotional spirit of the Church in her purest days.

4.) Those portions of the Liturgy which are most frequently used, as the regular service on the Lord's Day, and the celebration of the Lord's Supper, should embrace *several* forms, some shorter and some longer, some with and some without responses, with a view to avoid monotony, and to adapt them the more readily to the condition and wants of our various ministers and congregations which are evidently not prepared for an entire uniformity.

5.) The *language* and *style* ought to be throughout *scriptural* as much as possible; that is, simple, sublime, and devotional, such as we find in the Psalms especially, and in the Lord's Prayer. The doctrinal tone, which predominates too much in most of the Calvinistic Liturgies, ought to be used only within certain limits.

6.) The addition of a *Family Liturgy,* including a sufficient number of prayers, seems to be very desirable, not only on account of its independent value, but especially also because it would facilitate the introduction of the Liturgy amongst our laity, and thus promote its right use in the Church. For, in the opinion of your Committee, a Liturgy will never fully answer its purpose, and be sufficiently appreciated by the congregation, if it is confined to the hands of the minister. Like the Bible, the Catechism and the Hymn Book, it ought to be the common property and manual of *every member of the Church.* The laymen will take a far deeper interest in the devotional exercises, if they can follow the minister by their book, and respond at least with an audible *Amen* at the end of each prayer.

7.) Finally, a Liturgy ought not to interfere with the proper use of *extemporaneous* prayer, either in public or in private, but rather to *regulate* and *promote* it. Sufficient room should be left for its exercise in connection with the Sunday afternoon and evening services, as well as in weekly Bible lectures, social prayer meetings, catechetical exercises, and on special occasions.

If these principles be conscientiously and wisely carried out, it is hoped that, by the blessing of God, a Liturgy might be produced at last, which will be a *bond of union both with the ancient Catholic Church and the Reformation*, and yet be the *product of the religious life of our denomination* in its *present* state.

III. *Some specimens of the new Liturgy.*

In conclusion, we lay before Synod some *specimens*, as Synod required of us, viz: four forms for *regular worship* on Sunday morning, a form for the administration of *Infant Baptism*, another for *Adult Baptism*, and a *Marriage* service. They have been constructed on the above principles, and have undergone a thorough examination of the members of the Committee as far as they could be brought together.

It is now for Synod to approve, or reject, or to modify what we here submit under a deep sense of the responsibility of the work and of our own insufficiency for it, and to make the necessary arrangements for its continuation and completion.

If we are expected to suggest any plan to this end, it would be this: that Synod appoint a committee with instructions to print, as soon as the nature of the work will admit, a *specimen Liturgy*, for the *inspection* of our Church.

Respectfully submitted,

PHILIP SCHAFF, *Chairman.*"

In connection with this report the several specimen forms above mentioned were read, and then referred to the same committee with instructions "to carry out the suggestions made at the close of the report." All these forms, together with a communion service on the basis of the Palatinate, and several other liturgical contributions, were subsequently printed in the Mercersburg Review for 1854 and 1855, so that the Church at large had an opportunity of forming some idea of the probable nature of the work under preparation.

The scheme and the general principles adopted by the Baltimore Synod, were conscientiously, yet not pedantically adhered to by the committee in their subsequent labors, as will appear from a comparison of the report with the book. The order of subjects was improved; the chapters on miscellaneous prayers and the visitation of prisoners were dropped, and replaced by a few others not included in the original frame work. The recommendation mentioned under 4.) in the report, was carried out only in regard to the service for the Lord's Day, and the Baptism of Infants. In all other services the duplicates originally contemplated, were dispensed with, as it was thought, on more mature consideration, that a variety of forms might only introduce confusion.

After the adoption of a definite basis, the chairman distributed the various chapters of the Liturgy among members of the committee, with the understanding that they should have them ready till Spring, 1853, when a general meeting was to be held for their examination, correction and adoption.

But owing to various causes the work proceeded very slowly, and it was impossible to convene a general meeting of the Committee at the time contemplated. The more the members studied the subject and tried their hands at the preparation of devotional forms for others, the more they felt the difficulty of the task and their insufficiency satisfactorily to perform it. The Synodical Minutes for 1853 and 1854 report no further progress.

But the Synod held at Chambersburg in 1855 gave the enterprise a new impulse, a tolerably full meeting of the Committee having been secured. A report was submitted and adopted, in which the Committee wish their task to be confined simply to the preparation and publication of a *provisional* liturgy for *experimental* and *optional* use, and strongly advise Synod not to take action upon it, until it could be thoroughly revised on the ground of *practical experience* as to its actual working in the congregations under their care, (*Minutes*, p. 80, 81). The same Synod reduced the quorum of the committee to five persons, in order to facilitate their labors, and passed also a resolution proposing a well meant but impracticable plan for defraying the expenses of the publication of the provisional liturgy by public collections. This was, however, happily superseded by making the book pay for itself.

After this Synodical meeting the work was resumed with more spirit and energy than ever and persevered in, until it was finally completed. The Committee held several meetings, more than were originally contemplated, one in March 13, 1856, and four in 1837, viz: January 2, April 20, August 25, and October 13. Each lasted from one to two weeks. The number of the morning, afternoon and night sessions, as I learn from the secretary, amounts to one hundred and four, exclusive of the sessions of the Lancaster, and Mercersburg sub-committees, and those preceding the Synod of Baltimore. The first four of these general meetings were held at Lancaster city, owing to its central location and its being the residence of several members of the Committee; the last was held in Philadelphia in the midst of the late financial panic, and the proof was read as the book passed through the hands of the printer. The members will not easily forget the old fashioned round walnut table in the consistory room of St. Paul's church at Lancaster, and the similar table in the equally comfortable consistory room of the Race street church in Philadelphia, one of the oldest in the city and in our denomination, where once Schlatter, Hendel, Weiberg and other missionary fathersof pious memory labored in their generation. There the Committee sat many a day praying, writing, consulting together, criticising, examining and pondering over Bibles, Concordances, Liturgies, old and new, from the Clementine down to the Irvingite, and

> "Over many a quaint and curious volume of forgotten lore."

They applied the pruning knife very freely to their own productions and laid aside whole piles of manuscript. Human nature, unaided by divine grace, would hardly have submitted to such an unceremonious process. But the book, I am sure, is only the better for it. Almost every sentence and word were rigidly examined and measured. Sometimes interesting theological discussions would spring up and relieve the mind of the wearisomeness of minute verbal criticism. The whole was a capital training school, and if the committee could have recommenced their labors where they stopped, with the experience they had acquired, they would probably make a much better book than the one now published. Several forms prepared with considerable care, as prayers at sea, for the opening of consistorial meetings and Sabbath schools, could not be finally acted upon, partly from want of time, partly from want of room, the agreement with the publishers limiting the book to 400 pages. The last meeting, consisting of five members, was held on Wednesday the 21st of October, 1857, at Philadelphia, and closed at six o'clock, P. M., in a solemn manner by prayer and the singing of a doxology.

If we date the proper commencement of the labors of the Committee from the Synod of Lancaster in 1851, and deduct the year 1854, during which they were entirely suspended, owing to the absence of the chairman in Europe, we may call the new Liturgy the result of five years' combined labor. This is certainly not too much time for a work so difficult and responsible. But we must take into consideration that the members of the Committee, being all engaged in the active duties of teaching and preaching, could only bestow a limited portion of their time to this task. Under these circumstances it was completed in as short a period as could reasonably be expected.

A few days after the final session of the Committee they laid, through their chairman, their final report before the Synod convened in Allentown, which, after some discussion, was unanimously adopted on Tuesday, October 27, 1857. It was drawn up by Dr. Nevin, and reads as follows:

"The committee appointed to prepare and publish a *Provisional Liturgy* for the use of the German Reformed Church, beg leave to lay before the Synod respectfully, at this time, their final report.

It is with much satisfaction, and heartfelt thankfulness to God, they find themselves able to announce, that their difficult and laborious task has at length been brought to completion. A Liturgy, or General Order of Worship, including some Prayers for family use, and a small selection of choice Hymns, the whole forming a volume of about 400 hundred pages, has been prepared, and is now in the hands of the Printer, with the prospect of being published in the course of a few days.

It is not for the committee to speak of the merits of their own work. They may be allowed to say, however, that they have spared no pains to make it worthy of the solemn purpose for which it has been framed. It might have been produced in much less time, and with much less labor, had the object been simply to bring out a collection of written prayers of the first best sort that might have come to hand. But it was felt from the beginning, that the true idea of a Liturgy involved a great deal more than this; and that a great deal more than this was needed in fact, to satisfy the expectations and wants of the German Reformed Church. It was found, moreover, that with the progress of the work itself, the idea of what it should be, acquired new depth and force in the mind of the committee themselves; while it seemed to them, that the feeling of the Church also called for more in this direction than might have been distinctly thought of in the beginning. This gave rise naturally to caution and delay. A large part of the first preparations of the committee proved wholly unsatisfactory afterwards to themselves, and were either altogether laid aside, or at least wrought into entirely new form and shape. In this way, moreover, the work has been subject to long interruptions; and it seemed doubtful indeed at times, whether it would ever be completed at all. Nothing, however, has been lost, it is now believed, by any such difficulty and delay. The studies and conferences of the committee have at all events, as they believe, contributed much to their own qualification for the service committed to their hands, and enabled them to work out a result by their own united labors which could hardly have been reached in any other way. The new Liturgy is not a mere compilation, or outward putting together of heterogeneous parts. It has a true life of its own, such as gives unity and harmony to it as a whole; and it is hoped, that this will be found to be in harmony, at the same time, with the theological life and historical genius of the Church for whose use more particularly it has been prepared.

It is a matter of much satisfaction, we may be allowed to add, that no attempt is to be made to force the Liturgy upon the Church, without such general inward and free consent to its use. The Synod has ordered it to be prepared and published only for *provisional* use, and is not expected of course to take any action upon it one way or the other at the present time. It must go forth among the churches simply as an *experiment.*

Every congregation is left to settle the question for itself, how far it will accept the new book, or whether it will be accepted and used at all. This is, in the judgment of the committee, just as it ought to be. They would be sorry, indeed, to have the Liturgy introduced in any quarter, sooner or farther than there may be a disposition among the people to make it welcome, as a help to them, and not a hindrance in their public worship. In this way, the Liturgy asks no ecclesiastical sanction in its favor. It is enough that the Synod has sanctioned the principle of worship in such form, and that the new book is submitted to the churches by its direction and order. Whether it shall satisfy their judgment, and be taken into their full confidence and trust, remains yet to be seen. Years may be required to settle this question; and the interest involved in it is so vast, that no one should object to have years allowed for the purpose. As the case now stands, the Liturgy must work its own way, quietly and silently, into general use; or else pass away at last without any authority whatever, as a provision for which after all there has been no real demand in the reigning life of the Reformed Church.

Should this be so, the committee would not feel still that their labor has been wholly thrown away. They think it of much account, in any event, that a fair trial should be made in this way of the possibility of incorporating the true conception of a Liturgy practically with the worship of the Reformed Church. For it is not too much to say, that if the present Liturgy should prove inadequate to this end, no other is ever likely to be formed that will be attended with any better effect.

Signed in behalf of the committee.

J. W. NEVIN."

Here ends the Synod's action with reference to this liturgical movement, for the present. A few weeks after the adjournment of Synod the book left the press of the Messrs. Lindsay & Blakiston in Philadelphia. The Committee succeeded in having it published in good style, without any cost to Synod. They expect and ask no remuneration for their labors, whatever may be their just claim to it. All they received is fifty free copies in plain binding from the publishers which were distributed among the members, including those who took no part in the preparation, the literary institutions of the Eastern and Western Synods and the two congregations which kindly granted them the use of their consistory room. Whatever may be paid to them from the proceeds, beyond the necessary expenses, will be handed over to Synod for some benevolent object which they may hereafter designate. The contract with the present publishers, however, covers merely the provisional liturgy. Whenever the Church, by action of Synod, adopts the book as her own, she can make her own arrangements as to the plan and manner of publication. We would not have alluded to this point at all, if it were not for the expression of dissatisfaction in a certain quarter entitled to respect. The Committee have consulted in this matter the best interests of their work and of the Synod to which alone they are responsible. So far their course has been justified even beyond their expectation.

These are, to the best of our knowledge, the principal facts relating to the liturgical movement in the German Reformed Church from its beginning to the actual completion and publication of the new liturgy. The particulars of the various meetings, should they ever be of interest to any body, may be found in the minutes as recorded and kept by the faithful Secretary of the Committee, the Rev. Henry Harbaugh.

It remains now for the Eastern and Western Synod of the German Reformed Church—for both are here equally interested and have the same right to speak—to decide the fate of this Liturgy as a standard of public and private worship within their jurisdiction. There need be no haste in this matter. It may be best to delay final action for several years. The Church may either reject the book altogether, which it will hardly do, in view of its preceding actions. Or it may refer it to the old, or to a new committee for revision, with such instructions as practical experience may suggest. The Liturgy, thus revised, may then be made a binding law of the Church, or it may be adopted merely for optional use, allowing the ministers to use it in full, or in part, or not at all, as they may deem best.

I have no right to speak for the Committee as to what course may be the best. For my own part, I feel almost indifferent as to the result, leaving it altogether in the hands of that merciful Providence which has thus far guided the German Reformed Church in this country. I regret no time and labor bestowed upon the work, although I am free to confess, that I would never have consented to act as chairman, could I have foreseen the amount of trouble, anxiety and vexation which it involved. Without any disposition to boast, which is an offence against good taste, as well as good morals, it is not too much to say, that the book, both as a literary production and a book of devotion, reflects at least no discredit either upon the Committee, or upon the German Reformed Church, and will answer a useful purpose in the family and as a general guide to the ministers in preparing for the exercises of the sanctuary, even if it should never become an authoritative standard of worship. Whatever may be its ultimate fate, as an ecclesiastical standard, the Committee have the satisfaction that, in discharging the important trust committed to their hands, they did the best according the measure of their abilities and were guided by a pure regard to the spiritual welfare of the Church of their fathers.

We intended to condense all we have to say on the new Liturgy into one article. But as this historical account has extended beyond the limits originally contemplated, we must delay the critical *analysis* of the Liturgy to a future number of the Review. We would be still better satisfied, however, if another member of the Committee, or an outsider, well acquainted with the general subject of Liturgies, would relieve us of this delicate task.

P. S.

ART. III.—THE CALENDAR, CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL.

AMONG the strange fables which compose the structure of Grecian Mythology, we find one that refers to the god Chronos, who presided over time; an old man weighed down with years and accumulated infirmities, whose long, grey locks are moved by the passing wind, gently or rapidly as this may come in the form of the light zephyr, or the rude and stormy blast of old Boreas. In his right hand he holds the relentless scythe, with which all are cut down at the appointed time,—all, whether rich or poor, old or young; those whose years have been filled with good works and bright deeds, or those whose manly breasts are but prepared for noble encounters. The serpent biting its tail, appears by his side, the ancient emblem of time, or rather of the year. In his left hand a child is held, as if to be devoured by the god; for since he "brings an end to all things which have had a beginning, he may be said to devour his own offspring." A similar representation is given in Roman Mythology of the god Saturn, who was the father of the Olympian Jove, and one of the descendants of primeval Chaos. These representations satisfy us, that man does not require any higher illumination, than that which flows from the dim lamp of Nature, to make him conscious of the passage of time, or, that this is marked by the destruction of bright and shining members of his own race,—the darling children of an hour, petted and nursed by the delicate care of time and then subjected to the destroyer's power. The Roman poet in his Ode to Postumus, recognizes this peculiarity with much pathos, when he exclaims,*

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* Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
Labuntur anni: nec pietas moram
Rugis et instanti senectae
Afferet indomitaeque morti.
* * * * * *
Linquenda tellus, et domus, et placens
Uxor: neque harum quas colis arborum,
Te, praeter invisas cupressos,
Ulla brevem dominum sequeter.
Hor. Carm. Lib. II, XIV.

"How swiftly glide our flying years!
Alas! nor piety, nor tears
Can stop the fleeting day;
Deep-furrowed wrinkles, posting age,
And death's unconquerable rage,
Are strangers to delay.
* * * * * *
Your pleasing consort must be left
And you of villas, lands bereft,
Must to the shades descend;
The cypress only, hated tree,
Of all thy much-loved groves shall thee—
Its short-lived lord—attend!"

But the flight of time, when viewed, under the advantages of a brighter light than that which illuminated the path of Horace, becomes a subject of the greatest importance to the Christian mind. It is not only the loss of time that it regrets, the nearing of the dark and gloomy tomb, the dismal boughs of the cypress or the funereal trappings which adorn the hearse on its saddest errand. These are all repulsive to the light and joyous heart, but they may be surrounded with such a halo of glory, that man "shall go to his long resting place without a tear." It is not the unknown Future that appalls. It is the misspent Past that makes him cling to life with the fond hope that some good deed may blot out the record of past omissions and commissions, and may make him worthier of a blessed reward in the Future. *This* is the Christian's cause of regret, and, notwithstanding it is based upon purer and higher and nobler reasons than that of the pampered child of luxury, yet he must finally admit that of himself he can do nothing which will repair the misdeeds of the Past, but must rely on a higher power for assistance to labor aright during life. His agonizing soul exclaims in the words of the Christian Spanish poet:

"O world! so few the years we live,
Would that the life which thou dost give
Were life indeed!
Alas! thy sorrows fall so fast,
Our happiest hour is when at last
The soul is freed."

These considerations point out one class of events as marking periods in the great Calendar of Time,—the deaths of those who have lived and struggled in the world. Wherever death comes to a human being it impresses an indelible mark upon the breast of some one who has learned to honor or to love the deceased. The event is the central point around which will revolve the memories of the Past with such a centripetal attraction that all the alluring charms of the Present will not succeed in destroying the relation. Who has not some such periods, marked with indelible impressions and draped with sombre black, in the Calendar of his own life? To these, he refers all the incidents of that life,—speaks of events that occurred so long "before he or she died," and thus binds them to his memory by *friendly* cords, even though these be entwined with cypress. We say that every human being has such periods in the arrangement of his private Calendar.

The patriot, on the bed of death, has a nation watching, with breathless anxiety, every little symptom of his disease; hope contends with despair; glad expectation with sorrow; but the moment arrives and all is over. A nation weeps and mournful dirges are borne along by the winds as they sweep over the plain. A great leader has fallen and who shall take his place? Again, the Christian father or mother is sinking under the exhausting effects of disease, and the keenest anguish fills the breasts of their children. The family circle is to be broken;—the central jewel, around which the less brilliant gems had been clustered, is to be destroyed;—that which had been the source of happiness is to be removed. When death comes, know you not the deep mark he will make in the record of each one's life, by the sorrow that he throws so overwhelmingly over the dazzling day-dreams of a happy future? And there lives no man so wretched or miserable, so wicked and lawless, but the event of his death will form a mark in the Calendar of Time precious to some heart who, it may be, loved not wisely but too well.

But if sad marks are thus made on the Calendar, bright, happy ones appear also. The birth of a child constitutes a bright epoch, which proud parents and loving relatives refer to with great satisfaction; and thus that Calendar, which marks the progress of Time for each individual, has periods both of sorrow and joy, of deep anguish and high exultation.

On the present occasion, however, we wish to direct attention to those divisions of the Calendar, that the necessities of civil life have formed, with the assistance of Astronomical Science, and also those periods, with the laws for their determination, which religion has set apart for holy services. We trust the subject may not seem too commonplace for close and careful examination. It often happens, that a common subject may be very little understood, because our attention has never been directed to it. The explanation of the Almanac, says the eminent Astronomer, Arago, involves the most delicate and intricate points of science and general learning. Let us then endeavor to seize the main facts connected with its formation, and thus be enabled to understand the divisions of time, by which events in the civil history of man are recollected and accurately fixed. The words Almanac and Calendar are used indifferently in English to represent collections of tables, containing subdivisions of time considered with reference to artificial or natural relations. The first is derived from an Arabic word, signifying *the moon;* and its derivation shows us, that the moon gave the peculiar laws by which the divisions of time were determined among the Eastern nations. Calendar is derived from the Latin word *calendae*, which were the first days of each month in the year. Whatever may have been the other subdivisions of time adopted by mankind, that into days and years was fixed, by the movements of the earth in the heavens, beyond all danger of conventional alterations.

By a day, we mean, ordinarily, the time occupied by the Sun in an apparent revolution through the firmament; in fact it is the amount of time consumed by the earth in making one entire revolution on its axis. This period is divided into two portions, one during which a part of the earth receives its light directly from the Sun's rays, and a second when the only light, sent down, is from the moon or the stars. The former is known also as day and the latter as night. This division has existed from the first dawn of creation, when Omnipotent Power spake the word and "divided the light from darkness," calling the light Day, and the darkness Night. The relation of length, however, between these two periods is not fixed for any particular spot on the earth's surface, and between any two positions there will always be great difference. At the north pole a continuous day of six months duration is followed by darkness of an equal length of time, and those who are familiar with the travels of our modern Arctic discoverers, will recollect the descriptions of those long periods of light and darkness, and how they affect the minds of men who have been accustomed to the night and day of temperate or even tropic latitudes.

The day, in the proper sense of the word, is controlled, as we have said, by the revolution of the earth on its axis, and has been divided from a very early period of history, into twenty-four parts. Sometimes these were divided into two periods,—one, that of the light, which had its twelve equal divisions, and that of darkness, which was considered as composed also of twelve equal parts. With such an arrangement, the hours of the night, during winter, would be longer than those of the day, while during the months of summer, an opposite relation would be established between the two, and no equality of hours could exist on any other days of the year than the 21st of March and the 23rd of September, when the periods of day and night are equal. The more common division of the day, however, is into equal portions, each of which consists of twelve hours.

Among some nations, as is the custom now of Astronomers, the day was not divided into two periods, but the hours were reckoned from one up to twenty-four. Astronomers follow the custom of Ptolemy, and consider noon as the commencement of the astronomical day, which of course then extends to noon of the next day. The beginning of such a day is twelve hours after that of the civil day, which takes place at midnight, and its termination is also twelve hours later than the civil day. Almost all modern nations regulate their civil day from midnight, and they employ two initial points for designating time, the beginning of the day and the middle, or noon, when the sun is on the meridian; but the relative position of any hour is regulated by its relation to the middle point, being called either the hour of the morning or the evening, as it is before or after mid-day, and the fact is indicated, in writing, by the abbreviations A. M., or P. M.

The Jews, as the pages of both Old and New Testament clearly show, the Chinese, the Italians and the ancient Athenians began their day at the setting of the sun. One can well understand how a simple people, devoted to agricultural pursuits, not given to the study and cultivation of science, would naturally select as the commencement of their civil day, either the rising or setting of that bright orb, whose beams were to give light to their path and to infuse genial warmth throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms. These two events in the history of the day were regarded as the great facts of the natural world, to which both the activity and living energy of all that possessed life were due, since the rising of the sun was the great stimulus to action and, when aweary of continual exertion, the darkness, its setting produced, allowed of rest and refreshing repose to the animal world. There is thus a reason arising from man's relations to nature for the adoption of this notation. It also explains the reason for the form of expression which Moses employs to denote the first days of Creation,—"the evening and the morning were the first day." A writer of the present day would say, "the morning and the evening," instead of employing the old form which sprang from the mode of reckoning time in use with the Jews.

The Italians, according to Arago,* have continued this defective method down to the present time, counting the hours regularly from one to twenty-four, and giving as their reason for it, that travellers are kept in this way always reminded of how many hours they may employ before darkness shall surround them. The sun always sets at 24 o'clock, according to this calculation, and if the watch points 22 o'clock, we know that two hours will yet intervene before the close of day. But the advantages of any such system are really nothing as compared with the inconvenience attendant upon constant daily alteration of time pieces, and the impossibility of establishing any thing like a methodical arrangement of daily business. The arguments in favor of its retention must be based on blind love of antiquity, and not on any advantages that are inherent to it.

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* Astronomie Populaire, I, 268.

The same objections obtain, when we examine the method of the Babylonians, Syrians, Persians and Modern Greeks, who take the rising of the sun as the initial point of the day. This period, as well as the setting of the sun, differs daily, and hence no clock regulated by either of these events on one day would be strictly correct the subsequent day. These methods spring from an age when science was not known, but wherever it sheds its benignant rays in the present day, we find that they are abolished, unless deep-rooted affection or irrational prejudice should combine to prevent such an effect.

Whatever period may be adopted for the commencement of the civil day, it must be determined by the aid of the heavenly bodies, and thus, by a bond of necessary union we are bound to the planets and stars that shine in the immensity of space,—bound by such a harmonious relation that all our daily duties are regulated by them, while their inhabitants are in similar manner indebted to our planet and its kindred, for the arrangement and control of their daily avocations. And though our most ingeniously contrived and artistically finished Chronometers may render our divisions of the time, which intervenes between the fixed periods given by astronomical observations, somewhat accurate and reliable, yet we are obliged continually to alter them by the great regulators which the Eternal has established in the skies. As our own American orator* so beautifully expressed the idea in his oration on Astronomy—" for all the kindreds and tribes and tongues of men, —each upon their own meridian—the eternal sun strikes twelve at noon, and the glorious constellations, far up in the everlasting belfries of the skies, chime twelve at midnight; twelve for the pale student over his flickering lamp, twelve amid the flaming wonders of Orion's belt, if he crosses the meridian at that fated hour;—twelve by the weary couch of languishing humanity;—twelve in the star-paved courts of the Empyrean;—twelve for the heaving tides of the ocean; twelve for the weary arm of labor; twelve for the toiling brain; twelve for the watching, waking, broken heart; twelve for the meteor which blazes for a moment and expires; twelve for the comet whose period is measured by centuries; twelve for every substantial, for every imaginary thing, which exists in the sense, the intellect, or the fancy, and which the speech or thought of man, at the given meridian, refers to the lapse of time."

Astronomers take into consideration two kinds of days, the *sidereal*, which marks the interval of time between two successive passages of any star over the meridian, and the solar, which we have just considered, the interval between "two consecutive passages of the Sun through the meridian." The latter is the longer of the two, and constitutes that which we have called the civil day. But while this period of twenty-four hours is being determined by the revolution of the Earth upon its axis,—or the apparent revolution of the Sun about the Earth, the latter is undergoing itself a change of position in space which alters, with each instant of time, its relation to the Sun. The Earth revolves around the Sun, and this revolution requires a much longer time than that required for the revolution on its axis, giving the appearance of a constant change of position in the sun, and occupying an amount of time which is called a *year*. The year then means the number of days that are required by the sun in its apparent movements, before it returns to the same position on the ecliptic, whether this position be at the summer or winter solstices, the autumnal or spring equinoxes. It is not composed of an even number of solar days, but consists of three hundred and sixty-five days and a fraction under six hours. The difficulties which this fraction has created for astronomers and chronologists in past history, as well as the plans proposed to avoid further trouble about it, will be considered directly.

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* Everett's Discourse on the Uses of Astronomy.

The year is divided into Seasons, which divisions, although not employed as legal, yet are in use with all mankind. These are also determined by the relation of the Earth to the Sun, so that the Record in the first chapter of Genesis concerning the fourth day of Creation, can be literally interpreted, and the lights which were then established in the firmament have been not only "for signs," but also "for *seasons*, and for days, and years." These seasons are determined by the sun's apparent position on a great circle called the ecliptic, which circle is inclined at an angle of 23°, 27′, 30″ to the plane of the Equator. The sun in making its apparent circuit on the ecliptic will twice in the year cross the Equator, once in passing from south to north, and the second time on its return; these constitute the *Equinoxes*. The period of time which marks its extreme northern or southern position is called the *Solstice*. The Equinoxes take place on the 21st of March and the 23rd of September, and are known as spring and autumnal.

The solstices happen on the 21st of June and the 21st of December and are called summer and winter solstices;—these are the periods when in our latitudes we should be suffering most from intense heat or cold, but a number of modifying causes generally delays the periods of greatest heat and cold for some days beyond the Solstices. In Paris the fifteenth of July is about the period of maximum heat, and the fourteenth of January that of maximum cold.

The four seasons are thus determined by the Solstices and Equinoxes, from the 21st of March to June 21st, we have the season of *Spring*, from 21st of June to September 23rd, *Summer*, from the latter to 21st December, *Autumn*, and from that period to March 21st, *Winter*. These are the seasons, as the movements of the sun determine them for the northern hemisphere. They are the very opposite in the southern portion of our globe, the spring of the north corresponding to the autumn of the south, and the summer of the south to the winter of the north.

But we are admonished by the want of space, not to linger over this part of our subject. It would be profitable to examine more closely the nature of the effects which the Sun produces during the four seasons of the year,—to see how the scenes of nature are changed as though by magic power,—to watch the gradual disappearance of snow and ice at the termination of winter,—the gentle metamorphosis of rough and craggy ice-bergs into streams that glide down the hillside and make glad the verdure of the plain,—to pluck the floral beauties which cover the meadow,—to view, with thankful heart to the All-wise and Omnipotent God, the fields with their rich return for honest labor as the evening winds may blow across the summits of the waving grain,—or to join in the exultant shout of thankfulness that the devout heart pours forth in the song of Harvest-home. The seasons are so many periods for attracting man's attention to the wonders of Creation and the greatness of the Creator, that they form an unending theme for the philosopher and the poet. The harmony that exists throughout all portions of creation is here shown in its most wonderful form. Nothing is discordant. The Master's hand has combined all in the wondrous notes which are poured forth, by his creation, as tribute to the Creator's power. The seasons follow as regular developments of each other.

The childhood of Spring, bright and gleesome, is but the bud which will develop into the glorious maturity of Summer, destined also in time to become the matronly autumn, and to totter, in the decrepitude and cheerlessness of old age, as chilling winter to the tomb. But the end is not yet,—no! the regulations of Omnipotence have assigned to the seasons the duty of continually rehearsing their parts so long as the earth is subject to the laws of time, and thus while the earth is bearing fruit to man, is supplying his wants and providing for his comforts, it is ever preaching to him that all things are bound to decay, and that the end of natural life is inevitable death.

We have now to consider as the next division of time, one which, though enforced by civil authority, yet has its origin not in national causes, but in the religious feelings of man. The week indicates "a regular succession of days of labor and rest." It is a division of time not found among all nations, but has existed from the earliest periods among the Chinese, Jews, Egyptians, Chaldeans and Arabians. We shall see on examining the etymology of the English names of the days of the week, as well as those employed to designate the latter by the French, that they are associated in some very intimate way with the names of the Grecian and Roman deities, or with those of the Northmen;—the English being derived from Saxon and the French from the Classic mythology. Sunday is the day of the Sun; Monday that of the Moon; Tuesday that of Tuisco, a deity corresponding to Mars; Wednesday that of Woden or Odin —the Alfadur or All-father, who regulated the seasons by the creation of the sun and moon, and along with Vili and Ve—the other two gods, who were formed in the beginning,—created man, Odin granting him life and soul, Vili reason and motion, and Ve the senses and speech; Thursday is the day of Thor—the god of thunder; Friday that of Frigga the wife of Odin; and Saturday the day of Saturn. We observe then of the seven days that their names are the same with those of the seven planets known to the ancients, viz: the Sun, the Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus and Saturn. The etymology of the names justifies the conclusion that they were given for astronomical reasons, and thus the week contains "traces of some ancient astronomical system," which is not clearly understood at the present day. Various explanations have been given of the peculiar nature of this ancient astronomy, but none seem satisfactory. Arago advances the idea also that special virtues were attributed to the number seven by the ancients, and that "no one would have dared in Egypt, Greece or Rome to announce the existence of more than seven planets, as it would have been an infringement on the prerogatives of the number seven which would have entitled him to the maledictions of religion, and the punishment would have been death." The *first* day of the week is necessarily to be determined by ancient observances. The Jews, who give us the fullest records of the early establishment of the division of time, celebrated, in accordance with the fourth commandment delivered to Moses on Mount Sinai, that day as peculiarly sacred on which God "*rested*," after the works of creation had been accomplished, and especially blessed and sanctified. This is called the seventh day in the second chapter of Genesis, and the Sabbath day in the twentieth chapter of Exodus, and is still celebrated by the Jews, as it has always been, on Saturday. From this we observe the right that Sunday has to be called the first day of the week.

The division of the week has never been rejected by any nation that has once adopted it, with a single exception—that of France. In 1793, when the misnamed Republican party held the power over that fair land, Infidelity had become so widely diffused that the traces even of religious customs could not be retained. A general destruction, of all that savored of an acknowledgment of religion or its rites, was effected amid bacchanalian orgies and satanic revelry. The week with its one day, nominally at least, devoted to the service of the great Ruler of the earth, could not be permitted to remain. The very name of that day—Dimanche—a corruption of dies Dominica, the Lord's Day, would be a continual rebuke to the vice and crime of the government. Hence, the week must be abolished, and in its stead a period of ten days, called a *decade*, established.

For a period of thirteen years this arrangement was carried out, and the outrage upon the express command of the great Jehovah perpetrated by a government steeped in the filthiest vices and the grossest profanation of religion and its laws. But "man proposes and God disposes,"—the *decade* of the godless man of science—of the blaspheming infidel, has been rejected from the records of history; and the week with its regular days devoted to labor and toil, and its one day consecrated to the service of God, has again been restored, even in France, as a regular division of time.

The week was due to religious authority; by this it was established, and hence the necessity of its preservation, and its importance, as a division of time, is as great as though it had been regularly derived from astronomical laws. Days and years are produced by the phenomena which these laws exhibit,—they follow each other with unfaltering regularity, and form an unbroken series extending from the primal creative fiat—let there be light—down to our own time. Each one has first existed as a possibility in the future, then as an actuality in the present, abounding in its human sorrows and human joys, and finally has been reckoned among the things of the past—adding one to the number of the spectral column whose grim ranks constitute the skeleton of history. The week, however, has been appointed by God himself, not as the effect of any preordained laws, or as a consequence of their operations, but by special and direct command. Hence, it claims our special veneration,—our due acknowledgment. Violate we may the great law of nature that "day is the time for work," and night that of rest, and the consequences will merely be an exhaustion of vital energies, and a complete undermining of the constitution. We may disrespect the year, with its sequence of seasons, may sow the grain in summer, or in the midst of winter, may clothe ourselves in the thin apparel of July and endeavor to breast the storms of December, and the consequences will only be bodily want and suffering. But if we violate the week, a higher punishment awaits us. We have violated that which was solemnly established amid the most impressive manifestations of Omnipotent power, and have boldly claimed the right to use that which He declared was "the Sabbath of the Lord thy God." The punishment for this is greater and more enduring than that for the violation of the day and the year. In the latter case, the consequences are confined to time,—in the former, they extend through the boundless limits of eternity—the immense ocean in which time floats like a small bubble of foam, sparkling for a while in the colors that its own walls have produced by the decomposition of the pure light that has visited them from the Eternal Sun, and then swallowed up in the great waves without a trace left behind.

Months were doubtless first adopted as a matter of convenience. The memory would find it very inconvenient to recollect particular circumstances, if the three divisions we have thus far considered, were the only means of expressing intervals of time. It was desirable that the weeks should be grouped together and a name be given to such groups. In addition to this, however, we have some reason to believe that they were originally constructed in accordance with the movements of the moon, and that the period of time required for *its* changes constituted a month. This idea is sustained by the etymology of our word month, which is derived from the Saxon *monath*, and it from *mona*, the moon. In like manner the words employed in other languages for month are derived from the word used to indicate the moon. The time required for a complete revolution of the moon from one point in the heavens to the same point again, or that consumed between any two full moons, or new moons, constitutes a lunar month. This forms a period of about twenty-nine and a half days. In common parlance four weeks are considered as making a lunar month, so that the year, if this were true, would consist of thirteen lunar months.

The revolution of the moon soon ceased to regulate the months of the year. A division into lunar months might have been found inconvenient, and it certainly must have been as unmanageable as the Italian method of reckoning time from sunset. Had the moon performed its revolution in an even number of days, there would have been no difficulty about it, but as there was a fractional portion of a day in the time employed, the lunar period was unsuited for civil purposes.

The Egyptians adopted a plan for dividing the year, which was evidently based upon the idea involved in the lunar periods. The month consisted of thirty days. Twelve months formed the year, but there was always added five *complementary* days to the last month, before the reckoning began with the New Year. This would give three hundred and sixty-five days to the year. The Egyptians called the months Thoth, Paophi, Athyr, Choéac, Tybi, Méchir, Phaménoth, Pharmouti, Pachon, Payni, Epiphi, Mésori. The complementary days are called Nisi, for the common year, and Kebus for the intercalary by the modern Cophts. A system, very similar to this Egyptian system, was introduced into the French Republican Calendar of 1793,—that is the division of the year into twelve months of thirty days, with five or six complementary days, which were called, in consequence of their Revolutionary origin, *sans-cullotides*.

The Greeks divided the year into twelve months, which were alternately of thirty and twenty-nine days, and the deficiency was made up by an intercalary month. Their months were divided into three decades, and the days these contained were numbered from one up to ten. The months always began with the end of one moon and the beginning of the other. There was, however, no general system adopted throughout Greece, and different States employed months of different length.

To the Roman system of dividing the year our attention is particularly invited, since the names of our months have mostly been derived from theirs. The Roman Calendar first consisted of ten months, and the year began with what is our third month. This was called Mars, after the god of war, from whom Romulus was asserted to have descended. The second month received the name of April from the verb *aperire*, to open or unfold, as the earth was then unlocked from the severity of winter, and, softened by the warming rays of the sun and melting showers, the buds began to appear and prepare the way for vernal flowers. The third was dedicated to Maia, the daughter of Atlas and Pleione, who was the mother of Mercury, and eventually one of the stars constituting the constellation known as the Pleiades. The fourth was consecrated to Juno—the wife of Jupiter and the Queen of Heaven. The remaining six months of the Roman year, as established by Romulus, received their names from their numerical position, and were called *Quintilis*, Sextilis, September, October, November, and December. The additional months added by Numa, were called January, from *Janus*, who presided over the gates of heaven, and hence this month was then employed as the commencement of the year, and February from the word *februa*, signifying sacrifices for the spirits of the dead, which were offered during this month. We have preserved all these names, excepting Quintilis and Sextilis. As Julius Cæsar was born in the month Quintilis, its name was changed to that of July, and the name of August was given to the month Sextilis, in honor of Octavius Augustus, who became a consul during that month.

The Roman months were divided into three unequal periods, the first days of which were known as Calends, Nones and Ides. The Calends occurred on the first day of the month, the Nones on the 5th or 7th, and the Ides on the 13th or 15th. The days between these dates were characterized by their distance from the next festival, so that the days of the month after the Ides, would be called so many days *before* the Calends of the next month, those after the Calends so many days before the Nones, and those after the Nones so many before the Ides. The whole year consisted of but three hundred and fifty-five days, and in order to make the correction necessary on account of the inadequacy of this number of days to complete the period consumed in the revolution of the earth around the sun, an intercalary or supplementary month was added every two years.* This was called Mercedonius, and was inserted between the 23rd and 24th of February. This addition was made in order that the civil and the astronomical year might commence on the same day, at least every other year. The month Mercedonius some years was longer than others, in order to bring about this agreement, and the determination of its length was left to the High-priests. This power gave rise to great corruption, as it rendered its possessors able to shorten the period of office for their enemies and lengthen it for their friends. Confusion of the most annoying character invaded the chronologic reckoning of the Romans, until we are told that the autumnal festivals were celebrated in the spring and those of summer in the middle of winter.

This state of affairs attracted the attention of Julius Cæsar, and the result was the Julian reformation of the Calendar. It was accomplished with the aid of the Egyptian astronomer Sosigenes. The first object was to have an *intercalation* for the deficiency of the civil when compared with the astronomical year, which should be regular and free from alteration, and the next was to compensate for the fractional portion of the day which was appended to the three hundred and sixty-five days in order to make up the astronomical year. This latter object was accomplished by giving the civil year a definite number of days, omitting the fraction, and adding one day every four years to the number contained in the year in order to make up for the omission. The ordinary year would contain three hundred and sixty-five days, while every fourth year would have three hundred and sixty-six. The month Mercedonius was rejected and the days were apportioned out through the other months of the year, just as we have them at present in use over the whole globe, wherever civilized man dwells.

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* Arago, Astronomie Populaire, iv., 665.

The intercalated day was added to February, which has every fourth year twenty-nine instead of twenty-eight days; and instead of counting it as a separate day, Cæsar adopted the plan of reckoning the 24th of the month twice, and as this day was called *sexto-calendas*, the repetition of it received the name *bissexto-calendas*, or simply *dies bissextus*, whence our own name, given to the year of three hundred and sixty-six days—*bissextile*. This Julian reformation took place forty-five years before the Christian Era. Owing to the imperfect manner that the bissextile day was employed, Augustus had the Calendar again corrected, thirty-six years after the date of the Julian reformation.

The whole Julian reformation was based upon the idea that the revolution of the earth around the sun was accomplished in three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours, whereas in fact it occupies but three hundred and sixty-five days, five hours, forty-eight minutes, forty-nine and seven tenth seconds. The Julian Calendar could be employed for a number of years without any great inconvenience, but as the mean length of its year differs from the astronomical year, a period must eventually arrive when there would be important differences between the two, and the seasons, according to the Calendar, would be very different from those which were occurring in fact. The council of Nice, in 325, adopted a plan in order to determine the festival of Easter, based upon the supposition that the vernal equinox would take place always on the 21st of March. But if the civil year is considered as being three hundred and sixty-five and one fourth days long, then, in consequence of the greater length of this period, the following error would arise, the equinox would fall a fraction of a day earlier than the Calendar would call for it. This difference, though small, would be increased with each year until it would at length be days instead of minutes. While the Calendar would lead us to expect it on the 21st of March, it would take place on the 20th, 19th, 18th, &c. As we shall find hereafter, Easter is regulated by the period of the Vernal Equinox, and these differences between its real appearance and the time claimed for it in the Calendar, turned the attention of the Church to the necessity of a new reform of the latter. This reform was accomplished under the authority and direction of Pope Gregory XIII. in the year 1582. In the 1257 years that had elapsed since the Council of Nice, the Julian year had gained ten days on the astronomical year, and in 1582 the Vernal Equinox fell on the 11th of March instead of the 21st. The Council of Trent had recommended that some means be adopted to rectify this error. The Pope ordered that the day after the 4th of October, instead of being called the 5th, should be called the 15th. This reform was not considered as complete, however, until there should be some law established for preventing the same difficulty hereafter, and to make such a law an edict was promulged that in every four hundred years there should be only ninety-seven bissextile years, instead of one hundred, which the Julian Calendar allowed. This would cut off three days from every four hundred years, giving a mean length to the year somewhat longer than the astronomical year, but so little differing that there would be a gain of one day only in four thousand years.

The rule for bissextile years is that every year divisible by four is entitled to the extra day appended to February, but that those years which terminate as 1500, 1600, 1700, 1800, &c., and which are really divisible by four, must be divisible first by one hundred and then by four, in order to be considered bissextile. In this way in the space of four hundred years, three years which would be bissextile according to the Julian Calender, will remain common, that is, will contain but three hundred and sixty-five days, and thus, in every one hundred bissextile years, according to the Julian Calendar, there is retained but ninety-seven, according to the Gregorian.

In the year 1700 the difference of dates between the two Calendars became equal to eleven days, and in 1800 to twelve days. The dates, according to the Julian reckoning, are now known as "the old style," and those according to the Gregorian as the new style. The Julian system is still employed in Russia, and consequently there is a difference of twelve days between the dates of events as recorded by the Russians and by other nations.

There was great objection at first in Protestant countries to the adoption of the Gregorian changes in the Calendar. The great religious movements of the day which had resulted in a denial of papal supremacy by a portion of the Western Church, and a rejection of the customs and usages that were peculiar to the Church of Rome,—these were but little calculated to admit any agreement on the part of either Roman Catholic or Protestant on subjects religious or scientific. The sturdy Protestant declared that he would rather not agree with the sun than agree with the court of Rome, and therefore hesitated a long time about adopting the Gregorian changes. The decree of the Pope established the Gregorian Calendar on October 5–15, 1582. It was adopted in France, December 10–20, 1582 ; in the Catholic kingdoms of Germany in 1584, and the Protestant in February 19–March 1, 1600 ; in Poland in 1586 ; and in England September 3–14, 1752.

We have thus traced the history of our civil year, from its first establishment by Romulus, down to the changes which were instituted by Gregory XIII, under the advice of Lilio. It will be seen that centuries elapsed before science succeeded in defining not only the Calendar for any fixed year, but in obtaining the law of the variations of the Julian from the Astronomical year. It would be an error if we were to conclude that the civil year always commenced with the first of January. Arago gives five different periods which were or are employed by different modern nations as the beginning of the business year.

The birth day of Christ, December 25th, was celebrated as the beginning of the year in France during the reign of Charlemagne. In the same country, about the year 755, the first of March was selected as the commencement of the civil year; and during the 12th and 13th centuries, Easter day, notwithstanding it is moveable between the

22nd of March and the 25th of April, was used by some of the French. Up to 1752 in England, the year began with the festival of the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary, which was celebrated March 25th. During the year 1751, Parliament determined that 1752 should be considered as commencing with the first of January. In this way, 1751, really consisted of but nine months, and the ignorant populace are said to have vented their indignation upon the authors of the bill, pursuing Lord Chesterfield with the cry "give us back our three months." The first of January was retaken as the beginning of the year by the Germans in 1500. It is now adopted by nearly all nations excepting the Russians, where the commencement of the year corresponds with our thirteenth of January.

A few words on the subject of Eras and we shall take up the second portion of our subject. It is necessary to have some fixed point in the history of the past from which we can reckon the dates of events. In the years we have months, in these weeks, and in these again days, and thus we are enabled readily to fix the date of an event that may have happened during either of these periods. We want something of the kind when we have to fix the particular year of an event, and this is furnished by the Era.

The two Eras adopted by Christian nations have been the date of the creation of the world, and that of the birth of our Saviour. All events are referred to these two great facts. They constitute the Era of the world, and the Christian Era,—the first birth of matter with the creation of its master man, and the birth of the greatest man, of Him who united the natures of God and man, so that the sin and iniquity of the natural man might be sufficiently atoned for by His great sacrifice. The event which constituted the second Era was not only the greater of the two, but was the period in the history of the world towards which its antecedent events were looking for the restoration of Humanity to its original relations with the Deity, and from which those incidents, that have occurred since, have flown with more or less benefit to the race as they have been controlled by a spirit recognizing the importance of *the* great event.

The Era of the world was proposed early in the history of the Christian Church, probably as early as the days of the Apostles. Chronologists have differed as to the number of years which intervened between the two Eras. Scaliger advanced the opinion, that this was 3950, Archbishop Usher that it was 4004, and Josephus 4163 years. The estimate of Usher is most generally adopted by English writers, and has been recognized by Bossuet and Rollin. This Era is called *Anno Mundi*, and abbreviated by the use of the initials A. M. The years are estimated from the beginning in regular order up to the Christian Era, which necessarily constitutes the beginning of the four thousand and fifth year of the world.

We find that the birth of Christ was not taken as the initial point of a new notation of years until the sixth century. The Christian Church had no Era different from those employed by the non-christian communities, and we may conclude, that the Era of the world was used, or the Olympic Era which dates 776 years B. C., or the Era of the foundation of Rome, known as *Anno Urbis Conditae*, which dated 753 years B. C., and was represented by the letters A. U. C. In the year 532 of our Era, a Roman monk, Dionysius Exiguus, proposed that the birth of the Saviour should be adopted as the point of time to which all events belonging to the Christian portion of History should be referred. His calculation placed this event on the 25th of December, in the 753rd year after the building of Rome, and accordingly the 754th year was called the first of the new Era,—taking, however, the first of January, seven days after the supposed Anniversary of the event, as the beginning of the year. Any event in this Era is said to have happened in the year of our Lord, and is designated by adding the letters A. D., (abbreviations of the words *Anno Domini*) to the number of years after the birth of Christ. In this way the nominal Christian world, whether recognizing fully the doctrines of the Christian religion, or possessing full belief in the idea of the divinity of Jesus Christ, are unconsciously, in their modes of reckoning time, bearing witness to His birth as the grandest incident found on the pages of the world's history. Men, whose undevout lips were never moved in prayer, or whose hardened hearts never beat in sympathy with a religious idea, thus inarticulately join in rendering homage, all involuntary though it be, to the central fact of the world's history,—the wondrous basis of the Christian's hope and the Christian's trust.

We have thus endeavored to present the nature of those divisions of the Civil Calendar, that are required by the exigencies of civil life, and also the principles, whether arbitrary or astronomically necessary, which have regulated the construction of such divisions. The day and year have been shown as regulated by astronomical laws. When these laws were but indifferently understood, the lengths of those divisions of time were not accurately fixed. After science had cleared up the dark places in Astronomy, she taught man how the civil year, by which he regulated his business affairs, could be made to agree with the astronomical year that the sun and the earth determined. Then, and not before, was the year accurately fixed. Hence we can understand all the mistakes and errors which abounded in every determination of the year up to the time of the Gregorian reformation in 1582.

Months being arbitrary divisions of the year depended entirely on the correctness of the determination of the latter for their value. But, weeks were established by especial command of the Almighty, and depended alone upon the preservatien of the seventh day, however accurately or inaccurately its length might be determined by man, free from all labor or work.

The civil year is devoted to the worldly business of man. Saving alone fifty-two days—the Sundays—all the year is devoted to the search of such things as will contribute to his wants, comforts or luxuries. The requirements of the body are food and raiment, and these constitute all that are supplied by the labors of most men. The want of the mind is knowledge, not only that it shall be able to aid the body in gaining victories over material objects, but that it can investigate the nature of substances immaterial and eternal. This want as imperatively clamors for man's attention during the civil year as the necessities of the body which perishes, and he who neglects its call, lowers himself to the condition of a mere animal. But yet a higher want is experienced by his soul, which can only be satisfied by food that Omnipotence has placed within its reach, and this want is the highest of all, so that whatever may be the occupations of the civil year, *it* must not be neglected. The business of man consists, therefore, in providing for the spiritual, mental and bodily wants of himself and those constituting his family. One day, out of the seven constituting the week, was reserved by God in commemoration of His sovereignty, and is specially to be devoted to the first of these three classes of wants, although it must also occupy a portion of time during the other six days. This day was originally fixed on the seventh day of the week, but, "it was changed, by the Lord of the Sabbath, from the *seventh* to the *first* day of the week, that it might be, till the end of time, a memorial of his resurrection from the dead; while, being still unaltered in its essential nature, it should continue to answer, also, as before, all the purpose of its original institution."*

From the earliest times the ancient Christians celebrated certain days of the year in commemoration of great events in the life of Christ. Whether these days were the proper anniversaries of such events or no, the idea involved in the celebration was still the same—that the creature should hold in continual remembrance the life of his Saviour. Afterwards, other days were added in commemoration of the births or martyrdoms of the Apostles, Evangelists, Confessors and Saints. These were multiplied until each day in the year was considered as consecrated to the recollection of some religious fact or personage. The *propriety* of such commemorations does not come within the province of this Article. It is taken for granted; the reasons for it being based upon the conclusions which the Church Catholic has adopted. The number of the days which should be celebrated differs in the various branches of the Christian Church. Their enumeration constitutes the Ecclesiastical Calendar, and this is different in extent with each separate Church. The Roman Catholic Church has given the name of a Saint or Martyr to each day in the year, and has even assigned one to the intercalary day—the 29th of February. Protestant Churches have abridged this number and have adopted many or few of them in accordance with their own special theory on the subject. To consider the reasons for or against the retention of any of these days is, also, foreign from our present design. The Ecclesiastical Calendar, as recognized by the present Liturgy of the American branch of the German Reformed Church, and by the ancient usages of the mother Church in Germany and Switzerland, will now claim our attention, as something *admitted* to be right, and we will endeavor to show the laws which determine the various periods in this Calendar. Such a Calendar even existed with the Romans, who distinguished among the days of the year, such as were *dies juridici*, and *dies feriati*, that is judicial and non-judicial days. No man could be compelled to appear before the praetor on the dies feriati, and no business was transacted, unless of a certain character, which was specially named by Law. These days numbered, in the time of Marcus Antoninus, 150.*

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* Nevin's Biblical Antiquities, II, 163.

Some religious observances, as Christmas and Epiphany, always occur on the same day of the month. There are others which occur on different days, and hence are known as *moveable* holydays. It will be proper, to begin with those that are fixed, and we select first of all *Christmas day*, or the Anniversary of the Nativity of Christ. "This has ever been kept with great solemnity, festivity and rejoicing."†

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* Neal's Fasts and Feasts, 5 and 6.

† Calendar of Anglican Church, 152.

It was celebrated for about three hundred years by the Eastern Church on the 6th of January, though the 25th of December has been mostly devoted to its celebration. In the words of Saint Chrysostom,* it "is the most venerable, most astonishing of festivals, the fountain whence the other great festivals flowed, for had Christ not been born he would not have been baptized, which is the Epiphany; he would not have been crucified, which is the Passover; he would not have sent down the Spirit, which is Pentecost. But not only on that account, is this festival worthy of preeminence, but because what happened upon it is more astonishing than what happened on the others: for that Christ should die was a natural consequence of his having been born a man; for though he did no sin, yet he had assumed a mortal body; but that being God, he should be willing to become man and endure to humble himself to a degree which thought cannot follow, is most awful, most full of amazement.

Connected with the celebration of Christmas day, and immediately following it are three festival days recognized by the Church, as commemorating the martyrdom of St. Stephen, the beloved disciple St. John—the bosom friend of Christ, and the slaughter of the Jewish children by Herod's command; these festivals always fall upon the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and twenty-eighth days of December. They are celebrated immediately after Christmas, since each commemorated a certain form of martyrdom, and thus the idea was symbolized, to employ the words of the rubric for St. Stephen's day, "that the terrestrial birth of our Saviour is immediately followed by the death, that is the celestial birth of His martyrs." The reason for the order in which these days are placed is given by Wheatly, "That as there are three kinds of martyrdom, the first both in will and deed, which is the highest; the second in will but not in deed; the third in deed but not in will; so the Church commemorates those martyrs in the same order: St. Stephen first, who suffered both in will and deed; St. John the Evangelist next, who suffered martyrdom in will but not in deed; the holy Innocents last, who suffered in deed but not in will."

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* Neal's Fasts and Feasts, 10.

The festival of the circumcision of Christ, is celebrated on the first day of the year, and hence is known as New Year's day. Its celebration does not date further back than the end of the eleventh century. Since this day was taken as the beginning of the year, at the time of the establishment of the Christian era by Dionysius Exiguus, it has become a day of great importance both in the Civil and Ecclesiastical Calendar. Some kind of celebration always takes place, either religious or social, and men of business use it as a convenient initial point for their calculations through the year.

The festival of the Epiphany, or the manifestation of Christ, is celebrated on the sixth of January. It is intended to commemorate three several manifestations of our Lord: 1st, the appearance of the Star in the East, which guided the wise men to the place "where the young child was," and thus enabled them "to worship Him"—this peculiar Epiphany is mentioned in the gospel for the day; 2nd, the manifestation of the Trinity as shown at His baptism in the Jordan, by John the Baptist; 3rd, that of His Divinity or Power as shown in the miracle of the water turned into wine at the marriage supper in Cana of Galilee.

These constitute all the fixed festivals that are provided for by the Liturgy, and our attention must now be directed to the more difficult subject of the moveable holydays. It will be proper in considering these to begin with the Ecclesiastical year, which does not commence with the first day of the Civil year, but some weeks before it. The commencement of the Ecclesiastical year is regulated by St. Andrew's day—November 30th,—and takes place on the nearest Sunday, before or after it, which is called the *First Sunday in Advent.* The whole season of Advent, which fills up the space between this Sunday and Christmas, is devoted to the commemoration of the coming of our Saviour. It has been suggested that St. Andrew's day was selected by the Church to regulate the first Sunday in the year, because he was "the first that found the Messiah, and first brought others to Him," and hence it was right that he should be commemorated at the beginning of the Advent season. But since the first Sunday in Advent may come before the 30th of November, this idea would not always be represented in the arrangement of the Church year. We employ St. Andrew's day to determine the beginning of Advent, although there are no special lessons and collects assigned it in the Liturgy.

There are four Sundays in Advent, each having a special gospel, epistle and collect assigned it. After Christmas, to Epiphany, there may be one or two Sundays. The Reformed Liturgy, and the Book of Common Prayer, have a gospel, epistle and collect but for *one* of the Sundays—the latter ordering these to be used "*for every day after unto Epiphany.*"

The remainder of the moveable feasts in the Church year, as well as the celebration of Ash Wednesday and Good Friday, depend upon the date of Easter, or the Festival of the Resurrection of the Saviour from the tomb. The derivation of the word Easter from a Saxon word, *Oster*, which means to rise, shows that the character of the day is manifest in its etymology. Easter day was celebrated at the Paschal full moon, in consequence of the relation of the Resurrection to the Passover. Lardner tells us,* that "many of the early Christians held Easter to be the Jewish Passover continued as a Christian rite, and celebrated it on the day of the Passover, instead of the Sunday after. The Nicene Council put a stop to this notion and practice; and means were taken at the Reformation of the Calendar to prevent the Christian festival from falling actually upon the same day as that of the Jewish Passover."

In forming the law for the fixing of Easter, two things had to be kept especially in view; first, the fact of the occurrence of the Resurrection *about* the Vernal Equinox, and second, that it was *after* a full moon. With these facts the idea was quickly obtained that the festival should be celebrated on the Sunday which next succeeded the first full moon after the 21st of March, and in case "the full moon happens upon a Sunday, Easter day is the Sunday after." From this law we shall see that the earliest day on which Easter could fall would be the 22nd of March, and that this would only occur *when* the full moon appeared on the 21st of the month, the day of appearance being Saturday. The latest period for the festival is the 25th of April, which occurs when the full moon happens on the 20th of March. This moon is not then considered the Paschal moon, as it is *before* the Vernal Equinox, and the true Paschal full moon will really occur on the 18th of April. Should this day be Sunday, according to the general law, Easter will be the *next* Sunday, which would be the 25th. Easter day has fallen on the 22nd of March, in 1598, 1693, 1761, 1818, and will occur on that day in 2285. It has been celebrated on the 25th of April in 1666, 1734, and will be on that day in the years 1886, 1943, 2038 and 2190. Between these two periods,—a space of thirty-five days—Easter may happen in accordance with the conditions first named, and as it controls most of the moveable festivals, their position in the Church Calendar may vary within the same limits, i. e. thirty-five days.

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* Lardner on The Almanac, 9.

It would be erroneous to conclude from what has been stated as the law for determining Easter, that the Astronomical moon has any thing to do with it at the present day. Many changes have taken place in the science of Astronomy, since Easter day was fixed by the Church. Ideas about the movements of the Sun and Moon, then prevalent, have been rejected. This rejection would necessarily affect, more or less, the determination of Easter, but in order to preserve the old law, an ecclesiastical, or conventional moon has been created, by the age of which Easter is regulated. Easter is in fact determined by finding the first Sunday that succeeds the 14th day of the first ecclesiastical moon which occurs after the 21st of March, and if this 14th day occurs on Sunday, the Easter festival is celebrated on the next Sunday. In order to show that there is a difference between the Sundays which would be selected as Easter by the astronomical and the ecclesiastical moon, two cases from Arago may be cited. In 1798, Easter according to the astronomical moon should have been on April 1st, but, in fact being regulated by the hypothetic moon, it occurred on the 8th. In 1818, the day was determined astronomically as the 29th of March, but was celebrated in accordance with the ecclesiastical moon's indication on the 22nd. The reason why the determination is not made by the *actual* moon, consists simply in the fact that *its* position is obtained from astronomical tables, which are yearly being altered, as the science becomes more perfect. These tables are not constructed for many years in advance, and the Church would thus be dependent for the fixing of Easter on the appearance of the Civil Calendar. Whereas, according to the present system, tables are furnished us of the days, on which Easter will fall, for centuries to come.

The ecclesiastical moon is regulated by data known as "epacts" and "golden numbers." It is free from the contingent effects of modern astronomical discoveries. We shall endeavor to explain its peculiarities, drawing from Arago, Lardner and such other sources as are within our reach.

Meton remarked that nineteen years contain about two hundred and thirty-five lunar months, and that after the termination of this period, the same phases of the moon recurred on the same days of the month. Hence every nineteen years, festivals that were regulated by the phases of the moon, could be celebrated on the same days of the month. Such a period of time received the name of the Metonic Cycle. The Greeks were so delighted with this discovery, which would require them only to determine the dates of their feasts for nineteen years, as they would then have these for every subsequent period, that they had the numbers inscribed on their monuments in letters of gold. Since that time, the numbers composing the cycle of Meton have been called golden numbers.

When we compare the actual length of nineteen astronomical years with two hundred and thirty-five average lunar months, a difference appears of two hours, four minutes, thirty-three seconds. If the nineteen years exactly contained two hundred and thirty-five lunar months, "the whole course of time would be resolved into a succession of periods, or *cycles*," and the same phases of the moon which were noticed in any year of one cycle, would occur in the corresponding year of another cycle at the same moment of time exactly. But as nineteen astronomical years fall short by two hours, four minutes, thirty-three seconds of the length of two hundred and thirty-five average lunar months,—the same phases of the moon would occur on the same day every nineteen years, but exactly two hours, four minutes, thirty-three seconds later.

But here another difficulty arises, the astronomical year is always three hundred and sixty-five days and nearly six hours in length, while the civil year is of unequal length. Every fourth year it contains three hundred and sixty-six days, and in the next three, only three hundred and sixty-five. This would also prevent a cycle of civil years always being of the same length, as it may sometimes contain five and sometimes only four leap years, making a difference of one day in length. "If four successive cycles of nineteen civil years be taken, three of them will exceed one astronomical year by something less than a quarter of a day, and the fourth will fall short of an astronomical year by something more than three-quarters of a day. The total length of the four successive cycles of nineteen civil years will be as nearly as possible equal to four cycles of nineteen astronomical years."* From these facts we learn that "the cycle of nineteen civil years oscillates at each side of the cycle of nineteen astronomical years." The

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* Lardner on The Almanac, 13.

Ecclesiastical or true Paschal moon is supposed to move in the path of the true moon, but its periodical phases take place in accordance with the civil year, just as the phases of the true moon occur in accordance with the astronomical year. This fictitious moon will sometimes have its phases sooner or later than the real moon, though the extent of the differences will never be greater than that of the difference in length between the average and the real lunar month.

All time is divided into Metonic cycles of nineteen years, the first of which is supposed to commence with a day which is the last of the moon's age. The *golden number* for any year indicates its position in such a cycle, as for instance, if we say that this number for 1858 is 16, we mean it is the sixteenth year in the cycle which must have commenced with 1843. "The age of the ecclesiastical moon on the first day of the first year of the cycle being known, its age upon the first day of each succeeding year of the cycle may be determined. The number which expresses the age of the moon on the first day of any year of the cycle is called the *Epact* of that year." Now by calculation the following Epacts have been obtained as corresponding with the different golden numbers.

Golden Numbers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Epacts.	0	11	22	3	14	25	6	17	28	9	20	1	12	23	4	15	26	7	18

Having thus obtained the age of the moon at the commencement of any year, we can easily calculate what full moon, or rather what fourteenth day of the lunar month occurs first after the 21st of March, and then from this the Easter day is readily obtained. Applying the rule to the present year the Epact for which is 15, we find the first ecclesiastical lunar period expired on the 15th of January; the second on the 13th of February, the third on the 14th of March, and the fourteenth day of the next moon falls on March 28th, which happens to be on Sunday, and hence the next Sunday, or April 4th, is Easter day.

Easter being determined in this way, there is no difficulty in fixing the remainder of the moveable festivals. Lent consists of forty days before Easter, independent of Sundays. It begins with Ash Wednesday, which is exactly forty-six days before Easter. The name appropriated to this day was obtained from the ancient custom of placing ashes on the heads of the people after they had made confession of their sins. The day was preserved as a solemn fast. The period of Lent was instituted, as suggested by some, with a view to commemorate the fast of forty days and forty nights which Christ endured in the wilderness when he was tempted of the devil, or, as is more likely, in order to bring more especially before the minds of Christians the sufferings and death of the Saviour. The period was not begun as early as Ash Wednesday, until about A. D. 600. Before that time, it seems to have been of shorter duration.

The three Sundays before Ash Wednesday are counted backwards as the First, Second or Third Sunday *before* Lent, and are also known as Quinquagesima, Sexagesima or Septuagesima. The Sundays intervening, from Epiphany to Septuagesima, are numbered by their distance from the former festival, and they may vary from *one* to *six*.

During the Lenten period the Sundays, six in number, are reckoned from the first to the sixth in their order *from* Ash Wednesday. The *sixth* Sunday, however, is called Palm Sunday, as it commemorates Christ's triumphal entrance into Jerusalem when "a very great multitude spread their garments in the way; and others cut down branches from the trees and strewed them in the way." In the Roman Catholic Church, sprigs of evergreen are worn by the members on this day.

Palm Sunday, or the Sunday *before* Easter, is the beginning of the last week in Lent, which is known as Holy Week. This season was selected by the Christian Roman Emperors as the period for pardoning prisoners, "to imitate," according to St. Chrysostom, "as far as might be, the divine goodness which, at this time, freed mankind from the dominion of sin." It was considered as a week of especial solemnity. The rubric in the Liturgy requires "that there should be Divine service every day, and that the entire gospel history of Christ's Passion and death should be read." The words of Chrysostom will give us an idea of the importance attached by the early Church to this period; —" in this week, the long war was brought to a close, death was quenched, the curse removed, the tyrannous empire of the devil overthrown, his goods plundered, God and man reconciled; heaven becomes accessible, men and angels were joined together; what had been dissevered was united; the partition wall broken down, the barrier taken away; the God of Peace made peace between the things above and the things on earth."

On the Friday in this week, known as Good Friday, the anniversary of the Crucifixion is celebrated, and the Church directs the minds of its members to the nature and magnitude of the Sacrifice which was then offered up for the benefit of mankind. This was the great fast day of the year with the early Church, and special canons of its various Councils were directed against any indulgence in feasting on Good Friday, "prohibiting such persons from participating on Easter in the sacrament."*

Saturday of this week is celebrated as the anniversary of the day in which Christ occupied the tomb, and is known as Easter Eve. The early Church continued the fast of Good Friday, " for all who were able to bear it, over the succeeding Saturday, while Christ continued in the tomb, till cock-crow on Easter morning: and during the whole of that night the people continued assembled in the churches, in the expectation,—an expectation apparently derived from the Jews,—that on that night the Messiah would appear to receive his kingdom."

Monday in Easter is celebrated by the German Reformed Church. The Gospel for the day describes the meeting of the risen Saviour, with two of the disciples, on the road to Emmaus.

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* **Fasts and Feasts**, 321.

The Sundays after Easter are *five* in number, and reckoned by their distance *from* the great Festival. The first one of these was formerly called Dominica in Albis, on account of the fact that persons, who had been baptized on Easter-eve, which was the great baptismal day of the year, continued to wear their white robes during Easter week and on this Sunday. The fifth Sunday after Easter was formerly called Rogation Sunday. It and the two following days were known as Rogation days, as early as A. D., 474, when they were ordered as fasts, and were especially devoted to the consideration of the mode of asking God so that we may obtain our requests. This feature is preserved in the Gospel for the day, and the collect has especial reference to our doing good in the future under divine guidance.

The Thursday following the fifth Sunday after Easter, that is Rogation Sunday, is called Ascension day. This is always forty days after Easter, and it is celebrated at this distance from the great festival, in commemoration of the days, which Christ passed on earth after His resurrection, which were forty in number.

The Sunday immediately following Ascension day is simply known as *the Sunday after Ascension day.* It is followed by Whit Sunday, called also the Feast of Pentecost, from the fact that it is exactly fifty days from Easter. This day is celebrated in commemoration of the descent of the Holy Spirit on the Apostles, after the Resurrection of the Saviour. The next day, or *Whit Monday,* is retained as a Holyday by the Reformed Church, to commemorate the gift of the Spirit to the Gentiles, under the preaching of St. Peter.

Sunday immediately following Whit Sunday is known as Trinity Sunday. The mystery of the Trinity is especially held in remembrance on this day. The Ambrosian hymn is required in the service, because it offers up especial thanks to the three personages of the Trinity, and has always been recognized as the highest form of adoration which an uninspired writer has composed. The festival prayers for the day dwell particularly upon the attributes peculiar to the different personages of the Godhead. In the English Church the Athanasian Creed is appointed to be said on this day.

The Sundays following Trinity, which vary in number from *twenty-two* to *twenty-seven*, are named as *after* Trinity, and they fill up the remainder of the Ecclesiastical year.

It will be observed that Easter regulates nearly the whole of the Church-year, determining when each of the moveable feasts shall be held. In order to recapitulate what we have said, we extract, as a sort of resume of the whole subject, the following by Prof. De Morgan :* "In the English nomenclature Easter Sunday has always the *six* Sundays in Lent immediately preceding, and the *five* Sundays after Easter immediately following. Of these, the nearest to Easter before and after, are *Palm* Sunday and *Low* Sunday (Dominica in albis); the farthest before and after, are *Quadragesima* (first in Lent), and *Rogation* Sunday (fifth after Easter). Preceding all these are, in reverse order, *Quinquagesima*, *Sexagesima*, *Septuagesima;* and following them in direct order, are the Sunday after *Ascension*, *Whit* Sunday and *Trinity* Sunday. So that Easter Sunday, as it takes its course through the Almanac, draws after it, as it were, *nine* Sundays, and pushes eight before it, all at fixed denominations. Looking farther back, every Sunday preceding Septuagesima, but not preceding the fixed day of Epiphany (Jan. 6th), is named as *of* Epiphany or *after* Epiphany: the least number of these being *one*, the greatest number *six*."

In addition to the days which are mentioned in this article, as the festival days suggested in the new Liturgy of the Reformed Church in America, other days are celebrated by the mother Church, in her German home, in commemoration of the Apostles or some incidents of special importance in the history of the Church. With the view of showing that such days were *once* recognized in this country by the Reformed Church, we may mention that, in an old Hymn book, the fourth edition of which was published by Ernst Ludwig Baisch in Philadelphia, (1774), purporting to be prepared for the use of the Reformed Church in Hesse, Hanau, the Palatinate and Pennsylvania, we find associated with the Heidelberg Catechism, and with forms of prayer for morning and evening private worship, a full series of gospel and epistles with collects for all the Sundays in the year, the other festivals recognized in the present Liturgy, and for *other* occasions. The latter are for the "*Sunday after New Year*," Tuesday after Easter, Tuesday after Whit Sunday, the day named St. Andrew's, St. Thomas, the conversion of St. Paul, the purification of the Virgin, St. Matthew, the Annunciation, St. Philip and St. James the less, St. John the Baptist, St. Peter and St. Paul, the Visitation of the Virgin to Elizabeth, St. James the Great, St. Bartholomew, St. Mathias, St. Michael the Archangel, St. Simon and St. Jude. This will show that the Liturgical movement involving as it does, to a certain extent, the celebration of these days of the old Church year, is not a novelty introduced by restless men into the service of religion, but is the result of an ardent yearning after the customs of our fathers, a warm desire for a form of worship which unites people and clergy in their church services. And we need not seek after this latter out of the limits of our mother Church, whose past history is filled with endearing recollections of our fathers. Their blood, in many cases, was shed in the establishment of its doctrines and principles when persecution opposed them with all its vilest terrors. Let not their sons be drawn irrevocably from the old land marks, and carried away out into the sea of non-liturgical agitation, where their poor barks will, like many others in the same position now, be tossed about by every wind of doctrine, having no sure reliance upon compass or star or any other guidance in the midst of the storm. The necessities of the devout soul, the idea of worship itself, respect for the early fathers of the Church, the duty of handing down doctrines pure and undefiled,—

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* Lardner on the Almanac, 19.

all these constitute an argument all powerful in favor of Liturgical worship with the son of the German Reformed Church, and by implication also they invoke his attention to the Church year. To this latter, as the nobler Calendar of the two we have considered, the purest thoughts and tenderest feelings of the soul cling as, next to God's own Sabbath, requiring the attention and reverence of the devout. In this view, the Ecclesiastical Calendar is a great boon from the Church to her members.

> "As prisoners notch their tally-stick,
> And wait the far-off day,
> So marks SHE days, and months and years,
> To ponder and to pray;
> And year by year beginning new
> Her faithful task sublime,
> How lovingly she meteth out,
> Each portion in its time."

Mt. Washington, Md. S.

ART. IV.—THE PRINCIPLE OF ECCLESIASTICAL UNITY.

MUCH is said, at the present day, about Christian union, and numerous efforts are made to bring it about. Schemes are gotten up and plans laid to bring together the various religious or denominational organizations, and to harmonize the different religious interests of evangelical Christendom. We hear of Bible and Sunday School unions; of Christian associations and schemes of ecclesiastical correspondence; of union missionary societies and evangelical alliances; of Church-diets and mutual Christian conferences—all gotten up for the ostensible purpose of promoting ecclesiastical unity and cöoperation. The idea is noble and truly Christian; it rests on the consciousness of necessary agreement in matters of faith, and corresponds fully with the broad, absolute and catholic character of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. The efforts that are making to realize this idea are praiseworthy. They are the fruit of much self-denial, self-sacrifice and sincere devotion—they are supported by the gifts, the prayers and the tears of many. Notwithstanding all the activity and devotion, however, that have characterized these union movements thus far, they have almost universally failed to produce any thing satisfactory; on the contrary, they have frequently occasioned wider and deeper breaches and led to more wide-spread and general religious confusion. Why this failure of measures so loved, and so cherished? Does the cause lie in the principle, or in the policy simply of the movement? In the spirit of Christian candor let us examine and see.

Principle, in all things, is of vast importance. Without some solid fundamental principle, no system of science, of law, or of philosophy can stand—no system of jurisprudence of any kind can rest on any other foundation. But religion, above all other things, must be true and certain to satisfy the demands both of the heart and mind of man; it must rest on a foundation that the very gates of hell can neither shake nor destroy. Yet principle, without a corresponding system of policy, is a mere logical abstraction and must fail to accomplish the desired end; so in science, so in politics, and much more so in religion.

A little serious and careful attention to the principle of our modern evangelical union policy, may disclose to us the real secret of its general failure. This policy is based throughout on the principle of compromise; it recognizes no principle of binding authority whatever, but gives free scope to all shades of private opinion. Accordingly it may at any moment be left at the mercy of the whims and the caprices of ruling factions, or its object may be frustrated by sectarian bigotry and sectional jealousy. All its endeavors must necessarily be vague and unstable, and carry with them no guaranty of lasting duration; and for this reason it is not at all surprising that the scheme should be so powerless to produce any tangible and desirable effects.

The cause lies in the ground on which it rests, and not in the want of diplomatic skill. All irresponsible negotiation must at last result in nothing, unless it is ratified by legitimate absolute* legal authority. There lies indeed a moral responsibility back of all authoritative human mediation and law, the binding force of which can never be destroyed; yet in the nature of circumstances it is required that there should be legal and divinely constituted authority to point out the nature and obligations of that responsibility, in order that justice and truth may be maintained among men. The absence of this principle of binding ecclesiastical power mnst be taken as the chief cause of the failure of the scheme now under consideration. We do not feel disposed to deny the great merits to which the movement may justly lay claim, though it has failed to accomplish the main object in view. It has not only enlisted much Christian sympathy and devotion in its behalf; its abettors and supporters are not only governed by the purest and most disinterested motives; but, negatively at least, it is most emphatically preparing the way for the introduction of a better state of things. As far as its bearings in this direction are concerned it deserves to be universally hailed with delight; but when we come to consider the reason why it was not more successful in producing fruits of a positive and tangible character, we can ascribe it to no other cause than to the suicidal principle which lies at its bottom. It has a history; for it is not of recent date. Ever since the great ecclesiastical rupture of the sixteenth century there have been men, who devoted their best energies and their prayers to the cause of evangelical union; the policy that was pursued at different periods differs of course in form, but its ruling fundamental principle has always been the same. The results are now clearly before us. The object in view has not been accomplished. Sectism is still rampant on all sides. On the other hand, however, the consciousness of guilt and wrong at the bottom of these divisions has been sensibly developed, and many are looking around in alarm for a remedy against the terrible catastrophe of complete ecclesiastical dissolution. Nothing has contributed more towards this state of the religious mind than the principle of private judgment, as that reigns supreme in all the evangelical movements of the age, as every one may see who pays but slight attention to what is now passing in the religious world, both in Europe and America. It is universally felt that the sect-system cannot be sustained on scriptural ground; that it runs directly against the very nature of Christian truth; and that it interferes with and very seriously impedes the success of Christian missions. But in spite of all this, the system feels itself wedded to and based upon a foundation that has no power to avoid these consequences, at least in a positive and direct way.

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* We shall be obliged to use the word *absolute* and other kindred terms frequently in the course of this article; it is proper, therefore, here to state that, we take these terms in their broadest sense. There is an absolute authority which embraces both objective power, and careful subjective submission and coöperation.

Judging from the principles of the philosophy of history and from the bearing of all ecclesiastio-historical testimony, it appears that absolute authority, of some kind, is necessary to settle the social and religious differences of men. Politically, the world could not get along a single day, if such were not the safeguard of its peace and prosperity. All legal difficulties, whether of a private and personal, or of a more general character, must be adjusted in this way. Appeal here must stop somewhere, no matter how liberal and democratic the form of government may be. Moreover, civil authority must necessarily rest on *divine right*, as its only proper and legitimate basis. On no other ground can it claim submission and obedience. Hence Paul says: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God, the powers that be, are ordained of God; whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." Now it is readily admitted that there is a difference between civil and ecclesiastical power, both as regards the spirit and the form of administration. Both powers come from God; but the manner in which they proceed from Him is different. Civil power proceeds from Him in an indirect way, through society and the mediation of the civil law; the power of the Church, however, comes from Him in a direct, extraordinary and miraculous way. This very difference makes the latter much more positive and absolute than the former, since this is naturally vested in society, upon the will and prudence of which it depends for the mode of its administration; while the power of the Church has been miraculously communicated and defined. Besides the State does not necessarily rest on the ground of universal empire; no system of civil government can lay claim to any such high prerogative; and we find nothing abnormal or constitutionally at variance with the idea of civil authority in the existence of different States and Kingdoms. But if we carry this principle into ecclesiastical polity, we feel at once that we are doing violence to the catholic and absolute character of the Christian faith; for this claims the whole world as its empire, and admits of no rival interests and conflicting elements in its bosom. As regards doctrine and spirit this is pretty generally admitted by all who lay claim to evangelical orthodoxy; but the hyper-spiritualistic notions of the age make no earnest with the idea of the Church as a visible organism, governed by strict principles of ecclesiastical unity, and as a matter of course the authority of the Church sinks down to the level of a mere social arrangement. But this puts the Church in a very serious dilemma: if its absolute authority is denied, then the door is open to a variety of religious opinions and whims, and endless divisions and sects must be the result, which is, however felt to be all wrong and injurious; but if the principle of authority is allowed to rule, it will not only condemn the present state of the Church, but it will allow it no longer to exist. We have nothing to do here with either horn of the dilemma, not in a direct way at least; we merely refer to the difficulty with a view of presenting clearly the real cause of the failure of all the measures that have yet been gotten up, either to remedy or to avoid the evil. Right or wrong, the authority of the Church is the only reliable guarantee of unity in matters of faith—unrestricted private judgment, or the principle of religious compromise can never bring it about in a lasting and real way. It has never done so, and it is not likely that it ever will.

In order that we may not seem arbitrary in our speculations on this subject, we will examine into the history and method of God's intercourse with his people, with a view of showing on what principle he has always dealt with them.

But a single glance into the Holy Scriptures will convince any unprejudiced mind that God has always dealt with his people on the ground of absolute authority, and never on that of compromise. The Old Testament dispensation was emphatically theocratic; it was dictated by God in an extraordinary and miraculous manner. He met Abraham and called him to be the father of a numerous seed, and he gave him laws and religious rites that were to be strictly observed by himself and his posterity. When the days of their servitude in the land of Egypt were fulfilled, God again met Israel and led them into the promised land. And he gave them a law, through Moses, which continued with the same divine authority and force, until it was fulfilled by the same divine power that had instituted it. Its divine power and dignity was never taken away, though it was administered by human hands; but its claims to respect and submission were the same in the days of the Scribes and the Pharisees as in the days of Moses and Aaron; and those who executed it at any period of its reign were entitled to obedience on the same ground. And in case of disobedience or corruption on the part of the Jewish nation, God suffered not this unfaithfulness to set aside the authority of His law, but by special interference in various ways, he brought them back again to obedience to the law of their fathers. Now there is nothing of the spirit of compromise or of accommodation to the will and prudence of men in all this; on the contrary, the very form in which this law is to be executed and administered is expressly laid down, and implicit obedience to its provisions demanded. It was not established through the mediation of society; the popular will and voice were not consulted as to any of its special provisions; it came directly from God and wore throughout the character of a theocratic hierarchy, which was supported by the most solemn guarantees of the special protection and guidance of Heaven. That there is a difference between the Old and New Testament dispensations is true; but this difference does not consist in the abolition of the power and authority of the Church: it has to do rather with the peculiar form of administration and the specific provisions of the two dispensations, in which respect they of course differ greatly. Christ came not to destroy but to fulfill the law, and hence the relation which existed between God and his people remained the same as it was before. The authority of the Church was not abolished, but rather increased and extended to suit the more catholic character of the kingdom of Christ. This fact cannot be overlooked by any one who considers for a moment the nature of the apostolic commission, and of the extraordinary powers which the Saviour conferred in connection with it. What does it mean when the Lord declares that He has received all power in heaven and in earth, and upon the strength of this extraordinary power commissions His apostles to go forth into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature, baptizing in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and requiring all to submit to their authority on pain of condemnation? What does it mean when He promises to be with his Church alway, even unto the end of the world, and that whatsover should be done on earth by it, should be ratified in heaven? These are certainly not simply figures of speech; but this language carries with it a most awfully solemn significance and force, not for the Apostles and their age only, but for all succeeding generations. This the writings of the Apostles and the history of the Church prove beyond a doubt, and it is, therefore, a fact that admits of no controversy, that Christ has vested a power in His Church, which, in some way, is intended to be the in fallible warrant of the successful accomplishment of its mission, no matter what men may think of the manner in which this power is brought to bear. Yet the mode in which it was first communicated, was certainly not based on the democratic principle, or on the principle of popular intervention and mediation. Like the Mosaic dispensation, it came directly from God, through the mediation of His only begotten Son, by whom it was conferred upon a select number of men who exercised it without regard to the popular will, and suffered it to be exercised by others only where it had been communicated in a lawful and orderly way. It always descended to the people through the lawfully constituted official organs of the Church, and never did it ascend from the Christian people to those who were to be their spiritual rulers and pastors; and it was this very principle of absolute divine authority, which always stood above and ruled over the will of the people, that maintained the unity and secured the success of the Church in spite of all the vicissitudes of time, and the enmity and persecution of the world.

Divine and extraordinary power, strictly controlled by ecclesiastical unity, explains the secret of the success of the Apostles, and of the Church in their days. The exercise of this power in the performance of supernatural or miraculous works had much to do with the influence they wielded; but the grand secret of this supernatural power lies still further back: it is grounded in the mystical union of the Apostles with their glorified Lord, and in their union with each other in Christ as the infallible exponents and organs of the mysteries of the grand divine economy to which they belonged. A careful study of the teachings of the New Testament, and of the character and spirit of all the official acts of the Apostles cannot fail to convince us that this twofold union reigned supreme in the apostolic college and period, and that by this mysterious and irresistible force they brought men under their absolute spiritual sway. It was not simply their divine and extraordinary power *per se*, but this power exercised in the spirit of ecclesiastical unity that secured to them this extraordinary influence and success. Take, for instance, their pentecostal inauguration. Here thousands were converted and baptized in a single day! What was then the cause of this astonishing success? We are told that they were all with one accord in one place, and that suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, filling them all with the Holy Ghost, so that they began to speak with other tongues. Here then we have one part of the secret of the phenomenon—they were endowed with power from on high. But now the sacred penman goes on to say that this pentecostal scene was maliciously interpreted by some, while others wondered what it meant, and that; therefore, the Apostles rose up and, by the mouth of Peter, showed the cause, the nature, and the design of what was passing. The people, hearing this, uttered an unanimous testimony, being based on the prophecies of the Old Testament and accompanied by the clearest evidences of supernatural power; they were pricked in their heart and cried out: "Men and brethren, What shall we do?" Take then these two sides of the phenomenon together, and you have a true solution of the mysterious problem it proposes. On the one hand, you will find the Apostles in the possession of powers that come directly from Heaven; and on the other, you will find them bringing these powers to bear in the same direction:—here lies the secret of their success.

This pentecostal miracle forms properly the ground and starting point of the Church, and must consequently be taken as the norm of the subsequent official career of the Apostles. For this reason it is quite natural that we should find them every where occupying the same high ground, and exercising the same extraordinary powers in the same spirit of absolute unity and agreement. They are no longer the recipients simply of divine powers and prerogatives; but from henceforth they are the organs through which these are communicated and confirmed, and their authority is thus made the relative foundation of the Church. Whether at Jerusalem, or in Samaria; whether at Antioch, or in Cesarea; whether at Ephesus, or at Philippi—all must bend under the sway of their supernatural authority. Whether they bless or curse, their power is all the same. By the laying on of their hands the Holy Ghost falls upon many; others drop dead at their feet, or are struck blind. They make kings and governors tremble on their thrones; angels and earthquakes deliver them from prison. Hence men are every where amazed, or alarmed, and many cry out: "What shall we do?" The answer is every where the same! Such united power and testimony cannot fail to produce extraordinary results, and to bring about lasting and world-wide effects.

But there is indeed no difference of opinion among professedly orthodox Christians as regards the supernatural powers and prerogatives of the Apostles, or of the Church in the apostolic period. This is rather considered a fundamental part of evangelical orthodoxy, as that reigns at the present day; but the historical significance of the fact is not understood in the same way. Every sectary in the land may talk loudly about the miracle-working power of the Apostles and madly prate concerning the influence of the Holy Spirit on them, while he scoffs at the sacramental bonds and ecclesiastical ties that bound the apostolic college together, and guaranteed to them the possession and efficacy of their extraordinary powers. It is not the fact, accordingly, as such, but the historical continuity of it, in its proper churchly and sacramental sense, that constituted the point of difference. All theology, however, that ignores the Church, either in the days of the Apostles or afterwards, cannot stand the test of the most superficial biblical exegesis; and it is evidently too shallow and blind to bear the test of history in any sense. The Apostles themselves were called to their office in an orderly way, and they entered upon the discharge of its functions according to laws and ordinances previously laid down. Self-will and individual caprice were never made or allowed to become the law of their apostleship; but the will of Christ, as that was expressed through the mind of the apostolic college as a whole, controlled them each in his individual sphere. Hence Peter was called to account for entering into the houses of the uncircumcised and baptizing them, and only the fact that he had acted according to the Lord's own special revelation, who also had accompanied his doings with the ordinary special divine blessing, was considered satisfactory in the case. And the subsequent decree of the apostles, elders, and Church at Jerusalem, relative to the baptism of the uncircumcised was, as a matter of course, based on the same principle of absolute ecclesiastical unity and agreement; for to whatever law or democratic standard we may choose to bring down the ecclesiastical polity of the New Testament, as that reigned in the days of the Apostles, its fundamental principle of strict unity and implied obedience cannot be denied. No sectarian or party interest, of any kind, was suffered to sever the bonds of that supreme authority, which settled and ruled the faith and the ordinances of the Church. Any attempt to break up this unity, or to take away the ruling power of this authority would have been visited with the awful anathema of the Apostles; no matter whether the attempt would have been made in the form of schism, or of heresy. It needs indeed but little acquaintance with the history of the apostolic discipline, to see that such was its prevailing distinctive character and spirit.

But even as regards this point (though some deny the absolute unity and authority of the Church in the apostolic age) there would be no serious difference of opinion, provided only that the matter would be allowed to rest here, and no historical account be made of it in a binding sense. If, however, the same power and the same claims are understood to be vested in the Church at any succeeding period of its history, it must be in a sense sufficiently gnostic and vague to be brought successfully into the service of any scheme, no matter how radical, heterodox, or wild it may be. To make the authority of the Church absolute in any sense; to entrust to her the keys of the kingdom of heaven, by the power of which salvation is really granted or denied, would be simply giving the signal for a general war of popular indignation; the tocsin would be rung and all hands would rush to arms to bring the daring monster to the ground. We have no desire to fly directly in the face of this blind humor of the age; we simply present this matter as a historical fact lying at the bottom of apostolical Christianity, and as furnishing the only reliable criterion of its success. Right or wrong, the Apostles stood on the ground of absolute ecclesiastical unity, and this was the law by which they ruled and conquered. And what reasonable or biblical ground have we to confine this law, with its special divine immunities and prerogatives, either to the persons or the age of the Apostles, or to any other limited period of the history of the Church? The fact, to be of any satisfactory account, must be lasting and historical; it must embody itself in an actual ecclesiastical economy, fully adapted to its own broad supernatural powers, to make itself really felt and respected in the bosom of society. Any thing short of this will leave it at the mercy of the ebbs and flows of popular passion and caprice, and the Saviour's promise of continual and never failing presence with the Church is thus turned into a monstrous lie. All the acts and teachings of Christ and his Apostles concerning the Church, point to the future. There is no law of limitation laid down in any place, with respect to any particular period of ecclesiastical power and jurisdiction. The same order of things is to be continual, according to all the facts in the premises, even unto the end of the world, at least as regards the nature, the economy and the ruling spirit of the Church. Unity and authority forever;—whatever comes in conflict with this principle is abnormal and wrong.

In order that no one may be justified in holding that this assumption rests on no historical or biblical basis, we will proceed still further to state the ground on which it is based. It would indeed be an easy matter to furnish endless quotations from the writings of the Apostles, and the New Testament generally, that would at once place our subject in a clear and tangible light; yet for the sake of brevity and a more scientific and logical view of the sacramental and churchly tone of the Gospel, we shall simply present some of the ruling ideas of these writings, with a view of bringing out clearly their sense in regard to the question in hand.

Take, for instance, the Epistles of Paul. He constantly represents the Church under the figure of an actual organic body. This idea reigns more particularly in those Epistles in which he enters into a full discussion of Christian doctrine, as that to the Romans and the first to the Corinthians, and it therefore gives color and tone to his mode of theological thinking. If we take up the twelfth chapter of either of these two Epistles, in which the idea of the body is more fully developed, we will perceive that it embraces a twofold character, viz: First, the union of both Jews and Gentiles, through faith and baptism, into one visible and actual ecclesiastical organization, by the laws, or ordinances and functions of which all are to be controlled; and secondly, the cheerful exercise of all individual gifts and graces, within the sphere or bosom of this economy, for the purpose of promoting all the interests belonging thereto. That the Apostle is to be taken in this realistic sense is evident from the fact, that he presents the same idea in this very form in the Epistle to the Ephesians. Here our ascending Lord is made to build his Church on the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, and to establish various official functions in its bosom, which were of course already involved in the foundation on which it was made to rest, all for the purpose of gathering and uniting and perfecting the saints, and guarding them against the cunning craftiness and sleight of men full of error and unbelief. It will require no small measure of ingenuity to explain away the churchly and sacramental bearing of this Epistle, and to fritter away thus its real historical significance for all past apostolic Christianity. Admit for a moment this unchurchly and unsacramental interpretation, and what shall we make then of the entire system of the Gospel, as presented by the Apostle! Why all his solemn warnings against schism and heresy? Why call upon

Timothy, his beloved Son in the Lord, with all the earnestness and love of a spiritual father, to hold fast the form of sound words delivered to him; to take heed unto himself and unto the doctrine, that he might save both himself and those who heard him? Why condemn the Corinthians, with such unmitigated severity for creating factions and divisions? Why hurl his awful anathema against every one, who would preach a gospel different from that preached by him and the rest of the Apostles, even though he were an angel from heaven, if after all his theology must be taken to be fully at par with our modern sect mind? No such narrow and low scheme of evangelical thinking can at all do justice to the spirit and mind of the great Apostle of the Gentiles. It would turn all his most profound doctrines and solemn warnings into empty and pompous oriental verbosity, and involve the entire scheme of salvation by grace in spiritual obscurity and vagueness. Only when we suffer the Apostle's idea of the Church to reign, in all its actual historical reality and sacramental force, are we capable of doing justice to his threats, warnings and promises; for without such a historical and sacramental basis to rest upon the whole field of biblical exegesis will be left without a compass, and without a guide.

Peter would fain build tabernacles not alone; but he builds an holy temple unto the Lord; and contrary to the nature of things he builds it of *lively stones.* He chooses an holy priesthood and a peculiar people, all tied together of course by the living constitution and the laws which necessarily characterize and govern such order or economy throughout the wide domain of natural, social or moral being. This spiritual organism embraces strangers scattered throughout different provinces and countries, and includes the same national complexions with those to whom Paul wrote; yet they are all under one law and constitute but one organism, or else the analogy would not be true. A temple is a product of art, harmonious and symmetrical in all its parts; and although that of Peter is built of lively stones, it is still real and material, since otherwise we would miss the analogy of the stone. A nation, though peculiar and holy, must have a constitution or organization which embraces all necessary laws, powers and functions for its government and protection ; and the one of which the Apostle speaks must, therefore, also have these constitutional distinctive characteristics, to bear out successfully the nature of the analogy. A priesthood can be of no real account without institutions, laws and ordinances suited to its peculiar character and aim. Here again, therefore, we are brought into the same strait in which we have been before, if we deny or ignore the authority and sacramental significance of the Church, and drag down its objective force into the sphere of a vague and unsacramental subjectivity ; for in that case we will not only be obliged to abandon the real sense of the metaphors used by the Apostle, but it will be hard for us to explain what he means when he speaks in such lofty terms of the blessed privileges of those who have been called to be part and parcel of this sacred organism, particularly when we bear in mind that he speaks of them as a body. What meaneth their election, in this general sense, to an *inheritance incorruptible and undefiled?* What meaneth it that all the strangers, scattered throughout so many provinces, were brought to the Shepherd and Bishop of their souls ? What is the sense of their sanctification by the Spirit unto obedience, and their sprinkling with the blood of Jesus Christ, if after all the idea of sacramental grace has nothing to do with Peter's gospel ? or if the principle of ecclesiastical unity and authority is but a notion that may be dispensed with at will and pleasure ? The plainest literal sense of the Scriptures is easily overlooked, when prejudice and party spirit run high. If this were not the case it would be impossible to know how the writings of the Apostles could have ever been forced into the service of theological ideas and systems, which are as purely visionary and dualistic as those of the early Gnostics ever were, at least as far as the nature and significance of the Church are concerned. No system of biblical interpretation that ignores the Church as the proper sacramental medium of human salvation, can do justice to the broad sacramental ideas that every where meet us in the New Testament. The language of Peter and Paul is quite too strong, to suit any such low conception. They proceed throughout on the ground that the economy of saving divine grace, as realized in the bosom of the Church, is the only proper spiritual home and safety of the soul, and that this economy is, therefore, necessarily governed by the strictest principles of organic unity. Strike this feature from the plan of salvation, as presented in their writings, and it must fall into atoms.

John is sometimes called the ideal Apostle on account of his mystical and genial spirit, by virtue of which he at last brings all the various conflicting religious interests and opinions together and makes them repose harmoniously on the bosom of love. Yet if we had nothing by which to judge the character of his religious thinking, save his sharp distinctions between truth and error, light and darkness, the world and the Church, this would be sufficient to prove that he had no manner of sympathy with either the Gnostic or the Rationalistic tendencies of his age. Although he is wholly governed by love, this love is turned into holy indignation when schism or heresy come in his way. Hence he was perhaps more exclusive than either of the other Apostles; for when he exhorted the faithful to mutual love, he demanded that they should not greet those, bid them God speed, or receive them into their houses, who denied that Christ had come in the flesh. And as a criterion of soundness in the faith, he lays down obedience to the teachings of the Apostles, declaring that he who would not hear them was not of God. This is in all conscience plain enough in every way, to make out the strongest case of necessary absolute ecclesiastical unity and authority; and if our Apostle, therefore, is not as logical and didactic as Paul, or as practical and clear as Peter in the presentation of Gospel truth, it can certainly not be laid to his charge that he has not done full justice to its exclusive churchly, mystical and sacramental character. Just think of the sacerdotal prayer of our great High Priest, recorded in the seventeenth chapter of his Gospel! Here the Saviour pleads with His Heavenly Father for the unity of the Church, and such a unity too as may be seen by the world, that the world may believe that the Father has sent Him. He prays not for the world as such; but for them whom the Father has given him out of the world, and for those who through them would believe. Has all this nothing to do with the Church as the medium of saving grace? Is there no distinction made here between the united sacramental host of God's covenant people, and those who are on the outside of this covenant? The absolute unity of the Church and its absolute necessity as the bearer of salvation to the world is as strongly set forth, in this prayer of our Lord, as language can make it; and he who reposed so often on His bosom was not forgetful of his Master's mind, but he joins in all the plentitude and power of Christian love with the rest of the Apostles in vindicating and enforcing the claims of Christ's kingdom in the earth. The Church in all its conflicts, trials, sufferings; its joys and victories, is the theme of his apocalyptic visions: now he clothes her in the sad habiliments of mourning and sheds bitter tears over her reverses; and now he decks her in all the brilliant attire of an expectant Bride, or encircles her brow with the glowing insignia of an exultant victor. She is never lost, though often oppressed. In the midst of her trials and weaknesses, she is the home and the mother of the saints; for He who has said, "Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain they are retained," will never fail to keep His word. Hence blessed is he who entereth into this heavenly city; "for without are dogs and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie." Notwithstanding the spiritual and supernatural character of the Church, therefore, it is still real, historical and sacramental, and forms an actual concrete *jure divino* constitution over against mere nature on the one hand, and all mere spirit on the other. The contemplative turn of mind of the disciple whom Jesus loved, was particularly suited to grasp the idea in this real and mystical sense; since, with him, the *Word made flesh* was the fundamental norm of all religious thinking.

Taking now the Gospel in its integrity, as we find it recorded in the New Testament, we cannot possibly come to a satisfactory solution of its ruling genius without allowing, in the fullest sense, the historical continuity of the authority and of the sacramental significance of the Church. The apostolic commission admits of no other solution. According to this sacred charter the Gospel shall not only be spread or preached as a mere doctrine; but it necessarily involves a system of spiritual functions and powers, that is fully adequate to the aims and purposes of the economy of grace. The promise: "And lo! I am with you *alway*, even unto the end of the world," forbids us to confine it, in any sense, to the Apostles, to their age, or to any other limited period of ecclesiastical history;—the force of the commission must be just as comprehensive and as lasting as the Church itself, to make it of real account. We find no hint in the New Testament that the power to loose and to bind; or the power of the keys shall ever be taken from it. Indeed that would amount to a complete destruction or nullification of the divine supernatural character of the Church itself, and turn its ordinances and sacraments into sham. This explains the reason why the Apostles were so very jealous of its authority, and so unanimously and zealously guarded its unity; why they demanded faith not in Christ alone, but also in the divine character and mission of the Church, "which is His body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all," in the bosom of which men can alone realize the blessings of the grace of God; why they rejoiced so heartily that the Gentiles were no longer excluded from the covenanted mercies of the God of Abraham, but were now united into one body with Israel by faith and baptism into Christ, and were thus brought to the Shepherd and Bishop of their souls and to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled. In this spirit and in this power went the Apostles and Evangelists forth into all the world, conquering and to conquer. We have the results before us to this day. Had they simply proclaimed the Gospel as a doctrine, and in doing so lacked unity and divine power, they would not only have failed to produce such lasting and worldwide results, but their teachings would long since have shared the fate of all mere human productions. But they proclaimed and founded an actual, living, supernatural, historical economy of saving divine grace in the bosom of society; and by the special care of Heaven its institutions and functions have been perpetuated a blessing to the world, even down to the present generation.

It is a fact worthy of serious regard that the force of the principle of absolute divine ecclesiastical authority enabled the Church to achieve her most glorious victories, both in the field of missions, and of evangelical or theological culture, Christian life or worship. This is a fact, we are aware, which does not meet with general approbation; history, however, will have matters its own way in spite of the prejudices of men. The Patristic period was more prolific in the symbolical settlement of Christian doctrine than any other period of the Christian era; it has produced liturgical treasures* that surpass every thing that has since been produced in the same sphere; its missionary operations met with extraordinary success, both among the Jews and Gentiles; and its creations in the form of Christian charity and benevolence challenge the regard of all the world, especially when we consider that all these achievements were made in spite of poverty and persecution. In a word, it is a period of extraordinary extensive and intensive development in the history of Christ's kingdom in the world, and justly stands as a historical basis for succeeding ages. All its achievements or productions must however at last fall back on the ground of absolute ecclesiastical unity and authority, as that lies clearly at the bottom of its entire policy and forms the ruling principle of its life. The idea of the Church, in its proper mystical and sacramental sense, enters into all its ecumenical creeds; it rules in all the decrees and canons of its ecumenical councils; it lies at the bottom of its spirit of martyrdom, its veneration for relics, worship of the saints, and its prayers for the dead. All its prelatical and hierarchical predilections spring from it, and its ideas of sacramental and covenantal grace can have no other legitimate basis. The idea is not accidental, therefore, and attached as an appendix simply of some sort, in an outward and loose way, to the theological thinking and piety of the age; but it rules throughout as its very animus and life, and constitutes the very marrow of its religious zeal. Besides, its dread of excommunication and its cheerful submission to a most rigid ecclesiastical discipline, especially in the restoration of the lapsed, show clearly that the religious mind of the period lay in the direction of the sacramental unity and authority of the Church. Its power and authority were not allowed to rule outside of its own legitimate and properly constituted ecclesiastical bounds and organization. Its ecumenical councils never dreamed of tolerating a lawful rival by the side of their decisions and decrees; but the right of spiritual jurisdiction was strictly confined to the bosom and polity of the one holy catholic apostolic Church. Accordingly the voice of the Church, when thus officially expressed, was received as the very voice of the Holy Scriptures and of the Holy Ghost, who spake through it as the proper infallible organ and medium of divine truth. Now all this may be put down as a wholesale departure from the truth, and as the beginning of the reign of anti-Christ ; yet the fact cannot be denied that such was the religious habit of the age, and that all the Greek and Latin fathers were governed by it. Just think of Athanasius, or Chrysostom, or Cyprian, or Augustine, or any other hero of Patristic orthodoxy, placing himself on an equal footing, in a religious and churchly sense, with the heretics and schismatics of his day. It is well known that heretics were always condemned as having no part in the kingdom of God, simply on the ground of their violation of the law of absolute Christian unity and agreement. It would indeed be an easy matter to cite any amount of historical data in proof of this assertion, from the annals of Church history and from the writings of the fathers themselves ; but such a course would lead us far beyond the proper limits of this article, and it is besides not strictly connected with the object we have here in view. We assume the fact as beyond all reasonable doubt and refer to it, in this connection, only as the fundamental cause of the triumphs of the Church, in those early days, over Judaism and Paganism on the outside, and over heresy and schism in its bosom. No one acquainted with Church history will pretend to deny, that the unity of the Church was then the rock on which all the waves of persecution were broken, and on which all heretical and schismatical rival movements and organizations were dashed to pieces. The controversy lay always between this supernatural constitution, regarded as a historical fact always present in the world, and a simply human movement gotten up on the outside of it as its unlawful rival ; in this spirit of uncompromising unity, based on the principle of absolute divine right and authority, lay the grand secret of its strength over against all its foes, whether these came from within or from without.

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* The liturgical question, which is now beginning to make its importance once more properly felt and regarded, can never be rightly understood when separated from the consciousness of the living, historical, sacramental reality of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church. This will clearly appear when we come to inquire why the Patristic age was so peculiarly productive in this direction; for then the Church lived and moved pre-eminently in the atmosphere of an intuitional and joyous faith in its own sacramental realities and mysteries. With dialectic skill it settled the Creed and defined its dogmas, and then, in the joyous and reverential consciousness of being the sacramental organ and medium of the Holy Spirit, it turned the Creed into liturgical worship—into prayer, and praise, and glory to the Triune God—into commutual benedictions and blessings of the saints.

Before the Church can again worship in the form, spirit and language of the Fathers, will it not be necessary that she get back to the same whole-souled *bona fide* trust in her own historical and neverfailing reality, aa the one, holy, catholic and apostolic channel and bearer of sacramental and saving divine grace? Would such return not lead to living historical sympathy with the hypostatical mystery of the *incarnation*, and restore the charismata of liturgic, or holy religious art?

This principle of unity was then not based on the ground of voluntary agreement, on the part of any number of persons or religious organizations. The Church was not regarded as a mere idea, or principle, or Gnostic phantom, which required nothing more than the mind of the world to actualize itself in the way of a reliable ecclesiastical economy; but it was taken to be a positive creation coming directly from God and bearing with it to the end of time, a supernatural power, under a most real and outward historical form. And because the Church was thus held to be, outwardly, as well as inwardly, divinely instituted, it hurled its awful anathemas with equal severity against those who created divisions and left its communion, and against those who, while they were yet in its bosom, held and propagated dangerous errors. History records the failure of all the early sects, while it recounts with exultation the victories of the object of their unlawful rivalry and hatred. Whence this difference? Does it not lie in the *jure divino* character of the Church, and in the awful significance and force of its authority?

During the Middle Age, it is commonly allowed, the principle of unity had still more absolute sway than in the Patristic period. The papacy then reigned in all its glory and wielded an unbounded influence, both in religion and politics. Ecclesiastical power was now more centralized, and instead of the decrees and decisions of councils, the edicts, decretals and bulls of the popes reigned supreme. Much may be said of the darkness and the superstitions of the age; of the ambition, the avarice, and the tyranny of the sovereign pontiffs; of the ignorance and moral degradation of the people; of the corruption of religion and manners; of the barbarity and brutality of society; of the vices and scandals of the clergy; and of many other evils and wrongs that characterize the period. Yet these very facts, which no historian would pretend to deny, are the surest criterion of the never failing power of the Church, and of its fundamental principle of absolute unity. Whatever may be our opinion of the papal hierarchy, and in whatever light we may choose to regard its influence generally, it is clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that the authority of the Church, with its tremendous centralizing power and its powerful ecclesiastical organization, was the only successful lever of Christian civilization during this commonly called "dark age" of our era. Political power had then no existence, or it was at the mercy of a lawless horde of barbarians. Instead of reposing on the strong arm of civil government, or resting under the panoply of Christian civilization, the Church was cast on her own resources, forced to take the power into her own hands, and to give laws and civilization to the world. The power of the Church every where awed the barbarians into obedience, and gradually the chaotic mass was reduced to order and out of medieval barbarism came forth the glorious fabric of modern European civilization. Its spiritual conquests are however also of the most extraordinary character, particularly as regards the outward extension of the domain and influence of Christianity. The missionaries of the cross carried the gospel to the north and west and founded its institutions in the heart of Europe, where Christianity has since held the most absolute sway and produced its noblest fruits. Italy, Spain, France, England, Germany and Scandinavia were all added to the confraternity of Christian powers, and became the very centre and source of the future history of the Church. The simple fact of the Christianization and civilization of the German nations, who have since played the most important part in the history of the world and the Church, should be sufficient to screen this period from the wholesale charge of unmitigated ignorance, corruption, and oppression. It was indeed inferior to that which preceded it, in social refinement, theological scholarship, and civil power; for the ruthless hand of barbarism saved neither the literary treasures of the Church, nor the arts and institutions of civilization. All was chaos and confusion, and society universally showed signs of complete social and political dissolution. Whence then came the power that brought this medley and chaotic mass, this bedlam of national and religious barbarisms into order, and gave it a new life and new energy? There was no moral, centralizing and civilizing power sufficient for the work, save that of the Church and her powerful arm. Her irresistible authority—her uncompromising unity has no doubt done the work. She was the only source of law, order, learning and civilization amid the widespread barbarism of the age; for she alone had a powerful organization, based on the impregnable principle and consciousness of absolute unity, and she alone was in possession of letters and religion. Her power, with all its real or supposed corruptions and abuses, was therefore the only hope of the age; still this constituted the only warrant of the gigantic undertakings and colossal productions in the sphere of missions, of art, of cultus, and of civilization. No apology is offered for any of its sins, its abuses, or its errors; it is enough that justice should be done to its merits.

Modern Protestantism makes no merit of outward ecclesiastical unity, at least in the absolute *jure divino* sense in which it was always taken by the Catholic Church. It boasts of a more free and more spiritual union which, while it binds together all true and orthodox Christians in the bonds of faith and Christian fellowship, makes wide room for individual private opinion, and for separate and mutually irresponsible denominational interests. Moving preëminently in the sphere of individual subjectivity and giving decided prominence to the spiritual idea of the Church, it is in constant danger of running out into open hostility to all objective ecclesiastical authority, and of making shipwreck at last on the shoals of complete ecclesiastical disintegration. Considering its hyper-spiritualistic and hyper-critic dogmatizing habit which controls it to a fearful extent, we need not be surprised at its wholesale denunciations of medieval Catholicism, and all that savors of the same hightoned prelatical and hierachical character in the Patristic age, as a diabolical caricature simply of the true idea of Christian unity. We have nothing to do here with the question whether Protestantism is not a higher or better form of Christianity, than that from which it sprang; or whether it is not at least a necessary phase in the history of Christ's kingdom in the earth, and has at least a negative mission in working out the great problem of its final consummation. But while we leave the reader to decide that matter for himself, we desire to place the subject before us in its true philosophico-historical light with a view simply to expose plainly the real cause of the failure of certain measures and movements, gotten up for the purpose of ecclesiastical coöperation and Christianity on Protestant ground. It is however being well understood, by those who have made themselves acquainted with the spirit of history, that the social, political and religious wants of one particular age are not just of the same sort with those of another, and that even the same age may necessarily have its own peculiar national and sectional institutions and peculiarities; and that much allowance must be made for faults and imperfections all around. Accordingly it would be perfectly safe to predict that the rampant anti-popery and radical democratic anti-hierarchical fanaticism of the nineteenth century will, sooner or later, be obliged to lower its keynote considerably, when it comes to compare the merits of the present with those of Christian antiquity. Besides, the day may not be far distant when the principle of Protestantism will be put more severely to the test than it has ever been before, especially as regards its relation to the political, social and moral questions of the day. Thus far its centrifugal and atomistic tendencies have always been checked or controlled by social or political conservatism—by the arm of civil government, or the force of Christian civilization. In Europe it has had its powerful State establishments; and, in this country, though not in direct connection with the Government, it still rests under the shadow of a civilization, the fundamental principles of which are much older than itself, though these may have been modified and practically carried out to a more satisfactory extent. But take away now the political and social bottom on which it rests; destroy or nullify the power of civil government; let society run wild and introduce all the horrors of barbarism and of civil war; in a word, introduce a state of affairs similar to that which existed in

Europe after the breaking up of the Graeco-Romanic civilization of the Roman empire by the eruption of the northern barbarians, then it will be seen whether it will have strength enough, with the principle of private judgment at its bottom, to bring this chaotic and fermenting mass into order and to lay broad and deep the foundation of civil and religious prosperity. Circumstances do most emphatically alter cases, and it is not very likely at least that, under the above circumstances, any measures of religious compromise or eclecticism, based on the principle of private judgment, would answer the purpose. Political economists know very well that popular government must rest on the moral and law-abiding sense of the masses, and that whenever this is wanting self-government must cease. It is, however, a notorious fact that, in continental Europe, especially in Germany, nothing prevents Protostantism from springing up into endless divisions and distractions but the authority and the power of the secular governments. In the United States it would be somewhat of a riddle to tell around what standard it would rally, in case of the dissolution of the Union,* or the general breaking up of the civil and social structure on which it rests. We do not say, let it be borne in mind, that it will ever be forced, either on this or on the other side of the Atlantic, to settle this question practically—our hope and prayer is that God may in mercy prevent this fearful issue; yet may we not be permitted to inquire whether it would be equal to the task, provided such an issue should be forced upon it at last! It is the easiest matter in the world to dismiss this whole subject with a contemptuous sneer, and in the spirit of self-sufficiency to disavow all fears of any such disastrous results. Just so it is easy to boast of great heroism in time of peace; but quite another matter it is to fight the actual battles of a bloody war. In Europe God only knows how soon the fearful struggle will commence; and in America signs of decay and dissolution are palpable in all directions. Time will show what will be the issue.

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* A short time ago we had a conversation with an intelligent gentleman concerning the future prospects of our Government, who is no professor of religion and seemingly does not make much account of the Church in its proper sacramental sense; yet he knows how to appreciate its influence on the social and political interests of the country. He expressed his fears in behalf of the American Union in view of the rising and still increasing fanatical sectionalism of the American people, and most positively declared that the Pulpit was the only hope of our country; "for," said he, "if you ministers of the Gospel keep aloof from partisan sectional politics and use your influence to allay the sectional jealousies of our people, the Union will be safe; but if the Pulpit will become universally sectional, you will cause the dissolution of the Union and drive us all into infidelity and civil war." Such a confession, from such a man, came home to our mind with no ordinary force, not because the argument was at all new or strange. but because intelligent religious indifferentists are forced to acknowledge that the Church alone is able to carry our land safely through its impending social and political crisis. Yet when we look around and observe the blustering and vituperative spirit of many of our most popular American clergy, and the rampant sectional rationalism of our American religious Press, we have abundant cause to entertain serious apprehensions as to whether this only source of safety will not fail in the end. If the foundations of sacramental ecclesiastical unity had not been so universally shaken and the sacred trust of the Pulpit had not been so extensively degraded into mere rostrum flippancy, there would indeed be no just cause for serious alarm; but just in proportion as our American Protestantism has been carried away from the sacred moorings of a churchly

Yet our subject has decidedly a religious significance. Ecclesiastical unity has much to do with the success of the Gospel. It is the mission of Christianity to unite and govern the whole race, as well as to sanctify and save the individual. The history of the three last centuries shows that religious schisms and distractions are not calculated to promote the success of the missionary operations of the Church, nor to give a proper churchly direction to Christian charity, and to the intellectual development of society, although individual activity and liberality may be much

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faith is it ready to rely on an arm of flesh, and to carry us headlong into the whirlpool of social and political ruin.

We have no fears as regards the final success of the Church; for Christ is with her in spite of all the fanatical, heretical and schismatical aberrations that afflict her at the present day, and he will overrule even the wrath of man for good; yet it is as clear as the mid day sun that, before she can take proper and satisfactory care of all the intellectual, social and political interests of our country and of the world, as it now stands, she must use less slang and ultra-radical dogmatism and more fervor and unction; before she can sit and rule Queen of the nations, she must come back, as an humble and modest bride, into holy wedlock with her glorified Bridegroom, and clothe herself with the pure garment of righteousness and sacramental unity.—Church or no Church is emphatically *the* question of the age, and American soil is the battle-ground on which the solemn problem of its relation to the future civil and religious liberties of our race is to be decided.

increased by them; for in the sphere of missions less progress has been made during this than during any previous period of time, of the same length; and charity, as well as science and education or intellectual culture, have, necessarily been given over, in a great measure, into the hands of the world. The fundamental evil of all sectism, is the want of the power of centralization; the conflict of capricious party interests neutralizes and destroys its influence, and prevents it from bringing it to bear in the same direction. Having no solid historical bottom to stand upon and no consistent and unwavering policy to control its efforts, it can never, in a positive and satisfactory way, settle the interests either of faith, or of civilization. The colossal productions of the Church during the Patristic and Medieval periods, in the form of dogma, government, cultus and art; its gigantic conquests in the form of missions and civilization, and more especially its astounding success in the creation of an unprecedented scheme of charity and human emancipation, could never have been the work of a sectarian habit of mind. It was ecclesiastical unity and its corresponding principle of authority that did the work.—The final consummation of the kingdom of God in earth is evidently near at hand. The signs of the times point to the speedy conversion of all the nations of the world. Yet how little is the Church, in its present distracted state, capable of commanding the necessary force to bring the yet remaining gentile nations into the fold of Christ? Gigantic missionary undertakings, sustained by the most abundant means and resources, and equipped with all the necessary spiritual and ecclesiastical power, will be required to secure success. Hence unity and coöperation at home are the only reliable guarantee of success abroad; for without these, though the means may be at hand, they must fail to produce a satisfactory result for want of a policy that gives them positiveness and aim. And even at home, amid all the associations and hallowed influences of Christian institutions, thoughts, manners and habits, the principle of sect and schism takes away the power from the Church to settle peaceably and satisfactorily the most important doctrinal and social questions of the age. The temperance, or the slavery, or any other question, may tear it into pieces, if circumstances are favorable and passion run sufficiently high, and divide it into irreconcilable sectional factions, with none to rule over and to control them. It is, therefore, not a matter of surprise, that some deep feelings of dissatisfaction and of alarm should begin to heave the social bosom, and to grate upon the better feelings of the Christian world, and that a decided tendency toward objectivity and unity should make itself felt. It is, however, at the same time being felt, that it is not likely that a satisfactory and abiding state of Christian or ecclesiastical unity can be secured on the basis of mutual religious compromise, or on the principle of private judgment in its unlimited or unrestricted sense. Hence some fall back into the arms of Rome, while others are anxiously waiting for the special interference of Heaven, either by an extraordinary effusion of the Holy Spirit or the personal appearance of our glorified Lord. No matter, therefore, in which of these two directions the Church will move—both involve the giving up of the principle of private judgment and submission to absolute ecclesiastical or divine authority; and thus the movement is made to carry with it a *jure divino* force, which, say what we may, is the only reliable warrant of its final success. It is not for us to say what course the Church shall or will take; we will leave that to God, and to history. But in view of all the philosophico-historical facts in the premises, a decided movement towards unity and authority is an absolute historical necessity of the age, and it will make itself felt in spite of all that may be said or done to the contrary. But though we can neither prevent it or bring it about, by our own wisdom and strength, let our prayers still be sent up to Him who sitteth upon the throne, for the unity and the glorification of the Church, that the kingdoms of the world may speedily become the kingdoms of our Lord, that all nations, and tongues, and kindreds, and powers, and principalities may unite in giving glory to Him who ruleth and reigneth forever and ever.

Selinsgrove, Pa. I. E. G.

ART. V.—ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF BUDDHISM.*

Max Duncker. *Die Indier* (Geschichte des Alterthums). II Band, Berlin, 1853.

Dr. George Weber. *Die Arier am Indus* (Allgemeine Weltgeschichte). I Band, Leipzig, 1857.

Carl F. Kœppen. *Die Religion des Buddha and ihre Entstehung.* Berlin, 1857.

It is a remarkable fact, that although India, with its early civilization and commerce, its sacred language and highly developed religious system, has exercised so great an influence on the progress of other nations in Asia and Europe, the study of its history and literature, should, nevertheless, have been neglected so long, and that it is only the researches of the present day, which have begun to throw some light on this eminently interesting, but hitherto unknown subject.

This, indeed, may be said likewise with regard to other regions of classical antiquity—for our time is decidedly the most enterprising and successful of eras, not only by the happy application of science to mechanics and arts, but by the most profound historical investigations which bring back by-gone ages to our astonished eye with a clearness of outline and brilliancy of coloring of which our ancestors had no idea a century ago.

Such have been the result of the excavations in Greece and Asia Minor which have enriched the museums of Europe with valuable inscriptions and curiosities of art, while the ingenious discoveries of Young, Champollion, and Lepsius have triumphantly unravelled the Egyptian hieroglyphics, that for thousands of years had remained a mystery to the most learned among Greeks and Romans and the fathers of the Church. Nor do we any longer study the history of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspes only from the tales of Herodotus, but from contemporary documents in the arrow-headed characters on the ruins of Persepolis through the ingenious interpretations of Col. Rawlinson and Prof. Westergaard. And the day may not be distant when the admirable Assyrian sculptures, with their numerous inscriptions from the palaces of Nineveh—now the ornament of the British museum in London—will add new and authentic commentaries to the sacred scriptures of the Old Testament.

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* This article, in the form of an Address, was delivered before tho Faculty and Students of Franklin and Marshall College, at the opening of the Winter Term, January, 7, 1858.

Yet our studies on Hindoostan are far more complete; for they are not limited to the decyphering of some names and titles of Egyptian Pharaohs—nor do we pore over the sacred books of the Hindoos with the doubtful look with which we still glance at the mysterious arrow-heads on the marble slabs from the palace of Semiramis and Sardanapalus. An entire, immense literature in the noblest of languages—the Sanscrit—lies before us; learned Brahmins can explain away every obscurity, and English, French or German translations, faithful and yet elegant, may now spare us the trouble and expense of visiting the Brahmin Seminary at Calcutta, or the phantastic Pagodas of Juggernauth.

That India, with its population of more than two hundred millions of souls, is the most beautiful and fertile country in the world, is well known, and for a spirited and faithful description of it, we must refer to the delightful volumes of Bishop Heber. We shall only state here, that the physical cause of the extraordinary serenity and splendor of the Indian sky—more transparent than our American atmosphere—is there the same as that which in Greece and Italy makes the American traveler exclaim with rapture: "Truly this is Paradise on earth!"

It is that India is protected on the north by the gigantic ridge of the snow-covered Himalayah, the highest mountain-chain on the globe, which keeps back the northern blasts from the sunny plain of Bengal, in the same manner as Mount Blanc in the Alps secures a genial temperature to the plains of Piedmont, and Mount Olympus, the cloud-capped foot-stool of Jove, guards that of Thessaly in Greece. And thus Hindoostan, being bordered on the west and east by mighty rivers, the Indus and Ganges, and on the south by the Indian Ocean, the regular tropical winds, called *monsoons*—sweeping in the rainy season from the sea north toward Himalayah, are in their turn stopped by this barrier of eternal glaciers and forced to discharge their genial rains on the intervening plains and table-lands, thus fertilizing the rich soil beneath the powerful influence of a tropical sun.

This at once accounts for the extraordinary variety and exuberant growth and brilliancy of the vegetation, and the strength and vivacity of animal life in India, which embraces the Flora and Fauna of all varieties of climate from the frozen cliffs of Iceland to the burning sands of Africa.

And here we start the important question: To what race then belongs that immense population of Hindoos, the ancestors of savage Sepoys—"those black demons in human shape"—say the English, "who torture with fierce delight and murder our gallant officers, their wives and children, and whom we now, by stern retribution, blow to atoms from the mouth of our cannon." Were they aboriginal Malays from the islands of the Indian Ocean, related on the west to the Negro races of Africa, or eastward to the islanders of the Pacific and the more distant inhabitants of the American continent?

This question is now decided. Only the lowest cast of the Sudras and the out-lawed and wandering Chandalas were relics of the early native Malays. The higher and ruling castes of the Hindoos, according to the sacred books of the Vedas, belonged to the great Caucasian race, and it is since this important historical fact has been fully ascertained that the Hindoos, as well as the Persians, have obtained the modern appellation of an Indo-Germanic, or better still, an Indo-European race. Thus the Hindoos, like so many of their kindred tribes in Europe, appeared for the first time in India as conquerors.

With this great event, the settlement of Caucasian tribes on the banks of the Indus, breaks the early dawn of Indian history.

The warlike nomadic hordes inhabiting the high tableland Paropamisus, between the Caspian Sea and the Indus, began early to descend to the richer pastures on the southern plains. The western Iranian hordes took a south-western direction toward the Persian gulf and became ancestors to the Medes and Persians, closely related by language and character to their north-Caucasian brethren, the Germans and Sclavonians in Europe. The more eastern nomades, on the contrary, who called themselves *Aryans* or Brave Warriors, crossed the river Indus and occupied the sandy, but well watered hill-country of Punjaub—the Land of Five Rivers—which afterwards was conquered by Alexander the Great and is now inhabited by the fanatic sec of the Seiks, the faithful subjects and allies of the British during the present mutiny in Bengal.

Thus the western Iranians in Persia (Iran) were separated by the high ridge of Elvend from the Semite race of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Chaldæans, Jews, Phenicians and Arabs on the west, and their eastern brethren, the Aryans, the present Hindoos, were by a dreary desert likewise separated from the charming banks of the Ganges and the exuberant plain of Bengal, with its dark-colored aboriginal inhabitants of Malayan blood.

Yet, the restless Aryans, a nation of the highest capacity, did not long remain on the out-skirts of the desert. Some of the most beautiful songs in the Vedas describe their yearning after the fine pastures beyond the sands; and soon, on the wings of victory, they swept along the base of Himalayah and pouncing upon the black faced barbarians on the Ganges, they carried all before them and secured their conquests.

After a protracted warfare of some centuries we find the Aryans extending their dominion eastward to the mouth of the Ganges on the distant bay of Bengal and south, across the hill-country of Decean into the beautiful peninsula, now the centre of the British empire in India.

The dusky native population was either exterminated with the sword or surrendered to the victorious Aryans; others fled to the mountains where they strove to sustain their independence. It is at this period of Indian history that we discover the origin of the castes and a division of classes, similar to that of Sparta, at the time of the invasion of the Peloponnesus by the Dorians in the twelfth century before our Saviour.

The chiefs, at the head of their soldiers, formed the caste of the Kshatrias, who, as feudal nobility, divided the land, but bowed humbly before the pure, abstemious Brahmins, the Beloved of Brahma, who as a mighty, well-organized priest-hood, held science, literature and religion, with its yet simple and innocent worship, in their powerful grasp—while they left agriculture, mechanical and commercial pursuits to the third caste—the Vaisyas. And what then became of the poor natives, who, like the Helots of Sparta, lay howling in the dust at the feet of their conquerors? They were permitted to live as a fourth disdained caste of the unhappy darkies, the Sudras, the serfs and menials of their masters. They were less persecuted, however, than the numerous bands of outlaws—Chandalas—who had sought refuge in the mountains, and as a poluted and abominable race were not even permitted to approach or touch any person of the higher castes. Many of these detested Chandalas are supposed to have fled from India, and entered Europe as wandering Gipsies, during the middle ages.

The relation in which these four castes stood to one another is thus expressed by the Brahmins: that the priest had sprung from the head of the god Brahma, the warrior (Kshatria) from his breast, the citizen (Vaisya) from his hips, and the Sudra from his feet.

Though the castes were separated by their peculiar privileges, their dress and religious observances, intermarriage between them could not be entirely prohibited. New subdivisions of castes were, therefore, formed by the children that sprung from those mixed connections, in the manner as the Parthenians of ancient Sparta, and the mulattoes and mestizoes of Spanish America. This likewise accounts for the greater number of seven or eight castes, into which the Greek historians of the Alexandrian era divide the Indian nation.

The Aryans or Inds, had now passed through their heroic era, like the People of God, at the time of the conquest of Canaan, and almost during the same period; for their settlement on the plains of Hindoostan and the brilliant development of their government, language and literature embrace the entire space between Moses the Prophet and David, the king of Jerusalem—or from the fifteenth to the tenth century before our Saviour.

Thus, on the beautiful banks of the Ganges the nomadic hordes from the Caucasus had now become a peaceful, agricultural people, divided into several flourishing states, under native princes, and protected by the ocean, the rivers, and the eternal snows of Himalayah against the invasions of their neighbors. Only one attack is recorded in those remote times, that of the Assyrian Queen, the great Semiramis, which, however, terminated with the entire overthrow of her myriads on the Indus, and secured the permanent independence of India—while the brisk commerce on the coasts of the peninsula, called the land of Ophir in the Old Testament, (1 Kings 9: 28; 10: 11,) brought the Hindoos in friendly relatious to the Phenicians—the bold and enterprising Americans of antiquity.

Europe lay still in a deep slumber, when India, the cradle of Oriental civilization, was already in full possession of an original literature which flourished with a growth of blossoms and fruits in science and arts, similar to the fertility of its tropical soil.

Different and highly cultivated were the languages spoken in India. Sanskrit was the sacred language of the Brahmins, and its alphabet of fifty-two letters was called the Deva Nagáry, or the writing of the gods. Its literature is one of the richest in the world, in almost every branch of theology, grammar, poetry and science, though it has now become defunct, like the classical languages of Greece and Rome. It can, however, still be recognized in the modern popular dialects of Cashmere—in the Bengalee and Hindostanee, in the same manner as we in the Italian and Spanish discover the roots of the Latin.

The ancient dialect of the Hindoos in common life was the Prakrit, that is, the *soft* tongue, which was used in lyric and dramatic poetry and still exists in ten different idioms throughout India—while on the other hand, a third ancient tongue, the Paly of Malayan original, the native speech of the vanquished Sudras, continued to flourish in the peninsula and became the sacred depository in which all the religious books and extensive theological literature of the Buddhists were written afterward at the time of the great schism in the Indian Church. Thus we have three ancient written languages in India, Sanskrit, Prakrit and Paly. Of these the Sanskrit has the most surprising affinity to the European languages, and may almost be called identical with the Latin, Greek, German, Scandinavian and Sclavonian dialects.

This sameness of vocabulary in thousands of roots, and of a grammar common to so many nations—extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean—evidently prove that they descend from one common source, now lost—or, that at a remote epoch, the people who spoke these kindred languages must have been connected by mutual ties of friendship and commercial intercourse of which we have no historical account, but which may be explained by the supposition that the nations of Europe *originally* emigrated from the western regions of Central Asia—and this perfectly agrees with the traditions of our sacred Scriptures. The Sanskrit is a language both harmonious and grave, with a just proportion of consonants and vowels, rich in terms, free and flowing in its pronunciation, possessing numerous cases, conjugations, tenses and particles, and may be compared to the most perfect and refined original tongues.*

Yet though the *Vedas*, the *Puranas* and the entire theology of the Brahmins, are written in this noble language, its principal ornament and glory are the great Epic Poems of this period, which we may justly compare to the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, or the celebrated Nibelungen Lied of the Germans. The first of these in eighteen cantoes and more than ten thousand verses, is the *Máha-Báratha*, or the "Great War," which celebrates a national event: the contest between two royal dynasties, the Kuree and Pandee, on the banks of the Jumna, about the possession of the City of Elephants, Hastinápura, the present city of Delhi, into which are introduced numerous episodes connected with the early traditions of the Hindoos.

The second poem is the *Ramayána*, describing the Aryan conquest of the peninsula. The hero, the Indian ulysses of this lively and brilliant Odyssey, is the young and cunning Rama, king of Oude, whose tender and beautiful wife Sita had been carried off by a giant king residing in the island of Lanka, the present Ceylon. After many phantastic events Rama is vanquished by the robber and takes refuge in the mountains of Deccan. There he forms an alliance with Hanumán, king of the monkeys, who with an army composed of myriads of apes, monkeys and baboons, throws a bridge across the sea from the mainland to the island of Ceylon. Thus supported, Rama kills the monster and, conquering the island, carries his beloved Sita back in triumph.

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* As it may be proper to give an idea of the striking affinity of the Sanskrit with the languages of Europe, and to prove how justly we call them Indo Germanic or Indo-European, we present here a few specimens of Sanskrit roots.

God is in Sanskrit *Devas;* in Persian and Russian *Div;* in Lithuanian *Dievas;* in Greek Θεος; in Latin *Deus.*

Man is in Sanskrit both *Viras* and *Manava*, which, of course, corresponds to the Latin *Vir* and our Anglo-Saxon *Man.*

Woman is in Sanskrit *Gani;* in Greek γυνη, γυναικα; in Danish *Kone*, and in Old English *Quean.*

Father is in Sanskrit *Pitar;* in Persian *Padar;* in Greek πατηρ; in Latin *Pater*, and so in all modern languages.

Mother in Sanskrit is *Matar;* Son is *Sunnus;* Daughter is *Duhitar;* Brother is *Bratar;* Sister is *Swasar*; Daugther-in-law is *Snusa;* in Latin *Nurus;* in German *Schnur;* Brow is *bru;* nose, *nasa;* tooth, *dantas;* head, *kapala; caput*; voice is *vac;* sun, *hailis,* ηλιος; moon, *masa;* star, *stara;* earth, *go,* γη; sea, *mirah;* Latin *mare;* water, *uda,* υδωρ; fire, *agnih;* Latin *ignis;* day, *dyu* and *dina;* night, *nisa, nakta;* winter *hima,*χειμων; Latin, *hiems;* yoke, *juga;* house, *damas,* δομος; milk, *mleko;* Danish, *melk,* etc. The same accordance we find in the adjectives, pronouns, numerals, verbs, particles and even in the construction of the syntax. Vide Manual of Comparative Philology by the Rev. W. B. Winning, M. A. Bedford. London: 1838. p. 52, et seqq.

The descriptions of battles, of love adventures, of manners and customs and of natural scenery in these poems are, as we have said, worthy of the brilliant inspirations of Homer, whom they preceded by two centuries. For they were composed from ancient songs and traditions by the great Indian poets, Viasa, the author of Maha-Báratha and Walmiky, the still more favored writer of Ramayana, who both lived between the eleventh and tenth century before Christ. Yet the form in which these poems originally were written is very different from that which has come down to us, having early been subjected to many alterations and additions by the Brahmins, who introduced a new mythology and a more complicated philosophy, such as had become indispensable for them after the sweeping religious reform of Buddha. This great reformer of India becomes now the subject of our investigation, and the astonishing results of the contest between two religious systems is the great point in Indian history at which we aim.

When we speak of the religion of the Hindoos, the reader at once presents to his imagination the monstrous idols of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, that unholy trinity, with numerous limbs, hideous features and obscene emblems which to this day disfigure the gorgeous temples of India. But this is entirely wrong in a historical point of view. These latter excrescences of a wild superstition and corrupt taste were later, by the craft and imperiousness of the Brahmins, substituted for the purer and more spiritual worship of earlier times and may properly be likened to the extravagance and absurd doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, when compared with the pure and venerable dogmas of the Gospel.

Brahma, in Sanskrit, is of the neuter gender, and signifies *prayer*. It represented the spirit or soul of the world, as a spiritual being, throning high above the clouds and directing the affairs of man, not directly, but by means of powers delegated, to the luminous constellations of the firmament. The Hindoo religion of the sacred Vedas was, therefore, a Sabaism taken from the bosom of nature.

Indra, the god of the glittering heavens, of the blue sky, the thunderer in the clouds, was the Jupiter optimus maximus of the Hindoo world, the greatest of their deities. Indra ruled the destinies of man, together with the mysterious Varuna, the Uranos or Universe, with Savitra, the Sun, Mitra, the Moon, Rudra, the Storm-god, and Agnis, the Fire-god—all surrounded and attended by legions of light-winged, benevolent Asvini, the sun beam spirits of morning—who fought the battle for the protection of man against the false Vritra, the demon of darkness and his army of devils—a worship evidently called forth like that of Ormuzd and Ahriman in the religion of the Persians, to represent the good and evil principle, the noble virtues and the wicked desires, which combat for mastery in the human heart.

To these pure and benign deities, twinkling from afar on the dark blue welkin, the pious Hindoo prostrated himself on the bank of his sacred river and offered up without temples or idols, innocent libations from the fragrant milk of the Soma root, a shrub which he gathered during the moon-light nights on the slopes of the mountains.

Yet soon a change came over the spirit of his dream! It is an historical fact, that none of the northern nations, who by conquest occupy new lands in the soft and enervating clime of the tropics, can long preserve the stern virtues and war-like prowess of the northmen. They become indolent, luxurious and uxorius. Such was the fate of the Ostrogoths in Italy, the Vandals in Africa, the Spaniards in Mexico, and two thousand years earlier that of the Aryans in India. The kings sought the recesses of their seraglio ;—the Kshatriya caste of the nobles reveled in their castles, the Vaisiyas dosed in the forest-shade and left the tillage of their fields to the poor Sudra-slaves—only the abstemious and crafty Brahmins, throwing slyly the net of superstition over the other castes, slowly gained influence. For in the same manner as the Roman Catholic priesthood put their hierarchic yoke on the neck of the prostrate Visigoths of Spain in the seventh century after Christ, so the caste of the Brahmins in the seventh era before our Saviour, rose to absolute power, and after a long but ineffectual resistance of the Kshatriyas, at last humbled, subdued, despoiled and almost annihilated, the warrior-caste of India, and behind the glittering pageantry of some puppet king, took the entire government of the Hindoo States into their own hands. A feat which nearly at the same period of time was accomplished by the Memphian priest-king, Sethon, the Pharaoh of the twenty-sixth dynasty in Egypt.

Thus we can account for the mysterious disappearance of the warrior-caste in India, which at the present day exists only in the hill-country of Rashputana, among those proud Rashputies, who from time immemorial have defended their castles, like the feudal barons of the middle ages, against the encroaching tyranny of the Brahmins and now as mercenary Sepoys against the English.

The influence of the priest-government was soon felt. New superstitions, endless ceremonies and expensive sacrifices, weighing heavily on the poor, were introduced, and the whole religious system fortified and straitened to such a degree that the enervated, bigotted and obedient Hindoo people were almost driven to despair by three of the most fearful Brahminian inventions. In the first place by the cruel separation of the castes, which now had become intolerable by the terrible penalties inflicted on the transgressors, and the fines which flowed into the temple-treasures of the Brahmins.

Then, secondly, by the increase of absurd prohibitions of animal food, purifications, castigations and tortures of the body, and the introduction of a most rigid asceticism, by which the penitent recluses or hermits had to leave their wealth and their wives to the tender care of the Brahmins and themselves retire into the pathless depths of the forest and there eat roots and berries, or themselves get eaten by hungry tigers, as the only possible means of saving their soul through its speedy return into the bosom of Brahma—because the highest blessedness for man, according to the Hindoo idea, was the redemption of the soul from the circular course of death and regeneration. Yet it was this latter belief, the awful doctrine of metempsychosis, which made the Hindoo, in spite of a high civilization and of a delightful and fertile country, the most miserable creature on earth! This metempsychosis consisted in the fancy that the soul after death would, by a new birth, occupy the body of another man or animal, and thus the soul of an unhappy sinner be condemned for thousands and for millions of years, to pass on from one unclean animal into another, before it could attain the purity of the Brahmin priest, and like him melt into the soul of Brahma.

Nothing in the world did so much terrify the imagination of a devout Hindoo as the idea that, when he had incautiously eaten a beaf steak or drank a bottle of *arrack*, which in English signifies whiskey, his soul should then, after his death, be born again in the body of a grunting pig or raving wolf, and retaining its human sensations and passions and howling with despair, should thus pass through every reptile, down to the carrion-worm, before it could again ascend through a Brahmin and enter Paradise.

It was on account of this religious fanaticism, still prevalent in India, that during the present mutiny of the Bengal army, no punishment inflicted on the high-caste Sepoy prisoners, would be considered more terrible than the washing up the blood of the murdered garrison at Cawnpore—a pollution which could only be atoned by the restless wandering of the tormented soul of the culprit for millions of years. Can any deception of fancy be more absurd? And yet it is the sternest truth, that it was this awful superstition, together with the increased despotism of the vigilent and merciless inquisition of the Brahmins, that for nearly two centuries continued to stupify and oppress the lax and emasculated Hindoo nation—until the time was ripe and a rescuer appeared. This man was Buddha! The word Buddha is not a name, but a title or dignity—it signifes the Enlightened or Illuminated, like the Greek *σοφος* or *φιλοσοφος*.

His real name was Gautama, or Siddhartha, (fulfilling a desire), and being a member of the Sakya family he was afterwards generally called Sakya-Muni, or the Hermit of Sakya—and as he lived between the year 600 and 543 before Christ, he was the contemporary of Cyrus, Croesus and Solon.

His father was a king of the Sakya dynasty, who ruled over the small kingdom of Kapilavastu at the base of Himalayah, in the present state of Oude. The young prince was trained to chivalrous exercises and gained the victory over all his competitors, not only in the lists of warlike prowess, but in the higher acquirements of literature and philosophy. Being thus the handsomest and most accomplished youth of his time, he married in his sixteenth year, the charming Gopa, the daughter of Dandapanis, with whom he lived a merry life in his gorgeous palace embosomed in delicious gardens.* Yet in the course of time Gautama became tired of this voluptuous life; he began to feel satiety with the pleasures of the world and a divine voice seemed to remind him of his earlier existence in other bodies and of the earnest attempts he formerly had made to obtain the dignity of a saint—a Buddha—who might rescue the soul of man from the intollerable pains of its wanderings. This glorious idea filled his soul and he became silent and thoughtful. The king, his father, did all he could to cheer up his son; he sent him fleet horses, brilliant armor and the most charming Bayaderas—but in vain.

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* The Buddhist traditions give him two more wives, Jasodhara and Ridagsskyes, and add that he increased the number of his female attendants to such an extent that his palaces in later times contained 84,000 concubines and slaves. The chronicles of his life are full of absurdities as glaring as this.

One day when the prince took a ride to his garden-house, Lumbini, he saw an old man, with a bald head and wrinkled face, tottering along the road. Astonished, he asked his squire what this was? Why? said the latter, 'tis an old man who is going to die. And is this, said Prince Sakyá-Muni, the lot of all men thus to crawl away into the grave—of what use then are wealth and pleasure, when I am subject to the laws of old age and death? He returned deeply moved, and when, in two subsequent excursions, he met a leprous wretch covered with ulcers, and then beheld in a ditch a mouldering corpse, swarming with worms—his resolution was taken at once:—to quit the vanities of the world and to discover an infallible remedy for the salvation of the soul from death and regeneration.

At the mid-night hour he enters the serraglio; he whispers an eternal farewell to his sleeping ladies, embraces his beautiful son, Rahula, and escaping from the palace by a postern door, he mounts his favorite horse, Kantâka, and, followed by his squires, gallops full speed to the wilderness. In his enthusiasm he fancies himself accompanied by myriads of rejoicing angels; he hears the harmonious music of the spheres on high, while showers of flowers spread fragrance around, and his course is directed by the blazing fires of the mountain-tops. Having arrived in the desert, on the banks of the river Anumanam—now a sacred place of pilgrimage for thousands of Buddhist palmers, who every year gather in the magnificent *Stupa*, or temple, afterward built to the memory of the reformer—he doffs his princely dress, covers his shoulders with the yellow garment of the penitent, sends back his horse and attendants and hides himself for seven days in the thickest foliage of the forest. There he makes his vow of abstinence and poverty, and like a beggar, with an earthen pot in his hand, he wanders down to Magadha—the present Patna—on the Ganges, where he enters the College of the Brahmins, listens to their most distinguished teachers, studies the sacred Vedas, penetrates into the mysteries of Bràhminian theology—yet all in vain; the light of truth does not flash on his mind.

With five of his disciples he again flies the abodes of man, and after the most awful fasting and penance, during which he is abandoned by his pupils, and his body becomes shrivelled to a skeleton, he tottering ascends the Himalayah and sits down under the celebrated fig or banana tree—the throne of revelation, at Buddhimanda, with the stern resolution not to rise before he has become a Buddha.

Night is closing. Mâra, the god of Love, Sin and Death, now tempts the saint with terrible visions. At the sound of his trumpet a hundred thousand myriads of lions, tigers and one hundred and fifty miles high elephants rush upon him, the snowy peaks of Himalayah curb over him as if to crush him—the beautiful daughters of Mâra skirt and flirt around him—but Budda remains firm; he exclaims: "Your body is a bubble." He envelops his head in his yellow mantle and lo! he beholds all the circumambulating worlds; his former regenerations rise up before him, and he penetrates the entire concatenation of the successive causes of existence and their negation. He has caught the *nirvana*—he is possessed of the highest wisdom and rises—a *Buddha*. It is morn; the sun appears in its splendor; the immense plain of Hindoostan lies sleeping at his feet; he feels refreshed with faith and hope, and descends to the Ganges near Benares.

Such is the tradition. Surrounded by disciples he then continues for forty-five years that wandering life of praying, preaching and teaching to old and young, to high and low, the pure and impure, which effects one of the most astonishing revolutions in the history of mankind—puts a stop to the progress of grasping Brahminian despotism—and builds up the foundations of a new Church, that at this very moment claims one third of all mankind, or three hundred and sixty millions of worshippers, in India beyond the Ganges, in China, Tibet, Mongolia, Japan, and the Indian Islands.

This is an interesting fact; and the question rises: Wherein then consists the Nirvana, the leading principle of Buddha—by what simple and easily understood reforms could he draw around him the multitude, the millions of common people—and in what manner could the Buddhistic Church, centuries after the death of the reformer, take such a form, that the first Portuguese, who with Vasco de Gama, entered the Buddhistic temple at Callicut, were struck with awe and veneration, and knelt down, believing that they beheld before the altar Catholic priests officiating at the mass and administering the sacrament, while the clouds of fragrant incense and the pealing chant of the unseen choir, wrapped their souls in the ecstacy of Christian repentance.

The explanation, however, is somewhat difficult. All nations under a burning sky, seek the shade of the forest and consider as the greatest enjoyment, that *dolce far niente* of silent meditation or repose, which we North Americans reject as unworthy of active, intelligent and laborious Republicans. Now, the Nirvana of Buddha signifies *state of know nothing.*. Yet it is not only intended to express that happy state of mind when it is freed from desire or passion and the pains or crimes they engender—and the heart clings as lightly to the futile things of the world "as the dew-drop to the lotus-leaf." Buddha goes a step farther: he demands that the soul, in order to escape regeneration, must renounce every sensation, destroy every meditative principle and thus become extinguished and fall back into the nothing from which it arose; like the lamp that goes out when the oil is exhausted—"for," said Buddha, who rejected Brahma as the ruling spirit of the world and the entire religious system of the Brahmins—"from the void, from nothing, springs forth the countless multitudes of worlds, one after another, and they vanish again like the water-bubbles in the swamp." But how the actual world could take rise from the infinite vacuum—"that," said he, "is inscrutable to human perception."

Thus then the Hindoo philosopher, with Oriental scepticism, rejected the Almighty God as Creator of the universe; on divine revelation had flashed on his mind to open his eye to the mysterious working of the spiritual on the material world. Such a belief might satisfy a sainted hermit of Hindoostan: the majority of poor, unhappy mankind demand a God as protector and saviour—and we shall soon see how this want was supplied afterward in the Buddhistic Church. For it can easily be imagined that *that* place in the heart of the millions was awarded to Buddha himself—in the same manner as Odin, the great prophet of the Northmen, after his death, became himself in the religious enthusiasm of the Danes, that All-father, whom he, while living, had taught them to love and worship as the Creator and Father of the universe.

This extinction of the soul, without resurrection—this non-existence is the Nirvana. It differs from the belief of the Brahmins, that the soul duly purified should sink into the bosom of Brahma—and from that of all the generous and enlightened nations, both ancient and modern, who have found their happiness in the immortality of the soul in a future paradise of another world. Nay, the Egyptians, according to Diodorus, looked upon life itself only as the journey of a day and considered their homestead merely as an inn, whence after a short sojourn, they would pass into the magnificent dwellings of eternal life.

The oppressed and timid Hindoo, on the contrary, asked only for oblivion and death as a term of existence, and Buddha offered him in his Nirvana an eternal sleep without resurrection.

Yet, if the reformer had only taught this and had limited his promise to the future reward for a quiet, joyless and celibatarian life in the yellow vestment of the mendicant, his footsteps would have been followed by none but the starved and crazy hermits of the wilderness. Buddha only commenced his reform by preaching against the metempsychosis of the Brahmins, in the same manner as the great Saxon rose against the indulgences of the Pope. But as his eloquent admonitions attracted the listeners, as his popularity increased and the multitude of all castes crowded around him, he relaxed in his austerity; he extended his views, denounced the entire superstitous worship of the

Brahmins, the castigation and voluntary tortures of the body, and though he still recognized the political existence of the castes, yet socially he declared all men, of whatever caste or birth or training, as equally worthy, by love and justice toward their neighbors and a virtuous life, to obtain the precious reward of the Nirvana.

He became thus the champion of religious liberty and social equality—a great republican reformer who dared to preach the perfect equality of all mankind and the social independence of the castes, in spite of the menaces of the most powerful and arrogant priesthood in the world. The general tenure of his innocent life remind us forcibly of that of our Saviour. Like Jesus he held his discourses to the people in the open street and the market-place; he spoke in the Paly language, the vernacular tongue of the poor and oppressed, while the proud and boastful Brahmins gloried in their sacred Sanskrit and looked down with disdain and disgust on the Sudras and Chandalas, as the hypocrite Scribes and Pharisees on the Publicans and Sinners of the New Testament.*

And can we now wonder that people of all classes and castes, age or sex, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, Sudras, Chandalas, nay, the haughty Brahmins themselves, rich and poor, learned and know nothings, hurried to meet him, to listen to his words, and seek instruction and consolation. His fame extended from the Indûs and Ganges to the farthest promontories of the peninsula, and even at the present day the principal seat of the Buddhistic religion and learning is in the splendid temple at Kandy in the island of Ceylon. One kingdom was converted to the new faith after the other, and Buddha Sakya-Muni was received in triumph in his native city of Kapilavastu, twelve years after his departure. His father, the king, his own son, and the whole family accepted the faith, put on the yellow gown and built a *vihara* or religious meeting house in the neighboring palm-grove.

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* Ananda, the most beloved of the disciples of Buddha, after an arduous wandering in the mountains, meets a young maiden at a well and asks for a drink. "How can I approach thee," says she, "I am a Chandala girl." And Ananda answers: "My sister, I do not ask thee about thy caste, nor about thy family: I beg thee to give me some water to drink, if thou canst do it." This scene again reminds us of that equally beautiful one of our Saviour with the Samaritan woman at the well of Jacob near Sichem. The Gipsey girl became one of the most ardent pupils of Buddha.

Yet a terrible disaster was already looming afar. While Buddha, in old age, is teaching the multitude in the garden, Kapilavástu is suddenly attacked and totally destroyed by Virudháka, a neighboring king, with whom the Sakya dynasty had long been at feud. Buddha himself had in vain attempted to bring about a reconciliation and divert that revengeful prince from his bloody enterprize. Thus the venerable old man, already staggering on the brink of the grave, becomes an impotent eye-witness to the general massacre of his race; he beholds the conflagration of his native-place, and hears with agony the groans of the murdered citizens, without being able to raise his withered arm in their defence. After the sack and the withdrawal of the hostile army, poor Buddha, during the dark night, enters the city, now silent after the din of battle, and through desolate streets, filled with corpses, he visits the still smoking ruins of the palace and by the twinkling glimmer of the stars he beholds the awful sight of murdered and disfigured maidens and children; some still breathing he presses them in his arms and laying his hand on their forehead he blesses them, with the promise of the all-healing Nirvana.

Immense heaps of ruins, overgrown by forest, now cover the site of Kapilavástu.

Buddha was eighty years old when he felt the approach of death, while preaching at Kusinagara in the land of the Mallians near the Indus. He assembled his disciples around his couch and died in the arms of Ananda, with these words: "Transitory things are perishable, therefore, without delay, qualify yourselves for the Nirvana." Thus ended Buddha, without revival, in the year 543 before our Saviour, the same in which Pisistratus, the tyrant, in exile was plotting against the democracy of Athens and the benevolent Servius Tullius was building up the constitution and the walls of Rome.

His funeral was magnificent; eight kings surrounded the fire-pile, and divided his ashes, which were deposited in eight high stupas or towers, afterward the place of pilgrimage for millions of Buddhists—nay his relics were, after two centuries, sent all over the Indian world. For the veneration of the Saint was continually on the increase, and the influence of his doctrines almost past belief.

Thousands of stupas, temples and sanctuaries, in all the splendor of oriental architecture, rose on every site where he had dwelt and preached. Hermits, in direct pursuance of the Nirvana, peopled the forests and the clefts of the mountains; convents and monasteries became the centre of piety, hospitals for the sick and places of shelter and refreshment for the poor and the pilgrim. Zealous missionaries carried the soothing balm of the Nirvana beyond the frontiers of India; while the devout disciples of the Saint formed themselves into orders of ecclesiastics, who administered instruction, heard confession, and granted indulgence, pardon and benediction. A few years later numerously attended Synods laid down the canons, capitulars and liturgy for this gigantic Church, which, by the veneration of saints and reliques, by its sculptured and painted images, by missal and mass, confession and baptism, by shaven crowns and monkish cowls, coral chants and inspiring music, incense, beads and bells, processions and countless ceremonies, presents a very striking outward semblance to the Roman Catholic Church of the middle ages.

Yet the important reform of the Buddhistic Synods consisted in the recognition of the vast multitude of Brahminian gods, who, in order to please the people, were again restored to their seats in heaven and on earth; but only as subordinary spiritual powers, forming, as it were, the splendid court and cabinet of Buddha worshipped as the emanation of Divine Wisdom and the Restorer of Hindoo liberty.

It can not be denied, that the doctrine of Buddhism, at its first appearance, developed a high moral power and a deep sympathy with human suffering, in opposition to the torpor and cold disdain of the Brahminian law;—that it laid the foundation of a more liberal polity of love and charity toward man, and a purer morality for conduct through life.

It is true, likewise, that the religion of Buddha conferred a benefit on the nomadic races of Central Asia, on the Mongols, Thibetans and Chinese, among whom it was introduced some centuries later and who by its mild and humane principles were led forward on the path of civilization.

It gave, moreover, a new start to the sculpture and architecture of the Hindoos, those arts in which they by far excelled all the oriental nations. The statues of Buddha soon became the objects of tender veneration for his enthusiastic followers. They represent him as a man of great personal beauty, seated in meditation, or standing holding forth his hand in attitude of benediction.

And shall we now say a word of the wonders of Indian architecture, of those immense rock-temples of Ellora, Carli, and Bombay, built in the most pompous Gothic style of our Christian cathedrals—like Westminster Abbey, in London—with hundreds of excavated chapels, grottoes and cells for hermits, extending for miles through the most romantic of valleys. The numberless sculptures and friezes, representing events or traditions from the life and wanderings of Buddha, the elegant columns and arches, apparently suspended high in the air, display every where the most astonishing refinement and taste, united to labor inconceivable.

From these rock-temples, the laborious work of ages, we see the Buddhistic art pass on to those splendid *Pagodas* or *Bhagarties*: that is *sacred dwellings*—in the form of pyramids or cupolas arising in the azure sky of Hindoostan, adorned with colleges, convents, and artificial lakes, all embosomed in the paradisial gardens of a tropical vegetation.

And yet, in spite of all this, Buddhism was not a religion which could, by its internal strength and capability, promote the real development of a higher cultivation.

For it did *not* recognize the Almighty God as the Creator and Father of the universe, and amid the dim and cloudy visions of Buddhistic philosophy—with none of the ennobling and elevating influences of a revelation to direct and control—what wonder that it should seek refuge in the after-promptings of a phantastic superstition in the wild worship of Buddha, the teacher himself as a Dalai Lama, sitting on the altar in the great temple of Laksa as an incarnation of the deity in the human form.

And then by making the Nirvana—the non-existence and the flight from life and its cares the highest aim of existence—it banished the human mind into a narrow sphere and led it entirely astray from the reality of practical life and from the noble exertions to understand the world and victoriously to conquer it.

While Buddhism only attempted to develop the passive virtues of timidly suffering mankind, it stopped, it prohibited the active energy of a more spiritual cultivation—for even in its most flourishing period, its literature, voluminous as it is, has produced nothing but the records of dark and world-disdaining doctrines.

And when we look at the result, it has withered to a bony skeleton, its worship has become a confusion of empty, outward ceremonies—without faith, without piety and mental elevation—while an imperious, ignorant clergy of Lamas, high and low, keep the nations of Central Asia enchained and buried in torpor and stupidity.

We have attempted this sketch on the origin of the religion of Buddha with the view of its serving as an introduction to a future article, in which we intend to delineate the leading doctrines of Buddhism, and give an outline of the interesting history of that Church during its fierce contest with that of the Brahmins, the final cruel expulsion of the followers of Buddha from India, in the second century of the Christian era, their attempted settlement in Thibet and Mongolia, in opposition to the ancient Shamanism of those regions, their final successful installation of the Dalai Lama and the victorious extension of reformed Buddhism to China and Japan.

Franklin and Marshall College. A. L. K.

ART. VI.—BUTLER'S ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, by William Archer Butler, M. A. Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Edited from the Author's MSS with Notes, by Wm. Hepworth Thompson, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. In 2 Vols. Philadelphia : Parry & McMillan. 1857.

William Archer Butler was the first occupant of the chair of Moral Philosophy in Trinity College, Dublin ; the chair having been founded by Dr. Lloyd, the Provost, in 1837. "This honorable distinction must have been conferred upon him before he had completed his twenty-sixth year ; and it would seem that he entered without delay upon the duties of his office, which he retained until his premature death, which took place in 1848." Mr. Butler cherished the design of writing a complete history of Philosophy, a design, however, which, it appears was never carried out. For in 1842, when engaged on his Ethical Lectures, we find that he had ceased to write his Lectures *in extenso ;* and there is no evidence that he resumed the custom subsequently. A large pile of papers has come into the hands of the Editor, containing ample materials for additional structures, and furnishing striking evidence of the Author's varied and profound erudition ; but the connected history committed to writing does not come down to a later period than to that of Aristotle. From these circumstances it is to be inferred that the Lectures composing these two volumes, now for the first time submitted to the public, were prepared before the author had completed his thirtieth year.

The work opens with an Introductory Series on the Science of Mind, its methods, its superiority to other Sciences, and its disciplinary value.

Then come four complete Series of Lectures on Ancient Philosophy. The First Series devotes one Lecture to a review of the *Histories* of Philosophy; one to a discussion of the definitions of Philosophy; and one to a rapid survey of the nature and characteristics of the Indian Philosophies. From these the Author proceeds to Greek Philosophy; discusses its origin, characteristics and stages of development; and, beginning with Thales of Miletus, the founder of the Ionic School, (640–550 B. C.) sketches a brief, but lucid and discriminating, outline of the varying Systems as they followed each other in rapid succession, until the time of Socrates (469–399 B. C.). The Second Series resumes the philosophy of Socrates; pursues the history of its contrary developments; then enquires into the nature of the Cynic and Cyrenaic systems; and from the consideration of these, passes to a minute, thorough and full examination of the profound system of Plato. The Life (429–347 B. C.) and Writings of Plato; the Platonic Dialogues; the Philosophy of Plato as a whole; the Dialectic, and the Ideal Theory of Plato, occupy the remainder of the Second Series. The whole of the Third and Fourth Series are occupied with a critical analysis of Platonic Philosophy; the one Series unfolding the Physics, the Psychology and the Ethics of Plato; the other, tracing the progress of Platonic thinking in the diverging Schools which originated in it—the Academy, and the Neo-Platonists. The second volume concludes with an unfinished Series, consisting of three Lectures, on the Psychology of Aristotle.

Of these six Series, the first is the least valuable, a fact of which no one can be more sensible than the learned Editor himself. "The Introductory Series," he says in his Preface, "were evidently hastily composed." "Their rhetorical pomp of style, a meaning not always definite in itself, and frequently obscured by the very excess of illustration, the frequent repetition, and above all a certain vacillation of judgment on speculative questions, are faults which must strike the intelligent reader, and which would, I am persuaded, have been acknowledged by the accomplished Professor himself." On the other hand, after as careful an examination as time would permit, we can also freely concur with the Editor in his opinion of the superior merits of the Lectures on Plato and the Platonists, which occupy a part of the Second, and the whole of the Third and Fourth Series. These constitute the most valuable portion of the work. They may be regarded as an original and independent contribution to our knowledge of the great master of ancient philosophers; especially those on the Dialectic and Physics of Plato, which are a more accurate, full and popular exposition of his system than any work in the English language of which we have any knowledge.

Here we find the chief merit of this work. Though availing himself, as was most just and necessary, of the aid afforded by the best German works on the history of philosophy, to which the Author makes frequent allusion, he was, nevertheless, not satisfied with merely studying the profound researches of others; but seems also to have gone directly to the original sources themselves, and traced the processes of thought each under its various phases, as these were embodied by the leading thinker of Pagan antiquity in his own rich and expressive language. This is not true indeed of every part of the whole work; nor may it be true even of his review of all the less important systems of Greek philosophy; but it is undoubtedly true of the Lectures on Plato and the Platonists, of which the Author speaks, as "the result of patient and conscientious examination of the original documents." The second volume particularly will therefore be found to be a rich and interesting source of historical knowledge for the student of philosophy.

What the Author's own philosophical system was it is somewhat difficult precisely to determine. The Introductory Series, which throw more light than any others upon his stand-point, were unfortunately written first, when his mind and opinions had not been fully matured. As the Lecturer advances it is very easy to discover the maturing process. Thought is more logically arranged and more clearly expressed; the language is divested of redundancies and repetitions, is less burdened with an excess of illustration, and becomes more perspicuous, accurate and consistent. And judging from the accuracy of conception, the acuteness of judgment and the broad grasp of mind which distinguish some portions of the subsequent Series, we can not but come to the conclusion, that, had the lamented Author lived to edit his work himself, he would have subjected the Introductory Lectures to a careful revision, if not to entire reproduction. There is no remedy, however. We must form our judgment of the Author's system of philosophical thinking, if we would form any judgment at all, from his work as it lies before us.

There is an evident want of a positive and settled judgment as to what Philosophy is. Is it the science of Mind only, as distinguished from matter? Is it the scientific knowledge of *being* in general, comprehending both mind and matter? Is it merely the knowledge and classification of phenomena—of the phenomena of mind, or of the phenomena of mind and matter? Or, is it the scientific knowledge of Real Existence, that is, of the essential nature of things, in distinction from the knowledge of phenomena only? Does philosophy comprehend a scientific view of the relative, or of the absolute, or of both? To these questions we do not find a satisfactory and consistent answer. Sometimes Prof. Butler must be understood as speaking from one, and at others, from another point of observation. Sometimes philosophy certainly means the science of Mind only, and at others, it just as certainly takes a much wider range. We do not meet with a clear statement of the nature of Philosophy, in the light of which all portions of the discussion are consistent and intelligible; nor does the character of the discussion indicate a well-defined assumption, as to the nature of philosophy, which the Author holds firmly in his own mind, though it is not formally expressed. Hence the absence of entire consistency to which we have referred, and which the Editor calls "a certain vacillation of judgment on speculative questions."

But we do not wish to do injustice to the memory of

Professor Butler. We do not wish to detract from his large attainments and marked ability as a profound thinker, nor from the great merits of his posthumous work as a history of ancient philosophy. It is not difficult to account for vacillation of judgment on metaphysical subjects in a young man of twenty-six. From the knowledge we have of his educational history, we infer that his thinking was first cast in the mould of Scotch or English philosophy. Then, led to study German systems, German histories of philosophy, and the ancient Greek systems, especially the broad and magnificent sweep of thought that lay under his eager eye in the genial works of Plato, he was brought into living contact with another and a conflicting habit of mind. The great Scotch thinkers, Reid, Stewart, Brown, and others, imparted somewhat of their outward, mechanical and realistic tendencies to his method of thought. The continental philosophers, on the other hand, especially those of Germany, touched and educed the intuitional powers of the reason. Addressing these, they communicated to his mind somewhat of, what we may call, their inwardness, and authenticated to his consciousness the internal and essential nature of things as a proper object of reflection and of scientific knowledge. Feeling both the truth and the error, or the claims and the deficiencies, of the prevailing characteristics of the Scotch method of thinking and of the prevailing characteristics of the German method of thinking; of the realistic and idealistic tendencies of philosophy; of the sensational and the transcendental axioms of the human reason; his strong mind was naturally put into a state of conflict, in which he struggled to gain a position that would reconcile, and do justice to, different axiomatic truths underlying opposing systems, and at the same time eliminate the errors, and erroneous tendencies, which these opposing systems of philosophy incorporated. And it is not derogatory to the talents of a man of twenty-six or thirty, learned, profound and brilliant though he be, to say that he did not attain to such a solution of this difficult problem as could give entire consistency and harmony to his metaphysical disquisitions.

Taking this view of Professor Butler's status in philosophy, we may understand how naturally it would be for him to go beyond the assumed limits of knowledge as held by the Scotch or English metaphysicians, and launch upon what is regarded as the foggy and bewildering ocean of transcendentalism, whilst at the same time he retained some peculiarities which are distinctive of the School whose restraints his swelling spirit was impelled to thrust aside.

We find accordingly a distinct avowal of the Science of Real Existence in contradistinction from the knowledge of phenomena only. Take the following passage:

> "There is, Gentlemen, a region which lies beyond the scope of the popular metaphysic of our age and country, a region upon which the heavy clouds of scholastic and mystical theology have indeed long been suffered to rest, and whose substantial existence, confounded to the common eye with the mist that encompassed it, has at last been almost rejected in rejecting *them.* I refer to that profound, perhaps abstruse, certainly most important, department of speculation, which is devoted to investigating the objective reality of our knowledge, and the inferences as to real and independent existences which can be concluded from the constitution and principles of our intellectual being. Such a branch of study—the second great division of the system of metaphysical inquiry which I propose to you—would include these important topics: the independent reality of material substance, the reality and value of abstract truth, the absolute nature of time and space, and, above all, the real eternal and necessary existence and attributes of that great animating principle of all things which antiquity, by a noble and just analogy, entitled the soul of the universe, and whom it is given us,—while by the force of irresistible convictions of his Deity we can place him on the throne of the universe,—by the revelation of his assumed Humanity, to welcome to the almost nobler throne of the heart. All these considerations are of the kind which have been termed *a priori* reasonings, that is, reasonings which conclude the reality of certain existences from notions and convictions shown to be inseparable from our intellectual nature, as distinguished from conclusions obtained by the aid of experience and analogy." (Vol. I, p. 52.)

Here is a modest, but decided and bold, dissent from the chief authorities of the Scottish School in later times, who "not only neglect this high metaphysic of absolute truth, but deny its legitimate existence"—a dissent from his first masters in these studies which he acknowledges with humility; but his apprehension of the importance of the Science of Real Existence, he tells us, was among the "earliest convictions" of his mind, and has not diminished with its growth.

But, whilst Professor Butler vindicates, without hesitation, the certain knowledge of realities which lie beyond the range of experience, and thus departs very widely from his Scottish contemporaries who reject every species of investigation which can not be reduced to the forms of the Baconian logic, and tolerate no metaphysical science but that which has been denominated the Inductive Philosophy of the human mind, we are constrained to say, if we interpret his language correctly, that he fails to grasp the full import of the Science of Real Existence. This appears from his "two-fold distribution of Universal Metaphysics into the Philosophy of the mind properly so called, and the Science of Real Existence;" a distribution or division of Universal Metaphysics that is not valid. The certain knowledge of existences in distinction from the certain knowledge of phenomena, is not the science of the essence of things in distinction from the Science of Mind. Ontology and Psychology are not opposites; but ontology and phenomenology. Ontology includes psychology. The *real existence*, accordingly, is not merely that which lies beyond the perception of the sense, nor the essential nature of things other than the mind. Real existence is the general and essential nature of any and all the objects upon which the human reason thinks, whether these objects belong to the world of matter or to the world of mind, or the object be God, the Author of both. Of such essential and general nature of objects the reason takes cognizance in virtue of ideas evolved out of itself, and by an act of intuitive perception; and this intuitive knowledge is the basis of the possibility of all inductive reasoning from phenomena. The Science of Real Existence takes, therefore, an unlimited range; for the penetrative eye of the reason turns upon itself also, no less than upon the outer world, and perceives the reality of that which underlies and determines all its particular states of consciousness, as well as the reality of that which underlies the phenomena of all material objects. Thus arises a philosophy which is the foundation of all philosophies, a philosophy which is not coördinate to Psychology, or to the Science of mind, but superordinate to it.

In affirming the Science of Real Existence, as a legitimate branch of metaphysical speculation, our Author differs openly and widely from the leading Scotch metaphysicians, and evinces a capacity for profounder thought than his "first masters" evinced; yet he still retains one prominent peculiarity of the Scottish School, which, especially in its logical consequences, must be regarded as in conflict with his own deeper and broader theory. This peculiarity, for want of a better expression, we may name an *external* view of things, in distinction from an *internal* view. The integral parts of an object are thought of as existing side by side, rather than as being *in* each other. God is outside of the universe and works upon it from without, rather than an absolute, independent personality working *in* the laws which pervade and sustain its entire constitution. The Author's image of thought is a mechanism, a nice but arbitrary construction and arrangement of many lifeless parts, rather than a plant, or living organism whose various parts are developed from one life-principle which determines and pervades each and all, and makes them a unity.

"In pure psychology, as in experimental science, we abstract in order to classify, in ontology, as in mathematics, we abstract in order to apprehend the necessary relations of our abstractions. The one is the reproduction of consciousness under the form of system; its aim is to transform it by successive simplifications from a confused aggregate of mutual states into a definite catalogue of functions; as it were, to take asunder the many-coloured web of experience and lay the unravelled threads in bundles according to their colours and shades of colours, the whole web being still present, but the whole under a new form and collocation." (Vol. I, p. 59.)

"Life—of course I use the popular sense of that term—is the constant exercise of practical rules similar in their discovery to those of which we have just been speaking; that is to say, it is literally the exertion and product of an art; and to contemplate a life at its close is, in a manner, to inspect a machine whose parts are not coexistent but successive. The object and use of the machine thus completed is indeed hidden among the secret purposes of God, who, constituting us as the mechanics of our own conduct, reserves among the deep counsels of his mighty administration the final causes which assuredly exist for the life and trial of every single being of all his creatures." * * "Our ignorance of the ultimate object of the complicated machinery of each existence does not, it must be remembered, diminish either the *importance* of that object, or the *fitness* of the machinery to attain it, or our *certainty* of that fitness: on the contrary, we are to conclude that the ignorance *is part* of the fitness, since it exists." (pp. 102, 103.)

"The transcendent Artist who has formed this wonderful mechanism of thought, and who has purposed to direct its energies to Himself, has enabled it to do so by enabling it to recognize its own structure." * * * * * "Language, Gentlemen, is the sensible portraiture of thought, the dial-plate of the mind; and every fact, whether of change or constancy in the outward indication, marks a corresponding fact in the inward machinery." (pp. 109, 110.)

These extracts illustrate and establish what we have said. Professor Butler thinks of mind under the image of a machine, and of the Creator under the image of an Architect or an Artist, a method of reflection, which, if not fatal, is, to say the least, very prejudicial to true philosophy. Mind possesses life; a machine is without life. In mind the principle of life pervades all its powers, in virtue of which each is complete only as an integral part of one constitution; and no one can be thought of but in union and harmony with the others. In a machine there is no such principle.

The design of a machine can indeed be actualized only when all the parts are properly put together, yet each part is complete, as a part, whether connected or separated from all the others; for the parts are not unfolded from an unseen, determinative force within which abides and works in them, but they are what they are, and can be neither more nor less, because of a power operating from without and altogether different from themselves. A machine is an *external* union of parts; each being set in juxtaposition to the others, and thus forming an aggregated whole; whilst mind is an *internal* union, all its powers being such only through the presence of a common principle on account of which they not only sustain a reciprocal relation to each other, but no one power or faculty can be at all unless the others are also. The one is an arrangement of inorganic material; the other is an organic whole. The two things belong, therefore, to entirely different categories. They are so dissimilar and heterogeneous that it is impossible to think correctly of the one under the image of the other—of the human reason, with its mysterious depths, its living relations to the body and to God, and with powers, intuitive and logical, that climb the throne of God or reach down into the abyss of hell, under the image of a machine, the mere collocation by the will of blind, inert, dead matter, as means to some ulterior end. Just as well might we attempt to think correctly of a machine, for example, of the beautiful mechanism of a watch, under the image of a granite block; or of a plant, under the image of a piece of muslin.

Yet there are clear indications also of a very different habit of thought. We offer but one short quotation:

> "You perceive then that we extend with assurance the dominion of law and regularity not only *far beyond* our actual experience of its sway, but over every portion of the universe where there exists any element for it to govern. It is not merely a contingent principle of experience, but a necessary principle of reason; and, I must add, it is on this ground, and

this ground alone, that we call *God* not the God of the visible universe, but of infinity itself; a conclusion wholly unattainable by the popular argument of "design," for the very simple reason that no inference can overpass its premises. The revelation tells us, that wherever there is being there must be law; and where there is law there must be God." (Vol. I, p. 108.)

Law is a necessary principle of reason, and not a contingent principle of experience. Law is *in*, and not simply *upon* that which it governs. The infinitude of God is not the result of induction, but an intuitive idea of the reason. These are his views; and they evince a deep insight into the constitution of the reason and its activity, which, if developed logically, would exclude reflection upon mind, or man, or the world, under imagery drawn from a mechanism. For this want of consistency in the Author's method of thinking we account on the principle which we have already stated. Differing from the Scottish School under the impulse of a more profound and comprehensive philosophy, he continued to think nevertheless to a great extent according to a method under whose influence his manner of thinking had originally been shaped.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, of which we have thought it proper to speak, we hold these volumes to be an important addition to English Literature. They supply an existing want; that part of the work more especially which is devoted to the consideration of the golden age of Greek Philosophy. In learning thorough and trustworthy; in thought profound and comprehensive; in reasoning logical; in style brilliant and clear; and in expression forcible; this reproduction of Platonism in its objective connection with preceding and succeeding systems of philosophy, we can recommend to American students as more satisfactory than any work in the English language, Seeley's translation of Schwegler's *Geschichte der Philosophie* perhaps only excepted.

The Notes accompanying the Author's discussion by the Editor, Professor Thompson, are generally in very good taste. Based upon a sound judgment and patient study of original sources, they do not supply what the intelligent reader is familiar with himself, nor withhold what he really needs, but are a valuable supplement to the original work.

Lancaster, Pa. E. V. G.

ART. VII.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A TEXT-BOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY. By Dr. *John C. L. Gieseler.* Translated from the fourth revised German edition, by *Samuel Davidson,* LL. D. A new American edition, revised and edited by *Henry B. Smith,* Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Harper & Brothers. Vol. I, (A. D. 1—726) 1857. Vol. II, (A. D. 726—1305) 1857. Vol. III, (A. D. 1305—1517). 1858

THE two greatest works on the general history of the Christian Church, produced in the first half of the present century are unquestionably those of Dr. Neander, who died in 1850, and of Dr. Gieseler, who died in 1854. They were matured in respectful and honorable rivalry during the same period of thirty years of slow, but solid and steady growth, without being finished by their authors. They are equally learned, critical and reliable. They rest on the same intimate familiarity with the original sources. They exhibit the same rare talent of disentangling difficult and confused problems. They are equally free from partisan spirit and sectarian prejudice.

And yet they differ as widely as two works of the same age, the same denomination, and on the same subject can be expected to differ without actual contradiction. Neander's work is perfectly subjective and reproduces the original authorities in a continuous, warm and sympathetic composition, which reflects at the same time the author's own mind and heart. Gieseler's work is purely objective and speaks through the *ipsissima verba* of the same sources, arranged in notes and strung together by a slender thread of cold and meagre, but clear and concise narrative. The one gives the history ready-made and full of life, instruction and warning; the other furnishes the material with the indifference of an out-side spectator, and leaves the reader to animate and improve it for himself. With the one the text is every thing; with the other the notes. But for this very difference of spirit and method they admirably complete each other and are equally indispensable to the advanced scholar, the one for connected reading, the other for reference.

It is a strong proof of the great value of these immortal works that they are now fully naturalized in England and America. It is significant that this is owing more to American than British scholarship. The first, though an incomplete translation of Gieseler, from the third edition of the original, was made by Francis Cunningham, and published in Philadelphia, as early as 1836. A new version was then prepared for Clark's Foreign Theological Library by Dr. Davidson and Rev. J. W. Hull, and republished in New York. The Harper's have even stereotyped it, which is neither the case with the original nor with the Scotch edition and seems to indicate a larger prospective patronage even for such heavy works in America than they enjoy in Europe, or at least a superior spirit of enterprize; for we can hardly think that the book has been profitable either to the translator or the publisher.

Prof. Henry B. Smith,of New York, has recently undertaken the laborious task of a thorough revision of the Edinburgh translation and carried it down, in the three volumes thus far published, to the Reformation of the sixteenth century. This edition actually supersedes the previous editions. We prefer, of course, the original to any, even the most perfect translation. But as far as we have compared the two, in this case, we are free to say that Prof Smith has executed his task, as was to be expected, with great judgment and care and brought it within the reach of thousands who would otherwise be deprived of its benefit. Only those can estimate the amount of labor required, who have themselves tried their hands at it. We only regret that the fact of Davidson's version having been stereotyped by the American publishers, has prevented him from a more radical revision of the text. Dr. Davidson, we should suppose, from what little we know of him, is a gentleman of greater pretension than merit, and more indiscriminate admiration for, than critical knowledge of, German theology and neology.— Prof. Smith is evidently both a better German scholar and a better English writer, and far more at home in Church history. A valuable addition to his revised translation are the references to English works which escaped the attention, or appeared after the death of Dr. Gieseler. We regret to find no similar appendix at the end of the third volume. We hope that the fourth and fifth volumes, which are still wanted to complete the work, and where Prof. Smith will have mere freedom, will not fail to complete the literary apparatus of the original by the incorporation, in the proper place (not in an Appendix) of all important English works, which have appeared since the Reformation, on subjects connected with modern, especially British and American Church history. German scholars are often much better at home with the most remote sources of Greek and Roman antiquity, than with modern English—to say nothing of American—literature. English writers, on the other hand, have either no patience or no taste for collecting the names and dates even of their own standard works at the head of sections after the manner of Gieseler, Hase, Niedner and Kurtz. Hence the Americans will have to do this and to fill up the vacuum left even by the painstaking and persevering industry of the German historians, from want of acquaintance with the English language.

P. S.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES Explained: By *Joseph Addison Alexander.* In Two Volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 377, Broadway. 1857.

Dr. J. ADDISON ALEXANDER is justly regarded as one of the most erudite men in the Presbyterian Church. His life has been devoted to historical and critical studies; and adding to a mind of great native vigor, habits of patient and laborious investigation, he is naturally looked upon as an able and safe contributor to our American literature in those departments. His works upon Isaiah and the Psalms evince his ability to use the best results of German exegesis and criticism, without servilely following all the vagaries of the German rationalistic intellect. From the high position which he occupies, and his well-known reputation, his work upon the Acts has been for some time expected with considerable eagerness in the branch of the Church to which he belongs. The rich, popular work of Conybeare and Howson, and others in the same line, have recently invested the Acts with a new interest, whilst, at the same time, the rationalistic criticisms of Zeller and other Germans, are beginning to be known in this country. We think there may be some disappointment felt in Dr. Alexander's work. By the large class of general readers it may be considered all that was desired, but by a smaller, but perhaps more important class, it will not be regarded as just meeting their wants. We think Dr. Alexander has made a grave mistake in changing his plan, as he tells us, so that instead of putting forth a work, "with a view to the peculiar wants of ministers and students," he has given us one for the general reader. An exposition of the Acts *for the people* is not just the thing needed now. In fact from the very nature of the book we are inclined to think *the people* do not need very much in the way of explication. All that the people desire and need in the case of an obscure historical work, is simply an annotated edition. What is needed particularly now for the learned American world is a thorough critical vindication of the integrity of the book itself. Dr. Alexander would have given us a better work, and on the whole a more *useful* one, if he had stuck to his original purpose of writing one for "ministers and students." We regret also his adoption of the mechanical method of expounding each verse separately In many cases, as every reader knows, the sentences and thoughts are thus divided, and perhaps also a separate exposition demanded for what, from its connection with what precedes it, in no respect requires it. But withal, Dr. Alexander's work abounds in numberless excellences, and cannot avoid being of material service to our expository literature. His verbal critical exegesis will be found to be always careful, accurate and thorough, and his introduction contains a careful and comprehensive analysis of the whole book.

C.

THE PROTESTANT THEOLOGICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: being a condensed Translation of Herzog's Real Encyclopedia, with Additions from other Sources. By the Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., assisted by distinguished Theologians of various Denominations. Part VI. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858.

Part Sixth of this thesaurus of theological and ecclesiastical knowledge was issued about two months ago. It extends from Charles V to Confession, and comprises articles on some of the most interesting and important topics in the department of history, biography, ecclesiology, and theology, such as, *Chemnitz, Coccius, Clement of Rome, Church, Church Agenda, Communicatio Idiomatum, Form of Concord, Chiliasm or the Millenium, Christianity, Christology,* etc.; all of which are given in good and readable English, and many of them in the best style of the language. The general style of the work was commendable from the beginning, but as it progresses it becomes more fluent, compact, and accurate in diction, and is more free from errors in its typographical execution, and apart from the sterling merit of this Encyclopedia—the thorough scholarship, broad views and sound faith which characterize its articles—its general outward finish must enhance its acceptableness to the religious and scientific public. E. V. G.

STOCKTON'S PERIODICAL NEW TESTAMENT, No. 5. The Acts of the Apostles with Index, Introduction and Plates. Philadelphia 1857.

We commended this serial publication of the New Testament, by the Rev. Mr. Stockton, on the appearance of the first number. The intervening numbers (2–4) have not come to hand. The work is an issue (duodecimo) of the received version of the

New Testament in periodical numbers, in paragraph form, and without note or comment, to which is appended Dr. Horne's Introductions respectively as revised by Dr. Tregelles, and a Pictorial Apparatus, consisting of Views in the Holy Land. The present number has two beautiful plates: The Mosque of Omar, and the Pool of Bethesda. The plan merits patronage.
E. V. G.

ELEMENTARY GERMAN READER, on the plan of Jacobs' Greek Reader; with a full Vocabulary. Composed, compiled and arranged systematically by Rev. L. W. Heydenreich, Graduate of the University of France, and Professor of Languages in the Moravian Female Seminary at Bethlehem, Pa. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1858. pp. 164.

Prof. Heydenreich's Elementary German Reader is divided into two Parts; the first consisting of Exercises on Common Nouns, the Articles, Adjectives, Pronouns and various classes and parts of Verbs; and the second, of more difficult Reading Exercises in prose and poetry; to which is appended a good Vocabulary of the words occurring in the Reader. Beginning with simple sentences, the author advances gradually from these to more difficult and complicated passages, unfolding and applying systematically as he proceeds all the principles which enter into the construction of the richest modern language. The selection has been made from more than thirty authors besides the Sacred Scriptures, whence a great many examples have been derived, and judging from an examination of a number of sections, this delicate task has been performed under the guidance both of a oorrect taste and a sound Christian faith; the solid matter of the Exercises and general Readings being as well adapted to cultivate and nourish the growing minds of pupils as their grammatical structure is to make them familiar with the etymological and syntactical elements, the peculiar spirit and the idioms of the German language.

The book meets an existing want; and we would be pleased to see it occupy a prominent place as an elementary text-book in our Institutions of learning. E. V. G.

THE NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPEDIA: A popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by George Ripley and Charles A. Dana. Vol. I. A—Aragua. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway. London: 16 Little Britain. 1858.

This is a formidable work. The first volume, which does not yet finish the letter A, itself contains over 750 large double column pages, and about 2500 words. This may give the reader some idea of the extent and completeness of the work, which is of course one important element in its value. In such a work, above all, we desire completeness, as nothing is more vexatious than to have a work of reference on the shelf, when ten to one the very word you wish to refer to is not found in it. Still the principal thing in a Cyclopedia is correctness; as many who use such a work have not always the means at hand whereby they may verify names, dates, and other facts. This work seems to have been deliberately prepared—previous Encyclopedias have been examined, and the assistance of "nearly a hundred" scholars, as the preface informs us, has been had in the preparation of this first volume. We have carefully examined many of its articles, and must give praise to the taste, learning, and care therein displayed. The mechanical execution is all that can be desired.

The great progress made in all departments of knowledge within the last two or three decades, sets all the older works of this kind fairly behind the age. Those who possess them find that often those events to which they wish to refer are not mentioned, because they are later in origin; nor can they be found conveniently elsewhere, since they have not yet taken their place in permanent works in history, art or science. In this view the work before us must satisfy an important want; and we are, therefore, not surprised at the general favor with which it is received.

To a person who cannot afford a large library, a good Cyclopedia is indispensable. He may get along without it, but how we cannot well conceive. He must often spend hours in search of a fact, chasing it in fragments through many volumes, which he could find in a minute by the aid of a faithful Cyclopedia. Of course, a scholar, in any important investigation, will not be satisfied to rely wholly on such secondary sources; but even he may need to refresh his memory on certain points for temporary use, which he can do in this way with a greater gain of time. Every intelligent citizen should have the means in reach to book up his mind and memory, whenever circumstances turn his attention to a particular point. We are inclined to think that many persons do not know how much they lose by not providing themselves with just such works as this Cyclopedia.

The copy before us has been politely furnished us by Mr. Elias Barr, who has lately opened a very fine Book Store and general News Depot on East King Street, Lancaster, and who has the Agency of this work for Lancaster, York, and other counties. Through him the work can be promptly procured at publisher's prices. H. H.

THE

MERCERSBURG REVIEW.

JULY 1858.

Art. I.—SAVONAROLA.

Few men have excited such strong sympathies and equally strong antipathies among divines, historians and poets, and been submitted to such contradictory judgments both in the Roman Catholic and Protestant communion, as Jerome Savonarola, the leader and martyr of an unsuccessful politico-religious reform movement in Italy, and one of the most prominent and remarkable of the mediæval forerunners of Protestantism. He has been extravagantly lauded by the one as an inspired prophet, reformer and wonder-working saint, and as unjustly condemned by others as a priest-demagogue, a deluded fanatic, or a hypocritical impostor. It is still an unsettled question whether he resembled more St. Bernard or Arnold of Brescia, Luther or Thomas Münzer, Charles Borromeo or Gavazzi. He was burned as a heretic and schismatic under the excommunication of one pope, and almost canonized by another. Luther, Flacius, Beza, Arnold hailed him as a witness of the truth in the dark night of popery and as the prophet of the reformation; while latter Protestants, as the skeptic Bayle, the pietistic Buddeus,* and the liberal Roscoe, the enthusiastic admirer of Lorenzo de' Medici, assigned him a place among impostors or fanatics. In our own age he found new, though more moderate and discriminating apologists, mostly on the Protestant side, in such biographers as Rudelbach and Hase. Poetry also has revived and idealized his memory through the immortal epos of Lenau, which bears the name of the monk of San Marco.*

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* Buddeus, however, retracted in latter life the unfavorable view which he had maintained in his *exercitatio historico-politica de artibus tyrannicis H. Savonarolae.*

Fra Girolamo Savonarola was born September 21, 1452, at Ferrara of a respectable family, originally from Padua. He received a careful education according to the standard of his age with his five brothers and two sisters. He was destined for the medical profession, in which his grandfather, Michael Savonarola, the physician of Nicholas, Prince of Este, had acquired great distinction. But his serious religious disposition pointed him to a different direction. Even in his boyhood he loved retirement and avoided the gardens of the ducal palace, the favorite play ground of the youth of Ferrara. In his twenty-third year the growing conviction of the corruption of the world and the Church in his vicinity, drove him from the house of the parents to a Dominican convent at Bologna, where he hoped to work out the problem of his salvation. Two days after the arrival he wrote to his father: "I could not support the enormous wickedness of most of the people of Italy. Every where I saw virtue despised, vice in honor. When God, in answer to my prayer, condescended to show me the right way, could I decline it? Oh, gentle Jesus, may I suffer a thousand deaths rather than oppose thy will and show myself ungrateful for thy goodness." Then he asks his father to forgive him the secrecy of his departure, or flight rather, which had cost him bitter torment, and assures him that he would not return to the world, to be Cæsar. "As a man of strong mind, I beseech you, comfort my mother, and both of you send me, I entreat you, your blessing."

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* The documents on the Life of Savonarola have been published in great part by *Quetif*, Paris, 1674, and more recently by the learned Dominican *Marchese* in Archivio storico Italiano. Tomo VIII. Firenze 1850, and by *Giudici* in Appendice alla storia dei municipi Italiano. Firenze 1850. The following are the most valuable biographies of Sav. *Pacifico Burlammacchi* (died 1519): Vita del P. Girolamo Savonarola, ed. Mansi, Lucca 1761 (in Miscellanea St. Baluzii, vol. 1). *Joan. Franc. Pico.* Mirandulae Principe (nephew of the more celebrated scholar Giovanni Pico de Mirandola): Vita R. P. Hieron. Savonarolae. 1530, ed. Quetif (with other documents), Paris, 1674. *Bartoli*, Dominicano: Apologia del P. Savon. Firenze 1782. *A. G. Rudelbach*: Hieronymus Savon. und seine Zeit. Hamburg, 1835. *Fr. Carl Meier*: Girol. Savon., aus grossentheils handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt. Berlin. 1836. *Carl Hase*: Neue Propheten. Drei historisch-politische Kirchenbilder. Leipzig, 1851. p. 97—144, and p. 304, ff. (Compare also Hase's Church Hist. § 293, p. 380 ff. of the seventh edition). *F. T. Perrens*: Jérome Savon., sa vie, ses predications, ses écrits, d'apres les documents originaus et avec des pièces justificatives en grande partie inedites. Paris and Turin, 1853, 2 vols. *R. R. Madden*: The Life and Martyrdom of Savon, 2nd ed., London, 1854. 2 vols. Compare also an instructive and judicious article on Savon. in the London Quarterly Review, N. 197, for July, 1856. The main facts are also incidentally noticed in the historical works of Guicciardini. Nardi, Commines, Roscoe and Sismondi. Of Lenau's Savonarola the third edition appeared at Stuttgart, 1849.

Even at that early period of life, he seems to have looked upon Rome as the source of the corruption in the Church, if Rians, the editor of Savonarola's poems (which are not of much importance), is right in his calculation as to the date of the poem *de ruina mundi.* For there, in the fifth stanza, he makes the bold assertion that the downfall of Rome was necessary to a reformation.

"La terra è si oppressa da ogni vizio
Che mai da se non leverà la soma,
A terra se ne va il suo capo Roma,
Per mai non tornar al grande offizio."

At first Fra Girolamo wished to occupy a very humble position and performed the meanest services in the convent. But his superiors made better use of his talents and soon employed him as a teacher of what was then called philosophy and natural science. His favorite studies were the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the standard divine of the Dominican order, of St. Augustine, and the Bible. The last he knew in great part by heart.* There are still four copies of the Scriptures in different libraries at Florence, with annotations from his hand. His fervid imagination was captivated by the prophets of the Old Testament, and the Revelation of St. John. He made their terrible denunciatory language his own, and felt it his duty to apply it to the prevailing vices and corruptions of the age. He became convinced that he was a divinely commissioned prophet and soon mistook his own inferences from the Scriptures for divine inspirations.

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* So says his personal friend and biographer, Count Giovanni Francesco Pico de Mirandola, in *Vita R. P. Fr. Hier. Sav.* c. 4: ut totum fere sacrorum canonem et memoria teneret et profunde exacteque (quantum homini licet) intelligeret.

His first pulpit efforts, however, were by no means encouraging. The number of hearers, attracted by his growing fame as one of the most learned and pious members of the Dominican order, dwindled down to twenty-five, so that he retired for a period and reassumed the humble office of a reader. But suddenly, at Brescia, the hidden power of his eloquence broke forth and made an extraordinary impression. He preached on the Apocalypse, of which it has been said: *aut insanum inveniet aut faciet.* He declared that one of the twenty-three, or rather twenty-four elders was commissioned to reveal to him the terrible judgment which should shortly fall upon Italy and especially upon the city of Brescia. At first, however, he gave his announcements of the approaching doom and reformation not as revelations, but as the conclusions of his reason from the Scriptures.*

From this time he soon rose to the position of the first pulpit orator of Italy, and wielded an extraordinary influence over his hearers till the year of his downfall. His voice was rather harsh, his gesticulation at first somewhat awkward;† but his speech was full of passion, fire, and earnestness, surging up from the inmost depth of his soul and flowing forth, in true Italian style, from his eyes, his hands, his features, as well as from his lips. He spoke with authority, as one who believed to be entrusted with a divine commission. The fervid imagination of his Italian admirers, as we learn from Burlammacchi, in speaking of the days of his glory in Florence, beheld angels hovering over him on the pulpit, and the holy Virgin herself giving force to his benedictions, palms of martyrdom adorning his head, and even blood welling from his side !

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* "Non perrivelazione, ma per ragione delle Scritture." So he confessed himself in the trial as regards his first reformation sermon at San Gemignano.

† Pico, however, gives him also a good voice and agreeable manner: "Pronunciabat voce libera et acuta, non fervido solum, sed ardenti vultu, gestuque venustissimo. Ita vero illabebatur in auditorum aures, imo vero in praecordia, ut attentos eos extra se paene raperet."

In the thirty-eighth year of his age, A. D., 1490, (according to others, in 1489), he was sent by his superiors to Florence as teacher of the novices of the convent of San Marco. It is still full of recollections of his fame, and possesses besides considerable artistic interest by the frescoes of Fra Beato Angelico, who there embodied his prayers in pictures of angelic beauty. Here commences properly Savonarola's career as a politico-ecclesiastical reformer. To understand it fully, we must call to mind the actual condition of Florence at that time.

The republic of Florence, the city of Dante, surpassed in the fourteenth century all Italian cities in wealth, power and culture. Villani represents in its history the history of all Italy. Machiavelli furnished in his Florentine history a practical manual of political science. In the beginning of the fifteenth century a commercial house, the celebrated Medici family, rose gradually and almost imperceptibly to princely dignity and influence by enormous wealth and prudence, and made the beautiful city on the banks of the Arno, the centre of the reviving classical literature and art. Cosimo de' Medici (died 1464), who as a Rothschild of his age, indebted to him nearly all the crowned heads of Europe, including the Pope, and patronized, at the same time, on the most liberal scale, the sciences and arts, both from policy and taste, was the first to exercise monarchical power under republican forms, although the people, jealous of their sovereignty, banished him for one year (1434). After his sickly son, Piero, his highly gifted grandson, Lorenzo the Magnificent, confirmed and increased the power of that house. Roscoe regards him as the most extraordinary man of his age, especially as a statesman.*

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* The Life of Lorenzo de' Medici, called the Magnificent. Bohn's edition, page 9.

He gave up the commercial business, married a princess Orsini, and was himself called "principe," in the duplicity of the Italian and Roman language. Yet he wrote to his first born: "Although thou art my son, remember that thou art only a citizen of Florence." After the failure of the Pazzi conspiracy, which gives us a fearful picture of the Italian state of morals at the time, an archbishop and even a pope being the prominent actors in its criminal schemes, he maintained his temperate, but undisputed sway to his death in 1492, and left it to the less prudent and less vigorous hands of his son, Piero II., while his younger son, Giovanni, was crowned already in his thirteenth year with a cardinal's hat and destined to ascend as Leo X, the papal throne, at the most critical period of its greatest power and greatest danger. The nephew of Lorenzo likewise attained the pontifical dignity as Clement VII.

Such then was the condition of Florence when Savonarola began his career as a preacher of repentance and republican agitator. The liberty of the people was sold to a highly gifted family of bankers; the public treasury embarrassed by reckless expenditure; heathen literature and secular culture flourished more than ever, but in connection with all sorts of sensual enjoyments; the outward forms of religion were observed, but the inward condition of the Church was rotten to the core, and only too faithfully represented by the worldly and immoral popes, who immediately preceded the Reformation. We may apply to this Medicean age the words which Lenau puts into the mouth of Savonarola:

> "Die Künste der Hellenen kannten
> Nicht den Erlöser und sein Licht,
> D'rum scherzten sie so gern und nannten
> Des Schmerzes tiefsten Abgrund nicht."

With this Medicean family and with the cotemporary pope Alexander VI, who in wickedness surpassed all his predecessors in the latter days of Avignon and during the age of the "pornocracy" in the tenth century, Savonarola entered into a conflict of life and death. The two leading ideas of his mind and passions of his heart were the reformation of the Church, and the liberty of Italy. By them he shook the Florentine commonwealth to its base; by them he prepared himself a tragical death, and acquired an immortal name among the martyrs of reform before the reformation.

The mendicant friar opened his activity first in a close hall, then in the garden of San Marco. The growing multitude of hearers compelled him to preach in the church. On the first of August, 1491, he began a series of sermons on his favorite Apocalypse, and derived from it the practical theme: The Church of God must and will be renewed; but before this God will inflict heavy judgments upon Italy; both will take place in the present generation. This he announced with the confidence of divine inspiration. He uncovered the abyss of corruption, that yawned under the splendor of this modern heathenism. He spared no class and condition of society, but attacked with special severity the vices of the clergy and the monks. "Ye know nothing of the Scriptures," he tells them, "ye do not even know grammar; and this would be tolerable, if you were of good life and did set a good example. You keep concubines, ye do worse, ye are notorious gamblers; ye lead lives more flagitious than the seculars, and it is an awful shame that the people should be better than the clergy. I speak not of the good, but of the bad. Give up your mules, give up your hounds and your slaves; waste not the things of Christ, the gains of your benefices on hounds and mules. And the same I have to say to the bishops. If you do not yield up your superfluous benefices which you hold, I tell you, and I proclaim to you, (and this is the word of the Lord), you will lose your lives, your benefices and all your wealth, and ye shall go to the mansion of the devil." "Your sins," he says in another sermon, "make me a prophet. Hitherto I was the prophet Jonas, who exhorted Nineveh to repent. But I tell you, if you do not listen to me, I shall become the prophet Jeremiah, who announced the downfall of Jerusalem and then wept over the ruins of the city. For God will renew his Church, and that has never been done yet without blood." Every image, every word, every event in the prophets of the Old Testament, and the Revelation of John, he applied directly and immediately to his age and country, as if it had all been revealed for the special benefit of Florence, of Rome, of Italy, at the end of the fifteenth century. In an exegetical point of view, his wild allegorical interpretations of prophecy are absolutely worthless. But as specimens of an impassioned Italian eloquence and effectual practical application, they are remarkable.

It was, however, not so much a doctrinal, as a practical and disciplinary reformation which Savonarola aimed at. Wycliffe, Huss, Wesel, Wessel, Goch, and several other mediæval forerunners of the reformation, made a much nearer approach to the doctrinal positions of Protestantism. He felt himself in harmony with the traditional creed of the Roman Catholic Church, as much so as the leaders of the reformatory councils of Pisa, Constance and Basle. He held the holy Virgin in high veneration as the patroness of Florence. His views on practical piety were monastic and ascetic. The severe rigor of the law predominates largely in his sermons, over the winning power of the Gospel. Even in his uncompromising antagonism to the pope and the Roman corruptions, he proceeded more from moral, than dogmatic principles. But we must make allowance for his age and position. The ultimate tendency of his work looked evidently to a thorough reformation of the Catholic Church, which twenty years after his death broke forth with such irresistible force in Germany and Switzerland.

A year after his settlement in Florence (1491) Savonarola was elected prior of the Convent of San Marco. Contrary to custom, he refused to pay a visit on this occasion to the head of the State. This was the more improper as Lorenzo, and his grandfather, Cosmo, were liberal patrons of the Convent. He feared the friendship of Lorenzo more than his enmity. He regarded him as the chief representative of that polished worldliness, which he hated with all the rigor of an ascetic, and as the enemy of the liberty of the people. He directed the arrow of his denunciatory eloquence occasionally to the palace of the Medici and undermined their power. Lorenzo employed all the means of courtesy and prudence to secure the favor of the influential prior; but his tempting offers and indirect bribes were rejected with scorn. In his last sickness he sent for him and asked absolution at his hands. For he was accustomed to pay the Church all the respect which decency and prudence seemed to demand. Savonarola required from him faith, a restitution of all his ill-gotten gains, and the restoration of liberty to Florence. Lorenzo complied with the first two conditions ; at the third demand he turned the face to the wall in silence, and the friar withdrew. Politian, however, who was present, says nothing of the last condition, which rests only on the authority of Burlammacchi and may be a latter addition. According to Politian's account, the prince promised in the strongest terms to amend his life, and received the blessing of the Prior, making the responses in the firmest and gentlest tone.

Lorenzo died, April 8, 1492. His son Piero, had neither his talents nor his moderation. In the same year (Aug. 2) the infamous Cardinal Borgia, a man of uncommon energy and sagacity, and still greater vices, ascended the papal throne as Alexander VI. He had shamelessly bought the triple crown and soiled it with perjury, murder, and incest.* Savonarola at first acquiesced with the rest of Florence in the sovereignty of the new ruler. Perrens quotes a passage which reads almost like adolation of Piero, and contrasts strongly with his harsh demeanor to Lorenzo. But he continued in the style, if not with the authority, of the old prophets, to chastise the sins of the government and to announce in a time of profound peace, the approaching judgment of God over the tyrants of Italy. "The divine word," says Roscoe, "descended not amongst his audience like the dews of heaven; it was the piercing hail, the sweeping whirlwind, the destroying sword."* "Eccegladius Domini super terram cito et velociter," was his oft repeated text, which, however, is not found in this form in the Bible. "I will tell you, he will come in a storm, in the form of Elijah, and the storm will shake the mountains. Over the Alps he will come against Italy, as Cyrus, of whom Isaiah writes."

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* It is distinctly asserted by the distinguished historian, Guicciardini, and others, that Alexander, together with his two sons, kept criminal intercourse with his daughter, Lucretia Borgia. But W. Roscoe, while he denounces this pope as " the scourge of Christendom and the opprobrium of the human race," (Life of Lorenzo, p. 336), has undertaken the defence of his infamous daughter. (Life of Leo X, Bohn's ed. p. 323, ff.)

Soon afterwards, in August, 1494, Charles VIII. of France, crossed the Apennines with a powerful army, but not, as Savonarola hoped and urged, to free Florence and to reform the Church, but to take possession of the vacant throne of Naples. Piero de'Medici concluded a disgraceful treaty and surrendered all the fortified places to the enemy during the war. Florence rose in fury. Piero and all his faction were declared rebels and traitors. They fled from the city and took refuge in Bologna.

This was the crisis, which raised Savonarola to the height of power. He called an assembly of the people to the cathedral and became by common consent the lawgiver of Florence. He laid down four great principles as the ground-work of the new order of things, 1) Fear God; 2) Prefer the good of the republic to your own; 3) A general amnesty; 4) A general council framed on the model of that of Venice, but without a doge. His political and social views he derived substantially from Thomas Aquinas, who had spent much profound thought on the science of government. Like St. Thomas, Savonarola was no enemy to monarchy, but only to despotism. He regarded monarchy as founded in the government of God, the primacy of Peter, and the order of nature—even bees follow a queen. But the peculiar condition of Florence call for a republic. God alone, he said, will be thy King, O Florence, as he was the

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* Life of Lorenzo de'Med., p. 293.

King of Israel, and rebuked them for their desire to have an earthly king, as if he had forsaken them. In this theocracy or christocracy, the principle of love to God and charity to the neighbor, prayers and paternosters should rule. All the exiles were called back with the exception of the Medici.

The people exclaimed, *Viva Christo*, *Viva Firenze*, and entrusted Savonarola in the beginning of 1495 with the organization of the commonwealth on the basis of the ancient Florentine republic and his own theocratic ideal. It comprehended at that time about four hundred and fifty thousand souls, according to curious statistical returns published by Roscoe. About three thousand two hundred of them constituted the Great Council, (Consiglio Maggiore), i. e., the citizens with the right of suffrage and of taking part in public affairs. The Select Council (Consiglio degli Scelti) consisted of eighty members, who were elected half-yearly from the Great Council and entrusted with the legislative power. The executive power rested in the Signory. It was supreme under the control of the Great Council and under Jesus Christ, the only sovereign, who, together with the holy Virgin took special care of Florence and its new constitution. Savonarola's office and position was anomalous and undefined, but only the more influential on that account. It resembled that of the judges in Israel, or of a Roman censor with dictatorial power. He was properly the agent and representative of Christ, the oracular organ of the theocracy. He ruled from the pulpit, his throne, and from his monastic cell the Signory and the Council, and inspired into it his fervid, ascetic and religious enthusiasm. As to the details of the administration he gave himself no concern. "My mind," he confessed afterwards, "was always engaged in great and general affairs, the government of Florence and the reformation of the Church, and cared but little about small things."

The power which this monk exerted as the prophet, legislator and judge of this theocratic republic, during more than three years, is extraordinary, and admitted even by the sober historian, Guicciardini, and the shrewd politician, Machiavelli. The latter, who bases the civil government on purely secular interests, attributes his ruin to popular envy and jealousy, which rises against any person of too elevated a position. The whole population was carried away by his sermons and put them into practice. The theocratic republic had its *pacieri* or peace-officers, who kept order and silence in the church and on the streets; its *correttori*, who inflicted punishments on the delinquents; *limosinieri*, who made collections for religious objects; *lustratori*, who attended to the cleanliness of the crosses and other objects of worship; and even young inquisitors, or boy-censors, who watched over the conduct of men and women, including their parents and the negligent magistrates, stole into houses, seized cards, chessboards, bad books and musical instruments, and burned them up. Ill-gotten gains were restored. Deadly enemies embraced each other. Secular amusements, even the favorite horse-races on St. John's day, were given up. Many women left their husbands to enter a convent, others married with a vow of continence either for a time or forever; Savonarola declared that in a perfect state marriage would cease altogether in Florence. Fasting was a pleasure. The communion, heretofore celebrated hardly once in a year, became the daily food of the faithful. Crowds from the city, and the country, even from Pisa and Leghorn, flocked to the cathedral, where the seats were built up in an amphitheatre, and where the pulpit bore the inscription: "Jesus Christ, King of the city of Florence," to hear their spiritual leader thunder against the *Tiepidi* or the lukewarm; the *Arrabiati*, who were infuriated at his doctrines; the *Compagnacci*, or libertines, who detested his austerities and longed for the return of the gay times of the Medici; against luxury, usury, covetousness, sensuality, gambling, splendid and immodest apparel. Frequently in the midst of their devotions they rushed to the public squares, crying *Viva Christo*, dancing in circles, and singing the hymns of Savonarola and his disciple, Girolamo Benivieni. The celebrabrated painter, Fra Bartolomeo, also a Dominican of San Marco, cast all his naked figures into the fire, and was disposed at times to give up painting altogether as in itself sinful. A cotemporary remarks, "The whole people of Florence went crazy from love to Christ." "And yet," replied Savonarola, "there is no higher wisdom than this folly for Christ's sake." But how easily such a frantic zeal for religion turns over into downright profanity, may be seen from the procession on Palm Sunday in 1496, which was to take the place of the carnival. Not less than 8000 children with red crosses, and grown persons clad in white, like children, went dancing before the tabernacle in the public place and chanting the wildest Christian Bacchanalia:

"Non fu mai più bel solazzo
Più giocondo ne maggiore,
Che per zelo e per amore
Di Giesù divenir pazzo,
Ognun grida com' io grido
Semper pazzo, pazzo, pazzo."

In a sermon of the following Monday in the holy week, Savonarola sanctioned all this sacred revelry by the example of David dancing before the ark; of Elijah running and dancing before the King when the rain came down; of the apostles on the day of Pentecost, when they were charged with intoxication; of St. Paul, when accused of madness by Festus; yea of Christ himself, of whom the people said, "He is beside himself," (Mark 3, 21).*

Such an extravagant enthusiasm could, in the nature of the case, not last long. The Italians are a most excitable and changeable people. They had long lost the virtues necessary to secure and enjoy the freedom of law and the law of freedom. The natural spirit of Florence reacted against the rule of a monastic theocracy and conspired with a powerful ally, the pope, against Savonarola.

A more striking contrast than is presented to us in Savonarola and the cotemporary Alexander VI, can hardly be imagined. It was impossible that the most rigorous monk and the most dissolute pope could long remain at the head of two neighboring States. The Dominican reformer directed the severest blows of his denunciatory eloquence to what he abhorred as the source of all the corruptions of the Church, the Romish Babylon and its monstrous representative. The cunning pope tried at first to silence him by tempting bribes, and offered him the archbishopric of Florence with the prospect of a Cardinal's hat. The monk replied: I wish no other red hat, but the hat of martyrdom.* Then Alexander cited him to Rome, first by polite invitation, then by peremptory demand. Savonarola refused, assigning as excuses, sickness, engagement and the danger of assassination on the way. The pope, in October, 1496, prohibited him to preach and threatened him with excommunication. Savonarola suspended his sermons for a short time, but following the impulse of his spirit and encouraged by his ardent admirers, he ascended the pulpit again. Still bound in the chains of the Romish system he labored to reconcile his open rebellion against Alexander with the doctrine of absolute obedience to the successor of St. Peter, and bewildered himself and his hearers by sophistic distinctions. " Who has inhibited my preaching ? You say, the pope. I answer you, it is false. But here are the briefs. I deny that they are of the pope. You say, the pope cannot err. This is true, but it is equally true that a Christian, as far as he is a Christian, cannot sin. Yet many Christians sin, because they are men. Thus the pope, as far as he is pope, cannot err; when he errs, he is not pope. If he commands that which is wrong, he does not command it as pope. It follows, then, that this brief, which is such a wicked brief, is not from the pope. It is of the devil, not of God. I say, and you know it, that I am manifestly sent by God to tell you this distinctly ; and I must preach, though I have to contend against the whole world, and I shall conquer in the end." He thus laid claim to a commission superior to that of the pope, and appealed from the infallibility of Alexander to the infallibility of his private judgment. With manifest allusion to him he declared, "The popes disdain the more decorous vice of nepotism; they publicly call their bastards by the name of sons." He spoke also, like Crysostom, of the Herodias dancing and demanding the head of John the Baptist.

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* Predica 41, sopra Amos.

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* " so non voglio cappelli, non mitre grande nè piciole ; non voglio se non quello che tu hai dato alli tuoi Santi ; la morte, uno cappello rosso, uno cappello di sangue."

In the meantime, however, the affairs at home and the political aspect of the country turned rather against him. The Franciscans, always jealous of the Dominicans, sided with the pope in the attempt to ruin him. A plague broke out in Florence, (June, 1496), for which he knew no miraculous cure, except works of charity. Perrens charges him with a want of Christian courage and self-denial in avoiding exposure and shutting himself up in his cell; but other authorities say, that he refused the many places of retirement offered to him, and remained to console the afflicted, the secular as well as the brethren. Charles VIII, of France, from whom he had hoped in vain a regeneration of Italy and the Church, was compelled to withdraw soon after the conquest of Naples, as the Italian States, led by the pope, united against him. Florence became very unpopular on account of her French alliance, and was threatened by invasion from the neighbors. The Medicean party made an effort to regain its power, and united with the Arrabiati (the malignants) against the common object of their hatred. At one time they desecrated the pulpit with filth and placed a dead ass on the preacher's seat. Then a conspiracy was formed, supposed to have its centre in Rome. It was discovered in time, and ended with the summary execution of the five leaders of high rank, (Aug. 21, 1497), without their being permitted to appeal to the Great Council. But the friends of the Medicean faction meditated revenge, and threatened the life of Savonarola, who had not lifted up his voice for mercy. His friends found it necessary to give him a military guard on his way to the pulpit.

Encouraged by these circumstances, the pope threw off all his temporizing lenity. In May and again in October, 1497, he hurled the sentence of excommunication against Savonarola on account of heretical doctrines and obstinate rebellion to the holy see. The sentence was to be publicly read in the churches.

Savonarola, encouraged by a new Signory elected January 1st, 1498, and consisting mainly of the Frateschi, his partisans, celebrated mass in great splendor, gave the holy elements to the magistrates, ascended the pulpit and commenced his last course of sermons, on Exodus, while the Arrabiati beat drums around the cathedral, threw stones and endeavored to interrupt the services in every way. He denied the charge of heresy, declared the sentence of excommunication null and void and appealed from the earthly pope to the heavenly head of the Church. "I lay down this axiom, there is no man that may not deceive himself. The pope himself may err. You are mad if you deny it. How many wicked popes have there been who have erred. How many constitutions have popes issued, annulled by other popes; how many opinions of popes are contrary to those of other popes. . . Our doctrine has enforced holy living; their doctrine leads to all evil doings, to luxuriant eating and drinking, to avarice, concubinage, to the sale of benefices, to many lies and to all wickedness. Christ! on which side wilt thou be?—on that of truth or of lies? of the excommunicated or of the blessed? . . The Lord will be with the excommunicated, the Devil with the blessed." He is said to have declared that he would rather go to hell than to ask absolution from such a pope.

At the same time he prepared himself for the worst, and exhorted men, women and children to be ready to die for Christ. "If you ask me," he said in a sermon at the end of March, "what will be the end of this conflict, I say: Victory. If you ask more particularly, I answer: Death. The master after having used the hammer, casts it off. So he did with Jeremiah, whom he permitted to be stoned at the end of his preaching. But Rome can not extinguish this fire, and if it should be extinguished, God will kindle another, and it is already kindled every where, although they do not know it."

At the carnival of that year the most gorgeous religious processions were held and an auto-da-fe celebrated in the presence of the Signory; marble busts of female beauties, ancient and modern, splendid copies of Petrarca and Boccaccio were publicly committed to the flames, amidst the sound of trumpets, the ringing of bells and the chanting of the Te Deum; then followed another procession and wild dances of friars, priests, and laymen of every age, "whirling round in fantastic reel, to the passionate and profanely-sounding hymns of Jerome Beniviene."

Alexander was furious, and menaced Florence with the terrible interdict, if the city permitted the excommunicated monk to preach. The Signory endeavored to conciliate him. But Savonarola boldly appealed to Christendom and wrote letters to the emperor of Germany, the kings of France, Spain, England and Hungary, urging them earnestly to call a free Council for the reformation of the Church and the deposition of a pope, who was no pope, but guilty of sacrilegious simony and the most monstrous vices, who was no Christian, but an absolute infidel and atheist.* Of these fatal letters one was intercepted by the Duke of Milan and forwarded to Rome. On the 13th of March the pope dispatched a new bull imperatively commanding the Signory to execute the former decrees. The Council was divided; the Piagnoni and the Arabbiati contested every point. Finally they entreated the monk, for the sake of the peace of Florence, to cease from preaching.

At this juncture, Savonarola thought proper to obey, and preached a farewell sermon in the confident hope that the Lord would soon compel him to ascend the pulpit again.

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* Ad Imperatorem: Affirmo ipsum non esse Christianum qui nullum prorsus putans Deum esse, omne infidelitatis et impietatis culmen excessit. Ad Reg. Hisp.: Scitote enim hunc Alexandrum VI. minime pontificem esse, qui non potest non modo ob simoniacam sacrilegamque pontificatus usurpationem et manifesta ejus scelera; sed propter secreta facinora a nobis loco et tempore proferenda quae universus mirabitur et exsecrabitur orbis. See the Italian translation of these two Epistles in full in Rudelbach's biography of Savon. p. 462 ff. The Latin original was first published by Perrens.

But he was mistaken. His own indiscretion and the fanaticism of his disciples precipitated his fate. He solemnly appealed, on the balcony of the church of St. Marc, with the host in his hand, to a judgment of God, and proposed, according to the superstition of the age, the ordeal of fire or other miraculous tests, such as the raising of a dead body, whereby the Almighty himself might decide the momentous question concerning the truth or falsehood of his preaching and prophecy. Other accounts state that the first challenge proceeded from the Franciscans, who always jealous of the Dominicans, were his most bitter enemies. At all events, one of them, Fra Francesco di Puglia, preacher of the church of Santa Croce, (now the pantheon of Italian geniuses), was willing to stand the ordeal of fire. Savonarola, whose courage in action was by no means equal to his courage in word, vacillated, and then declined the perilous appeal. But his devoted friend and partizan, Fra Domenico Buonvicini, the aged prior of the Dominican Convent at Fiesole, eagerly accepted the challenge. Other monks of St. Mark, and even women and children declared themselves ready to risk their lives for what they regarded the cause of God. As Fra Francesco would not condescend to confront any other adversary than Savonarola, a Franciscan convert, Giuliano di Rondinelli, took his place as the champion of the Franciscan order and the cause of the pope, against Fra Domenico, the champion of the Dominican order and the divine mission of Savonarola.

The midday hour of the seventh of April, 1498, the same day, in which Charles VIII of France suddenly died, was fixed upon for the terrible trial, by which the following propositions of Savonarola, drawn up in legal form, were to be sanctioned or condemned by the miraculous interposition of God. 1) The Church of God must and shall be reformed after being scourged (flagellato). 2) After the visitation of divine judgments, Florence, like the Church, will attain to great prosperity. 3) The infidels will be converted to Christianity. 4) These things will take place in the present generation. 5) The papal excommunication is null and void, and those who disregard it, do not sin.* Two piles of wood, covered with pitch and oil and charged with gunpowder, were erected on the place of the Signory and divided by a narrow path, through which the two champions should pass in quick succession. The Signory awaited the spectacle on a lofty balcony; a loggia was provided for the monks; an immense crowd of spectators covered the ground, the roofs and the windows in every direction; five hundred soldiers, besides several hundred Compagnacci and Frateschi kept order. Savonarola, before he proceeded to the place of the ordeal, celebrated mass at St. Mark's, but expressed some doubts, in his short discourse, as to its issue, or as to whether it actually would take place, God not having revealed it. The two rival orders marched in solemn procession from opposite directions with crosses and torches and chanting the 68th Psalm: "Let God arise, let his enemies be scattered: let them also that hate him, flee before his presence. As smoke is driven away, so drive them away; as wax melteth before the fire, so let the wicked perish at the presence of God. But let the righteous be glad; let them rejoice before God: yea, let them exceedingly rejoice." Savonarola, in his priestly robes, bore the host and placed it on the altar, at which Fra Domenico knelt in humble devotion. The Signory gave the signal to proceed to the trial.

But now, when the fire was kindled and the assembled multitude was raised to the pitch of anxious expectation, there arose a singular altercation about the question, whether the two champions should carry the cross or the host into the flames, as the Dominicans proposed, while the Franciscans raised a cry of horror at such a sacrilegious exposure of the Saviour's body. The fierce dispute was protracted till evening, when in the midst of growing tumult and confusion, suddenly a torrent of rain descended from heaven and extinguished the flames!

This disgraceful failure deprived Savonarola for ever of the popular favor, which belongs to the changing vanities of life. The spell of his power was broken. The whole fury of the disappointed crowds burst upon him. He who shortly before had been almost idolized, was now mercilessly denounced as a "poltroon, hypocrite, impostor and false prophet." With difficulty, and amid curses and peltings, he returned with the broken procession, and only the body guard and the supposed miraculous power or inherent sacredness of the host he bore, saved him from the execution of mob-judgment. For the last time he entered the gates of San Marco and for the last time he ascended the pulpit to give an exposition of the events of the day to a few hearers and to dismiss them in peace.

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* We have condensed the eight propositions into five, leaving out nothing essential.

On the following day, which was Palm Sunday, the Arrabiati, assisted by hundreds of low ruffians, besieged the convent and fought with the Dominican monks till midnight, while Savonarola lay on his knees before the altar. At length the Signory sent commissioners with peremptory orders to seize him, together with Domenico Buonvicini and Silvestro Maruffi. On his way to the palace he was grossly insulted and mockingly asked: "Prophesy, who it was that smote thee." Some ruffian kicked him behind, and said: "There is the seat of his prophetic power."

On the 9th the Signory commenced the examination of the prisoners and continued it till the 19th, with the exception of Easter day. According to the cruel custom of the age, Savonarola was submitted to the torture, which, as Perrens remarks, he had himself proposed to obstinate gamblers. With his delicate and sensitive frame, he broke down at once and confessed all they asked, that his prophecies were no inspirations, but his own calculations or inferences from the Scriptures, and that ambition and love of power were the only motives of his actions. But as soon as the agony was over, he revoked his admissions. The repetition of the horrid process and the intervening intermissions wrung forth the same contradiction of confession and recantation, on which it was impossible to frame a legal process. A villanous notary by the name of

Francesco Ceccone, who had been involved in the last conspiracy in favor of Piero de Medici, offered his services at the price of four hundred scudi (although he received only thirty in the end), for the infamous work of manufacturing a minute report, which was substituted for the genuine record and published to wondering Florence. The charge of this forgery rests not only on the authority of Savonarola's admiring biographers, Burlammacchi and Pico de Mirandola, but also on that of the impartial Nardi and the grave Guicciadini, and is confirmed by the process itself as published by Quetif, and more recently by Guidici. On the 19th of April the report was read to Savonarola; he answered in ambiguous phrase: "What I have written is true," or like Pilate: "What I have written, I have written." When one of his apostate disciples, Malatesta Sacramoro, witnessed against him: "Ex ore tuo credidi, et ex ore tuo discredo," he deigned no reply. He asked the brethren of San Marco to take good care of the novices, to keep them in the fear of God and the simplicity of Christian life, and to pray for him now, when the prophetical Spirit of God had almost entirely forsaken him.*

He was confined to his prison without further examination for a month. During this time, he wrote a commentary on the penitential Psalm 51, and a part of Psalm 31, with a broken and contrite spirit, accusing himself of pride and ambition, but crying out of the depth of his misery to the infinite mercy of God and finding peace in the merit of the Redeemer. "Misery," he says, "surrounds me and besieges me like a strong army; my friends have gone over to the enemy; all that I see and hear, wears the color of sadness. The recollection of my friends and spiritual children fills me with grief; the thought of my cell and my studies pains me; the weight of my sins depresses me. Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me out of the hands of mine enemies? Who will fight for me, protect and help me? Whither shall I fly? I will fly to the Invisible and lead him as a host against anything visible. The Lord is my refuge and my fortress: my God; in him will I trust. (Ps. 91: 2.) In thee, O Lord, do I put my trust; let me never be ashamed: deliver me in thy righteousness. (Ps. 31: 1.) This is comfort indeed. Let sorrow, with all its host, press against me; let the world rise up against me. I confide in God, and my refuge is with the Most High. In thee, O Lord, have I trusted. Therefore I pray thee first of all, to deliver me from my sins; for the sins are the greatest tribulation, and the source of all other tribulations. Take away, O Lord, my sins, and I am free of all tribulation. In thee, O Lord, do I trust; deliver me by thy righteousness, and not my own; for I seek mercy, and offer not my righteousness. . . . No man is justified before God by the works of the law. . . . Thy mercy is thy righteousness for us, O Lord; but it would not be mercy, if it came from the merit of works. Deliver me through thy righteousness, even thy Son, Jesus Christ, who is the righteousness by which man is justified." This is evidently a very near approach to the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. Hence Luther re-published Savonarola's exposition of Psalm 51 in 1523, and accompanied it with a very commendatory preface, in which he undertook to canonize the excommunicated author, though the popes and papists should burst.*

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* "Lo Spirito della profetia m'ha al tutto abbandonato," as Burlammacchi, or "quem Spiritus pene prorsus deseruit," as Pico de Mirandola reports.

The pope was highly rejoiced and congratulated the Signory on their vigorous measures against the rebellious impostor, but wished them, after having tried him for all the political crimes, to forward him to Rome that he might be tried for his religious offences. He absolved all those who were engaged in the outrages on the convent of Saint Mark on Palm Sunday, even if guilty of homicide, and promised restoration and plenary indulgence to all the Piagnoni who should repent of their errors. But the Signory, which in the mean time had been newly elected, after disfranchising two hundred members of the Great Council, friendly to Savonarola, humbly asked permission to punish him by a public execution at Florence, that the deluded people might be thoroughly disabused. The real reason was their fear that he might reveal at Rome the political events of Florence. Alexander yielded to this request, whereupon they basely thanked him for his "divine virtue and immense goodness." He condemned Savonarola by what is called the *oraculum vivae vocis*, on the ground simply of Ceccone's falsified records sent to him, as a heretic, schismatic, persecutor of the holy Church and seducer of the people, and appointed the General of the Dominican order, Giovacchino Turriano, a mild but very old man, and a Spanish doctor of merciless severity, Francesco Romolino, as the two commissioners to preside in his name over the execution of an inviolable priest. Alexander is reported to have remarked: "Die he must, though he were John the Baptist," and Romolino declared on his arrival at Florence: "We shall make a fine blaze, for I have the sentence of condemnation (la sententia formata) safe in my hands."

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* "Das ist," says Luther, "ein Exempel der evangelischen Lehre und christlichen Frömmigkeit. Denn hier siehst du ihn einhertreten nicht als einen Predigermönch im Vertrauen auf seine Gelübde, Ordensregeln, Mönchskutte, Messen und die guten Werke seines Ordens, sondern im Vertrauen auf Gottes Barmherzigkeit, als einen gemeinen Christen. . . . Es durfte zwar der damalige Antichrist sich die Hoffnung machen, das Andenken dieses so grossen Mannes würde verlöschen, auch unter dem Fluche sein; aber siehe, er lebet, und sein Gedächtniss ist im Segen. Christus canonisirt ihn durch uns, sollten gleich die Päpste und Papisten miteinander darüber zerbersten."

On the 20th of May a new examination took place before the papal commissioners, of which Nardi gives an account.* Romolino questioned him two days about his heresies and schisms, the vituperations of Alexander and connections with cardinals inimical to him, his letters to the kings concerning the General Council and the deposition of the pope, his pride and madness and factious turbulence in Florence. Savonarola showed the same wonderful struggle between the weakness of the flesh and the courage of the spirit. He admitted all and recanted all. He confessed on the torture what he denied afterwards. He imploringly prayed to Jesus to forgive him his treasonable weakness. "God thou hast caught me," (colto), he said before his inquisitors in the chamber of suffering, "I confess I have denied Christ, I have told lies. O Signory of Florence, bear me witness, that I have denied him from fear of torture ; if I must suffer, better that I suffer for the truth. What I have said, I received of God—God, grant me repentance for having denied thee from fear of torture." This is the key to the whole process.

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* Signor Guidici has published, from the Magliabecchian Library, the "Processo di Frate Girolamo Savonarola," in the Appendice alla Storia Politica dei Municipi Italiani, 1850.

On such contradictory testimony of a strong weak man the sentence of death was pronounced, May 22, on Fra Girolamo and his two faithful followers, Fra Domenico, the prior of the Dominican convent at Fiesole, and Fra Silvestro Maruffi, a visionary somnambulist. Girolamo spent the last night in fervent prayer, meditation and quiet rest, smiling and talking in his sleep. In the morning of the execution, the 23rd of May, the day before the Ascension of 1498, he partook of the holy communion and implored the Saviour, who shed his blood for him, to forgive him any sins known or unknown, which he had committed since his baptism, and any scandal he had occasioned to the city and people of Florence. To a priest, who asked him whether he was ready to die, he replied: "My Lord was willing to die for my sins, why should I not cheerfully give my poor life from love to him."* The piazza de' Signori was crowded by spectators. The prisoners were stripped of their sacerdotal robes, and left with only a long wollen shirt—their feet naked. When at this ceremony of ignominious degredation the bishop of Vasona, a Dominican and former pupil of Savonarola, pronounced, in the name of the pope, the awful words: "I separate you from the Church militant and the Church triumphant." Savonarola said: "From the Church militant, but not from the Church triumphant, for that is out of thy power." Romolino read the sentence of death, in which heresy was mentioned as the only crime, and offered at the same time plenary absolution, in the pope's name, which was humbly accepted. Then the sentence of the Signoria was read, based partly on the alleged crimes of the falsified records, partly on the degradation of the monks by the papal commissioners.

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*Or more fully according to the account of Picus: "Nonne ob eum emoriar ego libentissime, qui pro eo quo me hominem peccatis infectum amore complectebatur, voluit innocentissime mori? Nonne ego animam hanc ejus gratia libenter effundam, qui nec pro millesima eorum unquam, quae pro me tulit, parte satisfacere possim ?"

The prisoners were now successively tied to gibbets, erected in the form of a cross, and committed to the flames. Silvestro died first, exclaiming with a loud voice: "Lord, into thy hands I commit my spirit." Then followed Domenico, who was convinced to the last of the innocence and the divine mission of his friend. Savonarola had to witness the sufferings of his friends, of which he was the cause, and to hear the insulting taunts of his enemies: "Now, monk, is the time to perform miracles." He prohibited his fellow sufferers from making any confession of their innocence, preferring to die in silence, like the Lamb of God carried to the slaughter. As he ascended the steps of the scaffold, he recited the Apostles' Creed. He cast once more a silent glance at the people. For a moment the flames were blown aside and exposed the bodies untouched, which the few remaining partizans regarded as a miracle. While his arm was burning, his right hand was seen raised as in the act of pronouncing the benediction. Some young wretches threw a volley of stones at the gibbets.

The ashes were carried to the bridge and cast into the Arno. Yet some real or supposed relics of bones and splinters of the gibbets became the treasures of succeeding generations, and his admiring biographer, Pico, reports various miracles performed after his death, which he attributes exclusively to this cause, that he was hated by the wicked and beloved by the holy. The manner of Savonarola's death, his crucifixion between two monks, the character of Alexander VI, as compared with Caiaphas, his temporary friendship with Florence, resembling the friendship of Herod and Pilate, etc., gave rise, as in the case of St. Francis of Assisi, to a disgusting and almost blasphemous comparison of the Dominican monk with the Saviour of the world. With great poetic beauty, but still exceeding the limits of historical truth, Lenau thus describes the last moments of his hero:

"Diess Antlitz auf dem Sterbensgange
Ist nicht des Sünders Angesicht,
Der an dem steilen Todeshange
Voll Schwindelangst zusammenbricht;

Auch ist es nicht das eh'rne Trotzen
Fanatikers, voll Gluth und Kraft,
Dem noch die Todesblicke strotzen
Von Flüchen wilder Leidenschaft.

Sein Antlitz is ein hoher Friede,
Sein Schweigen seliges Gebet,
Ein Rauschen nach dem Heimathliede,
Das tröstend ihm herüberweht.

Nun ist sein Auge hell erglommen,
Und blühend sich die Wange malt:
Das ist der himmlische Willkommen,
Der auf den Dulder niederstrahlt.

Und als er zum Schaffote schreitet,
Und mancher seiner Freunde jetzt
Nach ihm die Arme weinend breitet,
Spricht er den Trauernden zuletzt:

Verbrennt man mich, seid unerschrocken;
Wenn meine Asche treibt der Wind,
So denkt, dass diess nur Blüthenflocken
Vom schönen Frühling Gottes sind."

With Savonarola died the ecclesiastical reform, and the republican liberty of Florence, which became the prey of the Grand Dukes of Medici. Two descendants of this house, Leo X, who once fled before the face of Savonarola, and Clement VII, ascended the papal throne and opposed and promoted the Protestant reformation, while another descendant, Catharine of Medici, is inseparably connected with the horrible massacre of St. Bartholomew. The most dissolute state of morals took the place of ascetic rigor in Florence, and for some time there seemed to be no greater crime, than to have believed the great preacher of San Marco, and to have desired a reformation of the Church of

Rome.* Still he retained a few faithful friends, as his biographers, Pico de' Mirandola, and Burlammacchi, and the celebrated painter, Fra Bartolomeo, who, on returning from the scene of execution, drew a halo of glory round the picture of Savonarola, which still hangs in his cell at San Marco, with the inscription: Vir apostolicus. In the Dominican order a reaction took place in his favor, and he was revered as a prophet, moral reformer and martyr. Even his canonization was demanded, and is said to have been contemplated by Julius II. The Jesuits declared their willingness to give him a place in the supplementary volume to the Acta Sanctorum for May, provided the superiors of the Dominican order would procure the permission of the Roman see. But it would puzzle even their scholastic subtelty to reconcile the excommunication and execution of Savonarola by one infallible pope, with his canonization by another. On the other hand, Luther also, as already stated, from an imperfect knowledge of his works, has boldly undertaken to canonize him in the name of Protestantism. We have already remarked, that Savonarola contemplated no doctrinal reformation, in the sense of Luther, or Zwingli, or Calvin, but a moral and disciplinary, a monastic and ascetic reform of the Roman court, the clergy and the people, like the leaders of the Great Councils of Pisa, Constance and Basil. Nevertheless his proper place, especially in view of his conflict with Rome, is among the many forerunners of the great Reformation of the sixteenth century.

Savonarola wrote a great number of works in Latin and in Italian, sermons, religious and political tracts, epistles, and poems. Even Bayle, who regards him as a false prophet, admits that several of his writings are full of unction and piety. His sermons on the Apocalypse, Haggai, Amos, Ezekiel, Zechariah, the Psalms and the Book of Exodus were mostly taken down and published by his admirers, but give us even in their imperfect state an idea of the power he once wielded from the pulpit. His "Compendium Revelationum" (compendio di rivelazioni) written in 1495, is important for his inner history and his claim to prophecy, which it asserts and defends at length. He derives his prophetic mission directly from God, who alone knows the future, and indignantly rejects all arts of divination, especially astrology. Then in a visionary dialogue with the Tempter he suggests and labors to refute every possible objection to his supernatural gift, in a manner that reminds one of the French proverb: "Qui s'excuse, s'accuse." His predictions, he says, cannot proceed from divination and astrology, which he rejects; nor from a disorded imagination, which is belied by his profound knowledge of philosophy and the Scriptures; nor from the deception of the Devil, who knows not the future and opposes the good of his preaching; nor from foolish dreaming women, for he seldom conversed with a female. He confidently appeals to the fruits of his preaching as the crowning test of his higher mission. Rudelbach has devoted a long chapter of his biography (p. 281–333) to the consideration of this confident claim of Savonarola, and comes to the conclusion that he may be called a prophet in the same sense as Joachim of Floris, St. Brigitta, and other monks of the middle ages, who witnessed against the corruptions of the Church, and foretold some kind of a reformation. But such predictions may be mostly explained as rational inferences from the Scriptures and the signs of the times on the ground of an extraordinary power of divination. Most of Savonarola's prophecies are so loose and general, that they exclude themselves from the test of events. His most specific prophecies, concerning the intentions of Charles VIII of France, the speedy conversion of the Turks and Moors, of which he stated he could give the year, the month and even the day, and the promise to Florence of an age of unexampled prosperity after her tribulations, have manifestly proved idle dreams of a pious imagination. He himself notices the objection that he had prophesied many things which were untrue, and helps himself by the subtle distinction between what he spoke as man, and what he spoke as prophet. The Holy Spirit, he said, did not always dwell in the prophet! The prediction of a reformation is the only one which was fulfilled, but neither in his own age, as he confidently asserted, nor for Florence and Italy, which rejected it, nor in the manner which he desired. His ascetic treatises on the Lord's Prayer, and on the Simplicity of Christian Life, contain much that is sound and edifying. His most mature theological production is the "*Triumph of the Cross*, (Triumphus crucis, sive de veritate fidei) of the year 1497.* It is a defence of the Christian religion against the skeptical tendencies, which arose with the revival of letters, especially in Italy, among the higher classes, including prelates, cardinals and popes. He represents Christ as the conqueror, with the crown of thorns, bearing in his left hand the cross and the instruments of martyrdom, holding in the right the Holy Scriptures, riding on a triumphal car, preceded by the patriarchs, prophets and apostles, surrounded by the martyrs and great teachers of the Church, and followed by the innumerable host of believers.

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* "Ne'quali tempi pareva," says Nardi, "che nessuno vizio fusse piu vergognoso o reprensibile, che l'haver creduto al Frate ò desiderato la riforma de'costumi nella corte Romana."

P S.

Mercersburg, Pa., March, 1858.

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* The author of the article in the Lond. Quart. Rev., above referred to, in correcting Dr Madden, informs us that an English translation of this work was published at Cambridge in 1661, under the title: The Truth of the Christian Faith; or the Triumph of the Cross of Christ. By Hier. Savonarola. Done into English out of the Author's own Italian copy (Trionfo della Croce.) The fine poetic Preface is omitted.

Art. II.—HOW LITTLE WE KNOW!

How little we know!—of the divine; it might be said, of the spiritual, of the heavenly! But the thought has a nearer aspect. How little we know of ourselves, of our present being, of the moving visible things around us! A few steps even here, and every thing grows dim,—a little farther, and all is darkness. The soul starts back appalled at the disclosure of the vast unknown. It is the awe, not only of the undiscovered that stretches so far beyond our remotest science, but of the ineffable that lies directly above our most common knowledge,—of the deeply mysterious that mingles itself with our most ordinary being. It is a fearful thought, this *terra incognita* that lies so near us, this dense obscurity that rests upon those prime properties of matter and force which so constantly affect our daily sight and handling.

We need not go out of the physical, the nearest physical, to find ourselves involved in densest mystery. Take any product of nature, or nature in its universality, and how soon are we brought to a stand by any one of the three most general questions that may be proposed respecting it, *What* is it? *How* is it? *Why* is it? The first we answer most imperfectly through classifications and generalizations, each to be deranged, or thrown aside, on farther knowledge; to the second, we reply most dimly, through assumed laws ever tending to resolve themselves finally into the very phenomena to be explained; to the third there comes from nature no response at all, not even the self-cheating echo of our own voices, to tell us *why* we are, and *why* the worlds exist.

But transfer the inquiry to that higher plane of the spiritual, the divine, the eternal. How voiceless here is our science; how little trustworthy in itself our highest philosophy! Next to "*the fear of the Lord*," is this *awe of the unknown*. As the one is "the beginning of Wisdom," that is, religon in the Bible sense of the word, so is the other the commencement of all right philosophising. It is this that distinguished the Socratic from every other form of ancient or modern thought,—the knowledge of our ignorance! In his interpretations of the Delphic Oracle, Socrates styles it the soul's *καθαρσις*, or purification. It was this scepticism, this religious scepticism, that became the preparation for a true faith, and furnished the best hope of understanding the oracular *γνωθι σεαυτον*. Let no one shrink from the word. It is the best commendation of this religious *scepticism*, that it is, in all respects, the opposite to the most rampant spirit of modern infidelity.

How little we know! We feel strong in the conviction, that it is this thought which our modern world most needs. It might abate the pretensions of our literary class, so called, by leading them to feel how slight, after all, is the comparative difference, or any difference, between them and the common mind. It might make our man of science more modest, by showing him of how little avail are all his discoveries to cure the real ignorance, or relieve the real helplessness of mankind. Certainly is it time for our schools of philosophy to begin to doubt their power of solving either the cosmical or the human problem. How much longer must they continue to talk about the Absolute and Infinite One, his being, his personality or impersonality, his mode of intelligence and action? Are they not weary of the question, How does God *think*, and how "is there knowledge in the Most High," when after four thousand years of wrangling they have not yet begun to settle the first question in anthropology,—how does *man think*, and what is human knowing? Is it an action or a passion, innate in any sense, or wholly from without! All human inquiry needs the chastening of such a feeling, but especially would it seem necessary for that strangest of all paradoxes, the theological polemic. For him, beyond all other men, is there need of the Socratic spirit, and that Socratic maxim which is in such perfect harmony with the whole tenor of divine revelation.

How little we know of ourselves! *Who* are we? *Why* are we? *Where* are we? *When* are we? *How* are we? *Whence* came we? *Whither* go we? Qui? Quare? Ubi? Quando? Quomodo? Unde? Quo? Within this mystic seven, lies every thing that can be thought of the destiny of our world and race. What a dim outline map, what an unfilled blank, may we rather say, is even this small part of all that is, this nearest province to us of the whole of being. Here and there a few points faintly illumined by certain in-born, divinely given and divinely matured ideas of the human soul; a few shadows rendered visible by what are called the discoveries of science, though what these shadows truly are, and why they thus come and go, she cannot tell. Across it falls a ray from heaven, a line of light, narrow but clear, and infinitely precious, giving some guidance in the unbending aim of its own direction, whilst it casts a deeper shade of contrast on either side,—satisfying, indeed, the gaze that is ever fixed on its own steady illumination, yet to the wandering eye revealing often spectres of doubt and difficulty that never would have been known, or thought of, in the unrelieved darkness of nature.

We stand, then, upon the position, that for any satisfactory answer to these questions, for any answer at all to the most important of them, we look in vain to the highest past, present, or probable future amount of any thing the world has ever called science or philosophy. It is only of late that the former has even ventured to make the claim; the latter has often attempted the solution of some of them, and by her own confession, has just as often utterly and miserably failed. But it is not failure merely. The light they give us, certainly on all but questions *second* and *third*, or our position in space and time, is absolutely nothing; or rather, may we say, every seeming advance only increases the obscurity. The faint beams they throw upon the future, only make the deeper shade; the more light, the more darkness; the more knowledge the more mystery—the latter ever exceeding, and increasing in a more rapid rate than, the first.

If this be so, the conclusion from it all need not be formally stated. For all thinking minds, for all serious minds, there can be but one issue. Bible or no Bible, Revelation or no Revelation, becomes the question transcending all others. Has the silence of nature ever been broken? Has the Infinite ever come down directly to the finite soul? Has God ever really spoken to this distant world? Not,—Have we found Him? "Can we by searching find out Him?" but has he found *us?* and made himself known to us, not only as the Great Power of nature, the Preserving Life of the world as a whole, the "God of laws," the *causa causarum*, the Supreme Intelligence, knowing the parts only in their organic relations to the whole,—not only, we say, as Deity, or Divinity, or God in general, but as *our* God, our Father, our Redeemer, our Salvation, our Eternal Home. Has He found *us*, we say again? Has he found *us* lost wanderers in the wilderness of infinity? Has his supernatural voice ever come forth from his holy heavens, saying unto *us*, "This is the way, walk ye therein and ye shall find rest unto your souls"? Do we thus know Him as one who *knows us*, or with something of that knowledge which, in reference to its perfect state, is styled by the Apostle, "a knowing even *as we are known*." Such is revelation strictly. It is ever supernatural in its very idea. It is the history of God's supernatural dealings in our world,—of the supernatural as anciently manifested in a chosen nation, thus severed from all the other nations, and now in the Christian Church, thus also distinctly marked off and made the abode of a peculiar power, separate from all other influences, moral or physical, social or political. So also may it be said of the Scripture that contains this revelation. It is not ink and paper; it is not a mere writing; it is not a book simply containing certain words submitted to each man's private philology to be studied as he would study nature, but a *Living Word,* [*] an εμφυτος λογος, growing into the very souls of those who receive it, and having its true historical being only in connection with a *Living People,* in whom its divine power is ever historically and supernaturally attested. In distinction from this, we may talk of a revelation *through* nature, or *by* nature; the real thought intended may be well enough, and true enough in itself; but the language is a perversion of speech and ideas. In one very partial sense, and even then, to a very limited extent, it may be true that "science," as one of high repute,[†] has lately said, "is the knowledge of God," but of God ever as a Power *in* nature, ever as an Intelligence, great indeed, but looking only to natural ends as well as through natural means,—all-knowing indeed, but knowing wholes or parts only in their organic relation to the all. Thus nature *makes known,* but it is revelation strictly that makes us "*know* even as *we are known;*" and this is faith directly connecting the finite with the Infinite soul. It is faith, the gift of God, coming to us through supernatural means, and thus a supernatural knowledge as well as the knowledge of the supernatural.

But to take our questions in the order proposed. *Who* are we? In other words, what is our place, not in space, but in the scale of being? We know some things below us; we have gone down a little way into the abyss that lies between us and nothingness. We find no end even in this direction. But all estimates of distances, whether above or below, must ever be comparative. To think, or even guess, how far down we may be, requires some estimate, real or assumed, of what is over us, of what is somewhere between us and the Infinite.

Socrates imagines a class of rational beings who might have lived upon the bottom of the ocean. To them, as they gazed upward from their far down dark abode, the distant surface of the water would be their firmamental heaven, an unseen world above the watery plane, their highest thought of any transcending sphere. So to man may be the upper plane of the earth's atmosphere, which he supposes to have a defined surface like the waters of the ocean. Could we raise our heads above this plane, like fish above the water, or get upon one of those isles of glory that pierce with their illumined peaks this upper sea, we should behold another sun as it were—so much greater would be its brilliancy. We should see a fairer moon, a purer heaven, more glorious stars. We would not believe them to be the same that had so dimly and so coldly shone down into our earthly sub-aerial cavern. They would seem to belong to another world, and to another universe by reason of that glory which so much excelleth. Our science may criticise the imagery of Socrates; the sense *conception* may be false, but the *idea* remains as true as ever. What has science taught us, what can science ever teach us, as to our true rank, or how can she even guess at any quantitative rank we may possess in the worlds? We are at the head of being on our own small planet. In the pride of this we would regard ourselves as on a par, or in some measure, at least, of respectable comparison with whatever is highest among created things in all parts of the universe. And so in the term "rational beings," we most complacently invent a logical genus including ourselves and all that is not below us. But what a conceit of philosophy is this?—"the positive philosophy," we mean, that philosophy so much lauded by Westminster Reviewers and their boasting school of progress. We do know something of ourselves from history, if we know little or nothing of other beings. Now to think of an eternal development,—for that is all that such philosophy knows or can conceive,—an eternal development, and yet nothing as yet developed higher than this species homo! An everlasting right onward progress, and yet its present ultimate, all that has yet been reached, nothing greater, or essentially greater than man,—this "man of the earth" considered in his worldly or physical aspect as history and science exhibit him! Billions of ages! O what are billions of ages! An eternity—an eternity of upward eliminations, and still, as yet, no higher product worked out substantially than such beings as murder each other in earth's wars, and befool each other in earth's politics, or defame or praise each other in what is styled earth's literature! O what a conceit of philosophy, we say, is this! that nature, after having reached such a physical product, is never more to destroy it, as she did the mastodon and megalotheria that went before; she is to make no more loops in her cycles, to have no more of her old catastrophies, but to go right on now forever more in carrying out the civilization and cosmical destiny of this her crowning achievement!

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[*] James 1: 21

[†] Prof. Pierce of Cambridge.

And yet, some such view, based upon nature simply, enters largely into our ages' thinking. We love to regard ourselves as at least in the upper regions of the universe, if not quite at the summit; and so some would erect temples to humanity, and make a God of humanity, and a religion of humanity, as being collectively the divinest power in the universe. Such, too, is the tenor of our more common literary speculation. It is hard to bring our philosophy to the humbling thought that there may be chasms parting us from those above, as wide as those that separate us from the brute world below. It is hard for us to feel that there may be ranks of being, far below other being, and yet so immensely transcending us as to assign us to the lower orders of existence. We do not like to think of it as having truth even in respect to our dynamical or physical being, although humility is forced upon us here. A hard necessity, a mournful doom, which no science can relieve, no philosophy can soften, compels us to "say to corruption, thou art my father, and to the worm, thou art my mother and my sister." But we try to think better of our intellectual, our spiritual being, and revelation does yield us some comfort here, though science and philosophy, are as far as ever from giving us any satisfactory value. For all that they can teach, there may be some higher order of spirituality and rationality, to whom our wisdom, our science, our boasted art, our eloquence, our philosophy, may be comparatively no greater, no higher, than is to us the obscure instinct of the worm. We rightly hold that there is an immense chasm between even that self-moving, self-adapting instinct and the dead matter supposed to lie below; for a living worm is better than an inanimate planet; but so also may there be chasms above us, and still above us, world without end. And science cannot deny this. In fact all her analogies, if we reject any other or supernatural guidance, point to such a conclusion and no other. There is time and space enough to draw upon to satisfy any demand of any hypothesis. How long eternity! How vast infinity! What immense, what varied workings within these boundless bounds. The possible, the conceivable, becomes the measure of the real. What *has* been?—rather what may not have been within the worlds of time? What may not now be somewhere in the worlds of space? Who shall venture to limit it scientifically, or to conceive it limited by any equality with, or assignable proportion to, our earthly rank, our earthly progress, or any conceivable progress of our race? Measured on the scale of a conceivable universe, our whole solar sphere may be but as the microcosmal water drop, and we the sporting animacules that inhabit it. The quantitative estimate, the only estimate of the scientific analogy, would sink us in an unknown sea of organic change, a sea without a bottom or a shore. But faith can find us in its lowest depths; it bids us, even here, "Be not afraid." "Fear not thou *worm* Jacob; I have redeemed thee, saith the Holy One, I have called thee by thy name, I hold thee by thy hand, thou art mine." "Fear not, O thou of little faith, for thou art known unto me, and this is the assurance that thou thyself shalt know even as thou art known." "Fear not, only believe." It is thy faith that gives thee thy rank, thy value, thy fixed relation to the Infinite one. All things are thine, "all things are possible to thee, if thou believest."

This scriptural view of man's rank, or the mode of determining it, may be considered elsewhere; but we would simply say here, that as far as any human philosophy is concerned, or human knowledge, we have no more right to limit the universe in one direction than in another—in its ascent above us, any more than in its descent below, or its extent around and beyond us. There may be unknown worlds spiritual, rising above our worlds natural, or material. There may be worlds angelic or superangelic, worlds celestial and supercelestial; such terms being used to denote a notional fact, conceivable as a fact, but utterly unknown in respect to the real state or idea. Our space worlds, the worlds of science, may be the lowest in the scale. There is "a glory above the heavens," a supercelestial glory, from whence God "*looketh down* upon the earth-heavens," and all space-heavens, as something far below. "He humbleth himself to behold the things that are in the heavens," as well as "the things that be upon the earth." "I came forth from the Father into the *world*, (the kosmos); again I leave the world and go to the Father." The language is not satisfied by the idea of spatial change. It is a transition in rank, in sphere; the coming into the kosmos, is a coming down in the scale and order of being.

Our rank, our sphere, thus regarded, neither philosophy nor science can ever give. They can not tell us *who* we are. The Bible reveals something here, something of our greatness, as well as of our littleness, as we hope to show. It gives us our rank, but not by any of those computations which must in some way enter into every philosophic estimate. It assigns our *intrinsic* value unaffected by any comparison with an outward universe, be it small or wide; it gives us our *constant* value, unvaried by any fluxional ratio rising or falling with the conceived limits of any flowing nature. It does this in a way of its own, a way which science never could have derived from any a posteriori induction, nor philosophy have divined from any a priori dream.

Why are we? Close the ear to every voice save that which comes from nature, or the outward world; shut out every supernatural beam, and carefully eliminate all such supernatural light as lingers unacknowledged in any human speculation, and we have but one answer. *Why* are we here? To live, to propagate the race, to die. Listen to nature alone; look at the humbling facts she sets at the entrance of our existence, and plants along our whole earthly career; think of the appalling mystery that ever stands before us as its closing scene, and we are compelled to admit that any higher hope we may some how possess, comes not from her. If we believe in any thing beyond, it is in spite of sense. It is some power of faith or feeling that carries us in opposition, and sustains us in opposition, to all the reasons that come from sense; it is some divinely given and divinely preserved tradition that makes us hold fast to the creed in the face of all we most constantly see and know from earthly experience. But taking our premises from earth or nature merely, we could only conclude that boyhood is the truly valuable, the truly rational part of our being. The man is for the child; when past the season of youth, he is no longer an end but a means. In nature's system of interminable links, one thing is ever passing away to make room for another, one individual for another individual, one race for another race; there is no resisting the analogy that forces us on; this train once set in motion, must ever continue in motion; no induction that we can make, can ever give us a stopping place; there is no finish, no τελειον, no fixed relation to the central Infinite, except as we are assured of it by revelation from a higher plane. Philosophy talks of the higher faculties, and may contend perhaps, that their exercise, and not the low uses above mentioned, is the true end and office of our existence. But after all, when viewed in the chain of nature alone, what can she do with these higher functions? They can be in the series only to serve the ends, or uses, of the series. Grant that one of these ends, or the chief of them, is to enjoy (although there is deficient evidence, or only incidental evidence of this in the visible scheme of nature) then such superior faculties, as they are called, are but *means* to enjoyment, or, in a still more subordinate sense, have their *use* in the preservation of the ever moving continuity. Man has a higher intelligence than the brute, but it is that he may have more enjoyment, aye, and more misery too, if we limit our induction by the sphere of the visible or the known. As gills and fins were needed for the fish, and a higher apparatus of locomotion for the insect and the mammalia, so also the erect form, the higher kind of thinking, are both alike *means* for the preservation of the human place, as long as it is to last, in nature's passing series. Why call them then the higher faculties? If to *think* is after all that we may *live*, or, at the highest, if to *think well*, is but that we may *feel well*, what trick of naming can change the law of ideas, or give the *means* a higher dignity than those *ends* of enjoyment and continuity, to which, as far as any induction can show us, these boasted powers are alone subservient.

Philosophy dreams sometimes of something above what science ever has attained, or can attain to. She has an indistinct vision of some finality in man that is out of and above the physical series. Like the blind beggar, "she sees men as trees walking;" but this is by reason of an ointment that has been rubbed upon her eyes. She fondly fancies that it is her natural vision, but it is in truth a ray from another sphere, that has wandered down through the long and sometimes almost hidden path of a primitive or historical revelation. Listen to nature alone, and we are in an unknown chain of means and apparent ends that are never ends. Unless there be a supernatural finding, a hand reached down for our deliverance, we can never get out of this physical cycle; we can never find any meaning in our higher faculties. Such an outreaching hand can alone give us a positive end, as well as a positive value, and this it does by connecting us through the divine Mediator with the unchanging supernatural centre of the whole.

But *where* are we? Here our natural knowledge holds a more confident tone. We do assume to know something —it is contended that we know much—of our whereabouts in space. Modern astronomical discovery puts in a proud claim here. We are not disposed to controvert it as measured upon its own scale; but there is another standard, as compared with which, it may be shown to be vastly overrated. To the thinking mind it was, and is, a very old idea, that there is to our earth an immense *outside*, and that this may be filled, most probably is filled, with material and dynamical being to an amount exceeding all mathematical estimate. It came not from science, but from the direct out-thinking that connects vast room with vast occupation, and holds to such a *plenum* because there presents itself no *sufficient reason* why the power, be it physical or divine, which generated one world, should not have generated others, to any extent to which the conception could be carried. Hence the multiplicity, and even "the infinity of worlds," was a very old hypothesis. Our modern science has endeavored to bring this floating conception into numbers and earthly measurements. Its progress here is great, or it is almost infinitessimally small, according to the stand point from which it is viewed. But the grand practical result is unaffected by it. We are still upon the earth, and earth, whatever may be its space position in the universe, is still the real centre in our thoughts. It is still, too, the circumference of our substantial knowledge, of all we know of spiritual or moral being, of all we know of *life* in its lowest or widest form. There is a fallacy here, exceedingly specious, but which a little thought at once exposes. Our knowledge of the astronomical heavens, great as it may seem, is, after all, purely mathematical. That is, it is confined to the ideas of pure space and motion. To such ideas the visible discoveries, far as they may have gone, do only serve as diagramatical illustrations. The heavens are still to us but a vast orrery. We have discovered,—what have we discovered?—we have discovered *distances, times, magnitudes, masses, motions;* we have discovered angles, orbits, circles, ellipses, ratios, in a word, mathematical functions. It is, after all, the *dead* knowledge of numbers and quantities. Dead, we call it, (however beautiful as mathematical science) because, in its whole sweep, it has no single fact of *life*, of which it can give us the least assurance. "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father." There is, we repeat it, more of a cosmical, unearthly knowledge in this single statement, than in all the telescope has brought to light. A monstrous fallacy! some are prepared to say; but they may be challenged to find any thing else. We allude not now to the littleness of our astronomical science as compared with the immensely greater unknown that must be beyond the utmost visibility of the telescope. That might be called an unfair measurement. But within this telescopic field, what has it given but the barest skeleton of knowledge? The heavens are to us just as lonely, just as silent as of old. Imagination may take its flight, and so it could, and did, in the early day. That out-thinking into space and time, to which we have alluded, has ever belonged to the meditative soul. Miles and barlycorns, sines and cosines, have not increased its power, any more than its piety. Seclusion is still as of old, and in the beginning, the imperative law of the worlds. We are as much alone in the universe as in the days of Abraham and Moses. We may believe all parts of the conceivable kosmos physically connected; so dreamed the old astrology; it is, in fact, an a priori idea, or necessary law of our soul's thinking; but in all the higher aspects of the relation, morally, historically, socially, religiously, we are still alone, still in the same position as though our one seen, handled, familiar earth were, indeed, the centre and circumference of the physical universe. The practical, the emotional effect remains very much as of old. In this, notwithstanding Copernicus and Galileo, we are still Ptolemaists. The statement would be admitted, perhaps, in respect to the common mind; but an exception may be claimed for the scientific and the philosophical. *They* are no longer "of the earth earthy;" this little planet no longer bounds their spiritual vision. Ah, is it so?—Is it so? It is a melancholy question, an humbling question; but to whom has earth appeared the larger, aye, the more central world? To Laplace or Bernard, to Auguste Comte, or to Anselm, to the modern French and American naturalists, or to the Augustines and Akempis, who lived before the telescope was known or thought of?

Again—human knowledge may tell us something of our position in space, but in what space? The whole of that vast visible, some where in which we lie, is itself a floating quantity in a larger space, where all is drifting wilder, that is more unknown to us, than the floes of the Antarctic ocean. We are told that we are moving, sun and all, towards some point some where in the constellation Hercules. It may be a sweep so vast that ages of observation will be required to make sensible the first elements of its curvature, or beginning of deflection from a tangential right line. But assuming that there are some mathematical grounds for such a conjecture, the question still returns. We may ask as the anxious Buddhist asks—where are we going to, last of all? We are moving towards Hercules; but where is Hercules going to? The visible kosmos, Hercules and all, is sweeping round some inconceivably more distant centre, and so on to an extent to which there is no limit, but the utter exhaustion of the numerical imagination. Immensely grand is all this, even if it does surround the problem of life with a still denser obscurity, or but serve to create in thoughtful minds a stronger sense of the want of some better knowledge that may hold us fast from being lost in the thick night of all mere natural discovery. Immensely grand, we say, but even if true, there is no revelation in it,—none in the strict and proper sense of the term. "Verily I say unto you, there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth." Here is a true revealing. "In the beginning was the Word; and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us—I ascend unto my Father and your Father, unto my God and your God —In my Father's house are many mansions—Because I live ye shall live also." Here is *divine* knowledge,—something that comes down to us, that finds us, that determines our place, not by endless calculations running through the abysmal vortices of space, but by connecting us directly with the centre of infinite being. How personal the language! and it is this which makes it a revelation. "Fear not, only believe." Through all space and time has God come down to us, made himself known to us, revealed to us a value that cannot be diminished or affected by any numerical comparison with an outward universe. Even were this infinite, in a spatial or physical sense, still are we safe. We are known in heaven, our names are written there, we have a treasure there; there is a friend who thinks of us in the metropolis of the worlds; we have an advocate, a mediator, a brother in the heart of the Infinite.

When are we? Quo tempore? What is our place in the great chronology? The most modern of the sciences claims to have made some discoveries here, of which she boasts not a little. Without underrating her at all, it may still be made a question, Whether she has not involved the whole matter in a greater darkness? We have climbed one peak of the Alps, only to find "Alps on Alps," rising interminably before us. Here, too, the darkness increases faster than the light. There is discovered no beginning, no end, no plan that does not terminate in the physical series, and fall into the stream of its passing adaptations, no progress that can make us certain of any cyclical growth that necessarily excludes any cyclical decay.

But has the Scripture given us any thing here. We think it has. It furnishes no obscure intimations that we are in a mighty flood of ages, of worlds on worlds rolling on in time, even as the visible worlds roll on in space. No other idea could have given rise to those vast aeonic pluralities which are so remarkable a feature of the ancient Bible language. As far as words can aid the imagination or the thought, it sets before us that ineffable timeless, worldless state which was *προ των αιωνων*.* It makes known to us the *Malkuth kol olamim*,† "the Kingdom of all worlds" moving on εις τους αιωνας και εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων, "for the ages and the ages of ages." It reveals to us the *great beginning* that was "before the sun,"[*] "before the *day*,"[†] the beginning when "the Word was with God,"—the ineffable morn which the Scriptures represent to us as the απαυγασμα, or out-shining of the Logos,[‡] "the First Born before all creation." It reveals another beginning *in time*, the birth of the physical light, the beginning of the Kosmos in the temporal *out goings* of the same Word by whom "the ages were brought out of the unseen,"[||] and "without whom there was nothing made that was made."[††] It reveals the beginning of our own earthly system, and chronicles the wondrous *days*[§] during which this same hypostatic Word, or "Wisdom, was still with God, rejoicing continually before him, and having *his delight with the new born sons of men*."[¶] Curious indeed, and well worth our study, are the revelations, so called, of the rocks and shells, but what are they, we may well ask, when compared with this grand roll of chronology.

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* Col. 1 : 26. 1 Cor. 2 : 7. † Ps. 145 : 13. 1 Tim. 1 : 17.

And of all this, too, it may be said, that it is not given to us as mere knowledge. Connected with it there is another mighty fact that links us with the ages. Along with the *knowing*, there is again that *being known* to the Infinite, which constitutes the precious personality of the revealing. There is made known to us "the mystery that was hid from the eternities." He who is "the Image of the Invisible God," He who was "the First Born before all creation," He who is the Head of the cosmical constitutions and "by whom all things *stand together*," He also is "the Head of the body, the Church, the First Born from the dead, that he might be first in all things."[°] He who "was in the beginning," had also a human birth in our solar time; He who was προ των αιωνων, "*before the worlds*," before all time, came into the stream of our years, and dates from his incarnation the flowing of our historical centuries.

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[*] Ps. 72: 17. The Chaldee translates it—"Before the sun was His name set forth." So also the Syriac. [†] Isa. 43: 13. [‡] Heb. 1: 3. [||] Heb. 11: 3. [††] John 1: 2. [§] Prov. 8: 30. "*Day—day was I with Him.*" See the Hebrew. [¶] Prov. 8: 31. Compare Gen. 1: 26. Hence we see the reason of the transition in the language. He it was who was so personally addressed on the sixth day. "*Let* US *make man in* OUR *own image*." [°] Col, 1: 17.

But *whence* came we? What know we here? Science may tell us poorly *where* we are, but this passes wholly out of her range. "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" As a question of origin, it transcends, of course, all historical knowledge. *Whence* came we? It is the question now beginning to be so zealously, yet so fruitlessly discussed of the unity and origin of the human race. To show how little any scheme, or theory, or induction of science can do towards solving it, we need only call attention to the fact, that the antiscriptural naturalising here is taking two directly opposite roads. One finds unity where revelation announces diversity, the other diversity where revelation most unmistakably teaches unity. The school of Agassiz would separate men into a large number of unrelated natures; that of the Vestiges of Creation would make us all brothers to the worm and the toadstool. But what do they know about it? With them it is a mere matter of classification. What shall constitute a species, does not, with either, depend upon the known fact of unity of life, but on some hypothesis of greater or less amount of resemblance. One definition, constructed for a certain historical time and space, takes in, or excludes, a certain amount of resemblance; another definition, made for another time and space, or the same definition applied to a greater time and space, or connecting itself with another assumed causality, makes necessary a wholly different view both of classification and origin. We are justified in saying again, what do they know about it, and what does any one know about it, without a revelation? The thought is very obvious, and yet how little is it entertained! What a blank is left in this whole department of historical inquiry,—for such it is—if we close the Bible! What a shadow would rest upon the first and second, and many succeeding chapters of the world's chronology. Some talk confidently of the beginning of history, and of diversities then existing. It is the ground of their definition of species. But where, without the Bible, do we find the beginning of human history? Where are the points where the written runs into the monumental, the annalic, or chronological, into the mythical? All lost, irrecoverably lost. Three thousand years, and what a dim twilight reigns over our world. Four thousand years, and it would be the darkness of historical midnight, but for one silver stream of light that runs up far beyond, one sacred historical ray, narrow, yet clear, giving us just what God meant we should know of these early periods, and leaving all the rest beneath the vail. Put out this heaven kindled torch, and what have we left for the early day? Egyptian hieroglyphics, dark inscriptions on obelisks, ever promising, yet ever baffling, suggesting indeed much thought of an ancient buried life, yet giving no substantial knowledge of its history or its origin. We have monstrous sphynxes, withered mummies, mouldering sarcophagi; we have strange figures from Assyrian ruins. What do they mean? They mean much when read by the Bible. Take this away, and there comes from this dead matter a pale phosphorescent glow more bewildering than the night itself. Ethnology begins to assume form when studied by the tenth of Genesis. We see something in the dusky Egyptian catacombs, when we throw into them a reflection from the lamp of Moses. With Ezekiel for our medium, we discover some historical meaning in the winged bulls, and eagle-headed lions, that have lately been exhumed from the long concealed Assyrian "chambers of imagery." We are thankful to Layard and Rawlinson for their laborious researches; we are deeply interested in the resurrections they have made from these sepulchres of a forgotten world; but for real light upon the old Assyrian history, for clear painting, not of symbols, but of the actual truthful, ancient life, what is it all compared with the vivid limning we find in the 18th chapter of Second Kings, or the 36th and 37th chapters of Isaiah.

What was the earliest history of our race? Who were the most ancient men, and what were they doing upon the earth in the oldest times? What a charm has such knowledge for us? Yet these, as well as the still greater question, *Whence came we first of all?* must be answered mainly from the sacred Scriptures, or remain forever in the vast unknown.

The question *How* are we? Quomodo? Our manner and law of being, would bring in almost the whole domain of speculative philosophy. *How* we think—How we know, and what is our knowing. Are we soul and body separate, separable, or indivisible? Are souls born? Has the soul ideas? Is there an objective reason? Are individual things the only realities in the universe, or are there true entities corresponding to universal or generic terms? On all these questions, there have ever been, there are now, two zealously warring schools. The writer professes no indifference between them. He thinks one side better than the other,—more true, more rational, and far more religious. Nominalism, when carried fully out, seems to him, but another name for atheism. The question which some have styled a mere scholastic subtelty, we cannot help regarding as involved in all that is most fundamental in divine revelation. The Scriptures seem to have no meaning, if there is not a true humanity,—a true Christianity, as something distinct from a series of facts, or a collection of dogmas. And yet take away revelation, together with the higher thinking it creates in the soul, and who shall dare to say that any of these questions are settled by the independent human philosophy. The schools are now farther from agreement than ever. We may take our own side of these questions. We may claim for it the authority of the highest names in the world and in the Church; and yet there is no denying the fact, that the other views have been maintained by men of as high repute for mental strength and clear intelligence. Aristotle was as profound as Plato; Bacon is as great a name as Cudworth; Locke was as keen a thinker as is to be found in the Eclectic or Ideal schools. If we take then the standard of human authority, the same thought comes up here again, as well as in the fields of history and science,—*How little we know!* How little we know unless some heavenly truth is thrown in the scales. If there be no revelation, no hope of a revelation, (for the very hope is suggestive of the higher ideas) then might we indeed struggle to maintain what seems the holier truth, but it would be hard, perhaps impossible, to resist that philosophy which makes all thinking but sensation, all knowledge, yea, all faith, but induction, all universal truths but generalizations of phenomena, and all generic ideas but the barest logical names.

We know not whence we came. But whither are we going? Nature shows only a troubled stream of life issuing out of the unknown on the one side of its finite horizon, and losing itself in a still greater unknown on the other. Sombre as such a picture is, it is but an equivalent to the Bible thought as given to us in those passages where the main design would seem to be to represent how little man can know of his future destiny without the clearer representations that the Scripture elsewhere makes. "We spend our years as a tale that is told,"—as a sigh, says the Syriac,—"like a murmur," is the literal Hebrew,—a low, musing, melancholy sound. "Thou carriest them away as with a flood. "As the cloud is spent and gone, so is it with those that go down to Sheol." There comes the same wailing desponding voice from the deeply musing Preacher in Ecclesiastes—"He cometh in with vanity and departeth in darkness, and his name is covered with darkness." This apparent scepticism of the older Scripture is preparatory to a fuller faith. We may regard it as a dramatic representation of what we are, and of what we know, without a farther and clearer revealing. But even in itself it is a better thing than the easy faith of the sciolist, or the dry rationalistic belief in what is called "the dogma of the immortality of the soul." The solemn musings of Moses, the mournful queries of Asaph, are better for us, they are holier, they are nearer to the truth, nearer to the true light, than all the fine reasoning of the ancient philosophers. The melancholy sighings of the suffering man of Uz show a deeper appreciation of the great question than any thing we find in the words of an Epictetus or an Antonine. We may better doubt with Job and Koheleth, than believe with Seneca, or as Seneca believed. These old "men of God" had "that faith which pleased Him," because it ever recognized Him as *their* God, "*the God of the living*," and themselves, therefore, as "*living unto Him*," though how they lived they comprehended not. This faith they sometimes joyfully express, but even the Old Testament despondency, or scepticism, if we may call it so, was more religious, and therefore possessed of a higher dignity, than any modern opinions, however affectedly spiritual, that are not connected with the resurrection of Christ, and the Creed of the Church in respect to the intermediate and future state of the departed.

Whither are we going? Why must we die? It is not saying much when we say, that philosophy can not solve these problems. She gets along very well as long as the question is confined to the present ends of our present being. All is easy as long as she is allowed to talk of physical ends, and how all good is found, and virtue consists, in obedience to nature's laws, or the Author of nature regarded as having no higher purpose. All this is easy, and claims to be triumphant, until the discussion nears the "gates of Hades," and then it is that the great swelling words of this physical ethics dwindle down into a few unmeaning phrases about "the debt of nature," or it mutters forth at last that confession of mystery which the true revelation places at the very door step of all human knowledge. Right here it is, the true unearthly Wisdom begins to utter its voice. "O where shall wisdom be found, and where is the place of understanding?" The response comes to us—"It is not in the land of the living. Sheol and Abaddon say, we have just heard a rumor thereof with our ears."

We would not, however, underrate any light of nature. As proof of a life to come it is worthless; but as leading to faith by showing the need of a supernatural revelation, it has great value. The metaphysical argument for the soul's immortality leaves every mind just where it left Cicero's; but far otherwise is it with that other branch of the argument which is drawn from the deep sighing of our humanity,—from that universal prolepsis that has created a spirit-world in the mythology of all nations. When philosophy dwells on these, she is, indeed, an aid to faith; but it is only because in doing so she teaches man his darkness, and thus calls out that longing for a better life which ever maketh its inward moan in groanings that cannot be uttered.

> "Behold! We know not any thing.
> So runs my dream, but what am I?
> An infant crying in the night;
> An infant crying for the light;
> And with no language but a cry."

"Light, more light," were the last words, it is said, of the dying Gœthe." We may thank Heaven for such men as the great German poet, if not on their own account, at least for the Church's sake. The involuntary testimony that comes to Christianity from their mournful scepticism, is stronger than many a labored philosophical defence.

"O where shall wisdom be found." The Scriptures alone give the response. "The gospel has brought life and immortality *to light.*" The language is peculiar—"*hath made light,*" or illumined. These ideas of another life were of old. They were with the human race from the beginning, not as the offspring of any a posteriori or a priori reasoning, but as coming from that prolepsis before mentioned, which took up the primitive revelation of a Redeemer, or Lifegiver, made in the earliest day, and never wholly lost it in all the far off local and mental wanderings of the race. And so among all nations, the thought of another life was in the world, but it was cold, cheerless, ghastly. Read it in Homer, Pindar, and even in Job. It was a dim spectral vision, getting shape rather by its shade than its lustre, until the Christian revelation "made it light" in the Lord, in the glory of his cross and his resurrection.

Thus have we rapidly traced the seven great interrogatories. The conclusion every reader anticipates—not only the exceeding desirableness, but the absolute necessity to us of revelation—of a supernatural, objective revelation. But has even the Scripture solved them ? Not in equal extent, some of them not at all, none of them, perhaps, as much as we might desire, were it not that the first lesson of that revelation is docile submission to Him who maketh known to any of his creatures just what, and when, and how, and how much it pleaseth Him.

The Scriptures tell us nothing about our position in space. They disclose to us a mighty chronology, but tell us little, either of our date or our age in its immeasurable series. They reveal to us the aim of our existence and how we have fallen from it. They give a satisfactory answer to the questions *whence* we came, and *how* we came. They disclose to us all we have a right to ask on the question, *whither* are we going, although gratifying no mere curiosity of knowledge in respect to the physical conditions of the world to come. It is in this peculiar reserve that the Bible differs so widely from all spurious revelations. In its revealings the moral is every where predominant over the physical or even the psychological. It will not tell us how spirits live. It assures us of the reality of a state of blessedness, and of condemnation. It lifts a fold of the curtain, now and then, but only the more deeply to impress the moral announcement—"Joy to the righteous, it shall be well with him ; woe to the wicked, it shall be ill with him." Beyond the bare mention of these gates of Hades,* it tells us nothing of the passage through which we enter upon the other world, except that there is a Good Shepherd there who will lead us through the dark valley if we but believe on him—one who is there to take us by the hand, and "whose rod and staff shall comfort" us through all that gloomy way. "We know not what we shall be, but we shall be satisfied when we awake in his likeness." Even the New Testament keeps the veil over what may be called the psychological condition of the departed. To be with Christ, with Christ in Paradise, is the sum of its announcement for the blessed, as though this were enough for the believing soul, whilst any attempted disclosure of spiritual conditions would give nought but error, encourage no other spirit than that mere conceit of knowledge which, in this world at least, is so much opposed to the true spiritual health.

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* Job 38 : 17, "Hast thou seen the gates of *Tzalmaveth*—the same word used Ps. 23 : 4.

"Now we see through a glass darkly." "*Now we see things in a mirror shadowly*," as it may better be rendered. It is but the reflections, the images of things that we behold. This is no mere philosophic mysticism. We need not go to Plato's cave for the idea. A similar representation is given in the Scriptures, even the older Scriptures. "Man walketh in a vain show." *Yith hallek*—He goeth about, passeth to and fro—*be-tzelem*, in an image, an umbra. "*In imagine pertransit homo.*" Now we see in a mirror shadowly, but then face to face—the very substances of things as distinct from their appearances. "Now we know *in part*," εκ μερους. The expression may be misunderstood. It has not reference, we think, so much to the amount, or extent, as to the kind of knowledge. It is now piece-meal (*stück-weise*, as Luther has it) partial, inductive, in distinction from the intuitive satisfying vision of reality. It is partial, not in the sense of a few things compared with a great many things, but rather, as *ex parte*, one sided, being the view of things on one side, and that their lowest* or less real side. It is ex-

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*The Arabian Schoolmen had an expression, *makateu 'lumure*, by which they denoted the present knowledge. It means the "ends, or off-cuttings, of things"—*sectiones rerum*—the threads that stick out from the lower or wrong side of the tapestry which the great Artificer is weaving above—*exitus finales rerum comparati cum telisquæ super jugo textorio divinae voluntatis texuntur. Vide Willmet Lex.* 611. Science is endeavoring to trace the plan inductively from the under side. But turn the tapestry, and the figures, *the ideas*, stand out bright and clear to the common intuitive gaze. So may it be to the spiritual eye that looks down from the upper position. Those who were here the scientific and the unscientific are now upon a par. Newton has no advantage over the African slave, although in other respects, and for parte in the sense to which we have before alluded. It is "a knowledge of things;" or, if we may call it, in any sense, a knowledge of God, it is without that other thought, or with but little of that other thought, *His knowing us;* and hence it is put in contrast with the knowing as being known. "Now we know *ex parte*, but then shall we know as we are known." Then shall it be all divine knowledge in the truer sense of the term, even that divine knowledge of which the Christian hopes he has some experience here, but then, full, consummate, perfect, not in the sense of quantity, but of quality and idea; then, no longer in a mirror, but face to face. Its reality will consist in the fact that there will be no knowledge, as now, severed from the thought of God as knowing the knower therein. All will be divine knowledge as distinguished from "the knowledge of things," that is, of things per se; no knowledge ex parte, as in this world, or divided from that one constant, all pervading, all penetrating, life giving idea. The present inductive knowledge may be very extensive, but still accumulative, and, therefore, ever unsatisfactory and imperfect. The new facts make stale and dead the interest of the old, and yet are so like the old, that they pall as repetitions. It is a continual change of appearances, and motions, and forces, only to find at bottom the same substantial forms of sense and thought. This love of knowledge, as the knowl-

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other reasons, he may be spiritually far below one who had here so little of "the knowledge of things." Nature instead of revealing, stands revealed, It is *seen through;* and the scientific interest is gone, or has given place to a higher. We might compare it to a science of tangibilities that had for ages been building up among a race of sightless men. It might be very curious, very extensive even, in its accumulations of facts and generalizations of laws therefrom. It might have reached, as among its highest arcana, some of those proceedings in nature that are now well understood by the youngest child. Still it would be a vast science, a true science, a most interesting science. It might fill many huge volumes of books as "printed for the blind." But let now the new and unknown sense be added, how soon, as science, would it become nullified, be brought to nought, "vanish away"—in other words, wholly lose its scientific interest in presence of the higher vision. The Arabic idea may be supposed to have its germ in such language as that of Job 26: 14. "Lo, these are but parts (*ketzoth*, ends) of His ways; what a *whisper* is heard of Him, but the *thunder* of his power (his mighty hidden power) who can understand." The expression, "*parts of his ways,*" may have been in the mind of Paul, and suggestive of his own language.

edge of things, is higher than the sensual happiness, but it has in itself, unsustained, the same element of death. It, too, is a pleasure grounded on a pain, an enjoyment ever conditioned on the uneasiness of a want, a drinking that ever demands a thirst.* It is nobler, we say, far nobler than the Epicurean appetite of sense, but none the less is it a running cistern, "a broken cistern that can hold no water."

We may believe then that the knowledge here put in contrast with the knowledge *εκ μερους*, is not a mere enlargement of the former or a wider field, but something radically different. It is fulness in distinction from flowing change, *το τελειον*, finish, perfection, as estimated not by accumulation, but by its nearness to the central divine knowledge, and the perfect satisfaction which it must create in the consciousness of knowing as being known. The writer would take to himself a caution here, lest he be darkening counsel by words without knowledge; he would put his mouth in the dust when he remembers how far his own religious experience, if he have any religious experience, falls below the ideas he is endeavoring to set forth. But he cannot help thinking that the Apostle's language must refer to something else than difference in quantity or extent. So far, at least, we may have some confidence in our exegesis of the knowledge *ex parte* as distinguished from the knowledge face to face. If the explanation sounds mystical, the appeal may be made to the humblest Christian experience. Does not this teach him who is the subject of it, that there is, even in this world, another standard of knowledge than that of extent? Has he not had a few thoughts, a few emotions, that are more to him than all else that goes to make up the sum of his intellectual being—thoughts that he would think, emotions that he would be content to feel to all eternity? If such be the case with a poor shadow of earthly experience, often doubted, and sometimes fancied to be but a dream, how much more glorious, both the mode and the reality, in the life to come. Instead of a discursive wandering over the universe, it may be a beatific vision of a few glorious ideas, a rapt gazing on some truth throwing in the shade all other knowledge, an adoring contemplation, an everlasting worship in which the soul is satisfied forever and forevermore. It is difficult now to conceive of this; it is still harder to imagine ourselves satisfied with it, although the Scriptures seem so full of the thought that adoration is not only the highest attainment, but the constant employment of the other life. The difficulty is increased, to the general thinking, by some modern scientifico-theological notions which would transfer to the better world so much of the unrest, or restless action, together with the piece-meal, ex parte, fact-accumulating science of this lower inchoate condition. Even Aristotle could see it as a truth of reasoning, an intellectual necessity, that contemplation, *θεωρητιϰη*, must, in some way, be the highest and ultimate blessedness of the soul,* higher than action, even as an end must be higher than a means, or as motion has its significance, and its value, only in relation to the immovable, or as the highest expression of a force must be found in that energetic and ever energising equilibrium we style *a rest.* The disturbance, or loosening, of such equilibrium is the letting out of its latent power, and so the commencement of its waste. *Rest* is not *inertia*, but rather its opposite. The latter is the utter absence of power, a mere negation: the other the intensest form of energising. A static is a stronger thing than a dynamic; and so we might even venture to say that, though God creates both force and motion, and neither could exist but at his will, the highest energising of the Deity in nature would be the quiescence of the universe. Thus also in the better life,—contemplation may be the soul's highest energy, adoration, reverence the loftiest exercise of spiritual power.

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* Compare John 4 : 14, "Whosoever shall drink of the water that I shall give him, shall thirst no more forever, *eis ton aiona;* but it shall be in him a well of water *springing up* to everlasting life—*fons aquae salientis* in vitam aeternam.

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* Nicom. Ethic. x. 7. 6.

And so, in some sense, although in a different and much lower sense, may it be true of the Church on earth. Great bustle, or "great movements," as they now are called, may be but the spending of force. In this contemplative energy, this holy rest, there may be not only the deeper inward life, but the full fountain of the highest outward activity for the subduing of the world.

In respect, however, to the future state of the blessed, the Scriptures do certainly seem tocountenance some of the ideas we have been laboring to set forth. Thus much may be said with confidence, that the opposite, or more popular view of movement, of ever unfinished, ever restless progress, cannot be made out from any fair interpretation of the divine word. On the other hand, *rest*, assurance, perfection, that is, finish, in a word, blessedness,—the blessedness of contemplation, the rapture of unwearied adoration, although we cannot now see how it could be unwearied,—these are the prominent Bible ideas, and its outward imagery is in harmonious correspondence. The Paradisaical life, or the Heavenly life, is not the study of astronomy, or of any of the outward sciences, neither is it psychology, or the investigation of the mind's capacities, but the beatific vision of the Divine perfections, "the beautiful, the right, the good," as seen in themselves without the mirror of scientific or historical induction. "Whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away." We know that the primary reference of the Apostle here, was to the peculiar *gnosis*, or gift of knowledge, on which some prided themselves in the early Corinthian Church. But the whole closing language of this wondrous chapter has a remarkable air of universality. We must, therefore, regard it as including knowledge, or science, in its wider sense, "the knowledge of things" as that in which men have ever chiefly gloried. Of such knowledge it is said, not that "it shall vanish away," or utterly cease, which is a wrong translation, but that it "shall be made vain," (*καταργηθησεται,*) nullified, made of little or no account, in a word, *deposed*, put down in a lower or subordinate sphere; or, as it is better rendered in a verse below, "put away," as Paul "put away childish things." Now here, in our fallen perverted state, it is the great thing; then shall it be reduced to its true inferior rank, so that, in comparison with its former false assumption, it may be said to "vanish away."

The Bible does, indeed, speak of serving God in the glorified state, and this might seem to favor that idea of restless action which is so popular, but the careful reader will note the peculiar nature of this service. It is the service of worship. Such is ever the significance of the term employed, as used in the New Testament Greek. It is the service of worship, not of discursive thought or action. It is no longer δουλεια, but λατρεια. His redeemed "servants serve Him day and night," but it is "in his temple." It is temple service, however tedious and monotonous that may appear to our present modes of thinking. It is temple service, adoration, praise, thanksgiving, halleluias, forever and forever more. No satiety, no wandering curiosity, no search for variety either in worship or in knowledge. The hymn, the liturgy, the ineffable Te Deum, goes on forever. "They cease not saying, Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty, who was and is, and is to come." All is constancy, immutability, *rest*. Such are the leading ideas of the Scriptural language. The soul has passed through its physical state of growth, of peril, and probation. It is among the finished works of God. Fully redeemed, at last, from all change, from all wandering, "it goeth out no more." In the absorbing unwearied adoration of its Creator it has attained a *perfection* which is far better than progress, or any imagined amount of an ever imperfect, ever changing knowledge of changing things.

Such, we think, is the ideal impression conveyed by the Scripture imagery. Even when it comes in nearest accommodation to our present conceptions, there is still the same prominence to these thoughts of blesssedness, adoring rest, in a word *perfection*, in distinction from an ever *imperfect*, and, therefore, ever unsatisfying, progress. It is a state in these respects most unlike the present; for its highest negative description is given in the fact that "the former things have passed away." "Who are these arrayed in white robes, and whence came they? These are they who have come out of great tribulation, who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb; therefore are they before the throne of God and they *serve him* day and night in his temple. And He that sitteth upon the throne shall have His tabernacle among them. They hunger no more, they thirst no more." It refers to intellectual as well as to other thirst, for it says—"The Lamb shall feed them, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes." And again—"I saw a new heaven and a new earth, and I heard a great voice from out of heaven saying, behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither mourning nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things have passed away." "For the old things," says the quaint old Version of Tyndale, "the old things are gone." The language would seem to denote something more than merely another story of existence, raised a degree higher, to command a farther view of the same or similar objects. "The old things are gone." They may still lie far away in the remote back ground of memory. Some such view seems actually necessary to preserve the conscious identity of our continuous life. We may hold to all that has been said, and yet be far from the reverie of any mystic absorption, or transcendental change in the law of our ever finite being. The knowledge of these may still remain, although the new light of eternity has risen upon it. The saints know that "they have come out of great tribulation." They are in the satisfying mansions of their Father's house. "They hunger no more," either for bread or knowledge; "they thirst no more." Yet do they well remember that "far country," and the "mighty famine" that there once prevailed. They know the price that was paid for their redemption. There is still a knowledge of "the old things," but it is as of "things that are gone." Gone the probation;

gone the incertitude; gone that knowledge of shadows we now call science, or at least thrown far in the back ground. The Koran has a grand passage which we venture to quote in this connection, because the thought seems to have come to Mohammed from the Scriptures, and especially from some knowledge he may have had of the language of Paul. He represents the faithful as rising from their graves in the day of the resurrection. They lift up their heads after their long sleep, and their first words are, "the shadows are gone, truth has come."* The piece-meal ex parte knowledge has given place to the perfect, the changing to the fixed, the phenomenal to the substantial, the shadowy to the real, the temporary to the eternal. "The old things are gone." For now, whilst in the nursery chamber, we see as in a mirror shadowly, but then face to face. Are we merely putting one philosophical conceit in the place of another? Are we indulging in the vain glory of an empty mysticism whilst declaiming against the pride of knowledge? To the Word and the Testimony. St. Paul heard that which was ineffable; the Scriptural images represent the same. We cannot pretend to understand it; we cannot presume to interpret it; but this may we venture to say, it must be something transcending our present knowledge, not only in degree, but in kind; it must be something which is not a higher continuation, but above, and distinct from, any attainments we may here make, either in science or philosophy. "Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, it hath not entered into the mind of man to think, what God hath prepared for them that love him."

On the question, who we are? it may be said, as before, the Scripture gratifies no mere curiosity of knowledge. Yet still it does distinctly intimate to us, that we are in a great scale of ascending being—"Angels and Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers." It speaks of a Heaven above the Heavens, and of a third Heavens,—whether astronomical or spiritual, we cannot say.

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* Koran 17: 83.

Whether they are local, and, if local, where, we cannot say; Paul could not say. In this respect the Scriptures do give us more than science, or rather they give us that about which science is utterly silent. Still it might be said that notwithstanding such intimations of orders of being, the Bible leaves our own rank, our own true value, as much undetermined as does our human knowledge. Not so. It does give us our position, but by a mode of measurement which natural knowledge would never have discovered. The thought has been already alluded to ; but it may be well here to present it in a fuller and more distinctly reasoned statement. We may say, then, that there are two modes of estimating value. The one may be called the comparative or *quantitative*, in a word, the physical, the other the intrinsic, the religious, in a word, the supernatural. The first finds the value of each thing, spiritual or dynamical, by its ratio in the scale of *all* being viewed as matter of amount. The being of any thing, in its most general estimate, is made up of three main elements—space, power, thought,—what it occupies, what it does or feels, what it knows. These are all matters of amount, or quantitative estimate, and the ratio they bear to all other occupied space, all other doing, and all other thinking in the universe, is the numerical or quantitative value. But even mathematics will teach, that this can never give to us, or to any thing else, any constant, intrinsic value, as long as the universe may be conceived of as a varying measure of indefinite enlargement. The rank of man on one scale, may be that of the insect on another. It is the whole that has any real value in this mode of reckoning, and even that may be ever changing. Science can only talk of wholes, and of parts in their relations to wholes. To this whole, all that is individual, or even partial, must ever be sacrificed. As zoophytes and reptiles have made way for man, so man must make way for some higher development of physical being. We are only links, means, steps in progress, to be cast away when this progress rises above our own level, as it speeds onward relentlessly to some other temporary maximum, or sweeps round again in some cycle of degeneracy, preparatory to some necessary minimum, where physical being begins de novo, to run again through the same valueless series of gas, liquid, solid, plant, worm, fish, mammalia, homo, forever and forever more. All is transit. There is no other value here except numerical ratio, and this is ever changing.

In this thick night of nature, revelation comes to our relief. It finds us in this sea of incertitude and infinity. It does nothing to gratify the speculative curiosty by determining our scientific latitude. It has a far higher aim than that. It does not attempt to console us by determining the bounds of this quantitative estimate, and so letting us know how we stand *in the whole of being.* It does not sum up our accountability in that way. It does not make sin and righteousness flowing quantities in a vast scheme of political economy, with its table of values and accountabilities rising and falling with some actual or supposed extent of a universe to be governed. It does not thus measure the divine law, its ineffable sanctions, its incalculable penalty, its priceless expiation. There is no such language in the Scriptures, no such thoughts in any way expressed. But it does reveal another and more precious rule of value. This is not our ratio, arithmetical or geometrical, to any numerical whole of being physical or spiritual. It is the moral ratio of our nearness to God, the centre of all being, and the strength of that faith in the God-man Redeemer through which it is effected and made sure. Here is an intrinsic, a constant value for each moral and rational agent. His thought of God, his faith in God, his love to God, is the measure of his place and his worth in the universe. Nothing outside can affect this value. Ages may sweep away, worlds may be created and destroyed, the universe may expand or diminish, its bounds may be regarded as barely enclosing what was seen by the earliest human eye, or they may swell beyond all that the modern astronomy has ever dared to imagine ; still there is the same unchanging value,—the same to the finite creature whom it estimates, the same to the Eternal Mind that alone is capable of making the estimate. The soul that truly believes in Him, that loves Him, must be nearer to Him, and He is nearer to it, than to the most exalted being in the universe (exalted physically and intellectually we mean) that has less of this faith, or none of this faith, that alone "pleases God," and unites to Him. And so must the believing soul feel it to be. There may be ranks of being physically and intellectually above it, far above it. Still would it love to contemplate such exaltations of ascending intellectualities, or ascending powers, even though its own place in the great scale is physically depressed by it. It should love it, and would love it, because it brings glory to its Maker. Paradox as it may seem, it is itself made morally greater and higher by the very position that enables it to see its physical lowliness. The more humble its own place, the more glorious appears the transcending height of the divine Heavens to which it looks up through this vision-aiding valley of humiliation. This is the transcendental arithmetic of the New Testament: "The last shall be first, and he that is least among you all, the same shall be great." Such is the Bible calculus. The believers' value is not disturbed by any computation that measures him by the outward universe. Be this greater or smaller, younger or older, it matters not. His longitude, his place in being, is not geocentric, or heliocentric, or kosmocentric even, but theocentric. Its central sun is the *πατηρ των φωτων*, "The Father of Lights." It suffers no change or parallax, because it is not determined by any varying outward observation, but by its relation to Him to whom also, in a still higher sense, "there is no *parallagé*," or shadow of turning.*

And this is the peculiar glory of the divine revelation. It is itself the great supernatural fact of facts. It is God the Infinite seeking and finding *us*. Divine knowledge comes down. It is not any department, however high, of learning and science. It is not an upper story of any natural knowledge, or into which we mount from any vantage height of natural knowledge, but a different and separate sphere of thought. We do not ascend to it from "any heaven reaching hill" of philosophy, but it comes lowly down to us, sent from God himself. "We rise," it is said, "through nature up to nature's God." This may be true enough, but even then it is only nature's God it finds—"the Eternal Power and divinity," the Supreme Cause,—it may be, the Supreme Intelligence, as an intelligence of natural things. Nature, too, and this is what Paul intends, may keep us in mind of the unseen when revealed to us, or it ought to have kept us from losing such a revelation of the invisible when once made to us. But it goes no farther. Without another revealing to the hearts and minds of men, "nature's God" remains the God of the universe, the God of wholes that knows not the parts, except as comprehended in this universal impersonal relation to a mighty organic totality. At the utmost it reaches but to those first words of the Creed that are little or nothing to us, severed from what follows. "I believe in God—in God omnipotent." Natural knowledge may say this. "I believe in God all-knowing." To this extent also may it go. Beyond, it is the "unknown God." "I believe in God the Father." Here breaks in a voice from Heaven. It is a Father's voice, seeking the lost, calling to the lost, saying to us, as it said to the first man—"Adam, where art thou?" No man hath known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals him. It is no longer, as has been said before, simply a belief *in God*, in *a* God, but in *our* God, the Father, and nearer still, "the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." And then, nearer and nearer still, draws on the wondrous chain of supernatural truth reaching from the Infinite all the way down to our finite humanity, and which is so simply yet sublimely set forth in the earliest and most catholic symbol of the Christian faith,—the incarnation, the miraculous conception of a Virgin mother, the Redeemer's law-fulfilling life, his atoning death, the descent into Hades, the rising again from the dead, the ascent into Heaven, the right hand mediatorship, the coming at the judgment day,—the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting.

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* Jas. 1 : 17.

Here is divine knowledge. How scanty, some might say, especially as compared with the rich disclosures of natural theology! A few positive dogmas, or facts, with little or nothing of that inductive connection out of which we might construct a science or a philosophy! As knowledge, as mere knowledge, it may indeed, in one sense, be said to be but little; but O how precious! What would earth be without it? We need not ask where would be our hope of salvation? But what would become even of those things the world esteems highest, should this truth be withdrawn, or go out in a night of final, hopeless, unbelief. Philosophy, poetry, science, art—they boast, sometimes, of sustaining revelation, but where would they be a few generations after such a cloud had settled over our world? They were fast crumbling when Christianity came; what reason have we to expect that the highest mountains of human thought would escape submersion in that deluge of secularity, sensuality, and selfish ferocity, that would succeed the total eclipse of all belief and all knowledge that connects itself with the heavenly and divine?

But it is knowledge after all, some might say—or rather, what is there to prevent this from becoming mere knowledge, mere dry dogmas? Our space will only allow us to present briefly two preventive thoughts. The first is the great preciousness of this truth simply regarded as a revelation from God the Infinite. Were it but a father's voice calling unto us and saying, "Look unto me ye lost and be ye saved;" had it simply contained the announcement, "above you is the God of old, and underneath the everlasting arms;" had it barely told us, there is a great Saviour and a great salvation; or had it given only the general assurance, "in my Father's house there is bread enough and to spare;"

it would have been enough to give it this high position, not only as casting all other knowledge in the shade, but as making it something more than knowledge, even an "inborn, *ingrowing* Word," a *living truth* to the souls that truly received it.

The other thought is, that the true way to prevent these articles of the Creed from becoming mere scientific symbols, is to nourish in the soul a personal love for the divine personal medium through whom they are brought to us—Jesus the God man, Son of God and Son of Man; Jesus our Elder Brother, the great bond of union between the finite and the Infinite. The love of Jesus,—without it, all theology is but a *gnosis*, a philosophy. The name of Jesus—it is "as ointment poured forth." It is the preserving unction of all religious ideas. The Christian life, it is the life in Jesus;" the blessed dead, "they sleep in Jesus;" all precious truth, it is "the truth as it is in Jesus." Well may we "count all knowledge but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Jesus"—"the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely." "Whether there be prophecies, they shall cease; whether there be tongues they shall fail; whether there be knowledge it shall vanish away"—all knowledge that is not transfused and vivified by love. "For now abideth faith, hope, charity,—these three,—but the greatest of these is charity."

T. L.

Art. III.--THOUGHTS ON THE CHURCH..

SECOND ARTICLE.

Can a sect be *evangelical*, which refuses to accept the Apostles' Creed as the fundamental symbol of its faith? The question is simple, clear, and important enough, one would suppose, to command some respectful attention. The point is not, whether other symbols may not be worthy also of regard in their place; but whether any form of belief, written or unwritten, can be considered evangelically sound and orthodox, which does not start in this plain rule, and grow forth from it as its normative ground and type. Can the Augsburg Confession, for instance, or the Westminster Confession, or the Heidelberg Catechism, be of greater symbolical authority at any point than the Creed, for the determination of the true and proper sense of Christianity; so that the last may be lawfully required to bend to any of the first, instead of its being held necessary that the order of subordination should fall the other way? In the relation here between the older confessionalism and the confessionalism of later times, which is to be considered first and which second; which must be taken for the foundation, and which for the superstructure, of the Christian scheme of faith? And so in regard to any unwritten judgment or conception of Christianity, which may be cherished in any quarter as a favorite sectarian phase of what is counted evangelical religion; the point for consideration comes up always in the same form. Can any such conception ever be allowed rightly to take precedence of that view of Christianity which is set before us in the ancient Creed, and which was received by the whole Christian world in the beginning, as the necessary, and only legitimate expression of what the Christian religion is in its first constituent principles and facts? Can any confessionalism, in one word, written or unwritten, disown the Creed, ignore the Creed, make no conscious account of the Creed practically, as the basis of its opinions and teachings, and yet be, at the same time, evangelical, that is, answerable truly to the life and spirit of the Gospel? Can a Christian teacher, or a body of Christian teachers, occupy this position of broad indifference, or full antagonism, to what was held universally to be the absolutely binding *regula fidei* in the first ages, and yet deserve to be honored, notwithstanding, as sound in the faith and biblically orthodox?

With many in this incongruous predicament, we know, a ready and convenient escape from all difficulty is felt to be ever at hand, in the trite sophism which pretends to fall back at once on the Bible as the last rule of all right Christian belief. Here all our unchurchly sects fancy themselves to be planted on impregnable ground. They find it perfectly easy to stand forward with their diversified schemes of opinion, regardless of all primitive confessions and creeds, and to challenge the respect of the world for them as evangelical, on the simple ground of their having been drawn directly from the Scriptures and from no other source. Whether their schemes may agree strictly with the Apostles' Creed, they have not felt it necessary at all carefully to inquire; they have, on the whole, a sort of instinctive apprehension that they do not; but to what can that amount, in a case which confessedly refers itself at once to the higher rule of the Bible, to which every rule besides, it matters not how old, must be required of course to bend and yield? If there *be* any discrepancy between their faith and the proper historical sense of the Apostles' Creed, they are sorry for it; but it cannot be helped; they at all events, follow the Bible; and in such case, it is plain to see that if the Creed is not with them, the Creed must be wrong. With the ordinary sect spirit, setting all logic at defiance in this transparently stupid style, the less discussion one may have the better. We write for the thoughtful only; and such surely do not need to be told, that this pretended setting up of the Bible against the

Creed is a hypocritical sham of the poorest order, and nothing more. The question, as one would suppose any child might be able to see, regards not at all the authority of the Bible, but wholly and exclusively the interpretation of the Bible, the true and proper construction of what is to be considered its actual sense. It is not, as is sometimes shamelessly pretended: Must the Bible yield to the Creed, or the Creed to the Bible? but something very different indeed, namely this: Must the sense of the Bible as outlined in the Creed be regarded as its true sense, or may some other construction, some radically different way of understanding it, be allowed at pleasure to set this outline aside, and to make it of no force as a standard of Christian faith? Whether it be pretended to supersede the authority of the symbol in this way by a new written formulary, or by an unwritten scheme of Christianity professedly drawn fresh from the Bible, signifies nothing; all comes to the same thing in the end. In either case, it is the confessionalism of the Creed contradicted and opposed by another confessionalism, another theory of the Gospel, cast in a different mould and bearing a different type; and the only point to be settled is, which should be allowed to prevail over the other and to carry with it the highest authority, as a key for opening the full and proper sense of God's word. That the opposing interest should in any case affect to be ruled by no confessional authority whatever, and claim to be the direct voice of the Bible, would seem not to improve its position certainly, but to throw it rather into the worst possible form. A sect or party then, or it may be with just as much reason a single individual, is found setting up what after all can never be any thing better than a mere private opinion against the testimony of the general Church, spoken through ages; and gravely asking all mankind to be well assured that such private opinion is the veritable doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, which has a right, therefore, to be heard with implicit trust, in opposition it need be to all other professions of faith made since the world began. Simply to state the case, is to expose it. It is not easy to conceive of any pretension more outrageously absurd; and yet, strange to say, the spirit of it meets us on all sides, forming, one may say, the reigning tone and temper of a very large part of our American Christianity at the present time.

Again we ask: Can any system of religion which thus sets up—not the Bible really—but its own construction of the Bible, in opposition to what is exhibited as being the true sense of the Bible in the Creed, in opposition to this form of sound words in which the Church has seen fit to express its apprehension of the fundamental truths of the Gospel from the beginning—can any such system of religion, we say, deserve to be acknowledged as evangelical and orthodox?

We have a number of religious denominations in the modern Puritan world, which arrogate to themselves the title *Evangelical* as preëminently their own, for the very reason, as it would seem, that they agree in repudiating the churchly theory of Christianity presented in the Creed, as being in their mind contrary to the proper genius of the Gospel, and choose to substitute for this another and different theory altogether, extracted immediately, they pretend, from the Bible itself. However much they may differ among themselves, on other points, they are all happily of one and the same way of thinking here. They stand on the common ground of Puritanism as opposed to the old Catholic doctrine of the Church and the entire theology of the Apostles' Creed. Over against all this, they parade what they call the authority of the Bible, in other words, a general scheme of religion which they declare with great confidence to be the only true sense of the Bible; and thus will have it, that this new rule of theirs shall be taken for the test of evangelical character the whole world over, so that whatever in any age or country is found not to agree with it, must for that very reason, be condemned, as contrary to true godliness and sound faith. Can any such pretension, we ask, be allowed to hold good? Most certainly not; unless we choose to turn all confessionalism into derision.

Here surely we have a right to join issue boldly with the whole system of unchurchly Puritanism, and to put it solemnly on its own apology and defence. Its points of difference within itself, are indeed of only minor significance; what it needs most of all is the vindication of its general or main cause, the position, namely, by which it stands arrayed as a whole against the primitive faith of the Christian world. Take it, for example, in the form of some one of its manifold religious "persuasions"; let us say, the wide spread numerically powerful sect of the Baptists. They reject infant baptism; a serious matter of controversy between them and other sects of like Puritanic mind; but this is not the beginning of their error, the deepest and most comprehensive form of their heterodox faith. To reach that, we must go back of all such heads of sectarian dispute, to what is in fact common ground for the disputing parties, their want of faith in the Church, their state of full opposition in this view to the Creed. The Baptists are heretical, because they are thus at variance with the foundation symbol of Christianity. Here, first of all, they are bound to give account of themselves before the tribunal of the Christian world. Other points, so far as they are concerned, mean nothing, are in truth mere impertinences and irrelevancies, till this root issue be fairly met and settled. As it is a matter of small moment what Unitarians may hold on other topics of theology, while they refuse to own the doctrine of the Trinity and the proper divinity of Christ; so is it also of little consequence what may be thought of the economy of the Church, at other points, its sacraments and forms of worship, its prerogatives and powers, by those who call in question, or at once deny, the very being of it, as it is made an article of faith in the Apostles' Creed. Why should breath be spent in discussing the question of infant baptism, where the whole conception of the Church giving it significance is quietly disowned as an antiquated superstition? Let the controversy fall back on this point, the true idea of the Church, as its proper beginning. The Baptists call themselves evan gelical and orthodox, because they follow, as they tell us, the rule of the Gospel, in distinction from every other rule. We charge them with heresy, and pronounce them unevangelical and unbiblical, because they follow in reality only their own arbitrary and partial interpretation of the Scriptures, and refuse to find in them the sense in which they have been read by the orthodox faith of the Church through all ages. They are in broad conflict with the original symbol of Christianity, requiring the world to receive instead of it their own spiritualistic glossary everywhere, as the only sure and sufficient medium for getting at the true sense of God's word. Shall we be expected to yield to any such barefaced arrogance as this? No. The Baptists are neither evangelical nor orthodox. A main constituent of the Christian faith, one whole side indeed of the mystery of godliness as it was held by the universal Church in the beginning, finds no place in their system of belief. Their religion is not in the Bible, because it agrees not with the original *regula fidei* set before us in the Creed.

And so with Puritanism in general. Its cause here, as we have seen, is throughout the same. In discarding the old doctrine of the Church, in making Christianity to be a full and complete fact on the outside of the Church, it sets aside really the mysteries of the Church altogether; and by doing so brings in actually what must be considered a different Gospel from that which is preached by the Apostles' Creed, and which was held by the whole Church in the beginning to be the true glorious Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ. Is this to be evangelical? Is this to be orthodox, and sound in the faith as it was once delivered to the saints? Let the representatives of unchurchly Puritanism, who are never weary of repeating their stale insipidities on the subject of the Church, look this accusation fairly in the face, and meet it with some manly and honest answer if they can. It is high time, indeed, that attention were fixed more than it has been upon what must be held to be, in this whole controversy with Puritanism, the grand first matter in debate. The defenders of the interest should be required first of all to come to some positive explanation of their own posture toward the original faith of the Christian world, as we have it expressed in the Creed. Till this be done, it is idle to talk with them on other points. Where there are no common premises, there can be of course no common conclusions, no such conclusions at least in one and the same sense. To what can it amount to argue sacramental questions, points of ecclesiastical polity, Church topics of any sort, with men who have yet to learn, or who at any rate do not feel themselves bound to acknowledge, "what be the first principles of the oracles of God," as these were supposed to be settled in past ages by the old Catholic standard of the Christian faith? If we are to have any argument at all with such men, it should be made to fall back at once to the beginning. All that we can do properly, is to charge home upon them the practical heresy of their whole theological position. Let them set themselves right with the Creed, before they pretend to dogmatize in any other direction.

The doctrine of the Church, we have seen, is not in the Creed in any merely outward and mechanical way. It appears there as a necessary part of the general mystery of faith, being absolutely required, just where it comes into view, to carry forward the significance and power of the Christian salvation, from what goes before to what follows after; being nothing less in truth than the connecting link between the mission of the Holy Ghost, and the full course of grace subsequently in the experience of believers. In this view, the article could not be dropped from the system, nor transposed in it to any different place, without marring its organic completeness throughout; as on the other hand the article itself, so torn from its connections, could no longer retain its own proper meaning as an object of faith. So it is indeed with all the articles of the Creed. The symbol is not so much a number of separate acts of faith brought together in a common confession, as one single act rather compassing at once the whole range of the new creation from its commencement to its close. It has to do with its successive points, not as disjointed notions merely, but as concrete forces belonging to the constitution of a common living whole. Its articles are bound together thus, with indissoluble connection, from beginning to end. To believe any one part of it in its own sense, is implicitly at least to believe every other part; for the truth of every part stands in its relations to the whole system in which it is comprehended, and if it be not apprehended in these relations it cannot be said to be apprehended and believed in its own proper sense at all. In this way it is, that the article of the Church in the Creed is conditioned by the sense of the formulary at other points; as these other points are conditioned also by it again in their turn. There can be no true faith in the resurrection and glorification of Christ, and none in the consequent sending of the Holy Ghost, where it is not felt necessary to follow out still farther the objective progress of the mystery, and say: "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church;" and so, on the other hand, there can be no true faith in the Church, where it is not perceived to be the necessary outbirth in this way of these glorious antecedents, leading on to it, and making room for it in the world. It is not any and every way of owning the Church that can be said to satisfy the requirement of the Creed; as it is not enough for it either to own in any and every way the mission of the Holy Ghost.

The whole Creed carries with it thus from beginning to end an import, which accords in full with what it makes the Church to be in the order of salvation; and its articles can be rightly utttered, therefore, only as they are taken in real correspondence with this view. In other words, the theology of the symbol is churchly throughout. Its positions all hold only in that order of grace which involves the conception of the Church as the necessary fruit of its presence in the world. Sundered from this order, they cease to be altogether the objects of faith they are made to be in the system, and become instead mere matters of speculation and opinion. Hence it is, that the difficulty of Puritanism with the Creed is not confined by any means to the article of the Church itself, but extends to its universal form and structure; so that even when any of its propositions may seem to be readily received, it is still always with some want of entire complacency in the particular way in which they are here articulated and spoken. Left to itself, Puritanism would choose to utter the same truths always in a different manner and with a different tone. To its reigning habit of theological thought, the organization of the Creed must ever appear to be unnatural and defective. Its own construction of Christianity may embrace, to a certain extent, the same christological and soteriological positions and terms; but they will be found to have not just the same meaning; there is a difference always in their drift and scope. Puritanism may lay great stress on its orthodoxy, in owning the doctrine of the Trinity, the true and proper Divinity of Christ, and the Atonement wrought out by his death; and yet see no necessity whatever for carrying out all this to the issue which is ascribed to it in the Creed. It may acknowledge the Remission of Sins and the Resurrection of the Dead; and yet see no dependence of either one or the other mystery on the supernatural constitution of the Church. But this is not to hold these articles in the sense of the Creed. The confessional concord in such case is in outward sound only, and nothing more. The orthodoxy of the Creed moves, from its first article on to its last, in that method of faith which requires and implies in its proper place the presence of the Holy Catholic Church; and no point belonging to it can be held answerably to its general and only true sense, except as it is held in this way. No Gnostic apprehension of Christ's person, no merely spiritualistic view of his work of redemption, can satisfy its demands even in part. All must be taken in the form of an actual history, completing itself in the Church, "which is his body," running its course here as an order of grace in distinction from the order of nature, on to the glorious resurrection of the last day. So with all the benefits of the Christian salvation. They are, in the view of the Creed, fruits of the Spirit, which are to be found only in the Church, the home of the Spirit. The life everlasting proclaimed by the Creed is a mystery, that depends wholly on the process of the new creation in Christ, which is here exhibited as the object of the Christian faith; and in this way it has place only within the economy of the Church, and can be truly believed therefore only under such view. The remission of sins, in the same way, is regarded as holding in the Church, and not on the outside of it. Men may dream of its being elsewhere; may take it for something that is possible in the general relation of man to his Maker; may claim to be evangelical and spiritual, just because they conceive of it in this spiritualistic way, and make it independent of all sacramental forms and limitations. But no such notion of the remission of sins amounts to what the article means in the Creed. There it is a mystery conditioned by the more general mystery of the Church; it comes through the obedience of faith yielded to this heavenly constitution, and finds its proper symbol, its real signature and pledge, in the sacrament of introduction into the Church; which is for this reason also the sacrament of regeneration, serving to translate its subjects from the power of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins. Hence the form given to the article in the Nicene Creed, "We confess one baptism for the remission of sins," adds nothing in fact to the sense of its shorter expression. To believe in the remission of sins at all in the sense of the old Christian faith, is to believe that it comes through baptism as the door of entrance into the Church.

As the Creed is constructed within itself, in the way now stated, on a theological scheme which is peculiarly its own, and which determines the true sense of it at every point, requiring all its articles to be understood in one manner only and not in another; so it is easy to see, how it must in this way also draw after it a corresponding construction of all Christian doctrine beyond itself, imparting to it in like manner the power of its own principle and life. By its very conception, the formulary is archetypal and regulative for the whole world of Christian truth. It does not pretend to exhaust the necessary topics of divinity; it leaves room for a broad field of confessionalism beyond itself. But still, if it be indeed what it claims to be, a true scheme of what are to be considered the first principles of the oracles of God, it must necessarily rule the order and shape of all such additional belief throughout; in such way that no doctrine or article of faith shall deserve to be counted orthodox, except as it may stand in the bosom of the same scheme, growing forth from it, and carrying out the scope of it in a natural and regular way. All later confessionalism, to be genuine and valid, must have its genesis or birth from the Apostles' Creed, must refer itself to this as the real matrix of its growth and development. There must ever be a wide difference thus between a system of thought in which this order of faith is acknowledged and observed, and a system of thought in which it is disowned and disregarded; the theological system of the Creed and a theological system made to rest on any other basis; theology in the churchly and theology in the unchurchly form. A difference not confined to the immediate topics of the Creed itself, but extending through these to all topics; a difference not so much turning on single outward propositions, (though on this also to some extent,) as it is to be measured rather by the inward life of such propositions, the way in which they are understood, their spirit, their general purpose and aim. No Christian doctrine can be held under exactly the same form, within the system of the Creed, and on the outside of this system. Thus it is, that the authority of the symbol reaches out to all points of faith, and pervades with its presence the whole range of evangelical truth, making it necessary for every theological article to be held in full conformity with this fundamental rule, in order that it may have a right to be considered orthodox and true.

It is not enough, for example, to acknowledge the prophetical, priestly, and kingly offices of Christ, if they be set in no union with the true apprehension of his Mediatorial Person. It is not enough to maintain infant baptism, if we refuse to own at the same time the relation which the sacrament is made to bear in the Creed to the remission of sins. It is not enough to confess the inspiration of the Scriptures, if it be not with faith first in the Church; as though without such an apprehension of the Christian mystery as leads immediately on from Christ's glorification, and the sending of the Holy Ghost, to this great fact, it might be possible for any one, leaping over it as it were, and having no sense of its presence, to come in some other way altogether to firm faith in the Bible, as God's infallible word, and so through this afterwards to a full and complete scheme of evangelical religion. The Bible, great as it is in the scheme of Christianity, could not be substituted for the Church, in the place assigned to it as an article of faith, in the Creed, without violence to the whole order and sense of the Creed. In the view of this archetypal symbol, it comes rightly for all real faith, not before the Church, but after it. It is not the principle or beginning of Christianity, though it be truly its rule. It shines as a light from heaven *in the Church*, and was never intended to be a sufficient and final light for the world, as such, on the outside of the Church. Rationalism, Naturalism, Humanitarism, of all shapes and types, taking it in such wrong view, however much stress they may affect to lay on its authority, never receive it truly as God's word, have no power to understand it, and in their use of it make it for themselves, as a matter of course, a mere *ignis fatuus*, all the world over, "blind leaders of the blind." It would be an appalling spectacle, only to see in fact what an amount of actual infidelity—disobedience to the faith—is sheltered in our time beneath the specious plea of honoring the Bible in this false way.

Take again the doctrine of justification by faith. It is not expressed in the Creed. This of itself makes nothing against it; for the Creed does not pretend to set forth all Christian doctrines; it is an outline simply of what Christianity is in its primary, fundamental facts; leaving room for much to follow in the way of confessional superstructure. It is enough, if the doctrine before us be in the symbol by implication. But this at once serves, as we may readily see, to limit and define at the same time its proper conception. To be true at all, the doctrine must be held in union with the general system of the Creed, and not as something independent of it, and bearing to it only an outside relation. To conceive of justification by faith as a thing having no connection whatever with the objective world of grace brought into view by the Creed, a thing pertaining to the general idea of man's relations to God in the order of nature, instead of being bound in any way to the mysterious organization of the Church—the common error of the Puritanic mind—is to turn the doctrine into a fiction, which contradicts the symbol, and virtually sets aside its authority, bringing in indeed a new scheme of Christianity altogether. There can be no true faith, in the view of the Creed, which does not begin by owning and obeying the mystery of godliness proclaimed in its own articles; no true justification, which does not come from being set thus in real communication with the objective righteousness of Jesus Christ, as the power of a new creation actually present in the Church. No wonder, the theory which makes justification by faith to be a mere abstraction, and that also which resolves it into justification by fancy or feeling, find little or no satisfaction in the old Christian confessions. *Their* theology here, most assuredly, is not the theology of the Apostles' Creed.

What we have said, may be sufficient to show, how deep the distinction is between the churchly and the unchurchly schemes of theology, and how far in the end it is found to run. It regards not some points only, in the case of which there may be direct and formal opposition, but serves to qualify, in a very material way, the sense of all points. No article, either of the Creed or of theology in general, can be just the same, for one who owns the old Catholic idea of the Church, and for one to whom that idea has come to seem an empty fiction. Doctrines appear under different relations, and so under different aspects, as apprehended from the one stand-point or from the other; and even where they may seem to have the same sound, are still felt some how to carry with them always a different signification and force.

Let any one compare, in this view, the theology of the old Church Fathers, with the theology of modern New England, in what is commonly regarded as its most orthodox form. How the two methods vary continually from one another, hardly ever presenting the same topics in the same way! The Trinity, the Incarnation, all Christ's offices and acts, the authority of the Scriptures, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, regeneration, justification, and sanctification, faith, hope, charity, the resurrection, and the life to come—all are made to have a meaning in the one case, which is not just what they are felt to mean in the other. The two schemes are not strung on the same key, and they sound accordingly no note in common. Each has its own christology, its own soteriology, its own eschatology; in one word, its own whole atmosphere of thought, and habit of faith, so sharply defined and strongly marked, that it is impossible to avoid some sense of embarrassment, some feeling of strangeness, in passing out of one into the other. For one brought up in the Puritan habit of religion, it requires a new education, to be able either to understand or appreciate properly the Christianity of the ancient Fathers; as on the other hand we may be very sure, that any one of these returning to the earth would need to undergo a full revolution of thought, before he could feel himself at all at home in the bosom of Puritanism, or find in it any aliment whatever for faith and piety. We have in the case, in fact, two Christianities, two radically different schemes of religion, two whole systems of divinity that never move in exactly the same line.

So much hinges on this great question of the Church, which to the view of many seems so far away from the true central life of the Gospel. In comparison with it, as we have said before, the ordinary points of denominational controversy, the shibboleths that divide one unchurchly sect from another, are only of partial, superficial interest. Such sectarian confessionalism, with all its differences, holds notwithstanding for the most part in a common system or scheme of faith, and rests in substantially the same general conception of Christianity. To pass over from one branch of it to another involves no violent revolution. It is simply to go out of one compartment of a wide and spacious mansion into another. The mansion remains still the same. But the question : Church or no Church in the old Catholic sense, is of a widely different nature, having to do with the very consciousness of religion itself, and determining its universal order, method, and form. Its home is in the depths of Christianity, far down beneath the issues from which spring the ordinary divisions of denominations and sects.

In view of such a generic difference holding between the two systems, the churchly scheme of Christianity and the unchurchly, the theology of the Creed and its opposite—a difference which lies so deep and reaches so far—it becomes a matter of peculiar interest to determine precisely what its whole character signifies and means. In one case, as we have seen, the Church is taken to be an essential constituent of the mystery of godliness, while in the other it is considered an arrangement belonging to it only in an outward adventitious way. Here we get back to the last sense of the Church Question; which is found to be at the same time strangely implicated with the right construction of the Creed, conditioning in truth the way in which all its articles are to be understood. For not only does the Creed affirm the doctrine of the Church, making it a necessary part of Christianity, and so a necessary object of faith; but it throws the entire scheme of Christianity into such a shape and form, from first to last, as imperatively requires the doctrine in this sense, and cannot be satisfied without it. The Creed is constructed throughout, both in its antecedent and consequent articles, on that view of Christiansty which involves the idea of the Church in the form now stated, and makes it necessary for it to come into view just where it does in the onward flow of that good confession. This does not imply, however, that the Creed starts from the idea of the Church as its own proper principle. That which is the first question in regard to the doctrine of the Church itself, namely, what place is to be ascribed to it in the conception of Christianity, is not just the first question in regard to the theological system in which it is comprehended as a necessary article of faith. When we have said, therefore, that the Church is made in the Creed to be of the essence of Christianity, and that all the articles of the symbol are so framed as to shut faith up to this conclusion, and that it leads on thus to an entire theology of answerable form and complexion throughout—it remains still to ask: What then is that peculiarity of doctrine in the Creed, that distinguishing quality of faith, back of its doctrine of the Church, which calls this forth in its order, gives to it all its force, and imparts what we call a churchly character to the universal scheme of religion into which it enters as an organic part? What is the root or beginning of the broad difference, which reigns between the Catholic Christianity of the first ages and the Puritanic Christianity of modern times, between the theology which breathes the spirit of the Creed and the theology which breathes a different spirit, between the churchly construction of the Gospel and the unchurchly? It is not easy to conceive of a theological inquiry more interesting than this, or more worthy of being followed out with right study to a right answer.

Were we called upon to give in a word the distinguishing peculiarity of the Creed, in the view suggested by the inquiry, we should place it in the *historical* character it assigns to the Christian salvation, regarded as a supernatural process of grace, in opposition to every scheme which resolves it into a matter of mere speculative thought. Its doctrine of the Church falls back on its doctrine of Christ; and this is made to include, from first to last, the conception of a real union between the divine and the human, the life of God and the life of man, in the person of the Mediator, carrying along with it the work of redemption, as the process of a new creation in the bosom of the old, onward to the end of time.

In the Creed, as in the New Testament, Christianity has its last ground in the mystery of the Ever Blessed and Glorious Trinity; which is exhibited as an object for faith, however, not so much in the light of a doctrine, as in the light of a fact, opening the way for the revelation which God has been pleased to make of himself through the mystery of the Incarnation. This forms, accordingly, an act of self-manifestation on the part of God, by which he is to be regarded as coming into the world in a sense in which he had not been in it before, for the purpose of redeeming and saving men from their sins. The Word became flesh. That is the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ; and power to own and confess it, not as a dogma merely, but as a simple historical fact, is the beginning of all faith in the proper evangelical sense of the term. The beginning of all heresy, on the other hand, lies in the open or virtual denial of this great mystery. Hence St. John's memorable touch-stone for distinguishing true Christianity from that which is spurious and false. "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," he tells us, "is of God; and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world." The spirit of antichrist, in this way, is the rationalistic temper of the natural mind, which substitues for the mystery of the incarnation in its proper form a mere notional construction of Christ's person, in which, after all, no real historical union of the divine nature with the human is allowed to have place; setting up thus in opposition to the true Christ a false shadowy image, a mere spiritualistic phantom, which is made to counterfeit his name and usurp his place. Over against all such rationalistic spiritualism, the Creed makes full earnest with the criterion of St. John. It takes up and carries out in its own simple, historical way, that notable confession of Peter: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God;" in reference to which our Saviour said: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." The merit of Peter's faith stood in its power to break over the natural order of the world, so as to see and acknowledge in the person of Christ, there actually before him, the presence of a new and higher form of existence, joining the nature of God with the nature of man in a way transcending all common understanding and thought. Thou, Jesus of Nazareth, it could say—whom we know to be in all respects a real man like ourselves, and no spirit merely in human show—Thou, the Son of Mary, art at the same time the Son of the Most High God, and as such the Messiah, the true Saviour of the world. Such precisely is the confession, which forms the burden of the Apostles' Creed. Its theme may be said to be throughout, "Christ come in the flesh." In that fact, the objective mystery of godliness (1 Tim. 3: 16), it sees the whole fulness of salvation, the entire economy of redemption; and it lays itself out, accordingly, to set it forth in its necessary conditions and consequences, under a purely historical view, as the proper substance of Christianity, the one grand object of all true Christian faith. So apprehended, the Gospel is in no sense theoretical, but supremely practical. It is the presence of a supernatural fact in the world, confronting men under an outward form, carrying in itself objectively the powers of the world to come, and challenging actual sumbission to its claims in such view as the only way in which it is possible to be saved. Faith has to do in the case, first of all, not with any doctrines which may be supposed to flow from the fact, but with the fact itself as a simple matter of history; the history being, however, at the same time supernatural, out of the whole ordinary course of things in the world, and requiring, therefore, a very different kind of belief from that which is needed to take up the facts of history in its common human form. It is a great thing—too great for the reach of mere natural thought—to believe truly that Christ has come in the flesh; that Jesus was no mere man attended by the extraordinary inspiration of the Almighty, according to the old Ebionitic view; and yet no mere shadow either, according to any of the old Gnostic theories; but that in him the Word became actually and enduringly incarnate for us men and for our salvation.

On this supernatural fact, the Creed fastens its whole attention, referring it to its necessary origin, and following it out steadily to its necessary results, all in the way of simple historical apprehension and conception. Christ, the Son of God, we are required to believe, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man. He suffered, died, descended into hades. But it was not possible that he should be held under the power of death. He rose again; he ascended on high, leading captivity captive, and having all power given unto him in heaven and in earth. All this served only to prepare the way for his kingdom in the world, through the mission of the Holy Ghost, his great ascension gift, and the constitution of the Church, which is declared by St. Paul to be his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all, and with which he has himself promised to be present always to the end of time. In the Church, accordingly, as distinguished from the natural constitution of the world, the new order of grace brought to pass by the victory of Christ over sin, death, and hell, runs its course from age to age, in the salvation of all true believers. "We confess one baptism for the remission of sins; we look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come."

The peculiarity of the old Christian Creeds, is their way of grasping and following out the historical realness of the mystery of the incarnation, so as to make full earnest with the objective, continually enduring character of the new order of life it has served to bring into the world. In this respect, it falls in with what appears to have been the reigning tone of the Apostolic preaching, as we are made acquainted with it in the Acts of the Apostles. The same peculiarity runs through all the theological literature of the Ancient Church, as it entered also into its universal life. The object of faith is made to be always Christ in the flesh, Christ coming into the world, working, dying, rising again, conquering, reigning, carrying forward his kingdom in the most real way to the end of time. The whole Gospel is regarded as being in this way a *mystery;* not in the sense of an unfathomable, incomprehensible doctrine merely, but in the light of a fact not resolvable into the ordinary constitution of the world, which has nevertheless at a certain time entered into it, from the depths of eternity, under the most actual form, serving to bring out the inmost purpose of God in reference to man; the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3: 16); the mystery hid from ages and generations, but now manifested to the saints (Col. 1: 26); the mystery which from the beginning of the world was hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ, to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord (Eph. 3: 9–11); the mystery of grace, which was given us by God's purpose in Christ Jesus before the world began, but is now "made manifest"—the purpose having passed into supernatural act—by the "appearing" of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel; which in such view is nothing more nor less than his own glorious advent into the world creating and bringing to pass what it serves thus to reveal (2 Tim. 1: 9–10). Such an apprehension of the Gospel involves, and draws after it necessarily, the old Catholic idea of the Church, as it is presented to us in the Creed.

All heresy, so far as Christianity is concerned, starts in the form of unbelieving opposition to this mystery, refusing to see and acknowledge in Christ the objective, abiding presence of the new creation—the world of grace in full parallel with the world of nature—under its own proper historical character and form. Wherever it may end, it is sure to begin always, consciously or unconsciously, in a wrong view of the Incarnation. It does not lay hold of the fact, with any just sense of its terms and conditions, so as to be borne along by the outward authority of it in its own direction—the only true conception of faith; but turns it rather into a mere matter of speculative contemplation, by which it comes to be at last nothing more in truth than a thought or notion in the mind itself, substituted for the fact it pretends to believe. The mind thus does not pass over really into the objective sphere of the christological revelation, as it is in its own nature, but remains rationalistically bound all the time to its simply natural order of existence, fetching the mystery down to this, as it were, instead of rising above it by its means. The result is such a separation of the natural from the supernatural in Christ, and so in Christianity throughout, as will not allow them to come to any organic, abiding, and truly historical union whatever. Broad exemplifications of this false way of thinking we have in the strange dreamings of the old Gnostics, and afterwards again in the more subtle errors of Nestorius and Eutyches, by the coming round in opposite directions to the same end—such a sublimation of Christ's divinity, as left no room for the conception of his true and proper humanity in one and the same person, and served thus to transfer the entire mystery from the region of real outward history to the region of unreal inward imagination and fancy. These ancient heresies have been long since surmounted and condemned by the orthodox theology of the Church. But the spirit that gave birth to them, which is nothing else than the natural indisposition of the human mind to confess that "Christ is come in the flesh," still lives, we may be sure, and will continue to do so, and to make itself felt as a "false spirit," to the end of time. It is a spirit too, which may be readily recognized always, by being brought into comparison with what we have just found to be the true spirit of Christianity as it breathes in the Creed. The distinguishing peculiarity of the Creed is its sense of the actual, the objective, the outwardly historical, in the mystery of the Word made flesh, the regard it has throughout to the enduring realness of the new creation brought to pass in the world by Christ Jesus. Any system then which refuses to conform inwardly to this rule of faith, must be distinguished in the nature of the case by the opposite principle, a tendency, namely, to look away from the objective realness of the new creation in Christ, and to substitute for this a mere theoretical apprehension, by which the mystery is lifted out of its own necessary historical conditions, and made to resolve itself at last, more or less, into a scheme of doctrinal abstractions.

In this way we reach what must be considered the fundamental difference, between the churchly and the unchurchly schemes of Christianity, the Catholic order of faith and the Puritanic, the theology of the Creed and all theology besides.

Here it is then, that the full theological significance of the doctrine of the Church comes finally into view. Entering as it does organically into the construction of the Creed, it becomes necessarily a test or criterion by which to determine the quality of all Christian belief, as either corresponding or not corresponding with the proper sense of this symbol. The idea of the Church presented in the Creed is inseparably joined with its general conception of the historical nature of Christianity; proceeds with necessary development, we may say, from its way of looking at Christ's person and work. Not to see the force of the ide then, and to have no sense of its necessity, is to stand as a matter of course not in this habit or method of faith at all, but in some other form of belief altogether; which, in such case, cannot fail to labor under the general christological defect, that is found to characterise necessarily any theological system bearing a different type from the Creed. An unchurchly spirit, in other words, is in reference to Christianity always to a greater or less extent, a Gnostic spirit, tending to sublimate the true historical character of the Gospel into a spiritualistic abstraction, and causing it to become thus a doctrine or theory rather than the presence of a perpetual fact, a subject of opinion rather than an object of faith. The charge, we are aware, is serious; but it is not made lightly or at random; the truth of it is easily established, we think, both from the nature of the case itself, properly understood, and from actual observation.

It matters not, that those who are under the power of this spirit may profess, and believe themselves really to hold, sound christological views according to the standard of the Creed, rejecting and condemning the heresies which struck at the true constitution of Christ's person in the first Christian ages. The soul of an error is not so much bound to its first outward forms, that it must necessarily die and pass away when these come to an end. It may migrate into new bodies, and thus walk the earth as before. Particularly must this be the case with the error now before us, which St. John declares to be the root or salient point of all contradiction to the great mystery of godliness revealed in Christ, and which cannot fail in such view, therefore, to make itself felt as long as this contradiction shall last, counterfeiting the mystery, and setting up its own mock image, (the "mystery of iniquity" shall we call it?), in its room and place. Conquered in one form, it may be expected to appear still again in some other form, more refined it may be and plausible, but involving always in the end the same sense. It is not enough to confess that Christ has come in the flesh, in the terms of the Creed—"conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin

Mary"—if the confession break down afterwards with any part of what necessarily follows from this fact, as we have it carried out in the same rule of faith. For the objective realness of any fact includes its necessary connections, its historical antecedents and consequents, no less than the naked fact itself; and to be believed at all truly—to be apprehended as a reality and not as a mere dream or fancy—it must be so believed that these shall be owned and acknowledged at the same time. To deny the supernatural birth of Christ on the one hand, or to call in question the truth of his resurrection on the other, would be to turn the whole mystery of the Incarnation into a myth, though it were pretended never so strongly in the same breath to accept it as true. And so with the points that follow in the Creed; if indeed they *do* follow in the actual order of the mystery itself, as they are made to stand forth consecutively here in the order of faith. They must be believed, in order that there may be any full historical faith in the advent of Jesus Christ into the world; and not to believe them, is virtually to make such faith null, by turning its object into a Gnostic fiction, whatever pains may be taken to use at the same time, as far as they go, the old orthodox terms in reference to Christ's person. In the system of the Creed, the article of the Church is made to stand prominent among these points; and the assumption is, of course, that the coming of Christ in the flesh, regarded in its proper historical view, leads on to this in the way of necessary consequence, just as really as it draws after it his glorification at the right of God and the mission of the Holy Ghost. Not to have faith in the Church then—not to have any sense of its historical necessity in the general mystery of Christianity—as it implies in the first place a different conception of the Gospel from that which is presented in the Creed, involves also, in the second place, necessarily, a want of harmony to the same extent with what we have seen to be the distinguishing peculiarity of this old rule of faith, the stress, namely, which it lays throughout on the historical realness of the Incarnation. As the christology of the Creed, the way in which it looks at Christ's person and confesses his coming in the flesh, involves in the end the idea of the Church, it follows, as a matter of course, that those who can feel their faith complete, their religious system round and full, without it, must have the mystery of the Incarnation before their minds in some different way. From the nature of the case thus the unchurchly spirit, not falling in fully with the sound christological sense of the Creed, is found to carry with it always some portion of the leaven of Gnosticism.

It requires only small observation, to verify this conclusion in actual life. The unchurchly spirit prevails largely in the religious world at the present time, under all imaginable varieties of form ; and it is easy enough to see, that just in proportion to its power, it is everywhere a spirit unfavorable to a sound and just apprehension of the mystery of the Incarnation, regarded in the historical light of the Creed. Its tendency is universally towards such a spiritualism here, as goes finally to remand the mystery from the world of fact into the world of fancy, causing it to dissolve thus into thin air. In one direction, this amounts in fact to an open giving up of the higher nature of Christ altogether, as among Socinians and Unitarians; in which case, it is especially worthy of notice, how completely the idea of the Church is made to perish at the same time. Infidelity in such form may pretend still to honor Christianity, and to make high account of the Bible; but it can never be churchly. There is an inward contradiction plainly, between its rationalistic doctrine of Christ and the old Catholic doctrine of the Church. The first does not lead over in any way to the last, (as in the Creed) but excludes it ; showing that there is a natural affinity thus between the want of faith in the Church and the want of faith in Christ. But the spiritualism which is opposed to a just view of Christ's person may take another form; not denying his higher nature, but on the contrary so exalting this in thought as to sink out of sight more or less the historical verity of his lower nature ; and it is in this character more particularly, that it claims attention and observation, as going hand in hand with the unchurchly spirit in the modern religious world.

Of this we have a striking example in the history of the Quakers. Their Christianity was from the start unchurchly in the lowest degree—owning no dependence on outward ministrations, outward sacraments, outward ordinances and arrangements of any kind. It repudiated in fact the universal conception of the Church in the old Catholic sense; while it professed, notwithstanding, the highest veneration for Christ, and affected to make more of his supernatural presence and power than the whole Christian world besides. But it is easy enough now to see, that this pretension was vain; and that what the system honored in such view was not so much the real historical Christ of the Gospel, as a Gnostic fiction rather made to bear his name. With the progress of time, the error has worked itself out more and more into view—its sublimated conception of Christ resolving itself into the "inward light" of mere natural reason—until it seems ready now at last to fall over into the arms of open infidelity.

In the case of other unchurchly sects, the want of a sound historical sense of the mystery of the Incarnation, is no less certain, although it may not be so immediately and broadly apparent. One general evidence of it is found in the simple fact itself, before noticed, that they have so little complacency in the Creed; as feeling it to be in some way opposed to their own habit of thought, not merely in its doctrine of the Church, but in its whole theological construction. The symbol has for them a certain peculiarity throughout, which is felt to be mysteriously interwoven with the presence of this article in its place, and for this reason it is not to their taste. But what this peculiarity is we have now seen. It is nothing more nor less than the objective, historical light in which the fact of Christ's coming in the flesh is made to stand in this ancient rule of faith, imparting a corresponding character to its whole conception of Christianity. Out of this way of believing in the Incarnation, grows forth its doctrine of the Church, and also its general churchly bearing and tone. Want of sympathy thus with the ecclesiastical spirit of the Creed, is in truth want of sympathy at last with its christological spirit. In having no taste for the formulary then, those unchurchly sects show themselves in full proportion to their unchurchliness, estranged from its historical apprehension of the Christian mystery, and so under the power of a faith which must ever be, as differing from this, more or less Gnostically spiritualistic in its character. This is the true secret at bottom of their silent prejudice against the Creed, as it serves to explain also the true nature of their bad understanding generally with the Christianity of the first ages.

Still farther practical proof, ample and full, of the charge here preferred against the unchurchly spirit, as it reigns among Puritanic sects of the better class, is to be found in the prevailing character of their entire theology and religious life. The Church system of the Creed, we have already seen, not only rules the sense of its own articles throughout, but reaches through these to all Christian doctrine and practice, producing a style of Christianity which is very different from all that may exist under any other form. The principle of this difference, it now appears, is not just the doctrine of the Church itself in the form in which it is here made to be a necessary part of the Christian faith, but the Christology which lies behind it—the peculiar way in which the coming of Christ in the flesh is here apprehended and confessed. This it is—this historical apprehension of the great fact of the Incarnation in distinction from all Gnostic spiritualism—that calls out the article of the Church, among other mysteries, in its place, and communicates a churchly spirit at the same time to the whole symbol, and to the universal religious system also into which the symbol naturally runs. It follows, therefore, that all religious thinking which is not ruled by this spirit must stand, so far as that is the case, in a view of the Incarnation, which fails to make full earnest with the objective historical realness of the fact in the way of the Creed; the result of which must be a certain tinge of Gnosticism, extending in the end to its whole scheme of faith. The peculiar genius of the unchurchly system of Christianity in this way, as distinguished from the theological spirit of the Creed, will be found on examination to penetrate every part of its doctrinal and practical life. Any such examination, however, would amount to a comparison of the system in its details with the opposite form of Christianity, a comparative view of the Catholic and Puritanic schemes of religion in particulars, such as we have no mind to enter upon at the present time.

Lancaster, Pa. J. W. N.

ART. IV.—BAPTISM.

A Disputation concerning Baptism, by ANTHONY WALÆUS, Doctor and Professor of Theology in the University of Leyden, A. D , 1724.

CIRCUMCISION was unquestionably deemed of immense importance—so much so, that the LORD sought to slay even Moses because he had neglected that rite with regard to his son, (Ex. 4: 24).

And can we suppose that Baptism may now be neglected with impunity by a Christian parent? It certainly claims at his hands the greatest regard.

In the early days of the Reformation, it was highly thought of—a result of the intelligent and correct views of it, that were then entertained and advocated, as may be seen in the subjoined specimen, which the reader is confidently assured, will amply repay perusal.

Lancaster, Pa. I. S. D.

DISPUTATION CONCERNING BAPTISM, BY PROFESSOR WALÆUS, OF LEYDEN.

Those things having been explained that go to constitute the common nature of sacraments, it remains that we subjoin some things, as much as the manner of our institution requires, that pertain to both the sacraments of the New Testament.

Of these sacraments Baptism is the first, which, on that account, is called the sacrament of our regeneration and of our initiation into the Church; whence also the doctrine of baptism (Heb. 5 : 2) is reckoned among the first principles of Christianity after repentance and faith, and the whole practice of the Apostles, shows baptism always to have been used with the introduction itself into the external Church through the profession of faith and repentance, for a sign of the same thing.

To proceed, therefore to its explication, *βαπτω* and *βαπτιζω* whence *βαπτισμος*, properly signify to tinge and wash, of which signification Luke 11 : 38, is a manifest example; and thence, also the Pharasaic washings of cups, brazen vessels and tables, are called baptisms, (Mark 7 : 4,) and the ceremonial washings of the Old Testament (Heb. 9 : 10). Indeed that word is wont to be taken metaphorically for a plentiful effusion of spiritual gifts or a vehement immission of sad circumstances and griefs.

The distinction, taken from Tertullian himself, hence arose between the baptism of the flood or of water (from Matth. 3 : 11), of fire or the Spirit (from Acts 1 : 5), and of blood and martyrdom (from Mark 10 : 38). To these, others add the baptism of light or doctrine (from Acts 18 : 25), because the preaching of the word pours light upon the understanding of man and lustrates and illustrates his mind with its own light.

To us, however, it properly belongs to treat of the baptism of the flood or of water. That it may be compendiously and orderly done, let us treat, 1) Of its efficient cause. 2) Of its matter and form. 3) Of the end and effects; and in fine, of its subject, together with certain adjuncts.

The principal *efficient cause,* or the institutor of this sacrament, is God himself, as is manifest (from Matth. 21 : 25), where the baptism administered by John, is said to be from heaven and not from men ; and the Baptist himself testifies (John 1 : 33) the same to be God who sent him, that he might baptize with water, who said to him, on whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining, he it is who baptizes with the Holy Ghost.

We hence gather that that formula of baptism which Christ presented to his disciples (Matth. 28 and Mark 16) did not contain the first institution of baptism, but its extension to all nations and more strict mode of administration.

For we have concluded, with the Reformed Churches, that the baptism begun by John and continued by the Apostles from the command of Christ is altogether the same, although some variety may be observed in certain circumstances.

Variety can be observed in it, because that strict form in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is not narrated as having been observed, if you consider *το ῥητον*, (just what is said), although no doubt can exist but that John sealed that doctrine with his baptism, which unfolded the same divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and more distinctly the office of Christ, *ϑεανϑρωπον*, (Godman), as is manifest from Matth. 3, likewise John 1 and 3, where a summary of his discourses is contained.

And in the next place, because John commanded the person about to be baptized to believe in Christ, who was about to come and complete the work of our redemption (Acts 19 : 4), whereas we baptize in him, who died that we might die with him to sin, and rose again that he might raise us up with him to a new life—as Paul explains it, (Rom. 6 : 2, and thenceforth).

In all other respects, the same benefits of Christ were sealed in each ; for, as the baptism of John was the baptism of repentance and of the remission of sins, (Mark 1 : 4, Acts 19 : 4,) so also, our baptism signs the remission of sins and the gift of regeneration, as will hereafter at greater length be proved.

The *ministering cause* of baptism is the servant or pastor alone of the church, as all the examples which exist in the whole New Testament evidently evince, and the very command of Christ (Matth. 28 : 19), *Teach all nations, baptizing them,* &c. For as the seals of princes are not wont to be appended to edicts except by those who have been prepared for that purpose by public authority, so no one can lawfully confirm the publicly announced doctrine of the Gospel of God unless he has been called by a special calling and prepared for these things. Hence they are called the heralds of God, and ambassadors and servants of Christ, also, peculiarly, stewards of the mysteries of God. (1 Cor. 4 : 1, and 2 Cor. 5 : 20.)

We, therefore, acknowledge no necessity so great that private persons, whether men or women, can in this sacrament of baptism assume to themselves that which Pontificians themselves and Lutherans, in no case of necessity, permit in the sacrament of the Supper, since no necessity ought to dispense against the institution of Christ. But God himself alone is wont and able to supply the defect of ordinary instruments; either by substituting other extraordinary instruments, as some judge to have been done, in the example of Philip (Acts 8) and Ananias (Acts 22); or by claiming to himself the whole internal action without instruments, as, in those who died uncircumcised before the eighth day, also in the robber crucified along with Christ: and, opponents acknowledge it to be done in all the adult faithful, who, hindered by some unblameable necessity are not able to procure external baptism except by desire.

Moreover, although all members of the orthodox Church should labor by every mode not to seek baptism for themselves or their children, except by the Pastors of the orthodox Church, lest they should seem to have communion with heresy and with the unrighteous works of darkness, nevertheless, if any have been baptized by heretics who use the whole form of baptism and do not directly overturn the very fundamental dogmas of baptism, we deny that their baptism should be reiterated by orthodox pastors. But, of others who directly deny these, or change the form of baptism, the ratio is different, (*alia est ratio*), as was adjudicated in the Nicene Synod concerning the Paulianists, for in this case true baptism is not repeated, but, that which is true and genuine in the Church of Christ is substituted in the place of what is false and null, conferred by that which is not a Church.

The *essence* of baptism consists in its legitimate *matter* and *form*. But since the matter is either external and visible, which is wont to be called the sign, or, internal and invisible, which is said to be the thing signified—we must treat a little of each.

The *external matter* or *sign* here, as in all sacraments, is twofold, to wit, that which is substantial and that which is ritual. The substantial, by the consent of all, is water, as is to be seen (from Matth. 3: 6, Acts 10 : 47) ; and hence those things are plainly superstitious and to be classed among *εθετοϑρησκειας* (feats of will worship) which are adjoined to this matter by Pontificians, such as salt and oil —which from a *κακοζηιτια* (ridiculous imitation) of Jewish sacrifices, have been transferred hither ; also spit, tapers, (*cerei*) and like things, which were in common (*mutuo*) taken from the miracles of Christ, or the rite of the primitive Church that was wont to assemble in vaults (*cryptis*) or by night: because, nothing may be added to or taken from the commandments of God, (Deu. 12 : 32) ; and, in vain is he worshipped by the commandments of men. (Matth. 15 : 9.)

The numerous questions, moreover, which are here wont to be agitated by scholastics, are foolish: whether it is lawful to use for baptism any other than common water, such as lye, urine, boiled waters or distillations, also wine, vinegar, fine gravel too, or sand ; for as many things are rashly defined by them here from the hypothesis of the absolute necessity of baptism, so we read that no water except that which is common was consecrated and used for this sacrament by Christ and the Apostles—and, accordingly, since they want command and promise, they cannot be used from faith (*ex fide*)—and so we see both John to have preached at Ænon because much water was there, (John 3: 23) and Philip not to have baptized the Æthiopian already believing, before they had come to a place where was water (Acts 8: 36); and truly since nothing is more common than water, so that it has even passed into a proverb, cases of this kind (necessity) can very seldom arise.

The *ritual sign*, or that which is ceremonial in this sacrament is baptizing or washing in the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as expressly commanded (Matth. 28, Mark 16); whence it is called the *washing of water by the word*, (Eph. 5: 26), and the *washing of regeneration*, (Titus 3: 5), and the *putting away of the filth of the flesh*, by the Apostle Peter, by a metonomy of the effect, (1 Peter 3: 21).

Whether baptism should be administered by a single or trinal mersion, we always accounted a matter of indifference in the Christian Church, since no express command exists of that, as also whether immersion even, or aspersion indeed be used; since no express command of it exists, and examples of aspersion can be found in the Scriptures no less than those of immersion; for as Christ (Matth. 3) went into the water and came up out of it—also the Æthiopian (Acts 8), so many thousands are said to have been baptized in one day in the city of Jerusalem (Acts 2), also many in private houses (Acts 16 and 18, 1 Cor. 1: 16), where an entrance of this kind into the waters could scarcely be—which rite baptism in the cloud and in the sea also favors, of which Paul treats (1 Cor. 10), and the word *ραντισμȣ*, that is, of aspersion which is used of the blood of Christ for the abolition of our sins, (Heb. 9: 14).

And here, therefore the additaments of Pontificians are superstitious, to wit, the figuration of crosses and the use of exorcisms, since there are no vestiges of them in sacred Scripture, and each is taken from a depraved imitation of the ancient Christians who were conversant with the Gentiles: for, as the Gentiles, when they were converted in this manner, renounced Satan and the worship of idols, so also they used the figures of crosses, to show that they thenceforth gloried in the cross alone of Christ, which, although it can perhaps be excused in them on account of ecclesiastical usage in the beginning, ought not to be retained, in certain Reformed Churches, without any benefit or fruit.

The internal matter, or the thing signified in this sacrament, is also twofold, either answering to the external substantial sign, or answering to the external ritual sign.

Our purgation from sins through the blood and Spirit of Jesus Christ, answer conjointly to each external sign. For as the blood of Christ washes us from our sins (Apoc. 1: 5), since by the power and merit of the death of Christ, we are freed from our sins, so also the Spirit of Christ cleanses us from our sins, since he applies to us the merit of the death of Christ and his own efficiency delivers us from the kingdom of sin; for these two benefits of Christ are conjoined by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 6: 2), *but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God*, whence also (Eph. 5: 26), the Apostle says, *Christ gave himself for the Church that he might cleanse it with the washing of water by the word;* and (Titus 3: 5), we are said to be *saved by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour.*

The *form of baptism*, wholly (ολως) considered, consists in that sacramental union which exists betwixt the sign and the thing signified; for although its own form, both of the sign and the thing signified too, is peculiar, as is manifest from the foregoing (antecedentibus), nevertheless this single (singularis) form of the parts puts on the ratio, (rationem), as they say, of the matter signified, when it relates to the whole—as is wont to be done in integral parts.

This sacramental union of the sign with the thing signified is not a real and subjective conjunction, as some stream, but only σχετικη, or relative, consisting in that mutual respect, by which the sign puts and seals the thing signified to him who believes, and the thing signified, by the principal cause, is furnished and offered under the condition of faith and repentance.

For, neither is the blood really or corporally in the water of baptism, nor does the Spirit of Christ, although by his nature he is every where present, subjectively inhere in the same, nor is cleansing from sins effectively accomplished by the external washing of water, since that is purely a divine virtue, of which no creature by itself is capable; but, Christ himself, by the efficiency of his Spirit, unites us the more with himself and communicates to us his benefits acquired by virtue of his death, as he is wont to do that by his simple word: indeed, by so much the more efficaciously he does that in the legitimate use of this sacrament, by how much the more singularly, and in truth through two senses, to wit, hearing and seeing, the things signified here are proposed: and accordingly both our faith is the more strongly exalted and rendered active, and also it hence comes that external baptism is perspicuously distinguished by Scripture from that which is internal in this operation—and the administering cause from the principal, as can be seen (Matth. 3: 11, and 1 Peter 3: 21, &c.)

Foremost of all, therefore, we reject the opinion of Pontificians, who would have these external signs confer grace, ex opera operato, as they speak, only the bar (obex) of mortal sin may not be placed in the way, a restriction that is foolishly placed by their hypothesis, since even infants before they were regenerated, were all obnoxious to mortal sin, and adults not yet renewed, are as yet, necessarily, under the kingdom of sin—unless they say, either that original sin, or the kingdom of sin, in man, is not mortal—contrary to their own principles, and to Scripture, which testifies that a man who has not been born again cannot see the kingdom of God, (John 3). And, in the next place, the absurdity of this opinion is hence manifest since Scripture has opened to us no way of saving grace or of communion with Christ, except through faith. *For the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth,* (Rom. 1: 16), and Christ dwells by faith in our hearts, (Eph. 3: 17). Nay, *without faith it is impossible to please God,* (Heb. 11: 6).

We reject also the opinion of certain Ubiquitarians who bind the regenerating efficacy of the Holy Spirit so to the external water that either it is in the water itself, or at least cannot inchoate regeneration except in the very act of baptism: for this conflicts with all places of Scripture in which faith and repentance and, accordingly, both the beginning and the seed of regeneration in the persons to be baptized are previously required: for the efficient cause cannot be posterior to its effect.

Nor does the exception of some among them avail any thing in which they so distinguish the baptism of adults from the baptism of infants that they concede the baptism of adults to be the sign and seal of regeneration received, but maintain the baptism of infants to be the instrument of the regeneration that is to be begun. For besides that no foundation in all Scripture for that difference appears, which recognizes baptism of but one kind—these places also themselves (Rom. 6, Gal. 3, Eph. 5, Tit. 3, &c.), which they adduce for their opinion, treat properly and immediately of those who were already adult and who had been baptized at an age certainly adult, as that is manifest from these very places.

The *efficacy* of baptism we therefore do not bind to that moment in which the body is washed (tingitur) with external water, but in all who are to be baptized we pre-require with Scripture faith and repentance—at least in the judgment of charity—and that, as well in federated infants in whom we contend the seed and spirit of faith must be placed by virtue of the divine benediction and the evangelical covenant, as in adults in whom an actual profession of faith and repentance is necessary. And, then, as seed cast into the earth does not always in the same moment receive increase, but when rain and heat from heaven supervene, so, neither is the word nor the sign of the sacrament always efficacious at the first moment of itself, but at that time at length when the benediction of the Holy Spirit comes.

Many baptized in infancy demonstrate that, since they nevertheless live wickedly for a time, likewise many adult hypocrites, who sometimes long afterward at length seriously repent. Augustine, indeed, concerning the baptism of heretics universally pronounces: "Although with heretics and schismatics there is the same baptism of Christ, nevertheless it does not there operate the remission of sins because of the vileness of discord and the wickedness of dissension, but the same baptism then begins to avail for the acquittal of sins when they come to the peace of the Church—not that that baptism is disapproved of as alien or other, or, that another is given, but that the same itself which without, on account of discord was operating death, within, on account of peace operates salvation." That in some truly, as in Simon Magus, and other reprobates, it never has this effect, we think should be referred to the judgments of God, hiddenly just and justly hidden; because, not the sons of the flesh, but the sons of promise, are reckoned in the seed (Rom. 9); for although they who are passed by are not worthy, the remnant, nevertheless, in themselves are not worthy that in them the work of regeneration should be begun and perfected.

When, therefore, we say that the proper efficacy of baptism consists in sealing, we signify two things: In the first place, the greater certainty of the promised grace, and of that which is confessed, or which is to be confessed by the principal cause: In the second place, the confirmation and increment of the same. Since, however, that promise is not absolute, but conjoined with the condition of faith and repentance, it follows that the grace is not sealed except to those who believe and repent, and accordingly, also, not unworthily using the signs, as the Apostle speaks, (1 Cor. 11: 29).

In this respect we truly concede that the sacrament, as well as the other also, is even exhibited of the thing promised, because, in the legitimate and worthy use of this sacrament, these things which are promised are not only offered by the Holy Spirit to the faithful, but are even themselves exhibited and confessed, since God is veracious in the obsignation of his promises, and our sacraments are not appendages of the letter which kills, but of the Spirit who vivifies.

The uses, moreover, and effects of this sacrament are many and very great: for as many of us as have been baptized have put on Christ, (Gal. 3 : 27); we are baptized for the remission and washing away of sins, (Acts 2: 38 and 22 : 16): It is the washing of regeneration, and the answer of a good conscience by the resurrection of Christ, (Tit. 3, and 1 Pet. 3): By it the old man is crucified and buried, and the new man is made alive, (Rom. 6 : 3, 4, 5, 6) : and, finally adoption itself is ascribed to it, and salvation, (Mark 15: 16, and elsewhere).

Besides these primary uses, there are also others which are secondary, to wit, external insertion into a particular visible Church, (Acts 2: 41): Conjunction of the members of Christ among themselves and in one body (1 Cor. 12 : 12): and, from these, the consequent signification of our profession, and our distinction and dissociation from all the other assemblies of the unbelieving.

Nor truly are these uses and effects of baptism to be restricted to the remission and washing away of sins committed before baptism, or to reception into grace which at first is promised to the believing, as Pontificians desire who, for the deletion of mortal sins, as themselves speak, committed after baptism, have excogitated another sacrament, to wit, that of sacerdotal penitence and absolution, called by them the second plank (tabula), by which, first grace having been lost, it is necessary we should escape afresh from shipwreck.

For although we willingly confess that sins committed even after baptism are not otherwise remitted than to those who repent and believe, just as those which had been committed before baptism, we nevertheless deny that on that account there is need of some new sacrament for the reparation of this benefit since, in all the New Testament, sacred scripture has known no other sacrament of penitence and the remission of sins save that of baptism.

But, as themselves confess, that ordinary penitence and Dominical praying, along with the remembrance of baptism, suffice for daily or venial sins; so, we assert that extraordinary excitation of penitence and faith, with reference to that covenant which at first was sealed to us by baptism, suffices even in sins extraordinary and more aggressive: even as, if a wife has violated the faith of wedlock, to reconcile the husband to the wife, there is no need of a new marriage or new pledges of matrimony, but a serious repentance of the deed, along with confirmation of the old union, suffices.

This perpetual efficacy of baptism, not only the nature of the new covenant ratified by baptism attests to us, as also the perpetuity which is described to us (Isaiah 54: 10, Heb. 8: 12, and *passim* elsewhere), but likewise the example of circumcision by which, if you consider the substance, the same covenant was confirmed: and yet at this time the penitence of the remission of sins, subsequently occurring, as Pontificians also confess, was not a sacrament; but only the one seal of circumcision sufficed to seal to the penitent perpetual righteousness of faith and circumcision of heart.

The frequent custom of sacred Scripture testifies to this same thing; since from the use and remembrance of baptism it takes arguments by which those who have already been baptized as to the absolution of the old man and his lusts afterward rising up again and showing themselves (*sese prodentium*,) and as to the perpetual vivification of the new man, as you can see (Rom. 6: 2; 1 Cor. 12: 12; Gal. 3: 27; Eph. 5: 26, 27; Col. 2: 12, &c.); so that, not only is the beginning of salvation referred to baptism, but even salvation itself and eternal life, (Mark 16: 16, Peter 3: 21, and elsewhere).

Nay, it is truly absurd and impious to propose to a man already faithful and baptized any other satisfaction, or any other than the merit of Christ for the remission of any sin, or any other propitiation or reconciliation to God, than through that blood which cleanses us from all our sins (John 1: 7), of which blood that fictitious penitence of Pontificians is not the sacrament, but baptism—as has been before demonstrated.

Having finished these things which were briefly to be spoken, concerning the causes and effects of this sacrament, it remains that we pass to its subject, and adjuncts, a few of which should be expounded.

That the receiving subject of baptism is man is patent from Christ's command (Matth. 28 : 19). *Go teach all nations, baptizing them*, &c.—whence also the more learned Pontificians are wont to excuse rather than defend the baptism of bells (*campanarum*), which we, however, assert to be a pure profanation of Christian baptism.

Moreover, when we say man, we understand the living, not the dead, contrary to the Cerinthians, who even baptized the dead—abusing that place of the Apostle (1 Cor. 15 : 29), *Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead?* ; but it is far otherwise to be baptized for the dead than to baptize the dead: for they can be said to be baptized for the dead who are baptized to the mortification of the flesh or even to that lot in which, subjected to the opprobrium and persecution of the world, they bear about, as the Apostle speaks (2 Cor. 4 : 10), in the body, the dying, *νεκρωσιν* the mortification of the Lord Jesus.

Nor yet are all men who live in the world susceptible (*capaces*) of baptism, but they only who can be esteemed by us as belonging to the covenant, as being heirs of the New Testament, of which this sacrament is the sign and pledge.

Such, in the first place, are all adults, and they alone who profess faith in Christ and true repentance, of any people, condition or sex; because in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, as is evident from the command of Christ (Matth. 28 : 19). *Whosoever believeth and is baptized shall be saved;* also (Acts 2: 28). *Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ*, &c.

But if any one, though having professed faith, lives improperly, he is not to be initiated by baptism; because baptism is not only the sacrament of faith, but also of repentance; as also, neither is he, who may desire to favor or defend, along with the profession of faith in Christ and of penitence, errors or heresies contrary to the foundation of true faith : because repentance not only is from turpitude of life to sanctity of life, but also from errors to the acknowledging of the truth, as the Apostle speaks (2 Tim. 2 : 25). Yea, truly, it is so much wanting, that heretics or the favorers of such errors shall be admitted to baptism, that by the command of the Apostle (Rom. 16 : 17, and elsewhere), they are to be avoided by the faithful and debarred from the communion of the Church.

Such, in the second place, we esteem infants who have been born of faithful and federal parents, according to the promise of God (Gen. 17), *I will be thy God and thy seed's* : and that not only from the example of circumcision, which was a sign of that covenant and in place of which baptism succeeded (Col. 2 : 11), but also because to whom the thing signified pertains to them the sign itself, cannot be denied, as the Apostle Peter expressly testifies (Acts 10 47 : and 11 : 17). Now, truly, no one can deny that the benefits of the blood and Spirit of Christ pertain to the infants of the faithful except he, who wills them to be excluded from salvation ; for as no one can enter the kingdom of God except he who has been born of water and of the Spirit (John 3 : 5), so no one is Christ's who has not the Spirit of Christ, (Rom. 8 : 9).

For the purpose of confirming this there is a truly illustrious place to the Ephesians (5 : 26), where the Apostle says, *Christ loved his Church and gave himself for it—cleansing it with the washing of water by the word.* Whence it follows, either that the infants of the faithful are no part of that Church for which Christ gave himself, or that they too are cleansed with the washing of water by the word—so that we may now omit the examples of whole familes that were baptized by the Apostles (Acts 16 : 15 and 38, and 18 : 8, and 1 Cor. 1 : 16)—also the example of the Israelitish infants who no less than Israelitic adults were baptized under the cloud and in the sea, as the Apostle testifies (1 Cor. 10). And truly, if infants themselves coalesce with the Church of Christ into one mystic body, they are to be discerned by some sign of this communion from others who are aliens from this body.

We moreover exclude from baptism the infants of those who are plainly aliens from the covenant, such as the children of Gentiles are, of the Mohammedans, the Jews, and the like, whom the Holy Spirit himself pronounces unclean (1 Cor. 7 : 14), and accordingly, as extraneous they are abandoned by the judgment of God, as the same apostle commands (1 Cor. 5 : 12, 13). Unless, perhaps, by legitimate adoption or servitude that is just and *equal* (*proprie dictam*), they may be enrolled as it were, and inserted in the families of the faithful ; for in this case many Reformed Churches baptize them to be brought in this manner by God into the communion of his covenant. Without controversy it was so in the ancient Church (Gen. 17 : 12, 13), as Augustine from this fact sometimes derived an efficacious argument for election by grace against the Pelagians.

We do not, however, for that cause, exclude from the communion of this sacrament those infants who are born from a Christian stock and baptized parents, although their parents by a wicked life or an impure faith render the efficacy of the covenant sealed by baptism void against themselves, if by the same parents or their kindred, under whose power they are, they are offered by baptism according to the order observed in our Churches : because, under the new covenant the son bears not the iniquity of the father, and God no less remains the God of the children of the same as himself testifies (Ezek. 16 and 23), where he calls the children of impious Israelites his own sons whom they bear to God, although they offered them to Moloch ; and God also ordinarily collects his Church from among them by the ordinary preaching of his word. Whence he also ordered the children of that kind of Israelites, many of whom had died in their iniquity, to be circumcised no less than the children of the pious (Josh. 5: 4: 7). The Israelitish Church, and the primitive Christian, without controversy, always required such children to be initiated.

The adjuncts of baptism are: First, its oneness, (unity); for as we are only born never but once, so also we are born again never but once, and accordingly, we also never but once receive the sign of regeneration. Whence, as circumcision once conferred was not repeated, so also neither by command nor by example does sacred Scripture teach that baptism once legitimately conferred should be repeated; but on the contrary, wherever mention is made of baptism in the New Testament, mention is made of one baptism only, and never but once conferred. Whence, it is also and expressly called one, (Eph. 4 : 5).

No certain *time* has been prescribed for baptism as it was for circumcision. Meanwhile we judge, it ought to be sought as soon as it can be had by the order of the Church and the health of the individual to be baptized, because the ordinary signs (signacula) and instruments of divine grace cannot be neglected by us without sin, nor truly can they be despised except with great sin and danger.

Every *place* appointed for sacred assemblies is also sacred for baptism. Whence, we see in all the examples which the practice of the Apostles supplies, that baptism was conjoined with the preaching of the word, whether that place may have been public or a house of private individuals, provided only there may have been in them an assembly of the Church. However, that public places, when there is not a time of persecution, rather than private are to be appointed, for this action is demonstrated from this, that baptism is an appendage of the public ministry, not of private exhortation.

Although indeed there is no absolute necessity in baptism for particular witnesses, especially in churches which enjoy public quiet, their presence, nevertheless, provided they are pious and trustful (fidi), not only the thing itself shows to be useful, but also the custom of the whole primitive Church which, from a highly probable argument, along with the *imposition of names*, was taken from the very right of circumcision, as an example of it exists (Isaiah 8: 2, Luke 1 59).

But if any one cannot be certain about his baptism whether it was received in infancy, either from the testimony of the Church, or of parents, or of witnesses, or of others, or whether he may have been washed with no other than the baptism of midwives or private persons—we think that a man of this kind is to be baptized without scruple, because the baptism is not posterior and that which was prior is to be esteemed for nothing, as was rightly determined in the fifth Carthagenian Council (chap. 3), "It hath seemed good (placuit) unto us concerning infants, as often as very certain witnesses are not found who can without doubt testify that they were baptized, and they themselves are not qualified (idonei) by age to answer concerning the sacraments delivered to them, that they should be baptized without any scruple, lest that hesitancy (trepidatio) may avail to deprive them of the cleansing of the sacraments;" for as Leo rightly adds, "that cannot be said to be repeated which is not known to have been done."

Nor for that cause is conditional baptism to be approved of, which is wont to be observed in such like case by Pontificians after this form, *If thou hast not been baptized, I baptize thee*: as well—because a baptism of this kind wants the example of Scripture, and changes the form of baptism prescribed by Christ, as—because it leaves it uncertain to the baptized which baptism is true—a consequence not comporting with the end of baptism, which does not render ambiguous but signs and seals the divine promises.

Lancaster, Pa. I. S. D.

Art. V.—RAUCH ON EDUCATION.*

Man is the intended lord of nature. All that lives on earth bends to him. In proportion as animals approach him in rank, they become more regular in form—in their organs of sense—in their muscular and nervous system ; and with this increasing regularity a higher degree of independence of the power and activity of nature is secured to them. We are accustomed to look with amazement on the artificial texture of the spider's web, on the beautiful windings of the snail's house, on the regular formations of the tents built by little bees ;—yet these creatures are irregular in their forms and their productions cannot vie in beauty with many a fresh and vigorous flower, that opens its long closed bud, when touched by the rays of the morning sun. It is the same power of nature, which causes the germ of the plant to sink its roots into the soil and to send its leaves into the air towards the sun, that forms the wonderful and lovely crystal in the depths of the mountain, that performs through the insect those wonders, which we admire as if they were the products of calculation and design. What we are inclined to consider as independence in these insects, is but the highest degree of dependence. Hence it is that whilst these artificial productions are found in vegetation and in those animals which stand near it and whose existence is closely connected with it, we do not find them among those animals that approach nearer to man. All that is left them is an instinct guided by one of the senses, for which reason their heads hang downward and keep them in constant contact with those herbs and plants and objects, on which they live, and with the soil on which they walk and die.

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But man is even denied *this* instinct; for *him* Providence wished to rule over nature around him, and to guide and direct his own nature rather than be its slave and live in its service. His form is upright; and whilst his eye can look around on every side and measure the extent of the atmosphere, it was formed also, unlike that of the animal, to look upward and search after Him who created the world. Whilst his mouth is intended to receive his earthly food, it is also beautifully shaped for the flow of language—for the utterance of his feelings—for the adoration of his Benefactor. To make him conscious of this intended independence, nature, which acts towards all its other creatures like a kind mother, does nothing for man. He is born helpless, unable to make free use of his limbs, and without instinct to guide him in seeking his food. What he knows he must have acquired; what he can do he must have learned to do by exercise. Even his eye and ear, his taste and other senses, demand long and constant exercise before they acquire any degree of skill or security. Children, exposed from their earliest infancy, when found afterwards, have resembled animals more than man.—A boy taken up in the Hanoverian woods crept on his hands and feet; and though after much labor and time he learned to speak, he could not remember any thing of his former state in the wilderness. His faculties not having been exercised, were latent and slumbering, and he might have died without ever awaking to a consciousness of their powers. Since nature does nothing for us, it follows that we must do every thing for ourselves. Fire only can kindle fire; mind only can awaken mind. We must be among men to become men; we must be acted upon; our latent faculties must be aroused, must be drawn out into action, or else we remain like the animal. This mutual influence of men exerted on each other we call *Education* in its widest sense. Such education we find already among savages. Even he must have learned the use of his bow; must have learned to carve it, to hunt, and, as he belongs to some tribe, to obey. The degrees of education are different, and depend on the regularity with which our powers and faculties are exercised. But as the plant, whose roots take in moisture, whose leaves drink the air, whose flowers absorb the light, depends for its growth upon these elements, so man, as regards his intellect, depends on that mutual influence which we have called Education.

Yet I would not be understood for a moment, to cherish the unfounded idea, that Education is the *cause* and the development of the faculties the *effect*; that, as the artist of marble, we can make what we choose of our children in spite of their different temperaments, dispositions, natural talents, inclinations, and above all, in spite of that will, against which we cannot even induce a youth of decision to listen to us, much less to learn from us. The sun is the cause of warmth and light on the earth; and if the idea above mentioned were true, education would be the cause of light in our understandings and of warmth in our feelings and will; yet nothing is less true than this. Air, which operates as a cause on iron and effects rust, cannot effect any thing in the animal, for *its* heart and lungs convert air into blood. So does neither the sun, nor the air, nor moisture, produce any effect in the germ of the plant; though without these elements the plant could not grow, because they constitute the *conditions* necessary for its development. These elements only serve to call into action that power, that latent energy, that *nixus formativus* which Providence has laid in the germ, which gives form to the plant, which maintains it whilst alive, and enters another germ when it dies. Hence it comes, that whilst the plant receives its impulses from those elements with which it stands intimately connected by means of roots and leaves, it is, at the same time, not passive only, but active also; in receiving them it *takes* them, converts the moisture into sap, the air into sweet aromas, and light into the many lovely colors with which its flowers are ornamented.

Hence it is, that though all plants drink the same air, they differ in the perfume which they exhale, in the colors with which they adorn our gardens and woods. And will it be otherwise with our youth? Their manifold and various talents, all the faculties of their minds, are the slumbering seed which the hand of the Lord has scattered, that it may awake, and grow, and ripen, and become beneficial to our race, whenever education shall stir up their latent energies. But they must develop themselves by their own activity; education can only call this activity into exercise, guide and direct it. It is the pupil's mind which must judge, must draw conclusions, must understand the ideas contained in words, must now with acuteness search into the secret connection of things around us, and now with depth enter into the concealed riches of thoughts, given by others; it is the pupil's will, that must purify his desires and reign over them, that must establish his principles, must be the basis of every action and hold him answerable for every deed to a higher Judge. On a tablet we may write what we choose; it receives without discrimination what is right and wrong, good and bad, true and false. In receiving these things it is passive and unconscious of what it receives. But the mind does not receive impressions like wax. In receiving it is active; and unless what is committed to memory, is understood, nothing is learned. A word is but a sound; a word learned by the parrot is but a sound without a meaning. We can give the pupil words only; the ideas contained in them he must himself reproduce. Though we can guide him in doing so, and though we can strengthen his mind by degrees, we cannot carry the idea, an invisible thought, into his mind and bind it fast there.

Childhood, however, is the proper time for the cultivation of our powers. As the limbs of the body are yet tender and plastic, so the will of youth readily suffers itself to be guided and directed. The first impressions we receive are strong and lasting, because full of vigor and health; we are irresistibly attracted by every thing novel. Leibnitz, the great philosopher, when travelling, carried with him those manuscripts, which he wrote when a youth in the lecture room of his teachers. Children have a constant desire for activity. Their hands, their feet, their eyes, their tongues are forever in motion. They must play or run about, or ask for information; for at no time of life is curiosity more active and strongly expressed than in childhood. Rest is hated by a healthful child; it wants exercise; and a good education should satisfy the demand of its physical as well as its intellectual nature. If we neglect doing so, society suffers not only a loss, but a direct injury. To live and to be active are the same thing; talents which, if well directed, will benefit society, if left to themselves, will wrong it.

Much depends, however, on the *right mode* of educating children. Yet as long as we disagree in our notions of what education is, and of what should be its main purpose, it will be in vain to speak of modes. I must, therefore, beg leave to say a few words concerning *the main purpose* of education. Here every one may be ready to make the remark, that this point has been long settled; that the purpose is and must be *usefulness*. Teach those things which can be applied in future life and omit what life does not call for. Though on the whole I agree perfectly with this opinion, yet the term "usefulness" is vague, indefinite, varies in its meaning according to the character of individuals and ages. Whatever answers as a means for the satisfaction of our wants we call useful, be these wants sensual or spiritual. In an age, however, when sensual wants and desires reign over a people that stoops to make all its talents do homage to the senses; when the ideas of holiness, beauty and truth are esteemed only so far as they are good for something of which we stand in need; when every one thinks only of his own advantage and interest and seeks for those means, that will lead him to riches, to the gratification of his ambition or his vanity—in such a time the term *usefulness* is a precarious one. If it becomes the idol of all our efforts, of our institutions, laws and education, nothing will any longer be considered holy or good on its own account, but on account of its usefulness. Thus we will profess religion, because it is useful; be honest, because it is useful; be correct in our demeanor and true in our intercourse with men, because it is useful. The idea of usefulness will then be the measure, by which we estimate every thing; the highest good we possess, will be degraded to a mere means of advancing some favored purpose. The possession of reason will be desired by the sensual man, that he may speculate successfully and make money easily, or that he may moderate and vary his pleasures, which might otherwise become insipid and destructive to health. Whilst on the one hand, as Hegel says, we praise the Maker of nature, because He has created the cork-tree to supply corks for our bottles, we regret, on the other, that we can make no use of the diameter of the earth to measure tape and cloth.

But—some one may reply—in our enlightened age, in an age which, according to our own assertions, has outstripped all former ages in wisdom, we have become wise enough to know, that one man cannot live without another; that the welfare of the single individual is closely connected with that of his fellow-men; that we must consequently, elevate ourselves above the care of individual interests to that of the general well-being of the State. In this knowledge consists the end of wisdom; by it we have broken the chains of darkness and ignorance. Reign we must over the world of atoms; investigate its powers and use them for the service of our external animal life; we must fly through space on the wings of the wind and exercise the activity of our will, now here, now there, with the swiftness of lightning; we must manifest the presence of mind every where and prove that all things stand at our command and are created for our use, that we may rejoice in the fullness of our sensual life. This is the great end of usefulness, and *this* is the usefulness we speak of. To this end all are at present united. One completes the skill of another; and whilst each carries on his own business and occupation one frequently finishes the work commenced by another unknown to him, and commences a work to be completed by one after him. Thus all the members of a nation are united in one work; each one feels the efforts of another result pleasantly to his own advantage and every new trial passes like an electrical spark through a chain of many thousands to its final link.

But is this the *whole* work entrusted to our race? Shall we be united by desires and wants only and not also in the spirit? Shall we but know where every thing useful to the body is to be had, but seek in vain for what is kindred to the soul? Shall only our physical life enjoy its comforts and care, but our souls long in vain for their appropriate nourishment? Shall we improve every thing around us except those talents that connect the visible and the invisible world? Shall the main end of our efforts be nothing higher than the refinement of our selfishness, and shall the mind be condemned to be the slave of selfishness and the fool of time?

But suppose usefulness in life embraces the whole work to be done by those who are born to live for eternity; suppose that the sphere of our education be circumscribed by its relation to future use, the limits of which it never ought to exceed, and that *our own* idea of usefulness exhausts the whole sphere of man's activity and destination:—it ought, nevertheless, not to be the main design and aim of education. If a man has learned all the sciences and knows all wisdom, if he unites in himself the learning of all ages and is able to preach wisdom with the tongue of an angel, and is not a good man, a man of benevolence and firm principles, he may, like a Vampire, suck the very life-blood of our race, may, like a Helvetius or Voltaire or Machiavelli, use his talents and knowledge to the injury of his fellow-men. It is something quite different from this bare-headed, toothless idea of usefulness, which makes a man the benefactor of his fellow-men. Washington was inspired not by the idea of usefulness, but by patriotism, when he vindicated our nation's liberty; Lafayette did not leave

France that he might have a field of usefulness somewhere else, but the genius of liberty nourished him when a child to fight for her sacred interests when grown.

We must, it is evident, have another end in view, if we would educate our youth, as they ought to be educated. Harmony is the great end, after which Providence strives in man. No where in animated nature do we meet with it so strikingly as in the form of man. We discover indeed among all animals analogous manifestations of one and the same formation, or idea, which varies only according to different kinds and species and according to the elements in which they live. Some parts of this one formation are more distinctly marked in one class and less so in others; whilst those which are less marked, are in their turn principally prominent in another class, so that the beauty of this one general form is dispersed in isolated parts throughout the whole animal kingdom. But in man we find all parts in perfect harmony, and this harmony, in which no part is put forth at the expense of another, constitutes the beauty of the human form. So we find also again that many animals have one of the senses particularly strong, for example, the lynx, sight; the dog, scent. But no where do we meet with a perfect harmony of all the senses, as to strength and order, except in man. This symmetry of form and the senses is but a type of that harmony and symmetry, which Providence designed in our moral and intellectual constitution. The harmonious cultivation of the latent faculties of the mind is consequently the principal design of education. Only when the reason is fully developed and not merely a few of its parts, only when we are conscious of every power and energy in us, are we entirely *men;* whilst without this full development, we are like plants trimmed down to dwarfs by the knife of the gardener.

Do not fear that in this case there will be a want of men who will concentrate their talents upon one point, and continue to work miracles in their particular departments. Though every faculty that any one of us possesses, is possessed also by another, yet each one has it in a peculiar manner. All faculties limit and circumscribe each other, and the manner in which this is done involves a difference as regards their individual strength. Hence it is that in the one this, in the other that talent is left more or less free, and that therein consists the peculiarity which distinguishes one man from another and which inclines each to a particular sphere of action. Whilst, therefore, we desire that every organ should be developed and exercised, by which men may become acquainted with themselves, the things around them and above them, we ought, at the same time, to direct our pupils, in accordance with their peculiar talents to limit their activity and concentrate it upon one object, and to devote themselves with their whole soul and heart to one occupation. Yet unless all faculties are roused, this peculiarity cannot manifest itself. But, again, it is only among men that there exists a proper relation between knowledge and goodness, between the head and the heart, between science and practical morality, between understanding and will. When, however, with particular reference to a certain useful end, the mind is cultivated in one direction more than in another, the memory more than judgment, prudence more than feeling, cool speculation more than imagination—an unhealthy state of the mind is produced, which must result more or less to our own disadvantage and to that of our fellow-men. Life needs the entire man ; we must be active not only with the head but also with the heart; not only with the will but also with the hand. Knowledge without the cultivation of the will, a good head with a bad heart, what can it avail us ? In the will we live, and the heart must approve or condemn us, reward or punish us, strengthen or weaken us. The fortune of our lives and our government depends not exclusively on useful knowledge, but on our character as citizens ; and to form this character by cultivating the whole man, is the aim of education in the proper sense.

Who that is conscious of his higher moral nature would stoop to be the slave of a mere sensual life ? Would he not purify his principles and make them the guide of his conduct? That man is cultivated, who having accustomed himself to amiable, cheerful and graceful manners, divides the hours of the day and gives each its occupation; who maintains this order with strict regularity, never giving more time to pleasure, sleep and recreation than they require; who constantly struggles against his own weakness and never harbors vanity nor selfishness, nor thrusts himself into notice, but waving his own rights and claims is willing to acknowledge those of his fellow-citizens; who does not indulge hatred, nor wrath, nor enmity, nor cowardice, nor pusillanimity, nor sensuality; who feels displeasure, as often as he discovers an impure wish in his breast; and who knowing the measure and extent of his talents, and his merits, and of the duties incumbent upon him, is modest. That man is cultivated who is free, not only *externally* by law, but free by his will. He is the free man, who is never determined in his actions by desires, or passions, or mere wishes, but who, recognizing in the divine law the only palladium of his liberty, places his will under it, and, guided by it, reigns by the force of will over all his passions and desires, disdaining every lawless deed and opposing every wrong tendency of his age. But whence should this proper order of life, this proper restraint upon our desires, this proper moderation of self-conceit be derived, if not from the order in our minds and the harmony between our knowledge and will—if not from the symmetrical cultivation of the whole inner man? Truly, the man that has no music in himself, takes no pleasure in listening to music; and he who has no harmony in his soul, cannot discover any in the stars that rule over his life. The internal harmony must produce a corresponding effect upon our actions and deeds; and any dissonance in that must produce a corresponding dissonance in these.

In what has been said, I have tried to answer the question: What is the best mode of educating the young? For the teacher who knows the end of his endeavors, if he has any mind at all, will easily discover the shortest way that leads him thither, and if he should not, a few external rules will not be sufficient to guide him. We demand that education shall cultivate the whole man—the entire mind; we wish to accomplish this through instruction as one part of education. The selection of subjects to be taught, ought, therefore, to be liberal; our children cannot be satisfied with writing, reading and arithmetic, a little geography and thirty-six rules of Kirkham's Grammar; nor must we suffer them to learn from such motives as will strengthen their selfishness, such as fear of punishment or of future want, or hope of usefulness, or ambition. Nor ought we to claim but one faculty as the one through which we have access to their souls and through which alone they must learn, the memory, this storehouse of knowledge. We must rouse the whole inner man from the root up to all its branches—establish clearness in his understanding, purity in his will. But that which subdues the will and the understanding at once—which induces us to desire a thing as soon as we know of it, and which consequently unites knowledge and action, is *love*. Love to the subjects taught, must therefore be the great motive to learn, love to knowledge, to truth, to goodness, independently of any selfish calculation as to the use and advantage we may derive from them. Pascal remarks that we must know a thing in order to love it, and again that we must love a thing in order to know it—that the path to wisdom leads through love. But here is a circle, a difficulty which seems almost unconquerable. I cannot desire what I do not know, and I cannot become acquainted with a thing, unless I desire it. From this difficulty the teacher must deliver the pupil. Minds, says Plato, kindle each other. As the magnet attracts iron, so must the spirit of the teacher, if he has any, attract the fiery, cheerful and easily inflamed mind of the young. Let the teacher live with all his heart in his occupation; let him be inspired with love to truth and holiness; let his instructions be delivered in a free, lively and distinct manner; let him understand how to appeal now to the judgment, now to the feelings of his pupils; and especially let him be aware, that his instruction ought only to guide and aid the learner in reproducing all knowledge *by his own efforts*, and that what has been committed to memory without being distinctly understood will be buried there never to rise to life again; and there is no danger, but that such a teacher will dissolve the spell of the difficulty with which a seeming contradiction encircles us.

Love, then, is the hinge on which our method must turn; and the teacher who cannot succeed in producing it, himself bears testimony to his incapacity to teach. Each science, however has a method of its own; and it would be no less awkward to apply one and the same to all, than it would be to attempt to swim in the air, or soar in the water.

It would be impossible to enter into particulars in the short compass of a Lecture, and I shall, therefore, add only one word more: That method will be infinitely best, which in all the sciences recognizes a reflection of the eternal Truth; which knows how to lead the Fountain of life and of wisdom by many streams into every art, and into every science—how to connect every science with the Head of all knowledge.

ART. VI.—A PLEA FOR MATHEMATICS.

IN the early history of science all branches of knowledge were included under the common name mathesis, mathematics, or learning. Subsequently the term was restricted to those subjects which were more abstruse in their character, and required close attention and patient application in their investigation. All such studies were designated *mathematical*, or *disciplinary*, because they were supposed to afford the best training to the intellectual faculties, and the student was called *mathetes*, or *disciple*, because he was regarded as passing through a prescribed course of discipline, the object of which was the development of his mind. At length, however, as the science of number and quantity, combined all the elements of mental discipline in a high degree, it won for itself, by way of preëminence, the title of mathesis, mathematics, or science. It was in this light that it was for the most part cultivated and recommended as a study among the ancients. Their best mathematicians made only a limited use of their knowledge for the useful purposes of life, and none of them had any adequate conception of the application of their theorems and formulas to the solution of the grand mysteries of the universe. Plato recommended mathematics as the best training for correct thinking in all departments of knowledge, and as essential to a proper understanding and appreciation of his own philosophy. The judgment of antiquity, we may add, has been confirmed by the judgment of all subsequent times, Christian, as well as heathen, and been incorporated in all the educational establishments of the present day.

But we may inquire for ourselves into the disciplinary influence of mathematical study, and endeavor to verify, by our own reflections the judgment of the ancients.

Viewed under one aspect, mathematics is a purely ideal science, entirely abstract, as it regards the visible and tangible world. The most practical of all the sciences, it exists in its fundamental principles and their development, as an independent creation of the mind, a purely ideal world of its own, discovered, but not invented by the mind. It starts with zero, and by means of its symbols of plus and minus, it finds its subject-matter in the idea of quantity, that is, quantity, not as it exists under any particular form or in any particular place, but quantity as something abstract, as something or anything that may be increased or diminished. As such it may assume an infinity of forms, whilst its several constituent parts may occupy every conceivable relation to each other. Thus a point, a line, a surface, a triangle, a circle, or geometrical magnitudes generally, have in themselves no tangible existence. So too all our reasoning concerning quantity as something ideal, though aided by signs and symbols, is abstract. The ideas of equality, of inequality, or of proportion, by which one quantity is compared with another and its value determined by its relation to that which is known, exist only in the sphere of ideas; they cannot be grasped by sense, and are accessible only to thought.

From this it will be seen that the science of mathematics has its starting point in the ideal world, and that the superstructure which it rears lies on the outside of the world of facts and quantities that address themselves to the senses. This is the sphere of pure thought, the clime most congenial to the intellectual faculties and most favorable to their high and sublime activity. Man, however, is so constituted in his present moral attitude, that as a general thing, the world of sensible fact engages and absorbs his attention supremely, and, as a consequence, it is lamentably true, that it is only the lower faculties of his nature, those which connect him with the material world, that are exercised, whilst Reason, his noblest power, lies dormant. The mass of men, see, hear, taste, conceive, and indulge in dreams of fancy, but beyond this, it is seldom that they make an excursion. They cling to the shores of their native coast, ever keep in sight of its capes and promontories, and never venture out beyond the usual soundings into the great ocean of truth and discovery. The consequence is, man sinks more and more into the sphere of animality, and loses his high attributes of a spiritual and rational being.

Now it is the object of all true education to prevent this result, to reverse the process, to elevate man from his state of sensualism, to give the preponderance to his intelligence, to furnish him with an abode in the world of ideas, to open up to him new sources of pleasure and enjoyment, and to inspire him with new strength, by supplying his higher faculties with suitable stimulant. All branches of a good education are calculated to produce this result, some more and some less directly. The study of the pure mathematics, as is generally conceded, tends in this direction in a preëminent degree. Its tendency is to abstract the mind from the contemplation of the material to the immaterial, from the sensual to the spiritual. This we might say is the first conquest, which the mind gains in freeing itself from the slavery of the senses, and, we may also say, the most important.

When, however, the mind is thus raised above the world of sensible objects, and brought to gaze upon the bright empyrean above, it must learn to poise itself upon its own pinions, and be enabled to view with unwearied eye the new realities which now surround it. The power of *attention* must be acquired. This power seems to be a spontaneous activity, so long as man lives in the sphere of mere feeling, for men often feel compelled to yield their attentions to that which regales their senses. But just because this faculty of the mind is so wedded to sense, it is proportionally difficult to fix it upon ideas. To effect this, labor and struggle are requisite, the magnitude of which it is difficult to describe, but of which all successful scholars fortunately have had some practical experience, and so we may appeal to that. How was it when they first attempted to grasp the abstractions of Algebra or Geometry? They sat down with the full determination to master the contents of their lessons; the evening lamp was lighted, and the quiet, cozy appearance of the chamber seemed to invite to study and reflection. They were thankful to their parents for sending them to school or college, and they congratulated themselves that they were students. They had formed the fixed purpose and the firm resolve, if not to reach the exalted position of those giants in science, whose works they were studying, at least to follow after them at a modest distance. But they had scarcely mastered a definition in their evening's lesson, before their minds had wandered from ideal realms to this lower mundane sphere. A noise in the streets distracted their thoughts, and scattered the formative idea into a thousand fragments. They either follow whither their truant attention leads, throw aside their books and problems, leave their chamber, and mingle with the throng on the streets, or finding it difficult to get back into the world of thought, and still more difficult to reconstruct the crystalized idea, which had just fallen from their grasp, they are carried away to parts unknown, or, perhaps, to their homes, to the farm, the cattle, the barnyard, or to the condition of the crops. But, *Nil arduum est.* A single discomfiture cannot subdue an energetic mind; it may, and it ought only to call forth an increase of energy and courage for the next conflict. By repeated efforts the attention yields to the judgment and the will, until at length it becomes the submissive and obedient servant of that arbiter of human destiny, the will, leading it over the fields of science, fixing it in long and deep meditation upon the profoundest mysteries of the universe, and giving it that intensity of application, and that patience in investigation, which enable it to penetrate into the arcana of nature, and bring into the light of the mid-day sun the laws upon which the universe itself rests. *Crescit eundo.* One victory over the natural mulishness of the mind in reference to the study of the abstract sciences, imparts to it additional courage and cheers it with new strength to gain other and more difficult ones in future campaigns. It is not necessary here to refer in detail to the characteristic habits of study,—of fixed attention,—of long and patient application, engendered by mathematical study. They have become proverbial; and where not counteracted by wholesome recreation, and a just attention to the duties of social life, they have also become sufficiently amusing when viewed under one aspect, and sufficiently painful when viewed under another. The great Newton himself, apparently unconscious that he possessed a most exalted genius, attributes the success of his researches to his habits of study and persevering application. He says explicitly, "that whatever service he had done to the public, was not owing to any extraordinary sagacity, but solely to industry and patient thought."

With the attention awake and at the command of the will, the conquests of the mind in the sphere of science have fairly commenced. It is then prepared to analyse, to reason, to judge, to deduce, to infer, or gathering up the manifold, to embrace them in a single concrete unity, in a word, to generalize, to think. The power of thinking exists in all men as a possibility, but it needs exercise, training, development. This it finds in an eminent degree in mathematical stndy, for there, at every step, it is required to generalize, from Arithmetic up to the most abstruse problem in Calculus. To a certain extent, mathematical science is inductive, that is, it experiments in particular cases, with the view of arriving at a general principle, or formula; but this is not demonstration, nor does it give the mind the necessary guaranty of mathematical certainty, not even if numerous inductions should confirm the truth of the proposition. The object of mathematical investigation is universal and necessary truth; hence it becomes deductive, that is, it establishes a general formula, and when it has once discovered this, it proceeds from it as a certain and infallible truth, and brings into the same category many subsidiary truths, and solves an infinity of problems in one general solution. This process of thought is the highest flight of reason, and one of its proudest triumphs. It is constantly employed in mathematics, pure and mixed, where it not only serves to show the necessary truth of many propositions that are known, but in the hands of the skilful analyst also becomes a fruitful means in the discovery of new laws and relations. Nowhere in the domain of science can a purely *a priori* method of reasoning be carried so far, so safely, or with so little aid from facts or experiments, as in the science of which we are now speaking. There is that in in its concise and accurate language, its clear and well defined axioms, as well as in the formulas of its reasoning processes, which beautifully adapt it to be, as it is, one grand system of education, in which a world of truths and facts are held together by a few general principles. The Freshman, who has mastered Newton's Binomial Theorem, and the Senior, who has grasped Newton's principle of Universal Gravitation, will doubtless feel the force of these remarks.

In the nature of the case, mathematical thinking must be the same as correct thinking in all other branches of knowledge; for thinking and its laws must be the same everywhere, just as truth, its object, is the same, fixed and immutable; but there is this peculiarity in mathematical reasoning, which distinguishes it from all other kinds of reasoning. Its processes are the sure, the infallible guides to truth; its axioms are the necessary, the irresistible intuitions of the mind, so clearly and so accurately defined that they cannot be misunderstood, whilst the conclusions themselves are equally as irresistible as the axioms from which they are derived. He, therefore, who passes from one step to another and finally, to the conclusion of a demonstration, feels that he has found truth unmixed with error, and principles that are true without a single exception, whilst in other sciences, especially such as are entirely empirical, truth is more or less combined with error, giving rise to various theories or hypotheses, which in their turn supplant each other. In the sifting process, through which the mind passes in the analytic art, error is effectually precluded, and indeed in the nature of the case there is no room for its entrance. Hypotheses are admitted, but only for argument's sake, and then tested by an infallible standard, and either confirmed as necessary truth, or reduced to an absurdity at once. Certainty and truth are the only treasures, which mathematics accumulates in its storehouse. This is a prerogative, which it must perhaps always enjoy among its sister sciences.

The necessary result of this kind of discipline and thinking must be evident to every one. It must accustom the mind to reason correctly and with precision on all other subjects. It inspires it with the love of truth in general; it gives it humility and patience, and accustoms it to depend upon its own resources and strength in its searches after hidden treasures. As it insists on a sufficient reason for every proposition that is laid down, its tendency is to beget a pure love of truth on the one hand, and a valid scepticism in reference to error on the other. Lord Bacon's idols of the den, of the forum, and the theatre, cannot long retain their authority in the presence of mathematical analysis; for these have no necessity in the nature of things, and are simply the products of the imagination, which have come to assert the authoritative force of reason itself.

But in this connection the question may very properly be asked, Is mathematical training favorable to the investigation of moral and religious truths? By some this has been answered in the negative. It is alleged that the mind trained in the exact sciences to habits of the most accurate and vigorous modes of thought, accustomed to take nothing for granted without a clear and satisfactory demonstration, must necessarily waver, fall into doubts, and scepticism, when it attempts to penetrate the mystery that envelops moral and religious subjects. In reply to this, it must be admitted, that mathematicians, and some of them the highest lights in the firmament of science, have been sceptics, infidels, and even atheists. Some of them have been cold, calculating, unsocial and selfish. They have devoted themselves so exclusively to their studies as to overlook everything else, and forget that they were in a world of social beings to whom they were bound by reciprocal duties. They were men of one idea only, and that never transcended the limits of abstract number and quantity. Some of them have lost their eyes, their health, and their lives by devoting themselves exclusively and unremittingly to their favorite pursuits. But individual cases like these prove nothing to the point in hand. They only show that mathematicians may become one-sided as well as other men, that they can forget their duties to themselves, their fellow-men, and their God, as well as the devotee of pleasure or mammon. Man is possessed of various faculties, and the exclusive cultivation of any particular part of his being must necessarily result in injury to the symmetry of the whole. His social and religious nature requires cultivation simultaneously with his other activities. Where this is neglected, an abnormal moral development must take place, and the monstrosity will be the more hideous, in proportion to the strength of the original endowments of the mind. The great lights of France, her far famed philosophers and astronomers, lived in the midst of a corrupt social system, and hence it is much easier to trace their scepticism to early education, and to the irreligious atmosphere in which they lived, than to those elevating studies, by which they threw such a halo of glory around the name of French mathematicians. If they sailed through the celestial spaces, and discovered nothing beyond the verification of their mathematical formulas ; if they observed no foot-prints of the Creator, and gazed only upon nonentity in regions resplendent with beams of divine glory, it may reasonably be supposed, that it was owing much more to the spiritual blindness that had befallen them from youth upwards, than to the intellectual penetration, which enabled them to make such distant voyages. Newton and Kepler, in many respects their superiors, were surrounded by a positive religious influence during their lives, and we find, accordingly, that they studied the book of nature, as a pious man studies the Bible, in order to secure more exalted views of the Creator, and then to reflect their light upon the minds of their fellow-men. Newton, it is known, was unwilling to converse with a sceptical astronomer on the subject of religion, because he had never studied it, and, as if oppressed with a sense of the vanity of human learning, found comfort in the thought, that his scientific labors were calculated to afford men higher views of God.

But other things being equal, we believe it may be satisfactorily shown, not only that mathematical education is not inimical, but in the highest degree favorable to moral and religious training. A little reflection will show that in the nature of the case it cannot be otherwise. If it accustoms the mind to reason correctly and logically, and makes truth and certainty the end of all its demonstrations, it would seem to follow, that the mind thus trained, would be best prepared to reason correctly and to embrace the truth in all other departments of knowledge, but especially in those in which his highest interests are to be found. This may be shown to be true both negatively and positively. A mathematical mind must be quick to detect fallacies, and slow to receive worthless traditions, or the mere ipse dixits of schools or self-constituted oracles. Trained to accept of nothing as truth, but that for which there is a good reason or a valid authority, it acquires a scepticism in reference to errors and barren notions, which is not only valid and legitimate, but necessary and useful in the sphere both of science and religion. For this reason it must be adverse to false religion, with their systems of morals, and, in general, to all kinds of superstition. This is as it should be; for truth and error can never coalesce, and, in all cases, skill, like that of the mathematician, is required to effect the analysis. The modern period of the world's history is, to a great extent, free from superstition, as compared with other times, and there can be no doubt whatever, that the study of the exact sciences has been one of the principal human instrumentalities in bringing about our emancipation.

When, however, the mathematician comes to consider the system of dogmas and morals revealed to him in the word of God, the case is materially different from what it is when the object of his investigation is simply the product of the human imagination. Here, very consistently, he asks for the ground upon which this system rests, and what are its claims to his obedience. In answer to his queries, he is referred back to God as its author; when this point is once established, he discovers that all its utterances proceed from an infallible source in the Godhead. This is for him the sufficient reason for every scriptural requisition. Here in God he finds the sublime axiom, from which every truth affecting his moral and spiritual interests is deduced with as much certainty and necessity, as any truth in Geometry or Algebra. It is true, in his own department, he understands the reason of every step he takes in his demonstrations, whereas in divine revelation he finds his square and compass, his minus and plus unavailing; but this does not affect in the least his comprehensive axiom, that the word of God is true and cannot be false or contradictory. This axiom, moreover, is not something abstract, but a living concrete reality, and on that account entitled so much the more freely to his heart-felt reliance.

Under this view mathematics should have a prominent place in every well established course of education. The tendency of the time in various directions would indeed, if not resisted, lead to a radical change in our colleges and seminaries of learning, and substitute in the place of metaphysics, the dead languages, and the less practical parts of mathematics, various branches of knowledge of a more immediately useful character. Such changes as these might increase the student's knowledge of facts, and extend his general information; but they would not involve anything like correct training or a sound education. To be well informed, and to be well educated, are different things. The duties and responsibilities of life require not so much large funds of knowledge as active and well balanced minds. Law, Medicine and Theology supply knowledge for practical uses, but they presuppose as a necessary requisite on the part of the student, that he should have a keen, penetrating, and well disciplined mind, in order to master them and turn them to practical account.

In the next place, mathematical science may be recommended *for its numerous applications to the useful purposes of life.* This, however, is so evident to every one, that it is unnecessary for us to enlarge upon this aspect of our subject. A few illustrations will suffice. It is plain that the business-world is carried forward by mathematical processes. Numerical calculations are the unseen hinges upon which every enterprize is made to revolve; numbers and figures are the secret sentinels, which watch over its operations from beginning to end, pointing the way to success, and giving timely warning of danger or loss. A dwelling of the most modest pretensions must in the first place be constructed ideally by the mathematician, nor can its four walls occupy their proper places without employing a theorem that has come down from Pythagoras himself. Roads are laid out and constructed, land, provinces, countries and seas surveyed, and their boundaries fixed, and angry quarrels respecting the ancient landmarks allayed by the science of numbers. All machinery depends for the unerring accuracy of its work upon the skill of its projector. Enter one of our factories, behold wheel running into wheel, survey the long connections by which mechanical force is conveyed from one part of the building to the other, and the scene before you appears to be one of inextricable confusion. But be not disheartened by this vast display of force and locomotion; study attentively this vast machinery in its various parts, trace them in their connections, and you will find this multiplicity of parts combining to form one vast whole, a grand *multum in parvo.* Commence the work of analysis, and you will discover all the order, beauty, and symmetry of a mathematical problem. The scene before you is indeed nothing but a mathematical problem, projected into space from the mind of the architect, and now in the course of a tangible solution. The idea in its origin and development had its existence first in his mind, where it had already in idea produced the net value of the fabrics, which falls due to each stockholder; but then as all true ideas have life and power, it could not continue to exist in abstracto, but struggling with the life and power inherent in ideas, it sought an existence in concreto, and hence the problem has become a cotton factory, or under other circumstances, a United States Mint, a factory at Birmingham, a Leviathan, an Atlantic Telegraph, or a Pacific Rail Road.

But the wealth of a nation, it is said, consists in its commerce as well as in its manufactures. Certainly it must be admitted, that the progress of nations and of the world at large has been very materially promoted by its assistance. But what, we may ask, is busy, daring, adventurous commerce, except a mathematical problem from beginning to end? The cargo is an unknown quantity, one of the variable kind, whose value must be determined by the conditions of the market, its ebbs and flows. These latter the shipper well understands, and hence he sends forth his vessel upon the ocean, when the value of his goods is at a minimum at home, and at a maximum in some distant port. But how shall he take advantage of the ebbs and flows of the market, and by what means shall he expedite matters, so that he shall be in the market just at the right time for the sale of his produce. He must go and consult the mathematician, who constructs a vessel for him in idea, then with scale and compass delineates it upon paper, and afterwards hands it over to the architect, who, guided by his formulas, projects it into space. During all the time the vessel is in the process of construction, the genius of science presides over the workmen, and is constantly invoked in the shipyard. She must be so constructed as to cleave the water with the least resistance; her centre of gravity must be in the right place, and her masts and sails so adjusted as to impart to the vessel her greatest velocity. If in addition, she is to be propelled by steam, scientific genius is called into requisition to a still greater extent. Her furnace, cylinders, huge levers, numerous pipes and valves, must be of a particular size and shape, so as to perform their functions aright. The cylinder must be measured, the force of the lever estimated to within a fraction, and the valves made to open just at the right time, or else, soon after she is launched upon her proper element, the newspapers of the country are destined to be filled with heart-rending accounts of a sad catastrophe. The vessel that left the harbor under a stiff breeze is tossed upon the Gulf stream, her boiler useless, her sails and rudder gone, a mere wreck, rolling in the trough of the sea. Such are sometimes the results of a mathematical blunder, as simple as the substitution of a plus for a minus. But we will suppose, that no error of this kind has been committed, the noble vessel is a unity in all her parts, and provision has been made for every possible contingency or danger. How proudly she rides the wave on her appointed way, amidst storm and sunshine, the pride of the ocean, and one of the proudest trophies of science! Who shall guide her in her perilous course? Why does she not strike the Florida reefs, why, as if a "thing of life," does she near the cape of Good Hope, and around by Mozambique pursue her way to the Indies, and there at length enter the destined harbor at the appointed time? Science, with her trigonometrical formulas as tests, and employing the heavenly bodies as her finger-boards, has guided her with unerring accuracy over the deep, and now she brings her back again laden with the wealth of the East. The voyage has been a matter of figures, and now the grand problem is solved.

In the next place, the science of mathematics may be recommended *in view of its applications in the explanation of the phenomena of the material universe and in the discovery and verification of its laws.*

Lord Bacon based his philosophy of nature upon experience and observation. With justice he complains of the philosophers, who preceded him, that they attempted to teach what nature ought to be, and not what it is in reality. He, therefore, asks for a more accurate examination of facts, a more thorough sifting of the evidence pro and con, before a principle or law is admitted as an established, scientific truth. A system of cross-questioning must be instituted, that will detect error and bring the truth to light. He thus infused a spirit of earnestness, and a judicious scepticism into the minds of scientific philosophers, which have been felt to the present day, and contributed immensely to the rapid advancement of natural science in modern times.

But as Macaulay (in his essay on Lord Bacon) justly remarks, he exaggerated the errors of the ancients and his predecessors. Men had eyes and curiosity enough to observe nature attentively long before his time, and the history of science goes to show, that from the earliest times they used the one, and indulged the other. This is particularly true in the field of Astronomy, where celestial phenomena were attentively and accurately observed at an early period, and all the principle facts, which could be discovered with the naked eye, known and well established, as appears from their knowledge of eclipses. Others, during the age immediately preceding that of Bacon, had been the patient and diligent observers of nature. This was true of Copernicus, especially of the old Swedish astronomer, Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and others. Sir David Brewster, an unbiased witness in the case, speaking of the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, says, "Newton possessed no secret that was not used by Galileo and Copernicus, and that he would have enriched science with the same splendid discoveries, even if the name and the writings of Bacon had never been heard of." But again, Bacon did not seem to observe, that the advocate and judge from whom he took his idea of the philosopher, after they have made the most thorough investigation of the case in hand, and weighed fact against fact, until the certainty of their conclusions seems indubitable, may after all be deceived by their testimony, and be necessitated to pronounce an unjust decision against the person at the bar. "The process," we are again using the language of Brewster, "was never tried by any philosopher except himself. * * * * As the subject of its application, he selected that of heat. With his usual sagacity he collected all the facts, which science could supply, he arranged them with all the sagacity of a judge, and he conjured with all the magic of his exclusive processes. But after all this display of physical logic, nature thus interrogated was still silent. The oracle, which he had established refused to give its responses, and the ministering priest was driven with discomfiture from his own shrine. This example, in short, of the application of his system, will remain to future ages as a memorable instance of the absurdity of attempting to fetter discovery by any artificial rules."*

But why does the friend of Bacon, as he certainly was, express himself in this manner? Simply because, as a mathematician, as well as a philosopher, he knew that observation, experiment and induction were not in themselves sufficient to establish physical science upon a permanent basis. The conclusion drawn from a multiplicity of facts or phenomena, may be true, yet unless the existence of the general law, which establishes its truth and necessity, is vigorously demonstrated, there is a possibility that it may not be true, and hence though the mind may possess a certain degree of certainty, it must also be oppressed with more or less of doubt. The law may have been inferred from only apparent points of resemblance, or the operation of some other and deeper law may have escaped attention. Science thus constructed needs additional proof, and this can be found only by applying the "logic of mathematics." Previous to the time of Newton, Physics in general, and Astronomy in particular, were empirical, and had advanced as far as mere empiricism could carry them. Copernicus had by a process of reasoning located the sun in the centre of the solar system; Kepler had discovered the laws of planetary motion, the nature of the curves described by the planets in their orbits, traced the sun to the foci of immense ellipses, and shown the relation of their periodic times to their distance from the sun.

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* Brewster's Life of Sir I. Newton, p. 289.

Galileo, by turning the telescope for the first time to the heavens, discovered new bodies in distant space, and thus widely extended the boundaries of human vision. The science of Astronomy, however, still remained in a chaotic state: in fact, it could not in strict propriety be called a science at all. Great and important facts had been discovered, but these were without any point of connection or unity, and it was impossible to trace them back to any internal necessity. It was believed that there must be harmony and unity in the celestial phenomena, because, in accordance with the religious spirit of the age, the universe was regarded as having sprung from the divine mind, and, as such, ought to manifest traces of divine harmony and unity in its lineaments. Kepler was penetrated with this conviction, and after he had discovered his laws he surmised that the solar system must be held together by an attractive principle residing in the sun. But this was only a happy guess, and mathematician as he was, he never attempted to verify it by analysis. For a single discoverer, he had already made a sufficiently valuable addition to science by the discovery of the laws which have immortalized his name, and it was reserved for Newton, another and greater genius, to discover and demonstrate the true unity that pervades the heavenly bodies. He was the first philosopher that employed mathematics as the principle of his philosophy, and the most successful in showing that the latter could be established upon a permanent basis only as it rested upon the former. In his hands mathematics remained no longer an abstract science, designed merely to arouse or stimulate the mind, but a scientific apparatus, adapted to test the accuracy and to extend the boundaries of scientific truth. Availing himself of this new appliance in the study of nature, he commenced where Kepler left off, and advancing step by step, admitting nothing but what he could prove, he demonstrated the truth of Kepler's surmise, and showed that it was a reality, a mathematical truth, as indisputable as any theorem in Euclid. If the planets revolved in elliptical orbits around the sun, analysis made it appear that they *must* be solicited by a force residing in the sun. In the next place the law of this force was investigated. Galileo had taught him the law by which an apple falls to the ground, and he proceeded to inquire whether the force, with which bodies fall to the earth, was not the same as that which held the planets in their places. In the first place, he showed that the moon was falling from a straight or tangential line towards the earth with the same velocity as any other body, at her distance, if it were acted upon by the attraction of the earth. He then turned his attention to the planets, and discovered that they also were ever falling from a straight line towards the sun, in accordance with the same law. Thus at length, by his Geometry and Algebra, with his diagrams and equations before him, taking one step after another, and placing himself upon demonstration alone, he discovered his great law, that all bodies in the universe attract each other with a force proportional to their masses, and inversely as the square of their distances. With this principle the mystery of the material universe was solved. Light, order, and beauty sprung up where previously nothing apparently but chaos and mystery reigned. The principle of universal gravitation having been established, the laws of Kepler became the legitimate deductions of a higher and more comprehensive principle, and it was proved, *a priori*, that the planets must move in elliptical orbits with the sun at their foci; that when near the sun they must speed their velocity, just as when farthest off they must slacken their pace; that the times of their revolution must bear a definite relation to their distances; that the earth must be round, flattened at the poles and protuberant at the equator; that the waters of the ocean must ebb and flow at the approach of the sun and moon; that the axis of the earth must vibrate and describe a curve around the pole of the ecliptic in a long series of years, causing the mysterious phenomenon of the precession of the equinoxes; and that the moon is constrained to cross the plane of the ecliptic at a different point at each successive return of full moon, and after the lapse of about eighteen years return to the same point from which she started out, and then repeat the cycle of eclipses in the same order during the succeeding eighteen years. Facts like these, and others similar to them, were all proved to be sequences of one universal law, which bound them together and gave them an existence. It was a grand mathematical problem in all its parts, the solution of which involves only the known and well established principles of Algebra, Geometry, or Calculus, and may be made intelligible to any one, who will take the trouble of making himself acquainted with the elements of analysis. But it must also be remarked that it can be made intelligible only to such.*

Again, the Newtonian law has been repeatedly assailed, and that by mathematicians themselves. There were irregularities in the celestial phenomena, which seemed to contradict the law; there were phenomena, which it did not apparently explain : phenomena too, which seemed to predict disorder and confusion in our system at some distant day. A deeper analysis, however, explained the cause of these irregularities, and proved that they were the necessary consequences of the law in question, which, so far from preparing the way for the destruction of the present system of things, were only periodic in their nature and destined in their own appointed time to correct themselves.

Additional illustrations of a similar character might be drawn from other branches of Natural Philosophy, but it will suffice if we only refer to them. The same refined analysis, which has shed so much light upon the science of Astronomy, has been applied with equal success in the departments of Mechanics, Acoustics, and Optics. In regard to light, figures have shown, that the scale preponderates greatly in favor of Euler's undulatory theory, in opposition to the corpuscular of Sir Isaac Newton, and a deeper investigation may yet establish it beyond the reach of doubt. Other imponderables, such as heat, magnetism, and electricity, have yielded one after another to mathematical reasoning, and the laws, that control them, have been expressed by mathematical symbols. Indeed, it is now generally conceded, that nature from its humblest to its highest sphere is, so to speak, only the embodiment of certain fixed, mathematical laws, all of which, if the human mind possess sufficient penetration, may yet be discovered and expressed by analytical formulas. Under this view the material world, at least, may in itself be regarded as simply a system of concrete mathematics, and, the truth, which dawned on the mind of Plato, may continue to be verified more and more fully in the onward progress of discovery,—that "God is a Geometrician." M. Compte thinks the matter of all the sciences is subject to mathematical laws, but that owing to the inherent weakness of the human mind, it is vain for us to expect to employ mathematical reasonings on subjects that transcend the inorganic world. In the organic world, where the mysterious principle of life manifests itself, the phenomena becomes so complex and intricate, that they must forever baffle the mathematician in his attempts to reduce them to laws as certain and precise as those of Geometry.*

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* Admission to the sanctuary of Astronomy, and to the privileges and feelings of a votary, is only to be gained by one means,—a sound and sufficient knowledge of mathematics, the great instrument of all exact inquiry, without which, no man can ever make such advances in this or any other of the higher departments of science, as can entitle him to form an independent opinion on any subject of discussion within their range.—*Herschel's Astronomy.*

But however that may be, it is certain, that the inorganic world has as yet been only partially explored, and just as rapidly as one problem after another is solved, others of increasing difficulty call for solution. The Newtonian theory of the solar system explains in the most satisfactory manner the phenomena of the universe as it is at present constituted. But the sublime genius of Laplace started the still deeper inquiry, respecting the *manner* in which the universe came to exist under its present form, and ever since his time, the question, with the theory which he proposed, has excited a deep interest among philosophers and mathematicians. Some have been so sanguine as to believe that the successive steps, the scientific genesis, by which the sun, moon, and planets rose out of chaos, may yet be pointed out and demonstrated ; others, among whom is the author of Kosmos, doubt the success of such investigations, and regard the question as a problem that lies beyond the reach of the human intellect. Under one form or another, however, it may be remarked, it is doubtless destined to be finally settled. Mathematical learning and penetration will either wind through its labyrinthian mazes, as the geologist does in the primitive history of our globe, and bring back a reliable history of creation, or else, discover the difficulties in the way of its settlement and so, as in other cases, demonstrate the impossibility of its solution. In this grand question, as well as in all others pertaining to the material universe, the mathematician can be employed as the only reliable guide, the only safe engineer.

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* No person can read his Positive Philosophy without admiring, on the one hand, the order, system, and compass of thought, which it displays in discussing the science of nature, and without disgust, on the other hand, at its total blindness in reference to every thing that transcends nature. His work is valuable for the masterly exhibition and development which it gives of the idea of science, but beyond this of little account, except as an exponent of the new phase of infidelity, which is making its appearance in France and England. From the start it ignores the idea of Theology and Philosophy, and leaves the man of science without a God, and the system of nature with no basis to rest upon:

Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.

Lancaster, Pa. T. A.

ART. VII.—MAHAN'S LOGIC.

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC, or an Analysis of the Laws of Thought. By Rev. Asa Mahan, Author of an "Intellectual Philosophy," "A Treatise on the Will," etc. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1857. pp. 387.

THE work is both a comprehensive and a minute treatise on the general subject of Logic, in Four Parts, the First discussing the Analytic Conceptions and Terms, of Judgments, and of Arguments or Syllogisms; the Second, the Dialectic, or Doctrine of Fallacies—Invalid Conceptions—Invalid Judgments—and Fallacies of Reasoning; the Third, the Doctrine of Method; and the Fourth, Applied Logic. The author takes ground against the fundamental principle commonly adopted by logicians, that general negative propositions distribute the subject and predicate, but general affirmative propositions distribute the subject only; and maintains in consequence that "a reconstruction of the whole science is of course demanded." This is the key to the distinctive features of the science of Logic as unfolded by Rev. Mr. Mahan.

The position of the book is, in one sense, correct. It is not a *law*, as Bishop Whately and many others maintain, but rather an *accident* of general affirmative propositions, that they distribute the subject only; not a law, because not a necessity implied in the idea of affirmation; but an *accident*, because distribution depends upon the variable extent of the predicate. Affirmation is equally valid whether but one attribute, or several attributes, or all the attributes of the subject are set in the predicate. If but one or several attributes are set in the predicate, the predicate is broader than the subject; for these attributes may belong to objects other than those denoted by the subject. But if *all* the attributes of the subject are set in the predicate, it is neither broader nor narrower, but just equal in extent to the subject; for no other class of objects can possess all the attributes of the subject, and those attributes only, except that class denoted by the subject. In all cases, then, of what we may call *complete* affirmation, the extent of subject and predicate is the same; the attributes set in the predicate belong to all the objects comprehended in the subject, and collectively to no others; and pure conversion is valid.

But we can not concur with Mr. Mahan in adopting the new theory of Sir William Hamilton concerning the quantification, as it is called, of the predicate. He says: "To Sir Wm. Hamilton the world is indebted for one of the most important attainments in this science which has been made for centuries, to wit: in the *quantification* of the *predicate* as well as of the subject. In all propositions alike, as he maintains, if we refer to the *judgment* itself, that is, to what is really thought in the mind, the predicate always has as real a quantity as the subject." p. 84. This new doctrine of quantification proceeds upon a false idea of affirmation, and, as a consequence, involves a confusion of the offices of predicate and subject. The germ of an affirmative judgment is the subject-conception, a containing whole, in which we distinguish two essential elements, form and matter, or extent and contents, or quantity and quality. It comprehends a number of individual objects, which possess certain attributes, or marks, or constituent parts. Affirmation does two things: it designates these two elements and expresses their mutual relation; that is, it designates the number of objects, and asserts one or more attributes, or parts, to be constituents of each one of the objects. The first demand is met by the subject, the second by the predicate. The subject is not only a containing whole, but assumes a form also which expresses the number of individual objects with which the judgment is dealing. It comprehends all these objects, or some of them, or but one. It is general, particular, or singular. Thus it is the special office of the subject to deal with the *quantity* of an affirmative judgment. The predicate, on the other hand, does not say how many objects the subject comprehends, but what the subject itself is; it lays out an attribute or the attributes of the subject as that which is contained in it;

in other words, the predicate sets forth the contents of the subject. It may set forth the whole or only part of the contents; in either case, however, it sets forth of what kind or nature the subject is. Thus it is the special office of the predicate to deal positively, not with the quantity, but with the *quality* of an affirmative judgment. The logical expression of the union of these essential elements in a given conception is affirmation.

The quantification of the predicate by Sir William Hamilton is not, therefore, "one of the most important attainments" in the science of Logic; but it is rather a retrogression; it involves a real confusion of quality and quantity. The degree of completeness with which the predicate sets forth of what nature or kind or quality the subject is, is mistaken for quantity, or for the number of individual objects, of which this nature or quality is affirmed. As Mr. Mahan adopts this metaphysical error as a principle and modifies his system of Logic accordingly, it vitiates a large part of his valuable work.

There is a sense, indeed, in which we may speak of the *extent* of the predicate, but it is a different sense from that in which the word is used when applied to the subject. Whilst the extent of the subject pertains to the *individual objects* of a class, the extent of the predicate pertains to the attributes or *nature* of the class. When all the attributes or the entire nature is set in the predicate, the predicate is limited to the subject; it can not belong to any other object or class of objects. Then we say the extent of subject and predicate is the same or equal. But it would be more accurate to say that the *limitation* of the predicate corresponds to the *extension* of the subject; for the predicate, containing the complete contents or entire nature of the subject, belongs to the whole class of objects, but to no other class. Hence both are distributed: the predicate expresses the nature of each object of the class, and any object of which the predicate can be affirmed must belong to that class.

On the one hand, therefore, Mr. Mahan is correct in maintaining that general affirmative judgments may distribute the predicate as well as the subject; but in sustaining this position by the quantification of the predicate, he commits a grave philosophical error—an error that multiplies symbolical formulas needlessly, introduces confusion into the analysis of judgments, and must be the source of various fallacious processes of reasoning.

To illustrate this error of the author's system of Logic we might analyze the very examples which he employs to evince the quantification of the predicate; for want of space, however, we must forego the advantage of such an analysis.

Of the four Parts of the work, the third and fourth possess, on the whole, the most merit. The train of thought is perspicuous, for the most part truthful, and sufficiently comprehensive; though by the introduction of numerous illustrations the author allows himself to be drawn into a number of discussions, which, though good in themselves, are nevertheless no necessary part of a scientfic treatise on logic. For this reason the work is an excellent book of reference on a number of philosophical points to the general scholar or the advanced student, but is less valuable for the purposes of a text-book. A text-book should be short but not defective, exhaustive but not repetitious, comprehensive but not arbitrary nor prolix, and rigidly scientific in the introduction of topics and in the general order of discussion, employing such illustrations, and such only, as are necessary to exhibit principles, and their internal connection, clearly and forcibly. Judged according to this standard we must regard the book as deficient, though we have no hesitation, at the same time, in saying that it possesses many and some great merits.

The author seems to have been a diligent student of German philosophy, of whose distinctive characteristics he has a high appreciation. The influence of the German, in distinction from the Scotch, method of thinking can be traced unmistakably, especially throughout the discussion of the Doctrine of Method and of Applied Logic. We will conclude this brief review with an extract in which Mr. Mahan characterizes the two methods:

"We have already distinguished between the *fragmentary* and *scientific* methods of developing thought, the former consisting in a mere aggregation of topics generally contemplated and discussed in connection with some one department of thought and investigation, and the latter in a systematic development of said department itself in accordance with the immutable laws and principles of scientific definition and logical division and arrangement of topics. As far as method, in the development of thought, is concerned, the productions of the German mind preëminently bear the characteristics of scientific development, while those of the Anglo-Saxon partake, to a very great extent, of the fragmentary. Each department of thought is developed by the German mind from a certain "stand-point," and is so developed that every particular topic is distinctly presented as a necessary part of an all-comprehending whole, thus distinctly realizing the idea of system. In treatises proceeding from the Anglo-Saxon mind, on the other hand, we too often meet with little more than an aggregation of topics falling within the sphere of the department of thought to be developed, while each topic is developed with little reference to the idea of a whole including its parts."

E. V. G.

Lancaster, Pa.

ART. VIII.—HYMN OF BONAVENTURA.

Recordare sanctae crucis
Qui perfectum viam ducis
    Delectare jugiter;
Sanctae crucis recordare
Et in ipsa meditare,
    Insatiabiliter.

Quum quiescas aut laboras,
Quando rides, quando ploras,
    Doles sive gaudeas,
Quando vadis, quando venis,
In solatiis, in poenis,
    Crucem corde teneas.

Crux in omnibus pressuris,
Et in gravibus et duris
    Est totum remedium;
Crux in poenis et tormentis,
Est dulcedo piae mentis,
    Et verum refugium.

Crux est porta paradisi
In qua sancti sunt confisi
    Qui vicerunt omnia;
Crux est mundi medicina,
Per quam bonitas divina
    Facit mirabilia.

Crux est salus animarum,
Verum lumen et praeclarum,
    Et dulcedo cordium:
Crux est vita beatorum
Et thesaurus perfectorum,
    Et decor et gaudium.

Crux est speculum virtutis,
Gloriosae dux salutis.
    Cuncta spes fidelium;
Crux est decus salvandorum
Et solatium eorum
    Atque desiderium.

Crux est arbor decorata
Christi sanguine sacrata
    Cunctis plena fructibus,
Quibus animae eruuntur
Cum supernis nutriuntur
    Cibis in coelestibus

Crucifixe! fac me fortem
Ut libenter tuam mortem
    Plangam donec vixero;
Tecum volo vulnerari,
Te libenter amplexari
    In cruce desiderio.

THE CROSS—HYMN OF BONAVENTURA.

TRANSLATION.

Make the Cross your meditation,
All who long for full salvation:
Joy in it forevermore.
Look up to the Cross and love it,
There is naught on earth above it,
O forget it nevermore.

Toiling, resting, smiling, weeping,
Glad or mournful vigils keeping,
Comforted or sorrowing:
Going, coming, ever raise it
To your faith—and whilst you praise it,
Joy from it be borrowing.

In sore trial and affliction,
Think of Jesus' crucifixion:
Seek the cross congenial.
Pain and anguish die before it,
What a refuge! O adore it!
Source of bliss perrennial.

Cross! Thy blessed sacrifice
Is the gate of Paradise:
Standard e'er victorious.
Antidote for sin's sore bruises,
Guilt, who takes it, wholly looses—
Medicine most glorious.

O the Cross! 'tis health and glory;
Tell with joy its blessed story:
Hear it all ye dutiful.
Store-houses filled, and failing never,
Whence all saints may draw forever
Strength and graces beautiful.

Mirror of the soul, reflecting
Holy light, and power perfecting,
Cheering, strength'ning steadily,
To the saints by it is given
Glorious aid in winning heaven,
Furnished freely, readily.

Blessed tree! with flowers perfuming:
Purple blood on all its blooming:
Tree of fruits supernal.
Millions on its food have flourished;
Millions more by it are nourished
In the life eternal.

Jesus! O Thou crucified!
Jesus! who for me hast died!
Praise, praise for Thine agony!
Clinging to Thy Cross, and sighing
O'er my sins, and o'er Thy dying,
I am wholly lost in Thee!

Lancaster, Pa. H. H.

VIII.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

"HONOR TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS DEAD." A Lecture in behalf of the Mount Vernon Association: delivered in the State Capitol, Nashville, Tenn., Wednesday, Dec. 4, 1857. By Richard Owen, M. D., Professor in the University of Nashville.

This chaste and earnest Address illustrates some peculiarities and advantages of our Form of Government; refutes the charge made against Republics of being ungrateful to those who have rendered services to their country; argues the importance of cultivating the purer feelings which spring out of the relation of husband to wife, of parent to child, of brother to brother, of friend to friend, and of citizen to his country, in order to avoid becoming liable to the charge of ingratitude to our benefactors; holds up the life and character of Washington for imitation; exhorts all to perpetuate the memory of his life as "the most perfect combination of physical, intellectual and moral excellence of which history has preserved any record"; maintains the propriety of the nation purchasing Mt. Vernon for a monument to his greatness, as a means of perpetuating the advantages secured to us by Washington and other heroes of the Revolution; and closes with a fervent and eloquent appeal to Americans to quell all angry passions, all dissensions, jealousies and hatreds, and carry out in good faith the sublime precept and example of "Peace on earth, good will to men," in order to hand down intact to coming generations the blood-bought heritage of our fathers. E. V. G.

THE TRUE GLORY OF WOMAN, as portrayed in the Beautiful Life of the Virgin Mary, Mother of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. By Rev. *H. Harbaugh*, A. M. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1858.

Mr. Harbaugh's reputation, as a popular religious writer, is so widely established by the success of his previous numerous publications, that the simple announcement of his name on the title page can hardly fail to recommend the work here named to general attention and interest. The admirers of his spirit and style, who are counted by thousands—we might say perhaps by tens of thousands—may expect to find new cause for being pleased with him, as a matter of course, in the present volume. We pretend not, in this brief notice, to enter into any examination of its merits. Neither can we allow ourselves to go into the general merits of that very interesting subject or theme to which it is devoted; however much disposed we should be, in other circumstances, to improve the book as an *occasion* for such purpose. We can only say, we are well pleased that Mr. Harbaugh, who is in so much favor with the Protestant public generally, has seen fit to take the theme thus publicly and popularly in hand. For if it be true that Roman Catholics make too much of the Blessed Virgin, it is no less certain that the great body of Protestants now fall over to quite the opposite extreme; entertaining towards her, and for her, sentiments actually at war with a full believing apprehension of the great mystery of the Incarnation. Few seem to see or feel, that the danger of believing too little here, is just as real, and fully as serious, as the danger of believing too much. In a most important sense, the Virgin Mother of our Lord Jësus Christ is an object of faith. Her position in the economy of the Christian salvation is a truly supernatural position, not to be measured by ordinary experience or natural understanding. In such view, it belongs necessarily to the proper wholeness of the Creed. Gnosticism pretended to magnify the dignity of Christ, by turning the entire earthly side of His being into a shadow. But this was in truth to nullify his being altogether. To make little of the Virgin Mary—to think of her as only a common pious woman—is an error, which runs directly towards the same result. To make earnest in our minds with the real coming of Christ in the flesh, we *must* allow habitually a corresponding dignity to her—the highly favored, or full of grace, and blessed among women—through whose intervention, not blind, but voluntary and free, this glorious advent took place. We may possibly return to the subject at some future time.

N.

THE NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPEDIA: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by George Ripley and Charles Dana. Vol. II. Araktsheeff—Beale. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway. London: 16 Little Britain. 1858.

In a former number we noticed the first volume of this extensive work, which was published last December. That volume met with such a ready sale that the first edition was exhausted in less than two weeks. This fact shows at least that an earnest want for a work of the kind exists. We noticed the first volume favorably; and we must say our estimate of the work is increased by an examination of the second volume. Who could expect in a work of such compass, to find every article exactly to his mind. The one who demands this has himsef his peculiar bias of thinking, and may be as well in error as others. Think of a volume, like the one before us going over more than 2,000 words, and then say whether perfection, if measured even by an absolute standard, were such an one at hand, could be expected; how much less can we hope for that kind of perfection which each one may ask according to his individual standard. We no not speak thus apologetically for the work because we think it needs it especially; but to show how unjust it is, as a few papers have done, to select here and there an article, point out some supposed or real defects, and then measure by such specimens the merits of the entire work. Such critics remind one of a certain bird which sails over a thousand beauties of landscape which it does not admire, and at length lights down with gusto on a carcass!

The present volume contains 776 neatly printed, large double column pages. The first half finishes the letter A, and the other half is devoted to the letter B, which is not yet finished. Among the list of contributors we discover many of the most prominent literary and scientific scholars in the country. The need of a full Cyclopedia, coming down to our time, is felt, and we are glad that the present enterprise promises to succeed so well. H. H.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will. By Joseph Haven, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 590 pp.

We had prepared a long notice, or rather short review, of this well-written work on Mental Philosophy for the present number; but it has been crowded out. Room is left us only for a few words. The work is the result of extensive reading in the department of philosophy, and of profound study. The author does not collect the opinions of others, though as he ought to do he studies them closely, but thinks for himseef on the basis of what others have produced who have gone before him. He has wrought out a system, which, whilst internally connected, in the main, at least, with the Scotch and New England method of philosophizing, nevertheless bears at every point the marks of his own genial spirit and ripe scholarship. Judged from Professor Haven's point of observation, his production is thorough and successful. The arangement is clear; the discussion brief yet full; the language is perspicuous, forcible and beautiful, rising even gracefully at times into eloquence. As a whole, it is superior to any work belonging to this school, that has left the American press for the last decade of years; and the study of it in our Colleges will carry our youth, in some respects, beyond the mechanical method of thinking that prevails so extensively among us at the present day.

We can not, however, accord unqualified approval to this system of psychology. We must differ from the learned and highly esteemed author on many points of minor importance, and on some that are fundamental. But of these points of difference we can not now speak. We may recur to this subject in a future number. E. V. G.

THE

MERCERSBURG REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1858.

ART. I.—REFORMED SYNODS.

THE restoration of the Reformed, or—as it is commonly called—Presbyterian Church polity, is by many attributed to Calvin. This is correct only in part. The honor of having materially aided in its development belongs, no doubt, to him, but the first movement in that direction, and the first partial success in its restoration, belongs to Zwingli. Dr. Paul Henry, in his extensive and learned Life of Calvin, admits, that "the direction which Calvin took as a reformer, in matters of discipline, was that pointed out by Zwingli, and the opposite of that pursued by Luther."*

Our present inquiry has reference to the rise and history of Synods and other ecclesiastical judicatories in the Reformed Church.

The first Synod in the Reformed sense, growing out of the new order developed by the Reformation, was, beyond doubt, the one held at Berne, Feb. 13th, 1528, six days after the close of the Disputation of Berne, when the ten Theses were signed. It was called with a view "to ascertain the sentiments of the congregations, through their delegates, with regard to the Reformation." Whether this was designed to be the first of a series of permanent and regular Synods does not appear, but this is most likely. On account of disturbances which broke out in the Highlands, 1528, and also the religious wars of 1529 and 1531, what is usually called the first Synod of Berne did not meet till the 9th of January, 1532, continuing till the 14th.

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* Vol. I, p. 367.

It was composed of the clergy of the canton, two hundred and thirty in number. The proceedings are extant, and are said to be model records of an ecclesiastical assembly; not mere dry details of business, but breathing a cordial and fraternal spirit, full of evangelical unction and a deep Christian life and love.

Meanwhile, in the same year, 1528, in which the first special Synod was held in Berne, Zwingli instituted in Zurich regular semi-annual Synods. These, however, were not instituted by the congregations of the Canton, but were called and managed by the Civil Council; they were, therefore, not independent of the civil authority. Two presidents, elected by the ministers, presided over these Synods, one of whom was chosen from the lesser or greater Council; the other from the lesser Council only. The members of the Synod were all ministers, except that, including the lay presidents, there were nine members of the government.

These Synods were created for this purpose, namely: "That all the ministers of the Church might confer and take action, before nine members of the Council, in regard to such matters pertaining to ministers and the churches as necessity required, to the praise of God and the protection and advancement of His word, in order that any offences might be avoided or removed." Not only were the ministers permitted to present any case on which they wished counsel or redress before the Synod; but also the members, "if they had any matter of complaint or charge against the ministers on account of doctrine or life," could also appear, through one or two reputable men, whom the Council itself would appoint for that purpose. The most important business transacted in this Synod, says Gœbel, was the careful examination of each one of the pastors as to their doctrine and mode of life, and the mutual brotherly admonitions based on such examination. *Correctio mutua.** These Synods, after the mode of Zurich, were also introduced soon after in all the Highland provinces, in Basel, Strasburg, and through Berne, in the arch-bishopric of Cologne, and in East Friesland.*

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* "Zwingli's sketch of his Church polity appeared (after his death) in 1532, in the preacher's ordinance of the Superintendent, Bullinger, at Zurich. It was laid before a Synod, consisting of pastors, preachers, and two representatives of the congregation. The subjects considered were, first, the choice, appointment and ordination of ministers; secondly, their doctrine and

These Synods, though subject to the civil authority, yet conducting their deliberations in the presence of the members of the government, still exercised a very decided influence upon the State in political matters. And though there was no lay representation in the office of Elders, still "every individual member of the Church had also a certain degree of influence on its affairs through this, that the congregation was allowed to express its opinion respecting the chosen preachers."†

As already said, there was in these Synods no direct lay representation from the churches, nor did Zwingli restore the office of Elder in the congregations; yet from him originated a movement which eventuated in the restoration of this office. "In the year 1526," says Dr. Henry in his Life of Calvin, "a foundation was laid, through the marriage ordinance, for the stability of the Church (in Zurich). According to this decree, from two to four pious men were allowed to every minister as assistants. They were to see that the laws of marriage were strictly observed, to warn the quarrelsome and litigious, and, in case of necessity, to consign such persons to the magistrate to be punished. This regulation prevailed in the towns as well as in the country. Thence arose the establishment of officers, to whom was entrusted the oversight of morals and church discipline. These persons were allowed to inflict even a certain mea-

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life; and thirdly, the assembling of Synods." *Henry's Life of Calvin, Vol. I*, p. 368. Thus plainly with him originated the restoration of government by Synods.

* Gœbel's Geschichte des christlichen Lebens in der rheinisch-westphälischen evangelischen Kirche. Vol. I, 291. This is a most important contribution to the early history of the Reformed Church. It not only goes to the sources, in congregational and synodical records, but it presents also many features of Church life, as it unfolded itself in doctrine, government, cultus, and customs, which are overlooked in our general histories. It covers, in two volumes, together, 1358 pages. No one, who can read German, ought to be without it. Most of the facts in this article pertaining to the continental Reformed Synods, have been derived from this work.

† Dr. Henry's Life of Calvin. Vol. I., p. 368, 369.

sure of punishment, when warnings and admonitions did not avail, by exacting fines, imposing penances more or less degrading, and even by excluding the offender from the Lord's Table." How plainly did this point to the restoration of the office of Elder, to which it also led—though first under the hand of Calvin at Geneva in 1537.

Whilst Zwingli stopped short of reaching the full idea of the presbyterial element in ecclesiastical government in not restoring the Elder office, Calvin fell below him in failing to include in his polity the true position and power of Synods. In his system, 1537—1541, the ministers had not at first a body over them in the form of a Synod with ultimate power. They had only weekly assemblies among themselves (colloques, Cœtus) which were distinct from the Consistories, and had for their object the preservation of the purity and unity of doctrine among them. They assembled also quarterly for the purpose of mutual exhortation. The weekly assemblies were a kind of pastoral conferences, while those held quarterly were something like Synod's for the furtherance of spiritual discipline. In connection with these there belonged to the same system also annual church visitations to every congregation, performed by a committee of two ministers and two members of the Council.

Moreover, the office of Elder in Geneva, contrary to Calvin's principle, did not attain its true primitive position. "They were not chosen from the congregation, but from the Council, thereby constituting a regular aristocracy as in the State itself;" and besides this, "the number of lay members by far exceeded that of the clergy, so that the latter could not fail to find themselves overpowered,—a source of frequent anarchy." Calvin himself, however, opposed the introduction of a double number of laymen to the ministers in the assembly, regarding it as improper and evil, that the laity should have the power of outvoting the clergy. Thus it will appear, that the true idea of the presbyterian theory of government was far from being realized in the system of Calvin. Indeed excepting the formal introduction of Elders, it was scarcely any advance on what before existed in Zurich, Strasburg, Cologne, and other places where it was formed after the Zwinglian model, whilst, in failing to create a synodical council with general authority over individual pastors and churches, it fell far short of attaining the same stability and power.

A system of Church government, after the model of that in Zurich, was in operation in Strasburg as early as 1531, consequently long before the appearance of Calvin. It was in the form of an ecclesiastical convention, composed of all the ministers, together with twenty-one lay members from the churches. These last were to have an oversight of the lives and official conduct of the ministers, in important cases to counsel with the clergy in regard to church affairs, and in general to assist faithfully in the advancement of all that pertained to church and religion. Three at a time, with the minister, held alternately weekly meetings, or presbyterial sessions. The same system was also introduced in the Cologne reformation. The apostolic office of Deacons was here restored. The system included also annual church visitations like those afterwards introduced by Calvin. Conferences were also held weekly, as well as semiannual district and general, or diocesan synods, for the mutual instruction and exhortation of pastors: "It is our will, and we demand it, that the pastors diligently and regularly attend the Synods and all necessary exercises, seeking ever farther to improve themselves in the proper knowledge and practice of their duties."

This system of Church government gained great influence in Northern Germany. This may be judged from the fact that, when in 1545, de Lasky began to introduce the presbyterial polity in Emden, he took the ecclesiastical arrangements of the Cologne reformation as his model.

It is due to Calvin to remember that his own mind had advanced to a much more true and full idea of the presbyterian system of Church government than he was able at that time to carry out into practical effect. This his Institutes will show. Dr. Henry, his biographer, has correctly remarked : " Calvin departed probably from the right principles propounded in the Institutes, only because driven to a different course by the obstinate viciousness of the people. His spirit should be contemplated in his works, rather than in his doings. He has displayed his moral judgment so admirably in a theoretical point of view, that no Christian can find any thing to object to it. But there were rocks lying on the path of the real world. His ideas as a reformer were better developed in France."

In 1555 a pious nobleman fled with his family to Paris. He declared one day in a secret assembly of many pious persons who lived in that city, that he could not have his child baptized "according to the idolatrous ceremonies," and proposed the election of an evangelical minister. After fasting and prayer, they elected a young minister who had just come from Geneva, and immediately instituted a consistory of Elders and Deacons. This was the origin of the French Reformed Church. The already existing congregations throughout France joined themselves with this Church in Paris, and with wonderful rapidity the Reformed Church spread from place to place through the kingdom. So great was the number of members in France quietly organized under the presbyterian form of government, that four years later, 1559, " they were able to hold a general Synod at Paris, and exhibited their views of discipline in forty articles. In successive Synods these first principles were further developed, till at length the law book of the French Church was perfected. It contains, in the last edition, fourteen chapters, and two hundred and twenty-two articles." The system of Church polity which they thus established was altogether after the model of Calvin's, though an advance of it, and it developed itself in a way more free and realized the presbyterian form of government more truly than had ever before been done. It was independent of the State. Each congregation was governed by a consistory of Elders and Deacons, holding their office for life. This consistory elected the minister, but the congregation had the power of veto. The congregations were united first in Classes, which met four times a year; these in district Synods, which met twice a year; and finally all in a general Synod, which met once a year. Through Classes and the general Synod, the Church governed itself by deputies, providing for all the expenses of its government, paying its ministers and officers, and all the expenses of the delegates to and from their ecclesiastical assemblies. The general or national Synod, had unlimited and final power. Appeal could be made to it from consistories or provincial synods. The Classes were composed of the ministers of a given district, each one accompanied by one or two lay presbyters, who were elected by the consistories as the representatives of the people. The general Synod was composed, not of delegates from the Classes, but like the Classes themselves, of ministers and Elders from all the congregations. The President of the general Synod was chosen by a plurality of votes, with no other power but to preside over the proceedings. Ministers and Elders were on an equality in the Synod, except that an Elder could not be chosen President.

It is worthy of note that Calvin was in favor of the appointment of a permanent President, in Judicatories, and that the office should always exist in some distinguished member of the Church. In accordance with this view, he remained permanent President of the consistory. In these views he was opposed by Beza, who wished the office to be held by a regular succession of new occupants. "In the first Synod, held in Paris," says Dr. Henry, "a protest was characteristically made against a permanent Moderator, and in the very first article adopted." The object of this was to guard against the creeping in of any hierarchical elements, or any thing that might develop itself in that direction. This was in advance of Calvin, who, besides desiring the office of President to be permanent, "recommended in fact the episcopal element for the larger and more important countries." "He proposed a form of Church government to Sigismund, King of Poland, in which he combined, in a certain sense, the episcopal with the presbyterian element." "Casaubon declares in a conversation with Uytenbogaret, that Calvin had become bishop of Geneva. Mr. de Beza had said to him, that Mr. Calvin, who had rejected episcopacy, was in fact bishop of Geneva, and that a little before his death, he had proposed to Mr. Beza to make him his successor, but that the latter had refused the offer."* In his letter to Sigismund, dated 1544, Calvin says: "The ancient Church introduced the patriarchate, and gave each province its primate, that by this bond of peace and union the bishops† might be more fully held together; as if in the present day an archbishop should be appointed President in the renowned Kingdom of Poland, not to rule over the rest, or to invade their rights, but who, to preserve order, should possess the first rank in the Synods, and strive to preserve a holy union among his official brethren. Bishops also might be appointed for the provinces and for the cities, on whom the responsibility should peculiarly rest of preserving order. The natural course of things directs that one should be chosen from the rest to take the chief management of affairs; but it is a very different thing for a man to be satisfied with a moderate degree of honor, according to the proper measure of human capacity, to his wishing to embrace the whole world in his boundless sway." From his holding the parity of the ministry, and saying that the dignitary of which he speaks should be "chosen from the rest" of "his official brethren"—and from his idea that his honor of position should be based on and "be according to the proper measure of human capability"—as well as from his view "that the office of President should always exist in some distinguished minister of the Church," we see plainly that the episcopal arrangement which he proposed to

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* Dr. Henry's Life of Calvin. Vol. I, p. 401.

† By which he means the ministry, not an order above presbyters. He held the parity of the ministry. "I call bishops and presbyters, without distinction, servants of the Church. The Scriptures recognize no other servants of God but the preachers of the Word, called to govern the Church, and whom they sometimes name bishops, sometimes elders, or pastors." Quoted in *Henry's Life of Calvin.* Vol. I, p. 371.

Sigismund, and considered proper "for the larger and more important countries," as a means of unity, rested on no doctrine of the divine right of episcopacy. Rather he thought only of one made chief by equals, who should be "a bond of peace and union," and would be such because his elevation to such position rested in the confidence of his equals whose voice elevated him. His primate was nothing but that of a President, whose office he desired to be permanent, having certain power between sessions. For this reason he desired that this position should always be awarded to "some distinguished member of the Church."

Calvin saw a disadvantage in concentrating the ruling power once a year or oftener in a Church judicatory, and then having it dissolved in the interim, and hence sought to remedy this apparent defect by a permanent President, embodying the powers of the Synod between its sessions. But he did not so clearly see, or perhaps adequately consider, the danger of such sacred power being concentrated in one man, and that to be held for life, especially after he denied the divine right of such office in a president or bishop, or by whatever other title designated. By favoring the form of episcopacy as a judicious convenience, and yet denying the divine right of Bishops, he invited all the dangers connected with it, without claiming that divine right, without which it cannot possibly prove an advantage in the way of peace and union. He did not see that the perfection of the Presbyterian system of Church government, in a Synod with its lower judicatories, made the acts of the Synod, in substance, the acts of a bishop—thus establishing a general power over the individual as a bond of peace and union, whilst the provision whereby a Synod might be assembled in any case of need, actually gave the Synod a permanent existence, and made it possible to invoke its help in any case of grave concern. Whilst there was in the Synod no danger of hasty or of too much government—a common evil—it furnished, at the same time, a permanent centre of power and bond of peace. All who bear the ruling power by virtue of ecclesiastical office, and not a single one—the Synod, not its President—this constituted the ultimate power. The Synod is the bishop.

Thus only in restoring the office of Elder, and in so far as this pertains to the Presbyterian system of Church government, did Calvin restore this system of ecclesiastical polity. As regards its perfection in the wider idea of synodical councils, he not only did nothing to favor it, but his influence was strongly operative against its early realization.

Interesting is the establishment of Synods among the "Churches sitting under the cross," in Holland and Westphalia, made up of refugees from France, the Netherlands, the Palatinate, and other places. These Churches held their first Synod secretly at Teux in 1563. The first general Synod of the Churches of the Netherlands was held at Antwerp, 1566, most largely composed of Belgian Churches; at which time the Belgic confession of faith was improved and formally adopted. But alas! the next year, 1567, this Netherland Church, in consequence of the invasion of the Duke of Alba, was again scattered, and the pilgrim Churches sought a home in Western Germany and some in England. Yet, "as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing: as poor, yet making many rich: as having nothing, and yet possessing all things," their faith, and hope, and worship grew and flourished in the lands of their exile. By thousands they took up their abode in the towns and cities along the Rhine, from the Palatinate to Wesel, and Emden, and became the immediate occasion of the firm establishmeut of the Rhine-Westphalian Reformed Church.

Wesel, the largest city in the district bearing that name, and situated near where the Lippe empties into the Rhine, received the evangelical doctrines early in the Reformation. Above the gate toward Cleves they caused to be cut in stone the beautiful and significant words: "I STAND OPEN TO THE PIOUS." No wonder that such an invitation should be welcomed by the homeless refugees. Many entered that city; and here these persecuted Churches, drawn together by a Christian spirit and the pressure of their woes, held their second Synod, 1568. Their proceedings were conducted in the Latin language. The decisions of this Synod were then finally adopted and brought into full force by the general Synod of the Churches of the Netherlands "which sit under the cross and are scattered through Germany and East Friesland," assembled at Emden, a large and beautiful sea-port town on the Ems, in East Friesland, 1571. This Synod became thus in time the permanent basis of the national Church of the Palatinate as well as of Holland.

The so-called Synod of Wesel, 1568, was not, in the full sense of that term, a Synod—rather a kind of preparatory conference, without the authority of making final decisions. The object of it was to prepare a form of Church government embodying the principles of the best Reformed Churches, which should then be laid before a regular and legal Synod of all the Belgian Churches for correction and final adoption. The Churches in the Rhine lands were not represented in that Synod. It included only about twenty Netherland congregations, represented by forty-six ministers and elders, to the decisions of which, however, seven others who were absent, afterwards attached themselves. Peter Dathenus, Court preacher of Frederick III,—who had been sent by that Prince to promote the order and advance the interests of the Netherland congregations along the lower Rhine, and if he could not prevent the holding of this Synod, at least influence its counsels—was President. The most important, and, at the same time, the most difficult matter to be accomplished by this convention was to reconcile and unite the Zwinglio de Laskian views and customs with those of the Calvinistic Walloon churches, as they existed together in the Netherlands, in relation to doctrine, government, and cultus. Hence, in order "to prevent all tyranny of conscience and strife," the Synod, with great wisdom, passed as its first resolution, "that the congregations should be perfectly free in all such non-essential matters as are not distinctly found in the teachings and precedents of the Apostles, or are not in themselves necessary and unavoidable." But in more important matters, there shall be no hasty departure from the general views and customs of the Church as they then existed.*

The end sought by this assembly was well attained. A full system of government was wrought out; and its excellence, and its accordance with the general sense of the Reformed genius and spirit, is best attested by the fact, that with some emendations it was adopted, as we have already indicated, by the general or national Synod of the Netherlands at Emden, 1571.

The conclusions of the conference of Wesel in regard to Church government, were based chiefly on the form of government introduced in London by de Lasky; but care was taken as far as possible to harmonize the system with that of Geneva. However, in order as little as possible to come in conflict with the native Churches of Germany, it was distinctly declared, that the Synod did not wish to reflect upon any other Church by their decisions, but that they had only prayerfully sought to have reference to the circumstances and wants of the Belgic Churches; and that they had so arranged their system, that, as time and circumstances should make it necessary, it could be altered and amended, so as to accommodate itself to the relations of Church and State as well as to the farther development and spread of the Church.†

In agreement with the Church government of Geneva, Cologne, and that of de Lasky in London, the Conference of Wesel designated four classes of officers in the Church: Ministers of the Word and Sacraments; Doctors or Teachers (Lehrer oder Propheten) to which Zwingli also refers; Elders; and lastly Deacons—these last of two kinds, Deacons and Deaconesses. Their views of these officers are thus given by Gœbel.

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* Gœbel's Geschichte des Christlichen Lebens, &c. Vol. I, p. 409, 410.

† Gœbel's Geschichte, &c. Vol. I, 410.

1. The Synod held, that the *ideal* of the election of a minister is, that it be done mutually by the Elders of the Church and the civil officers, and that the congregation might be satisfied with their selection. But as this ideal could scarcely be attained, they held that the Synod should coöperate with the Elders in such election ; but as long as even this could not be carried out in order "to avoid an improper lordship of the Elders over the people," it should be the duty of the Elders to propose to the congregations a double number of the needed ministers—thus, in this respect, to proceed not according to de Lasky's German, but after the manner of Pollannis' French pilgrim congregation of London. In new, or not yet properly organized churches, neighboring congregations shall assist. The examination of a minister shall be conducted by ministers, or it may also be done by elders only. It shall be to ascertain whether he agrees in all points with the Belgic confession and with the Genevan or Heidelberg Catechism. He shall be ordained by his colleague or by a neighboring minister, in which he shall be pledged to the system of Church government.

2. The board of Doctors or Teachers (Das Lehrer- oder Propheten-Collegium) shall, once or twice a week, in connection with prayer, publicly explain the Holy Scriptures in regular order. To constitute this board there shall be selected not only the ministers, but such of the elders and deacons, and also from the congregation, as may be qualified. These shall also be called into counsel whenever points of doctrine come up in the consistory.

3. The Elders or Presbyters, with the ministers, constitute the church council or consistory. Their office requires them to watch over the souls of the members, to visit the sick, to labor in the way of general supervision, exhortation and the exercise of discipline. To enable them well to do their work, it is necessary to divide the congregation into parishes, in each of which an Elder shall reside and labor. The election, examination, and ordination of Elders and Deacons is the same as that of ministers. The

Elders can hold no council without the presence of the minister, except in pressing exigencies, and they shall carefully avoid all lust for power. A presbyterial-protocol shall be carefully kept.

4. The Deacons hold the alms, and have the special care of the poor and sick. In places where it appears suitable and necessary, elderly women of tried faith and life, may be called into service as Deaconesses.

Inasmuch as the Elders and Deacons, if true to their calling and duties, had necessarily to employ much of their time, which had thus to be lost to their private interests, it was directed that, for the relief of such as could not afford the sacrifice of time, annually or semi-annually there should be a change of one half the members, by appointment of others in their places.

No minister is allowed to leave his charge without permission of his congregation and the Synod. Only the minister shall baptize; and this sacrament shall be administered publicly in the congregation; except in cases where congregations are just forming, in tenderness to the weak, it may be administered in the family, yet not without the presence of a small congregation of four or five believers. Before the administration of the Lord's Supper, the Elders shall visit the members in their several parishes. No one can commune who has not first professed the articles of faith, and submitted himself to the rules of discipline in the Church. Adults to be received as members must be examined by the minister and elders, but not publicly. Children, however, it will not be inappropriate to examine publicly—both must submit themselves to the discipline. In all congregations the Lord's Supper shall be celebrated with the breaking of common leavened bread, and not with wafers.

The public confession of sin may be made in a free way, or according to the form of Geneva, or of some other Reformed Church. The prayer *after* the sermon shall be a free prayer, Before the service begins, an Elder or a Deacon shall read a chapter from the Holy Scripture—so that there may be no temptation to engage in idle conversation in the Church—a custom which originated in the Swiss French Reformed Churches, and is yet customary amongst them. In singing, only the Psalms (of Dathenus) shall be used, and as far as possible only the the Goudimel tunes shall be sung.

Care shall be taken that no congregation is organized which is not based on this form of government. For purposes of discipline, and also that proper watch may be had over the moral conduct of the ministers, there shall be a meeting of the Synod (Classis) at least quarterly, and the provincial Synod shall meet semi-annually. These meetings shall not take place in any one location, but shall be adjourned from place to place, not only thereby to avoid all prominence or desire to rule, of one church over another, but also that in this way the condition and circumstances of the various congregations may be the better known and watched over.

Such was the system prospectively wrought out by the Synod of Wesel. It remained for the legally assembled general Synod at Emden, 1571, composed of a large number of representatives from very distant places, on the one hand, to examine this form of Church government and fully to confirm it, and on the other hand, actually to organize the Church on this foundation—to arrange its provinces, districts and congregations, and to order the weekly assemblies of the consistories, the quarterly or semi-annual meetings of the Classes, the annual meetings of the provincial Synods, as of Germany, England, and Belgium, and the convocation of the general Synod once every two years. The President of this Synod, as also of the following one held at Dort, 1574, was a minister from the Palatinate, Casper von der Heyden, pastor of the Dutch Church in Frankenthal.

The arrangements were all successfully made. The German Province was divided into four Classes, each one including a prominent place indicated by the name printed in capitals. 1. The Palatinate—composed of two congregations in Frankfurt, one in Schönhofen, HEIDELBERG, Frankenthal and St. Lambert. 2. The Dukedom Zulich—including two congregations in COLOGNE, two in Achan, one in Maestricht, Limburg, Neusz, and some others. 3. Cleve—containing WESEL, Emmerich, Goch, Rees, Geunep and others. 4. The pilgrim churches of EMDEN.

The Belgian Province "under the cross," extended from Northern France to North Holland and West Friesland, and consisted of four Classes—Braband, German Flanders, Welsh Flanders, and Holland,

The English Province was not yet arranged.

In these smaller Synods or Classes they first elected a President, then one preached a sermon, which was discussed by the rest. Then followed a careful visitation of the congregation, in the midst of which they had met. Then followed action on any business presented; discussion of such important points as were suggested by the President; and lastly the election of delegates to the Provincial Synod, a like number of ministers and elders. In the Provincial Synods they acted first on matters of Doctrine, second on Discipline, and then on Miscellaneous matters.* Such was the system of government which was inaugurated at the Synod of Emden, and which proved a great power for good in all the regions over which it extended then, and spread afterwards.

Whilst the pilgrim congregations in the bounds of the Palatinate, were thus brought under regular Presbyterial Classical and Synodical Church government, the same system made slow progress in the native churches of that principality after Frederick III. passed over into the Reformed Church, 1560, and published the Heidelberg Catechism, 1563. Olevianus could at first succeed no further than to effect the organization of Synods composed of ministers without elders. Congregations were still without elders, and the discipline was in the hands of the State. Still, after long and careful examination, Frederick yielded to the views and wishes of Olevianus, and in 1570, by his direction, but amidst strong opposition from the opposite party, presbyterial boards were instituted in all congregations, and the government and discipline of the Church explicitly entrusted to them. These presbyters, called from the chief feature of their calling, censors, were, however, not elected by the congregations, but appointed for life by the higher ecclesiastical authorities. Even this proved a decided blessing in the government of the churches, though it was far from the true ideal of the Presbyterian system.

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* See Gœbel's Gesch. des Christ. Lebens. Vol. I, pp. 311–318.

As the Reformation progressed and native Reformed congregations were formed in the Rhine Provinces they became more and more united with the congregations of the refugee Churches, and during the period between the first Synod of Emden, 1571, and 1610, they together stood under the care of the General Belgian or Netherland synod. But the Reformation advanced in the interesting Rhine country, and after many reverses and trials endured by the Reformed on this battle ground of the faith, the set time for a general organization of the Reformed Churches in that region came.

In 1609 the government of these Provinces, which had for the last thirty years been strictly Roman Catholic, changed into hands favorable to the Reformation, in the persons of the Statthalters of Brandenburg and Pfaltz-Newburg, who began to rule under a union effected by Hessian intervention in 1609. In 1609, the same year in which he became ruler, the Statthalter, Margrave Ernst, of Brandenburg, received the holy communion in the Reformed church in Wesel, and under his protection and through his influence, the Reformed congregations in the three principalities of Julich, Cleve and Berg, were organized into a General Synod, 1610, in order by its care "to further these countries in the knowledge of the true religion for which a blessed door had been opened in the providence of God." To the General Synod of these three Provinces, a fourth Provincial Synod, that namely of Mark, was united in 1611. Thus was constituted a Synodical organization, including four provincial Synods, which, from that time on, during a period of over two hundred years formed a firm and indissoluble bond of union for the Reformed Church in the lower Rhine Provinces. It endured firmly, especially during the first years, many fires of persecution, as in 1614, 1616, 1622, 1623, 1625, and so at a little longer intervals through the whole century.

This effected, Palsgrave Wolfgang William found occasion for dissatisfaction. In conscious opposition against this Reformed General Synod, he called in 1612, Lutheran General Synods in the four Provinces of Julich, Cleve, Mark, and Ravensburg, yet not at one place, but each one by itself, in Julich, Dinslaken, Unna, and Bielfeld. Thus was the division, which was hitherto not outwardly marked between the two evangelical confessions, effected and established for the following two centuries, till it began to yield again toward the end of the last century, when appear the beginnings of the Union formed by these Synods.*

The Reformed General Synod thus organized in the Rhine Provinces, held its meetings very regularly for two hundred years. The first four meetings were held some time apart, on account of tumultuous times—thus, 1610, 1611, 1619, 1622, 1633—but from this last date regularly.

This system of Church government in the Rhine Provinces was a most wise and perfect organization, realizing perhaps as nearly as may be the true ideal of what is called the Presbyterian idea; and it has been to the Reformed Church in all subsequent time, and in all countries, as a model. From its General Synod the power of government descended in beautiful gradation and attenuation through the Provincial Synods, and their subordinate Classes and Consistories, to the individual member—uniting, in a way that made all bondage impossible, the firmest authority with the very highest freedom—the freedom under law.

The congregation, or church, as they were wont to call it, was governed by the presbytery, or body of elders, with the pastor as president, at that time, as now in America, after the habit of the French churches, called the Consistory. The selection of Elders was always conducted in connection with prayer; the first time by the Inspector of Classis, and thus under its direction and with its consent, and in the presence of the most prominent members of the congregation—and afterwards, according to the custom of the congregation, generally by the Elders themselves, or also by the members of the congregation from a double number which had been nominated by the Elders. The Consistory met once, and in some cases twice a month. The Deacons stood under the Elders, and were elected in the same manner as the Elders themselves. The minister was elected either by the whole congregation or by its deputies, or, in some cases, by the Elders alone, who in this important matter called in those of the congregation who had previously served as Elders, and thus formed the "great council." The direction and consent of the Classis were always necessary—in many cases it nominated three, out of which the selection had to be made. In the large towns the civil authorities at first claimed the right of a voice in the election of pastors, but this was earnestly resisted by Classes and Synods, till at length, after much controversy, the General Synod in 1683 decided that selection belongs *juris divini* to the congregations, and steadfastly refused to examine and ordain any candidates who were not so elected.

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* Gœbel. Vol. II, pp. 20, 21.

The single congregation, with its consistory, was, however, not independent. "Presbyterianism," says Gœbel, "is the natural and deadly foe of Independency." Hence the congregation never appears as a self-existing whole, but only as a member and part of a higher unity in the General Synod, through Classis and the Provisional Synod. These sub-Synods, of which there were four, were each divided into three Classes or district Synods, as they were also sometimes called, to which each congregation sent one minister (even if it had more) and one elder. Through these subordinate bodies the unity and the power rises, and becomes complete and final in the General Synod. Hence, at the close of the very first General Synod, it was decreed: "That no one shall be at liberty, in any way, to oppose or change anything which is here determined and decided, either in presbyterio, classico-conventu, or provinciali Synodo, unless it is first so resolved by the General Synod."* Hence, it was law, that the properly attested credentials which every minister and elder was required each time to bring from the Consistory, must distinctly declare that the congregation, Classis, or provincial Synod sending, submits itself beforehand to all the legal decisions that should be made. So strictly was this principle adhered to that a violation of it, or a refusal to submit to it, was followed by suspension or exclusion, be it minister or congregation. To the Provincial Synods of Cleve and Mark, their Classes always sent six delegates each, four ministers and two elders; whilst in the much more vigorous Classes under the Synods of Julich and Berg, the congregations "under the cross" held to their custom of sending a delegation from each congregation. This was not denied them; and in the fact, as Gœbel has well said, "we behold how freedom reigned with order, and unity in diversity, in the Reformed Church of the Rhine provinces." The General Synod, which met every three years, was constituted of six delegates from each of the four provincial Synods.

A representation of the Eldership in the Judicatories was positively required. If a minister appeared in Classis or Synod without his Elder, the congregation was censured, or the minister himself not admitted into the body. Only later, in 1750, some Synods made exceptions in favor of poor congregations, allowing them to send their minister alone. There appears no distinction between the min-. isters and elders, as to authority in all the synodical acts They spoke of one another as "brethren-ministers," and "brethren-elders." The President was elected at each meeting of the body, and he held the office of

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* Gœbel. Vol. II, p. 82.

Inspector till the next following meeting. As such he had the oversight of his Classis or Synod during his term—the representative of the Judicatory to the churches, by its authority and choice for the time being made chief among equals.

Since 1674 it has been the beautiful and excellent custom, on the Sabbath preceding the assembly of the Classes or Synods, in all the churches earnestly to offer up public prayer for divine assistance, and the grace of the Holy Spirit, in these councils of the Church.

A brief sketch of the manner in which business was conducted in the Synod belongs to our subject, and shall here be abridged from Gœbel. It was opened by the President of the previous year, by greeting the members, making a brief address, and offering prayer. Then the credentials of the delegates were handed in and read, new members received, the case of such as were absent, or who had come too late, disposed of and the representatives from other Synods to "keep up brotherly correspondence," recognized. Then a preparatory censura morum ratione eligibilitatis was held in order to ascertain whether any of the ministers present had in any way by his conduct rendered himself ineligible to the office of President. Gœbel says he has met with only two instances in which the eligibility of ministers was disputed,—and in 1670, when the Labadist Nethemis unsuccessfully disputed the eligibility of another, and in 1737, when the Elders of the Reformed congregation of Elberfeld opposed that of the grandfather of Schliermacher because he was under censure of the Presbytery on account of Ronsdorfian errors. This matter over, the election for President was held. The newly elected President offered prayer and made an address, in which he thanked the retiring President for his faithfulness and labor of love in his official position. Then the members of Synod all took the vow of loyal adherence to the doctrines of the word of God, as set forth in the Heidelberg Catechism, and pledged to one another "with mouth and hand" to continue in the truth by doctrine and life. Then began the regular business of Synod, in which, according to a standing custom, all pastors present who were not delegates, were invitea alsot o participate.

In the Classical meetings the same mutual vow and pledge was given at the beginning, after which inquiry was made of the deputies of the congregations as to the state of things among them, in regard to the preaching of the gospel, administration of the holy sacraments, holding of consistorial meetings, the exercise of church discipline, catechization, family visitation, visitation of the sick, care of the poor, supervision of the schools, and the life of ministers, elders, and members; whereupon, says Gœbel, the Protocols generally read: "that, God be praised, all these things are in a pretty good condition." Yet exceptions are also constantly recorded.

At the Provincial Synods, the first business was reading the minutes of the previous meeting, also those of the Classes, of the other three provincial Synods, and those of the General Synod, and all points requiring attention discussed and acted upon. These Synods generally continued three days. On the second day of the session the Synodical Sermon was preached, which service since 1662, was accompanied by the celebration of the Lord's Supper, in which all the members of Synod participated. The Synodical Sermon was less designed for the practical benefit of the hearers than for the examination of the ministers; on this account one of the younger or newer members was appointed to preach the sermon, which was afterwards made the subject of a discussion, before the Synod by ministers and elders, and thus became the occasion for examining points of doctrine, which not only served to try the preacher's orthodoxy, but also indirectly served to benefit all the ministers who engaged in or listened to the discussion. Finally, under the head of "Imposita," Synod took up the election of delegates to corresponding bodies, delegates to the General Synod, the synodical preacher, the place of next meeting, the reception of such candidates as had been examined by the Classes, the appointing of the Inspectors named by the Classes. Then such requests and complaints as may have been sent in from civil officers and councils, were considered under the title "Gravamina." Then came censura morum, if action in this matter was not, as was generally done, "for this time omitted and sent back to the Classes." Under this head each minister and elder was examined, as well in regard to his life in general, as also his conduct during Synod, receiving a brotherly exhortation and warning, "The brethren also mutually exhorted one another to greater love and meekness." Finally, as "Annexa" follow financial settlements, the concluding prayer, dismission of the Synod, and signing of the proceedings.

Such is a brief account of the presbyterial, classical, and synodical arrangements, as they existed in the lower Rhine Westphalian Reformed Church, in part, since 1571, and in whole, since 1610, down to the time of the evangelical union, a period of over two hundred years.

It would have been inconvenient for us to interrupt the course of our narrative, of the rise and progress of the Reformed form of Church government in the various provinces of the Continent, to notice the introduction of the same polity in England and Scotland. This shall now be briefly done.

The Presbyterian Church of England was formed after the model of the Reformed Churches of the Continent. At the accession of Mary, 1554, John Knox fled from England to the Continent, visited Frankfort, Geneva, and various parts of Switzerland, profiting greatly by the counsels of Calvin. In 1555, he was pastor at Frankfort for a time, but returned to England that same year. In 1556, he was elected as pastor by the English exiles of Geneva, the city of Calvin, which he accepted, and now removed his family to that city. Whilst at Geneva, "although he was now fifty years of age, he devoted himself to study, under Calvin, with youthful ardor."* In 1559, having spent about three years at Geneva, he returned to his native land, and now began effectually to establish the Reformation there. It may be truly said, for history will verify the assertion, that what was good in the system of Knox, both as relates to doctrine and Church government, he had brought from the Reformed Church of the Continent, and what was semi-political and radical was his own. This is not the place to show how Calvin himself, with the greatest respect for Knox, yet protested against many of his radical tendencies. A single quotation from Dr. Henry's Life of Calvin in reference to Knox, is sufficient to our present purpose: "He was a powerful instrument in diffusing the principles of Calvinism in England, Scotland, and even to a still wider extent; but we must carefully keep in view the circumstances by which they were distinguished. Knox was the founder of the Scotch Presbyterian Church, from which arose the rude, fierce spirits of a subsequent period. He it was who confounded the holy cause of truth with the interests of a political party; who impressed upon the Protestant Church in England its peculiar outward character; and who, in this not apostolic, aroused a power which was afterwards to exercise so mighty and destructive an influence."*

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* Henry's Life of Calvin. Vol. II, p. 339.

The Church of Scotland framed its Confession of Faith, and its First Book of Discipline, and met, in its first General Assembly for its own government, in August, 1560. Dr. Henry says, that in this Book of Discipline set forth by Knox, "he shows his admiration of the rules followed at Geneva, and wrought out the system at full. Calvin had the delight to be made acquainted with this glorious progress of his plan, with this triumph of his doctrine and his discipline."†

Thus was the continental and proper Reformed system of Presbyterian Church government adopted and inaugurated in Scotland; and the Presbyterian Church in the English nation was thus a later branch of the Reformed Church. What a pity that, as it owed its establishment to that source, it did not also remain ecclesiastically in union with the mother Church. It was the earnest desire of Calvin, and others of the Reformers of the Continent, that all the Provincial Reformed Churches should be united in an ecclesiastical bond that should transcend national divisions, and differences of language. This great desire, however, was not realized. The English branch of the Reformed Church remained outwardly separate, and still holds that position both in England and America.

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* Vol. II, p. 327. † Idem, p. 331,

The first organization under an ecclesiastical judicatory of the Presbyterian emigrants in this country was the Presbytery of Philadelphia, 1706. It consisted of seven ministers. In 1716, this Presbytery was divided into "four subordinate meetings or presbyteries," and these united in the "Synod of Philadelphia," which was thus formed, holding its first meeting in Philadelphia, September 17th, 1717, composed of thirteen ministers and six elders. It is worthy of remark, that in the organization of the Presbyterian Church in this country there was no precise modelling after the Presbyterian Branch of the Reformed Church in Scotland, but the Reformed polity, in a wider sense, was very properly kept in view and made the basis of its construction. This is evident from the synodical acts of 1721, where it is declared that the Presbyterians in America had exercised the Presbyterian government and discipline, according to the practice of "*the best Reformed Churches, as far as the nature and constitution of this country will allow.*" Thus this one of the grand-daughters of the Reformed Church, as we may express it, did not merely look to a single Reformed daughter, but very wisely took new counsel of the venerable mother herself.

The first organization of the Presbyterian Presbyteries and Synods in a General Assembly, was effected in 1789. It was sundered into Old and New School in 1838—the Old School Assembly retaining the power of a final judicatory, and the New School surrendering it, and becoming only an advisory body, whilst final power was granted to the Synods—which must be regarded as a virtual abrogation of that which forms the crowning perfection of the Reformed form of Church government, and is an entire departure from all the precedents of the Reformed polity.

It was on the Reformed side of the reformation that a free structure of ecclesiastical government received its earliest and noblest development. The Lutherans, in their theories of Church government, adhered longer to the old system of the Church from which they reformed, and then later, to the State to which they looked for the help needed in this respect.

It is necessary here, along side of what has been presented in regard to the Reformed system, to give also some account of the Lutheran polity. This we prefer doing, in part, in the words of Dr. Henry in his Life of Calvin.

"That it cost Luther, who was the first to set himself in opposition to the hierarchy, no slight trouble to acquire any clear notion of the Church, and of its relation to the State, is evident from the indefiniteness of his views. Melanchthon gave a far better representation of the Church in his 'Apology.' Thus, in contradistinction to the Catholic Church, he describes the true Church of Christ as the congregation of saints, bound together by the same faith in Christ, and whose communion with each other is declared by their joining in the same confession, and participating in the same sacraments. The visible, political union of God's people in the Old Testament, was a type of the future spiritual polity. The form of the outward constitution was a matter of indifference to the German reformers. The *politia externa* might exist under a variety of forms if it did but uphold the kingdom of God. Hence they did not reject, as Calvin and the Swiss, the Catholic constitution. They believed that they ought to preserve it, in so far as they could do so consistently with the Gospel. Thus it happened that they held no definite views on the rights of the Church, and would willingly have retained the Catholic system, had the bishops submitted to be reformed. But as these dignitaries resisted such attempts, and the Church was no longer subjected to their authority, the reformers gave their support to the temporal government, that they might obtain in return the aid of its support. Thus they allowed it to change the constitution of the Churches, when the interests of the Gospel required it, and their officers neglected to do it themselves. Hence the earlier forms originated with the civil power, and the latter acquired ecclesiastical authority by the further development of the reformation. As early as the year 1520, Luther called upon the emperor and the nobility to aid the reformation, and thus to establish the Church by means of the temporal power. Subsequently, as he gave no peculiar form of government to the Church, he was led, in his perplexity, to desire that the civil magistrates would act more decidedly, and that the government might refuse to tolerate vain doctrine, though it did not compel confession. He also advised the banishment of heretics, but not their capital punishment, in the infliction of which the civil power might go too far. After the death of Frederic the Wise, he felt still more evidently the insufficiency of his earlier views. "If on the one side, we limit and define, it is then taken advantage of; a law is necessarily introduced, and opposed to the freedom of belief; if, on the other, nothing is determined, men rush on, and make as many factions as there are heads, and thus both the Christian simplicity and the Christian union, of which St. Paul and St. Peter speak, are destroyed."

In 1527, when the great Church-visitation in the electorate of Saxony was brought to a close, Luther wrote in the preface of the Visitation-articles, drawn up by Melanchthon,—"Although the electors are not called upon to teach or govern in a spiritual capacity, still they are bound, even as temporal rulers, to prevent schisms, factions, and disturbances; even as the emperor Constantine summoned the bishops of Nicaea, because he neither would nor could suffer the Schism which Arius had created among the Christians, but constrained them to unity of doctrine and belief."

But after making some few statements of his opinion, Luther seems to have left the whole matter, of the relation of the State to the Church, and of their respective rights, to be settled by his followers. Instead of a mixed tribunal of laity and clergy being instituted, as in Geneva, to settle the questions in debate, superintendents were appointed. At the very first Church-visitation they received full authority to watch over churches and schools, to provide for the defence of pure doctrine, of outward order, of church property, and, further, to determine disputes respecting marriages. But as this arrangement was not found sufficient, a spiritual tribunal was established, first at Wittenberg, through the chancellor Brück, and which consisted of two spiritual and two lay councillors. During Luther's lifetime, that is, in 1542, the elector, John Frederic, employed the Wittenberg theologians and three jurists to draw up a constitution for this tribunal.

The principles of the Lutheran Church government, as contrasted with those of the Calvinistic, are seen in the so-called Wittenberg reformation of 1545, the last and the most striking exhibition of the views of the Saxon divines on Church polity.

Among other things, it is said of bishops :—" A certain variety of ranks is necessary among the servants of the Church; for unless all had the same gifts, the wiser must exercise inspection over the weak. If the existing bishops would cease from their enmity to the Gospel, and embrace the true doctrine, we might patiently endure their authority. Their aim would then necessarily be, either to preach the Gospel themselves, or to have it preached by faithful men. They would exercise by their visitations a control over the doctrine of the Church, would hold ecclesiastical sessions, and sometimes synods, and would take care of both the higher and lower schools. With regard to the choice of bishops, it seems best that it should remain as before, in the hands of the supreme colleges or chapters, and that where the princes have certain rights they should still retain them. For if an attempt should be made to restore the old practice of electing bishops by the votes of the whole people, or of the chief men of all ranks, let us remember that this mode of electing them excited, in ancient times, the greatest tumults in Asia, in Greece, and Italy; and were it practiced in Germany, it would produce still more fearful consequences."

In the fourth section, on church-tribunals, it is said,—"God has committed the sword to the magistrate to uphold discipline and respect; and He has also established an ecclesiastical tribunal, which has not the power of life and death, but that of excluding from church privileges and communion." Subsequently, and with good reason, disputes concerning marriages were referred to this tribunal, so many questions of conscience arising therefrom. These questions had often been found too difficult and perplexed to be resolved by individual pastors: it was, therefore, determined to establish consistories, at convenient distances, in every diocese, before which matrimonial disputes might be settled in a Christian spirit.

The clergy of every place were to admonish all who had fallen into sin or error. If they did not improve, they were to be cited before the consistory, in order, if found guilty, to be punished. This was the case when offences had been committed of which the civil magistrate took no cognizance; as for example, if any one published false doctrine, spoke scornfully of the Gospel or the Sacraments; if he neglected for a whole year to make confession, or to partake of the Lord's Supper; if he reviled his pastor, or any other servant of God; if he lived in open adultery, or lent his money on usury, or was disobedient to his parents, or indulged in intemperance or gambling. In any of these cases, the consistories were to pronounce sentence of excommunication, and to send an account of the sentence thus passed to the parish in which the offender dwelt: there the instrument was to be read from the pulpit, or to be nailed to the church door. Should the offender despise this proceeding against him, he might, under certain circumstances, be punished by the temporal power.

According to the views of the Saxon reformers, the true

Church, agreeably to its proper nature, was an object of belief, but never perfect on earth. Without separating, however, the invisible from the visible Church, the kingdom of the Gospel is ever to be viewed as distinct from the kingdom of the law, and therefore as independent of the latter. But the Church may require in times of necessity protection of the State. This, Christian magistrates owe exclusively to the Christian faith ; and hence there is naturally an internal bond of union between the temporal and ecclesiastical power.

That Luther was unwilling to introduce, as Calvin did, constitutional forms arose from the conviction that the steps by which the enlightenment of the German people advanced, did not agree with the establishment of such forms. He thus expressed his anxiety, "that factions might not spring therefrom ; for the Germans are a wild, rude, turbulent people, with whom it is not easy to begin anything, unless there be the pressure of the greatest necessity."*

Philip of Hesse made the experiment in 1526 of a free constitution, but without finding any imitator. The principles of this constitution were indeed far more republican than the Calvinistic system. Every district was entire in itself, and had the right to choose its own bishop (or pastor), and to depose him. An assembly of laymen and ministers was held every week, in which the conduct of every one, the bishop included, was proved and judged ; but the whole congregation only could excommunicate. Marriage causes were tried in each district by the bishop and experienced assistants. Excommunication was inflicted for spiritual offences only, but it carried with it the loss of all civil rights. The churches were united together by a Synod, which assembled yearly at Marburg. Every bishop was to be accompanied by a lay deputy. The sovereign, the higher and lower nobility, in case they were present, and the bishops and lay deputies, had all the right of voting.

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* Walch x, 272. Compare also Tholuck, Litter. Anzeiger, 1832, p. 478.

The Synod tried, approved, or annulled the deposition of any bishop which might have taken place in this community. "In different cases the parishes might appeal to the Synod, but its decisions had no power except that which they derived from their intrinsic worth." The Synod of Hamberg and Lambert of Avignon rejected this constitution. Essential alterations, however, were soon necessarily introduced into this system of Church polity, which brought to light its unfitness for the times. The German communities would probably not have been opposed to such a constitution, if it had been less republican, and had it been introduced by degrees, and not suddenly. Calvin had to struggle for twenty years for his 'Institute,' and had to educate a new people for himself. Luther also wished to arm himself with the right of excommunication, but had not the courage to introduce it. In his last sermon on confession, preached at Wittenberg in 1522,* (on the occasion of the Carlstadt disturbance), he says "Christ says of confession, 'If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone,' (Matth. 18: 16); and if the offender would not abstain from his sin and humble himself, the minister was to separate him from the whole congregation, and put him under ban, till he repented and was again received. It would be a Christian work to restore this discipline, were it possible, but I cannot trust myself alone to establish it." A sterner system of discipline, such a one as was not introduced till after his death, would have saved Luther many annoyances. He comforted himself with the hope, that the improved state of the Church would of itself bring about a better form of government."†

Gœbel, speaking of the Lutheran Church of Westphalia, says: "In the form of government the true Lutheran view ever manifested itself in the establishing of an inward and inseparable union of State and Church, so that everywhere the civil government as such, constituted and ruled the

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* Sermon vom Bann, bei Walch, 20: p. 1099.

† Henry's Life of Calvin, pp. 396–400.

Church, without however having the privilege, in any way, to interfere with the doctrines of the ministers. Church discipline, also, was not exercised by an authority from the congregation, and in its name, but was in the hands of the civil authorities, and exercised in a civilly legal way from the stand-point of citizenship. The separation, or holding apart, of clergy and laity, pastor and congregations, without further intervention of presbyters, or elders, which has its foundation in the Lutheran doctrine and cultus, manifested itself also in Westphalia after the effort to introduce there the Reformed Presbyterial and Synodical system, since—what is very significant—there were at most only *advisory* Synods or Ministerii, and not such as had final power of decision, established ; and into these there were seldom or never any Elders admitted."

To trace the future developments of the Lutheran ideas of Church government, would lead us too far out of our way. It is enough for our purpose to have shown that in its first principles it had nothing in common with that of the Reformed polity, toward which, however, it inclined more and more.

In America the first Lutheran Synod was organized August 14th, 1748, with lay delegates. "In the different kingdoms and provinces of Europe, their systems of ecclesiastical government, are very various and inefficient ; in no section retaining strictly the principle of ministerial parity, with perfect freedom from State control."* In this country the government adopted by the Lutheran Church is in the main the Reformed system. Its consistories, conferences, and synods, all admit representation by Elders. Unlike the Reformed, however, their General Synod organized in 1820, "is only *advisory*, and therefore bears most analogy to the consociations of the congregational churches of New England."† Thus it stops short of the full Reformed system, and the authority disperses where it ought to culminate. It is remarkable that Dr. Alexander of

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* Dr, Schmucker, in History of All Denominations, p. 333.

† Dr. Schmucker's Theology. p. 186.

Princeton (as quoted by Dr. Schmucker), in his "plan proposed for the reorganization of the Presbyterian Church, on the occasion of the recent convulsions in that body, is exactly similar in all its principal lineaments to the Lutheran system, as practised in this country by the Synods connected with the General Synod—" namely," that the General Assembly should have only *advisory* power, and their Synods, each for its own district, that final judicial power now possessed by the General Assembly. The New School body adopted this principle.‡ Strange that Dr. Alexander should not have seen that to disrobe the General Synod of its superior power, is to cut off the head of the Presbyterial system ; because here only does its true sense become complete.

Unfortunately hitherto the Lutheran Church in this country has not been able to attain to unity and uniformity under one perfected system of government. Of the state of the Church previous to the formation of the General Synod in 1820, Dr. Schmucker says: "Prior to this era, the Church had gradually become divided into five or six different, distant, and unconnected Synods. Having no intercourse with each other, these several portions became more or less estranged, and lost all the advantages of mutual consultation, confidence, and coöperation." The organization of the General Synod was a noble movement in the right direction; but it encountered many difficulties. Two years after its organization the largest and oldest of the district Synods, that of Pennsylvania, withdrew, and has only within a few years united again. Other Synods have not yet come into the union, and of course the difficulty of uniting them indicates a variety of sentiment as well on the subject of Church government as on points of doctrine. "This system of Church government," says Dr. Schmucker in the History of all Denominations, 1844, "is not yet adopted by all our Synods; yet its general features, with perhaps a greater admixture of congregationalism, substantially pervades those Synods also which have not yet united with the General Synod." Since then, however, the General Synod has made progress; and yet simultaneously with this movement, in the way of closer ecclesiastical union, there have arisen Lutheran organizations, chiefly composed of European emigrant churches, who refuse to come into a general union, and whose ideas of Church Government are in an opposite direction from congregationalism. As life is deeper than form, and doctrine before government, the Lutheran Church in America has earnest problems of faith to adjust and harmonize in its bosom, on the successful accomplishment of which all hope of its unity must depend. The organization of the General Synod is a testimony in the right direction, which may in this way also truly become a higher power.

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‡ "The Synod is the court of the last resort in all cases of a judicial nature, so that the whole appellate jurisdiction of the Church is limited to its final decision as a PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ; having supreme control in its own appropriate sphere, though subordinate to the General Assembly, as to the review and constitutional oversight of its acts."

"It (the General Assembly) is not necesarry to Presbyterian government, nor is any court higher than the Presbytery, but it has the advantage of representing all the congregations in one body."

"Since the Session of 1840, the Assembly exercises no judicial power, as it had formerly done, the Synod now being the highest court of appeal."—*Rev. Joel Parker, D. D., in History of All Denominations*, pp. 487, 488.

The organization of the German Reformed Synod in America took place nearly a year anterior to that of the Lutheran, namely September 29th, 1747. The German Reformed congregations being confined to the regions East of the Allegheny mountains, and mostly to Pennsylvania, the Synod remained one body till the year 1819, when it was, by its own action, divided into eight districts, or Classes. In 1819, the Classis of Ohio was formed, and in 1824 this body was organized into the "Synod of Ohio," with three subordinate district Synods. In 1836 the Classis of Western Pennsylvania obtained permission to unite with the Synod of Ohio, when it became "The Synod of Ohio and adjacent States." Still later the district Synods were dissolved, and the whole territory divided into Classes, under the one Synod. The two Synods are mutually represented in each other's meetings by delegates, having all the power of the other members. It is yet necessary that these two Synods, and others which will undoubtedly spring up farther West, should be made subordinate to a still higher body uniting the representation and authority of all. As the extension of the Church has created the necessity, so the subject has already engaged initiatory consideration.

The German Reformed Church in America is organized on the true Reformed system of Church government. Pastors and Elders and Deacons are elected by the members, the Pastors being ordained by the Classes, the Elders and Deacons by the Pastors. The Pastor, Elders and Deacons form the Consistory, of which the Pastor is ex-officio President. By this body the congregation is governed,—but under the supervision of the next higher body, the Classis. The Classis is constituted by the Pastor and Elder from each congregation in its bounds. The Classis has power over the ministers, consistories, and churches under its care—but is itself under the supervision of the Synod. The Synod is composed of delegates from the Classes, the basis of representation being this: If a Classis has from three to six ministers it can send one minister and one elder to Synod—if it has from seven to twelve, two—if from thirteen to eighteen, three—and in the same proportion for any larger number. In the Synod rests the final power.

The consistories meet regularly, once a month, or, as in some congregations, at the call of the president whenever business requires its counsel. The Classes meet once a year, in the spring; and Synod once a year in Autumn.

In this system of government the members of the Church by their vote, are represented, in a gradual and well ordered ascending scale through the subordinate bodies, in the Synod where the authority which governs them culminates and from which it comes back to them as the "higher power." Thus freedom and authority are made one, each being conserved by the other.

The government of the Dutch Reformed Church in America is of course the same. Initiatory steps towards its Synodical organization in this country were taken as early as 1737; but the end was not fully reached till September 14th, 1747—just fifteen days prior to the organization of the Synod of the German Reformed Church.[*]

H. H.

Lancaster, Pa.

ART. II.—GNOSTICISM.

GNOSIS denotes in general all more profound philosophical or religious knowledge, in distinction from superficial opinion or blind belief. The New Testament itself, however, makes a plain distinction between true and false gnosis. The true consists in a deep insight of the essence and structure of the Christian truth, springs from faith, is accompanied by the cardinal virtues of love and humility, serves to edify the Church, and belongs among the spiritual gifts wrought by the Holy Ghost.[*] The false gnosis,[†] on the contrary, against which Paul warns Timothy, and which he censures in the Corinthians, is a morbid pride of wisdom, an arrogant, self-conceited, ambitious knowledge, which puffs up, instead of edifying,[‡] runs into idle subtleties and disputes, and verifies in its course the apostle's word: "professing themselves to be wise, they became fools."[||]

In this bad sense the word applies to that strange and wonderful system of error, which began to reveal itself already in the days of St. Paul and St. John, and which in the second century, under various schools and parties, spread over the whole Church, threatening to corrupt

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[*] See Life of Rev. Michael Schlatter, pp. 51–56.

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[*] Λογος γνωσεως, λογος σοφιας, 1 Cor. 12 : 8. Comp. 13 : 2, 12. Jno. 17 : 3.
[†] Ψευδωνυμος γνωσις, 1. Tim. 6 : 20. [‡] 1 Cor. 8: 1. [||] Rom. 1 : 22.

Christianity by foreign speculation and to resolve its real mysteries into phantastic dreams of the imagination. The ancient Gnosticism rests on an overvaluation of knowledge or gnosis, and a depreciation of faith or pistis. The Gnostics contrasted themselves by this name with the Pistics, or the mass of believing Christians. They regarded Christianity as consisting essentially in knowledge alone; fancied themselves the sole possessors of an esoteric, philosophical religion, which made them genuine spiritual men; and looked down with contempt upon the mere men of the soul and of the body. They moreover adulterated Christianity with sundry elements entirely foreign, and thus quite obscured the true essence of the Gospel.

As to its substance, Gnosticism is chiefly of heathen descent. It is a peculiar translation or transfusion of the heathen philosophy and religion into Christianity. This was perceived by the Church fathers in their day. Hippolytus particularly, in his lately discovered "Philosophoumena," endeavors to trace the Gnostic heresies to the various systems of Greek philosophy, making Simon Magus, for example, dependent on Heraclitus, Valentine on Pythagorus and Plato, Basilides on Aristotle, Marcion on Empedocles; and hence, in his work, he first exhibits the doctrines of the Greek philosophy from Thales down. Of all these systems Platonism had the greatest influence, especially on the Alexandrian Gnostics; though not so much in its original Hellenic form, as in its later orientalized eclectic and mystic cast, of which Neo-Platonism was another fruit. The Platonic speculation yielded the germs of the Gnostic doctrine of aeons, the conceptions of matter, of the antithesis of an ideal and a real world, of an antemundane fall of souls from the ideal world, of the origin of sin from matter, and of the needed redemption of the soul from the fetters of the body. We find also in the Gnostics traces of the Pythagorean symbolical use of numbers, the Stoic physics and ethics, and some Aristotelian elements.

But this reference to Hellenic philosophy, with which Massuet was content, is not enough. Since Beausobre and

Mosheim, the East has been rightly joined with Greece, as the native home of this heresy. This may be inferred from the mystic, fantastic, enigmatic form of the Gnostic speculation, and from the fact, that most of its representatives sprang from Egypt and Syria. The conquests of Alexander, the spread of the Greek language and literature, and especially Christianity, produced a mighty agitation in the Eastern mind, which re-acted on the West. Gnosticism has accordingly been regarded as more or less parallel with the heretical forms of Judaism, with Essenism, Therapeutism, Philo's philosophico-religious system, and with the Cabbala, the origin of which probably dates as far back as the first century. The affinity of Gnosticism also with the Zoroastrian dualism of a kingdom of light and a kingdom of darkness, is unmistakable, especially in the Syrian Gnostics. Its alliance with the pantheistic, docetistic, and ascetic elements of Buddhism, which had advanced at the time of Christ to Western Asia, is equally plain. Parsic and Indian influence is most evident in Manichaeism, while the Hellenic element there amounts to very little.

Gnosticism, with its syncretistic tendency, is no isolated fact. It struck its roots deep in the mighty revolution of ideas induced by the fall of the old religions and the triumph of the new. Philo, in his time, endeavored to combine the Jewish religion, by allegorical exposition, or rather imposition, with Platonic philosophy; and this system, according as it should be prosecuted under the Christian or the heathen influence, might produce either the speculative theology of the Alexandrian Church fathers, or the heretical Gnosis. Still more nearly akin to Gnosticism is Neo-Platonism, which arose a little later than Philo's system, ignored Judaism, and in its stead employed the more of Eastern and Western heathenism.

The Gnostic syncretism, however, differs materially from both the Philonic and the Neo-Platonic by taking up Christianity, of which Philo was wholly ignorant, and which the Neo-Platonists directly or indirectly opposed. This the Gnostics regarded as the highest stage of the development of religion, though they so corrupted it by the admixture of foreign matter, as to destroy its identity.

Gnosticism is, therefore, the grandest and most comprehensive form of speculative religious syncretism known to history. It consists of Oriental mysticism, Greek philosophy, Alexandrian Philonic and Cabbalistic Judaism, and Christian ideas of salvation, not merely mechanically compiled, but, as it were, mechanically combined. At least in its fairly developed form in the Valentinian system, it is, in its way, a wonderful structure of speculative or rather intuitive thought, and at the same time an artistic work of the creative fancy, a Christian mythological epic. The old world here rallied all its energies, to make out of its diverse elements some new thing, and to oppose to the real, substantial universalism of the Catholic Church an ideal, shadowy universalism of speculation. But this fusion of all systems served in the end only to hasten the dissolution of Eastern and Western heathenism, while the Christian element came forth purified and strengthened from the crucible.

To their speculative zeal the Gnostics, at least in some cases, added a practical moral feeling, a sense of sin, stimulated by Christianity, but overstrained, so as to lead them, in bold contrast with the pagan deification of nature, to ascribe nature to the devil, to abhor the body as the seat of evil, and to practice, therefore, extreme austerities upon themselves. This practical feature is made prominent by Möhler, the Roman Catholic divine. But Möhler goes quite too far, when he derives the whole phenomenon of Gnosticism (which he wrongly views as a forerunner of Protestantism) directly and immediately from Christianity. He represents it as a hyper-christianity, an exaggerated contempt for the world, which, when seeking for itself a speculative basis, gathered from older philosophemes, theosophies, and mythologies all it could use for its purpose.

The flourishing period of the Gnostic schools was the second century. In the sixth century only faint traces of them remained; yet some Gnostic and especially Manichaean ideas continue to appear in several heretical sects of the Middle Ages, such as the Priscillianists, the Paulicians, the Bogomiles, and the Catharists ; and even the history of modern theological and philosophical speculation, at least in Germany, (think of Hegel, Strauss and the Tübingen school,) shows kindred tendencies.

The number of the Gnostics it is impossible to ascertain. We find them in almost all portions of the ancient Church; chiefly where Christianity came into close contact with Judaism and heathenism, as in Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor ; then in Rome, the rendezvous of all forms of truth and falsehood ; in Gaul, where they were opposed by Irenaeus, and in Africa, where they were attacked by Tertullian and afterwards by Augustine, who was himself a Manichaean for several years. They found most favor with the educated, and threatened to lead astray the teachers of the Church. But they could gain no foothold among the people ; indeed, as esoterics, they stood aloof from the masses ; and their philosophical societies were no doubt rarely as large as the Catholic congregations.

We now proceed to give a succinct analysis of the system of Gnosticism as a whole.

Gnosticism is a heretical philosophy of religion, or more exactly, a mythological theosophy, which reflects intellectually the peculiar fermenting state of that remarkable age of transition from the heathen to the Christian order of things. If it were merely an unintelligible congeries of puerile absurdities and impious blasphemies, as it is grotesquely portrayed by older historians, it could not have fascinated so many vigorous intellects and produced such a long continued agitation in the ancient Church. It is an attempt to solve some of the deepest metaphysical and theological questions. It deals with the great antitheses of God and world, spirit and matter, idea and phenomenon ; and endeavors to solve the deep problem of the origin of evil,* and the whole question of the rise, development, and end of the world.

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* Πoθεν κακον.

In form and method it is, as already observed, more Oriental than Grecian. The Gnostics, in their daring attempt to unfold the mysteries of an upper world, disdained the trammels of reason and resorted to spiritual intuition. Hence they speculate not so much in logical and dialectic mode as in an imaginative, semi-poetic way, and they clothe their ideas not in the simple, clear, and sober language of reflection, but in the many-colored, fantastic, mythological dress of type, symbol, and allegory. Thus monstrous nonsense and the most absurd conceits are chaotically mingled up with profound thoughts and poetic intuitions.

The highest source of knowledge, with these heretics, was a secret tradition, in contrast with the open popular tradition of the Catholic Church. In this respect they essentially differ from later sects which generally discard tradition altogether and appeal exclusively to the Bible as understood by themselves. They appealed also to apocryphal documents, which arose in the second century in great numbers, under eminent names of apostolic or pre-Christian times. Epiphanius, in his 26th Heresy, counts the apocrypha of the Gnostics by thousands, and Irenaeus found among the Valentinians alone a countless multitude of such writings, "innumerabilis multitudo apocryphorum et perperam scripturarum."† And finally, when it suited their purpose, the Gnostics employed single portions of the Bible, without being able to agree either as to the extent or the interpretation of the same. The Old Testament they generally rejected, either entirely, as in the case of the Marcionites and the Manichaeans, or at least in great part; and in the New Testament they preferred certain books or portions, such as the Gospel of John, with its profound spiritual intuitions, and either rejected the other books, or wrested them to suit their ideas. Marcion, for example, thus mutilated the Gospel of Luke, and received in addition to it only ten of Paul's Epistles, thns substituting an arbitrary canon of

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‡ Adv. haer. I, c. 20, § 1.

eleven books for the Catholic Testament of twenty-seven. In interpretation they adopted, even with far less moderation than Philo, the most arbitrary and extravagant allegorical principles; despising the letter as sensuous, and the laws of language and exegesis as fetters of the mind. The number 30 in the New Testament, for instance, particularly in the life of Jesus, is made to denote the number of the Valentinian aeons; and the lost sheep in the parable is Achamoth. Even to heathen authors, to the poems of Homer, Aratus and Anacreon, they applied this method, and discovered in these works the deepest Gnostic mysteries.* They gathered from the whole field of ancient mythology, astronomy, physics, and magic every thing, which could serve in any way to support their fancies.

The common characteristics of all the Gnostic systems are (1) Dualism ; the assumption of an eternal antagonism between God and matter. (2) The demiurgic notion ; the separation of the creator of the world, or the demiurgos from the proper God. (3) Docetism ; the resolution of the human element in the person of the Redeemer into mere deceptive appearance.†

We will endeavor now to present a clear and connected view of the theoretical and practical system of Gnosticism in general as it comes before us in its more fully developed forms.

1. The Gnostic theology revolves about the conceptions of God, matter, demiurge, and Christ.

It starts from absolute primal being. God is the unfathomable abyss,‡ locked up within himself, without beginning, unnameable and incomprehensible ; on the one hand infinitely exalted above every existence, yet on the other hand the original aeon, the sum of all ideas and spiritual powers. Basilides would not ascribe even existence to him, and thus, like Hegel, starts from absolute non-entity.

But the abyss opens ; God enters upon a process of development, and sends forth from his bosom the several aeons ; that is, the attributes and unfolded powers of his nature, the ideas of the eternal spirit-world, such as mind, reason, wisdom, power, truth, life.[*] These emanate from the absolute in a certain order, according to Valentine in pairs with sexual polarity. The further they go from the great source, the poorer and weaker they become. Besides the notion of emanation,[†] the Gnostics employed also, to illustrate the self-revelation of the absolute, the figure of the evolution of numbers from an original unit, or of utterance in tones gradually diminishing to the faint echo.[‡] The cause of the procession of the aeons is, with some, as with Valentine, the self-limiting love of God, with others, metaphysical necessity. The whole body of aeons forms the ideal world, or light-world, or spiritual fullness, pleroma.[§]

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* Hippol. Philos. V, 8. 20. IV, 46. † Δοκησις, φαντασμα. ‡ Βυθος.

Essentially different from this is the material visible world, in which the principle of evil reigns. This cannot proceed from God; else he were the author of evil. It must come from an opposite principle. This is matter,[¶] which stands in eternal opposition to God and the ideal world. The Syrian Gnostics, and still more the Manichaeans, agreed with Parsism in conceiving matter as an intrinsically evil substance, the raging kingdom of Satan, at irreconcilable warfare with the kingdom of light. The Alexandrian Gnostics followed more the Platonic idea of the *υλη*, and conceived this as *κενωμα*, emptiness, in contrast with the divine vital fullness, or *πληρωμα*; or as the *μη ον*, related to the divine being as shadow to light, and forming the dark limit, beyond which the mind cannot pass. This matter is in itself dead, but becomes animated by a union with the pleroma, which again is variously described. In the Manichaean system, there are powers of darkness, which seize by force some parts of the kingdom of light. But usually the union is made to proceed from above. The last link in the chain of divine aeons, either too weak to keep its hold on the ideal world, or seized with a sinful passion for the embrace of the infinite abyss, falls as a spark of light into the dark chaos of matter, and imparts to it a germ of divine life, but in this bondage feels a painful longing after redemption, with which the whole world of aeons sympathizes. This weakest aeon is called by Valentine the lower wisdom, or Achamoth, and marks the extreme point, where spirit must surrender itself to matter, where the infinite must enter into the finite, and thus form a basis for the real world. The myth of Achamoth is grounded in the thought, that the finite is incompatible with the absolute, yet in some sense demands it, to account for itself.

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[*] Νους, *λογος, σοφια, δυναμις, αληθεια, ζωη,* etc. [†] Προβολη. [‡] Basilides and Saturninus use the former illustration; Marcus uses the latter. [§] Πληρωμα. [¶] Υλη

Here now comes in the third principle of Gnostic speculation, namely, the world-maker, commonly called the Demiurge,* termed by Basilides Archon, or world-ruler, by Ophites, Jaldaboath, or son of chaos. He is a creature of the fallen aeon, formed of physical material, and thus standing between God and matter. He makes out of matter the visible, sensible world, and rules over it. He has his throne in the planetary heavens, and presides over time and over the sidereal spirits. Astrological influences were generally ascribed to him. He is the God of Judaism, the Jehovah, who imagines himself to be the Supreme and only God. But in the further development of this idea systems differ ; the anti-Jewish Gnostics, Marcion and the Ophites, represent the demiurge as an insolent being, resisting the purposes of God, while the Judaizing Gnostics, Basilides and Valentine, make him a restricted, unconscious instrument of God to prepare the way for redemption.

Redemption itself, that is the liberation of the light-spirit from the chains of dark matter, is effected by Christ, the most perfect aeon, who is the mediator of the return from the sensible phenomena world to the supersensuous ideal world, just as the demiurge is the mediator of apostacy from the pleroma to the kenoma. This redeeming aeon, called by Valentine *σωτηρ* or *Ιησους*, descends through the sphere of heaven, and assumes an ethereal appearance of a body ;

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* Δημιουργος, a term used by Plato in a similar sense.

according to another view, unites himself with the man Jesus, or with the Jewish Messiah, at the baptism, and forsakes him again at the passion. At all events the Redeemer, however conceived in other respects, is allowed no actual contact with sinful matter. His human birth, his sufferings and death, are explained by Gnosticism after the manner of the Indian mythology, as a deceptive appearance, a transient vision, a spectral form, which he assumed only to reveal himself to the sensuous nature of man. Reduecd to a clear philosophical definition, the Gnostic Christ is really nothing more than the ideal spirit of man himself, as in the "Leben Jesu" of Strauss. The Holy Ghost is commonly conceived as a subordinate aeon. The central fact in the work of Christ is the communication of the Gnosis to a small circle of the initiated, prompting and enabling them to strive with clear consciousness after the ideal world and the original unity. According to Valentine the heavenly Soter brings Achamoth after innumerable sufferings into the pleroma, and unites himself with her—the most glorious aeon with the lowest—in an eternal spirit marriage. With this all disturbance in the heaven of aeons is allayed, and a blessed harmony and inexpressible delight are restored, in which all spiritual (pneumatic) men, or genuine Gnostics, share. Matter is at last entirely consumed by a fire breaking out from its dark bosom.

2. The anthropology of the Gnostics corresponds with their theology. They see in man a microcosm, consisting of spirit, body, and soul, reflecting the three principles, God, matter, and demiurge, though in very different degrees. They make three classes of men: the spiritual,[*] in whom the divine element, a spark of light from the ideal world, predominates; the bodily, carnal, or material,[†] in whom matter, the gross sensuous principle rules; and the psychical,[‡] in whom the demiurgic, quasi-divine principle, the mean between the two preceding, prevails. These three classes they frequently identified with the adherents

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[*] *Πνευματικοι.* [†] *Σωματικοι, φυσικοι, σαρκικοι, υλικοι.* [‡] *Ψυχικοι*

of the three religions respectively; the spiritual men with the Christians, the carnal with the heathens, the psychical with the Jews. But they also made the same distinction among the professors of any one religion, particularly among the Christians; and they regarded themselves as the genuine spiritual men in the full sense of the word, while they looked upon the great mass of Christians[*] as only psychical, not able to rise from blind faith to true knowledge, too weak for the good, and too tender for the evil, longing for the divine, yet unable to attain it, and thus hovering between the pleroma of the ideal world and the kenoma of the sensual.

Ingenious as this thought is, it is just the basis of that unchristian distinction of esoteric and exoteric religion, and that pride of knowledge, in which Gnosticism runs directly counter to the Christian principle of humility and love.

3. We pass to the ethics of Gnosticism. All these heretics agree in disparaging the divinely created body and over-rating the spirit, and in the pride naturally connected with such an error. Beyond this we perceive among them two opposite tendencies: a gloomy asceticism, and a frivolous antinomianism; both grounded, however, in the dualistic principle, in a false ascription of evil to matter and of matter to the devil, and each extreme frequently running into the other, as the Nicolaitan maxim in regard to the abuse of the flesh,[†] was made to serve asceticism first and then libertinism.

The more earnest Gnostics, like Marcion, Sarturninus, and Tatian, and the Manicheans also, felt uncomfortable in the sensuous, corruptible and perishing world, ruled by the demiurge and by Satan; they abhorred the body as formed from it, and forbade the use of certain kinds of food and all nuptial intercourse, as an adulteration of themselves with sinful matter; like the errorists noticed by Paul in his pastoral Epistles.[‡] They thus confounded sin with matter, and vainly imagined that, matter being dropped, sin, its accident, would fall with it. Instead of hating sin only, which God has not made, they hated the world, which he has made.

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[*] Οι πολλοι.

[†] Δει καταχρησθαι τη σαρκι; the flesh must be abused, to be conquered.

[‡] Comp. 1 Tim. 4: 3.

The other class of Gnostics, as the Nicolaitans, the Ophites, the Carpocratians, and the Antitactes, in a proud conceit of the exaltation of the spirit above matter, or even on the diabolical principle, that sensuality must be overcome by indulging it, bid defiance to all moral laws, and gave themselves up to the most shameless licentiousness. It is no great thing, said they, according to Clement of Alexandria, to restrain lust; but it is surely a great thing, not to be conquered by lust, when one indulges it. According to Epiphanius, there were even Gnostic sects in Egypt, which, starting from a filthy, naturalistic pantheism, and identifying Christ with the generative powers of nature, practiced debauchery as a mode of worship, and after having, as they thought, offered and collected all their strength, blasphemously exclaimed: I am Christ. From these pools of sensuality and Satanic pride arose the malaria of a whole literature, of which, however, fortunately, nothing more than a few names has come down to us.

4. In cultus the Gnostic docetism and hyper-spiritualism led consistently to naked simplicity, as in Marcion ; sometimes to the rejection of all sacraments and outward means of grace ; if not even, as in the Prodicians, to blasphemous self-exaltation above all, that is called God and worship.*

But with this came also the opposite extreme of a symbolic and mystic pomp, especially in the sect of the Marcosians. These Marcosians held to a two-fold baptism, that applied to the human Jesus, the Messiah of the psychical, and that administered to the heavenly Christ, the Messiah of the spiritual; they decorated the baptistery like a banquet-hall ; and they first introduced extreme unction. As early as the second century the Basilideans celebrated the feast of Epiphany. The Simonians and Carpocratians used images of Christ and of their religious heroes in their worship. The Valentinians and Ophites sang in hymns the deep longing of Achamoth for redemption from the bonds of matter. Bardesanes is known as the first Syrian hymn writer. Many Gnostics, following their patriarch, Simon, gave themselves to magic, and introduced their arts into their worship; as the Marcosians did in the celebration of the Lord's Supper.

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* Comp. 2 Thess. 2 : 4.

5. Of the outward organization of the Gnostics (with the exception of the Manichaeans, who had a complete hierarchy with a primacy) we can say little. Their aim was to resolve Christianity into a magnificent speculation; the practical business of organization was foreign to their exclusively intellectual bent. They formed, not so much a sect or party, as a multitude of philosophical schools. Many were unwilling to separate at all from the Catholic Church, but assumed in it, as theosophists, the highest spiritual rank. Some were even clothed with ecclesiastical office, as we must no doubt infer from the fiftieth Apostolic Canon, where it is said, with evident reference to the gloomy, perverse asceticism of the Gnostics: "If a bishop, a priest, or a deacon, or any ecclesiastic, abstain from marriage, from flesh, or from wine, not for practice in self-denial, but from disgust, (*βδελυρια*), forgetting, that God made every thing very good, that he made even the male and the female, in fact even blaspheming the creation, (*βλασφημιαν διαβαλλει την δημιουργιαν*) the same shall be excommunicated." This shows the antagonistic attitude which the early Church was forced to assume even against the better class of the Gnostics.

6. As to the effect of Gnosticism, it was, like all heresy, overruled for the promotion of truth by the wisdom and mercy of God. It acted as a most powerful stimulus upon the intellectual activity of the early Church and was the negative condition of the patristic theology, which cannot be understood without it. It was in opposition to it that those fundamental doctrines of the oecumenical creeds on the unity and trinity of God, on the creation of the world, on the true humanity and divinity of Christ, on the rule of faith, and the resurrection of the body, were brought out

and scientifically developed. Thus modern German rationalism and pantheism, the greatest, most learned and powerful system of error, which arose since the days of Gnosticism, served a similar good purpose and called forth the modern evangelical theology of Germany, which is at once a refutation of rationalism and a mighty progress in the intellectual life and wealth of the Church.

P. S.

Mercersburg, Pa.

ART. III.—EVIDENCES OF CIVILIZATION.*

I propose for our consideration some of the displays that at this time distinguish the developments of our national life, and the influences these are likely to exert on our thinking as a people, and destiny as a nation ; and to group a few of those phenomena under what is believed to be their appropriate head, or governing principle.

I propose to consider the Individual, in his connection with society and the influences and evidences of the principle of the absorption of the individual by society and government, as they are believed to exist in the public mind.

The Individuality or freedom of man under government and law, has ever been exposed to two dangerous and destroying influences: First, the Spirit of Anarchy, and second, the Spirit of Despotism. In other words, the tendency or disposition of man to shake off all government and law, and exercise a personal freedom and independence destructive to the freedom of others, and finally to that of himself; or in the opposite direction, to invest government or society with unjust and oppressive powers, quite as formidable to liberty or individuality as its opposing principle. The first is the principle of Individuality expanded into Anarchy; the second, the principle of Social power expanded into Despotism.

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* An Address delivered before the Alumni Association of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa., July 27th, 1858, by A. K. Syester, Esq., of Hagerstown, Md.

When we remember that government has its origin or necessity in a two-fold nature of man: first, his direct, or individual affections; second, his indirect or social affections,* and consider that his direct or individual affections are always regarded as more energetic and stronger, than his social or sympathetic affections, it may seem strange and incredible, when we assert that of the two, the social affections and feelings, have always been so fostered, trained, strengthened and developed, as completely to absorb and dwarf the individual feelings, under the operations of almost every government that ever existed.

It was especially the vice of every government of antiquity that it invariably assumed and exercised powers inconsistent with, and destructive of, every consideration connected with the dignity, importance, rights, or accountability of man. That government became despotic or absolute, without one struggle on the part of the people to avert the evil, and the most abject slavery existed among all, and still exists under every government that bears any analogy to, those that flourished centuries ago; and these assumptions and exactions of government were sanctioned by reason and philosophy, and vindicated by the people who were made thus the victims of unjust and oppressive power.

There has come to pass, however, not indeed so universally and clearly as might be wished, but sufficiently general to establish it as an object of permanent interest among the thoughtful, this important and significant revolution in opinion, namely, that government exists not for its own sake, neither for the sake alone of society, but for the protection of the individual against the encroachments of society and for the development of his varied capabilities;—that man is no longer to be regarded in that relation as an instrument to be formed and fashioned to subserve the purposes of government, but that government is an establishment to be moulded in conformity to his dignity and importance, and with careful reference to his high destiny; that man is not made for government, but government is made for man. Simple and self-evident as the reduced form of this proposition may appear, the world has been slow, very slow in acknowledging its truth. Century after century has looked upon its toilsome and precarious growth, and its truth is just coming to be recognized and sanctioned. It is, however, not universally endorsed, neither is it by any means practically illustrated, or substantially vindicated under the operations of Law or Government any where to the full extent of its paramount claims and interests. It has never been without its friends in the economy of government. It was too closely allied with the truest instincts and virtues of the human heart, ever to have been without some one, who would announce it in his published thoughts, illustrate it in his personal experience, or vindicate it in his death. Many of the ancient governments where, from their structure and history, we naturally turn for a discovery of this proposition, were total strangers to its entire claims.

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* See Calhoun's works, 1st Vol.

In the governments of Greece, pure democracies, as we know them to have been, we look for a protection of the individual, for a recognition of man's personal accountability and a vindication of his high and honored destiny ; but these Governments never once felt the force of these honored claims ; never admitted them into the spirit of their laws; their voice was never once heard in the areopagus of that people. No one indeed can read the history of Greece without a shudder at that page, where the individual is seen in his relations with society and government. Government and society were everything ; man was nothing, except so far as he contributed to the splendors and power of the State. We are startled at beholding, amid all the perfections of Grecian life and the deathless glories and unfading splendors that invest her name, the Individual, dwarfed and trembling before the altars of her nationality, adorned as they were with the matchless beauties of her art, and the finished precision of her science ; and notwithstanding all that her poets, orators, painters, sculptors and philosophers have done for her, yet her statesmen have marred the beauty of her national character, deformed the proportions of her social life, and blurred the radiance of her history by monstrous outrages on the natural rights of man, that seem darker and blacker by the very brightness and splendors that surround them.

Humanity grows pale when told that a society whose brow was so decked with all the jewelry of thought, whose step amid the intricacies of science was so graceful and faultless, and which was clothed in the flowing robes of a most charming and elegant literature, could from considerations of self, tear from the embrace of maternal affection the delicate, deformed or helpless infant to which that mother clung with sad but increased fondness because of its very deformity.

It is still more terrible to remember that that queenly, yet remorseless society, could, for its own interest, so distort and dry up the natural and affectionate impulses of the human heart, in training and schooling the public mind, as to cause that mother to experience a high and sacred duty in thus destroying the life of an offspring, toward whom, by reason of its delicacy, the heart prompted a fonder love, and a more sacred care.

It is equally revolting to consider that age, around which so much of our veneration and regard will ever associate itself, that decrepitude, that shall always challenge our tender and forbearing sympathies, that these met with neither respect or sympathy from a society that crowned government with the honors of earth, that crushed out all true nobility of the soul in the degradation of the individual, whose existence had no significance, no purpose or glory, beyond the interests of the State. More than all this is made apparent from the temper and tone with which society there inoculated the philosophic mind of Greece ; for in her Philosophy, as applied to her polity, her Philosophy, which there, as every where else, is the fullest expression of national being and temper, these enormities stand out in bold relief.

We are appalled at the fearful calmness of Plato, and his utter disregard of anything sacred or important in individual life, when we find him in the presence of the State using such expressions as these: That "With respect to the children of citizens of inferior rank, and even the children of other citizens who are born deformed, the magistrate shall hide them, as is proper, in some secure place, which it shall be forbidden to reveal."

Aristotle also observes: "In order to avoid nourishing weak or lame children, the law should direct them to be exposed, or made way with." It was monstrous that Sparta and other governments of Greece actually committed such monstrous and shocking crimes, but it is absolutely incredible to believe that reason approved them and philosophy threw its sanctions around them, adopting and vindicating them as the perfection of reason, as applied in that direction. When the philosophy of a people can be made the text book of the defence of crime, and reason its advocate, when society can thus distort and wither all the green leaves of human affection in the cruel crucible of its philosophy, we fain would turn in loathing and disgust from the sterile fields and stagnant pools of national life, bereft of every vestige of Individuality, even though the Ignes Fatui, generated in that broad waste of miasma and death, light up the scene with a rare and striking wonder. We would not that a single cloud should flit across the radiant glories that lie broad bannered, in the history of Greece; we would not that a single leaf should fall faded and withered from that still green cypress that encircles her fame, or that one object of attachment or regard should be torn from a name redolent with all the perfections of classic beauty and the graces of a polite and elegant literature. But you will all agree that in Greece the importance, responsibilities and rights of the individual were not recognized, that his obligations were sadly deformed and disfigured; that in those pure democracies the most revolting tyrannies prevailed. The Individual was swallowed up in society, he was lost in the State. It will also be admitted that this absorption of the Individual by society, was not the work of a day, a year, or several years; not the consequence of a sudden and violent overthrow of an old order of things, and the establishment of a new. The chains of slavery were not suddenly forged around the old Grecian.

The frame and structure of those governments, at the same time, demonstrate the existence at one time of the active presence of a strong and masculine feeling which moulded them into forms, where the highest assertion of Individuality was graven; they demonstrate the existence of a powerful and jealous interest in society, which sought to secure for all time the rights of man, in his relations with society and law, by introducing him into a direct and active participation in marking out the practical operations of government; and yet we have seen that the Individual was absorbed in society. Government had not gone out suddenly; it had drifted out slowly from its original mooring. The influences that had first moved it were not perceived; or if perceived, were accounted unimportant. They worked on for years silently and steadily, and the people had not learned from the lips of any of their great ones, that "the price of Liberty was eternal vigilance." The old Grecian looked with pride upon the wealth and accumulating splendors of his State, or bowed in humble submission before a power and patronage which it had been his glory to build up, but before whose glance he trembled, the mere toy of its caprice. He was taught to trust in a human power beyond himself, saw the State assuming the care of interests, and promoting objects, valuable, as he believed, to society, and he gave over with cheerfulness, now a jot, and then a tittle of his own natural rights, trusting to the justice of the people.

The State had assumed the direction of all public diversions and to a large extent of private recreation. He saw that State, clothed with vast powers for Good or for Evil, invested with resources to gratify national pride and personal ambition, public welfare and personal interest, to redress public evils or personal wrongs, and never once asked his reason how far the State might safely be entrusted with its important powers, or questioned his judgment whither all these were tending. He looked only to the virtues or charities of the object to be realized, never considering whether the means evoked might not in the end, be infinitely worse than the evils to be arrested. It mattered little to him, what citizen was stricken down, provided society demanded the sacrifice. "It would be monstrous if the people could not do what they like," was the instant response of the multitude to the faultering defense of the commanders at Argenusae. From being indifferent to the rights of others, each man had grown regardless of his own, and finally those promptings that first placed the Individual high up in the economy and distribution of powers under Grecian government, were overshadowed and dwarfed under the supreme and dangerous attributes, thus little by little bestowed on society and the State.

The political history of Greece, presenting us with this melancholy decline of that stalwart principle, which first impressed its virtues on her policy and which was so sadly and without a struggle effaced, is followed by the same story in Rome. The rise and decline of Individuality in that vast and powerful government might well lead us to question its stability anywhere. After the expulsion of the Tarquins, and the establishment of the Tribunate, the Roman government assumed the form of a pure Republic, with an admirable distribution of powers; the whole structure bound together by a most solemn league and covenant. Not content with a simple participation in the enactment of laws operating on him; not content with simply erecting government as his defense against the encroachments of society, the old Roman limited the operations and scope of government itself; he established a system of checks and balances on the powers and departments of government by dividing those powers, and plainly marking out those departments.

There was, therefore, an assurance in the form of government, in the division of its powers, in the plan adopted to circumscribe the scope of its operation, in the written law, in the solemn covenant that distributed the powers and defined the extent of each, and above all in the history, and stern and inflexible character of the old Roman, that society would not there absorb the individual, that government could not trench upon his rights. For many years the old Roman guarded his admirable government and inestimable rights with more than vested fidelity. Amid all the excitements and convulsions of party struggles, the shocks of foreign war, and the seductions of its conquests, or the splendid triumphs of Roman armies, he seems to have retained with jealous and tenacious grasp his iron hold on his personal rights. But long before the form of the Republic was broken down, the spirit of Republicanism was extinct in the Roman heart.

Centralization, a concentration of power, had been silently undermining the liberty of the Roman citizen, and eating out those stern Republican virtues, under whose influence the Roman name had grown great, and yet the citizen fondly dreamed his liberties were eternal, because the Republic existed. Government soon began to draw to itself powers and assume responsibilities other than those contemplated in the establishment of the Tribunate. The Tribunate itself demanded additional powers, in order to promote the interests of the plebian, and the demand was too often honored. The Tribunate came to be regarded as the agent of the plebians, and government itself as the agent of society. The Republic had grown powerful and its honors splendid. Its positions were too dazzling, its powers too tempting for even Roman virtue. It was concentrating, by these means the affections of the people upon itself, and thereby also all power; for the people too readily gave, or too quietly submitted to its exactions. Party spirit and partizan strifes ran riot over the promptings of that true dignity of character and that proper self-reliance that always invests the individual with the crown of self-respect, and the true dignity of manhood. Conquest had set her stars and trophies on the brow of the State, and had laid the wealth of empires at her feet. All other people worshipped the Roman power, why should not the Roman citizen? The known world was quailing before the fiery glance of her stupendous and resistless power, how could he, how dared he question her decrees; her haughty step and impious frown was on the banded strength and sacred rights of the world, and the cries of injured innocence and appeals of outraged right, went up in vain. What was man under this vast, overshadowing, almost boundless stretch of consolidated might and power! The Individual was more completely absorbed than ever. The forms that he had established to prevent centralization by operating a division of power, behind which, in times of peril, he might entrench his individuality, and defend his rights, were washed off by the surgings of that proud nationality, that swept conquering over all the world. The citizen was transformed into an instrument in building up her power. His life was nothing, save only as it contributed to its expansion; its noblest manifestations found their ultimate and highest glory, only in that. For this power, men were called on to peril life, to expend it, to die. Men fought for Rome, for that peerless power that had crushed out national existence, and stricken down justice and right all over the world, and had given the citizen in exchange for the hardy freedom of old, the splendid appointments and dazzling patronage of a proud and mighty State.

That the Roman mind had been gradually seduced from a proper estimate of the individual, and that man was no longer respected in his dignity and position or rights, is manifest from the purposes to which society, under the sanctions of government, with a coldness absolutely incredible, so often dedicated him. The gladiatorial shows of themselves are enough to define the view with which government regarded the people, and the people each other. The degradation to which it was the practice, and pleasure, of both government and society, to reduce the unfortunate victims of war ; the hungry avidity and the fearful pleasure with which the people crowded to witness these scenes of murderous strife, demonstrate that the Roman heart had lost all conception of the dignity or responsibility of man, and that he could be made at any time, to minister to an appetite, whose greedy gorging could be appeased only with innocent and unfortunate blood. The Individual was absorbed in a centralized power, the dignity of his character, his destiny and accountability were all overshadowed by the might and majesty of society. And finally, a government having origin in the noble recoil of a political heart, whose generous indignation was roused by the personal wrongs and personal consideration of one of her most humble but noble citizens, and whose every power and aim was thus marshalled in obedience to the demands of Individuality asserting its claims against the exorbitant pretensions of society, was divested of its vitality, robbed of its power, by the growth of that principle of social despotism, or centralization, that has ever existed as the most formidable enemy to the healthful and manly development of the Individual.

If we draw to our aid the light of a practical philosophy, it will be seen that, in the two orders of civilization, we have just been so hastily contemplating, the value and importance of the Individual decreased precisely in the same degree that the strength of society and the influence of the State expanded, or rather that the growth of Individuality kept no equal pace with its rivals. We have seen how prone is the human heart to forget, or overlook its own individual dignity, accountability and importance, under the intoxications which the splendors of a powerful government produce ; how liable humanity has ever been, under the most favorable circumstances, to render homage to some objective power, at the expense of the yet higher and truer dignity of the soul, and to dwarf and drivel all the noble considerations of self-respect and importance in the support of some interest beyond it, whose pretensions are exaggerated by the voluntary concessions, or servile habitudes of the Individual himself. It will, therefore, surely be no impertinent inquiry instituted, whether there be not among us influences, and at the same time displays of national being, calculated to lead us, and pointing with unerring precision to the same fatal errors and evils; whether we have not too often, and are not now bestowing on society, many of the attributes that belong to the individual, and falling into modes of thought, and habitudes of action, calculated to invest the State with certain responsibilities and duties, that ought to be assumed and tenaciously held by the Individual as the very elements and conditions of his being.

Society indeed stands before us here, armed with a prouder prestige than the old Roman ever saw: crowned with a loftier honor than ever gilded the name of Greece, and with a more dazzling diadem resting on its brow, than poetic fancy ever gleaned from the concentrated glories of both.

Literature and Science are beginning to invest our name with the most honored associations. An oratory peculiarly our own has thrown its electric ardors over the national heart, touching all its cords with an enthusiasm and power rivaling the noblest displays of antiquity, and filling the world with the measure of a fame unrivaled in our own age. Art is flinging the flowing robes of its own perfections like a beautiful mantle around us. Military glory, and naval achievment have laid their bloody trophies and gory honors thick and high on our national altars; a daring commerce is laying the world under tribute, and pouring its wealth at our feet; and the stars and stripes are streaming o'er every bounding billow of the ocean, or mirrored in every tranquil sea of the world.

The material displays of our national life are the wonder of the world, and the pride of our own bosoms. Before the energies of our national being an almost interminable and boundless forest, stretching from the Blue Ridge, in the East, beyond the banks of the Mississippi in the West, has given way. The Alleghenies, that formed the most remote boundaries and almost impassible barrier to the colonies, have long since been traversed by turnpikes, penetrated by canals and tunneled by railroads, and a countless army of civilization, has been thronging through their gorges, crowding through their defiles or pouring from their summits and spreading throughout the great valley of the Mississippi, grappling with forest stream and marsh, until the rich mould of unnumbered centuries, is teeming with the happy homes, busy population and abundant harvests of a high and energetic civilization. Rank after rank, column after column, still continue to follow each other in rapid succession from the Alleghenies, crossing the broad and luxuriant valley beyond, and pressing the frontier farther and still farther west, are pitching their tents at the base of the Rocky Mountains. But no obstacle can stay the impetuosity, or arrest the march of this marvellous movement, and those eternal barriers of rock and snow, where nature seems to have established her most impregnable barrier, have been forced, and countless legions are deploying into the fertile plains beyond.

Glorious indeed has been, and still is the march of this mighty army of civilization. No smoking ruin, no shrieking desolation, no wail of despair, or cry of injured innocence, marks its progress; the blessings of millions of happy homes are resting in peace on its banners; its march is timed by the grand harmonies that swell up from the proud hearts and exultant hopes of thirty millions of freemen; green fields and fertile landscapes, dotted with the farm house and embroidered with all the ensigna of cultivated life, start into being at each manouvre of its forces; a thousand thriving villages and bustling towns fortify its rear; proud cities, with glittering spires, sparkling domes, busy mart, and thronged exchange, mark each halting place, and the rattle of the engine, with its ponderous train, is the reveille that calls each soldier to his duty. Cities, towns, and villages, the rattling factory and the busy worshop, the browsing herd and the abundant harvest spring forth like magical creations at its footfall. Never before was the progress of a people conducted with such amazing expansion and bewildering velocity. Never were the phenomena of the national life attended with such wondrous results. States, which formerly were the slow and doubtful growth of centuries, under the matchless energies of our nationality, are the product of a few years, and crowned with the lofty honors of sovereignty, are moving up in stately procession to take their places in the grand confederacy.

Society is accomplishing prodigies here, of which antiquity, in the boldest flights of her poetic fancy, never once caught the most distant resemblance. All this is justly a source of pride, and not to be discouraged. But how stands the Individual in relation to all this? What position does the mere *man* hold amid the ten thousand hosannas that are ever pealing forth in honor to these stupendous developments? Do these phenomena leave him undisturbed in the scale of importance? Does he take into proper account himself, his own dignity, importance and position? Does the public mind, as it gazes in rapture on these majestic and imposing scenes, pay homage to the Individual, who is greater than all these; who "was made but a little lower than the angels," who is the crowning point of all God's creation, and for whose service and end, the machinery under whose auspices these phenomena are conducted, was devised, and for whose personal development, expansion, and advancement, civilization itself displays, under God, her wonderful outgoings. Is it true, that with these majestic and striking objective forces around, to challenge admiration and inspire reverence, he will turn from them, to weigh the importance, and estimate the value of the priceless jewels that lie in his own being? Do men, as often as they should, as they look upon this swelling stream of life, bearing on its bosom the gigantic capacities, stupendous issues and high problems of a civilization or society, into which would seem to be crowded all the hopes and interests of humanity, consider the still nobler capabilities, still higher issues, and profounder problems, that lie wrapped up in their own several individual existences, and acknowledge that for the proper illustration and solution of them, these amazing scenes under Providence are going forward? Is there no reason to fear that the proud and crested billows that roll in such measured majesty across this ocean of life, may not receive more of our admiration than the causes which impel them, and the purposes that shape their course, may share in our regard? And shall we be censured for insisting that unless along with this amazing expansion and velocity of social power, this marvellous exaltation of national life, there be a corresponding development and exaltation of individual importance, the displays of our national energy may be wonderful indeed, but hideous deformity will haunt its yet maturer manifestations, and gloat over its old age in the preponderating strength and exclusive development of but one side of man's nature.

We need not stop here to inquire into the agencies by which the results we have just been contemplating are accomplished, and whether in their subordinate relations, they each tend to produce the evils we dread. It is sufficient in this view of our subject to know that these phenomena exist; that their importance is ever magnified by that seductive spirit that is ever exalting something beyond and objective to the soul, and that they cannot, ought not, to be assailed from any quarter, which seems to arm them with a triple power to consummate the evils we have been suggesting. There are, however, other conditions of the public mind, deep rooted and fixed, whose daily and hourly operations are marked by a direct antagonism to the principle of Individuality. The national heart is throbbing with impulses which carry within the most fatal and destructive consequences that can well be conceived of, to every just conception of Individual dignity and importance, and a total blindness to every just view to its relations with society.

Party spirit, which comprehends the length and breadth of our land, furnishes a broad and undisputed field for the direct offensive operations of the principle of social despotism. Here the principle of absorption reigns in absolute, undisputed supremacy; its contrivances to insure a complete subjugation of the Individual, to crush out every sentiment of esteem and regard for him, in the public mind, are of the utmost fitness. The entire system of party tactics is made to contribute to the power, and enlarge the operations of social despotism. The man, who once comes fully under the influences of party drill, (and how few are there who can be said to be beyond it!) must make instant and complete surrender of his own self-reliance and independence, as far as the objects of the association are concerned. He must adjust his sentiments, measure his thoughts, shape his expressions, weigh his opinions and define the scope of his activity in politics, by the lines, rules and formulae, published by the majority.

He must acquiesce without a murmur, in the authority of conventions, and do their bidding with cheerful alacrity; he must give o'er his long cherished thoughts, his most well considered principles, change his opinions, and ignore, it may be, a public history at the beck or nod of a caucus. The doings at the capitol, if his party happen to be in power, are holy things to him; they are just as much articles of faith as any article in the creed. Before these, conventions, majorities and caucuses, bow in servile submission. The partizan never views them as propositions about which he may make up an opinion of his own, but receives them in implicit faith as they reach him; and if there is any individual activity displayed in the case at all, it exhausts itself in employing the arguments of the White House, in defending them, if any one feels himself bound, in the same way, under the influences of an opposite driil, to assail them. The politician (and who is not one?) cannot say his thoughts are his own. He has long since paid these over as the price of his membership, and he never dreams of violating his contract. Mohammed, in his boldest dreams of consolidated and centralized power, never saw a more abject servitude of mind and heart than this. The partizan may flatter himself all the while that he is an independent man. He may swagger in a bastard courage and boast about certain "inalienable rights," among which is the liberty of speech and the independence of thought. He may make a show of manhood, when no danger is at hand; but when the hour of trial draws nigh, if the servile habitudes of his soul will ever permit one, the doubtful and anxious struggle between the attachments of party and the convictions of duty, bears witness to the iron strength of the fetters with which the spirit of party binds up the individual.

Not only do the habitudes of thought acquired in connection with such associations, and the strength of party affections, ever cling round the Individual to subordinate his will and subjugate his reason to a power beyond him; but the independence of his thought and will is subjected to another equally powerful influence, and the despotism of party spirit fully discloses itself in the universally endorsed tactics of party drill, systematically employed to enforce the authority of party agsinst the suggestions of duty, and the convictions of individual thought. Does a man, in spite of the influences that have operated upon him with all the power of law, feel the strong appeals of duty and independence, resisting the trammels with which public opinion and party discipline have encompassed him, rend his chains asunder, and stand forth in the aerena of politics with the royal robes of manhood drawn up in princely style around him, armed with the sceptre of principle and crowned with the laureate of truth, his position is the signal for the hootings of the mob, the scorn of the multitude, the frowns of power, and the vindictive fury of a partizan press. His conduct is esteemed a species of apostacy, whose historical similitude is to be found in the treachery of Judas Iscariot, or the treason of Benedict Arnold. The howlings of an infuriated party break in deafening peals around him, follow him in his declining years and go echoing along the distant confines of age. Thus are the promptings of individual conviction made to yield before the growing strength of party zeal and the suggestions of duty to recoil before the accumulating influence and importance of majorities. Thus is the public mind trained and schooled in the despotism of party associations and an importance and supremacy conceded, by an alarming unanimity, to a social power, before which the attributes of individuality must drivel into insignificance. The individual is absorbed in his party. Upon its altars he resigns his own independence and some of his most important obligations to his fellows, and to his country. What is to be hoped from a people who will adjust their intellectual and moral armor for the strifes of politics before such bonfires as these? And what is all this but *centralization leavening* the masses?

It cannot be expected that a people so accustomed to such training, can confine their habits of thought and modes of action to the sphere of partizan activity. The reigning power must be expected to be copied, and we turn with alarm to other quarters, and find the operations of the same principle busy with all our interests as a people.

The sanctions of law itself, projected to guard individual rights, are coming to be held in light esteem, and these powerful and venerated defences of life and property have too often been made to yield before the pressure of an inflamed public opinion, whose excitements reaching the judge upon the bench, or the jury in their box, compel them to yield to its demands. It was but yesterday, too, that men, instigated by evils that afflicted the body politic, organized a social power for their extermination, before whose irresponsible might the Consitution and Laws of a State, behind which lay all the securities and guarantees of individuality, went down like chaff before a driving tempest, and we were called on in a land, where trust in law is the beating heart and thinking head of government, to witness a spectacle where the Individual was torn from the defences of the law, dragged out from his strong entrenchments and exposed in his weakness to the terrible and irresponsible fury of a social power whose despotism sickened the very heart of humanity. That this display of social despotism, however, only seemed to familiarize the public mind with its horrors, and prepare it for a repetition of the same horrors, may be seen in the fact that one of our largest citiest lately followed the example.

Let public sentiment continue to exalt, at the expense of the Individual, a civilization whose ruling phenomena are the material displays that adorn its bosom and most arrest the public wonder; let the energies of the national life continue to be appropriated to the attractions of that grand saturnalia, where the public mind drinks deep the draughts of partizan rancors,—draughts whose intoxications are drawn from the countless streams that ever trickle from the stricken heart of Individual Freedom, and where it grows mad over the wild carnival of irresponsible power—a carnival whose revelry is intensified by each new outrage on man, that feeds the hungry avidity of its revelers: and then let the national heart beat high and quick under the unnatural excitements produced by struggles for a political power, whose distinctions open only to the hand hardened by the greedy grinding of gain, or tainted by the palmings of bribery, and whose patronage too often wait on the drivilings of effeminacy; let the national heart become tempered and toned by impulses such as these, and it needs no pen of inspiration to write the word of doom that shall record the ultimate history of such a people.

But it does not rest here. The organization of many benevolent associations among us, is in many instances attended by large exactions on the Individual quite as destructive to a healthy and manly development of his powers, as some of the displays we have just been considering. Men are too apt to regard only the good ends to be accomplished, where the means employed do not violate law or morality, and seldom consider in such cases whether the means employed may not in the end produce calamitous results far outreaching in the end, the good to be reached in invoking them. We, therefore, find societies formed for the accomplishment of almost every benevolent and charitable object which can address itself to the sympathies of the human heart; many of which demand sacrifices and tribute from the Individual who is subject to their rule, and all of which undertake to define the limit and objects of his charities, or sympathies, or hold out the promise of pecuniary considerations, as a reward for the execution of benevolence and a motive to membership. And it is a question by no means free from doubt whether the separation of the design or conception from the execution of philanthropic or benevolent interest: the first the business generally of the head,—the last the duty of the general body; and whether systems, that seem to satisfy the consciences of men, in the discharge of all their charitable obligations, by a mere conformity to the established rules of some society, perhaps the payment of "monthly dues"—whether this transfer of our conceptions and obligations of charity to the shoulders of some society, may not have the effect to transform these living and touching graces of our nature into cold, dead, marbled-visaged formalities. Persons too imagine that they behold the utter failure of all the means established under Providence to rescue humanity from the evils incident to life and filled with philanthropy, and overflowing with sympathy and benevolence, undertake the reorganization of society itself. The public is called on to make surrender of certain natural rights for the good of the new order. These calls are never unanswered. Thousands flock to the standard thus set up by some new Moses in the wilderness, surrender their personal accountability and dignity, limit the scope of their individuality, no longer the honored promptings of reason and will, trained by religion in obedience to the freedom of Heaven's laws, but by the narrow lines and small circles of some school of disgusting fanaticism. These associations take under their control not only the direction of personal sympathies and charities, but in many instances assume the management of industry and labor, the direction of personal enterprise, and control of personal energy. Many of the institutions existing under the sanctions of government too are considered improper, and social organizations are promoted to operate against them, in defiance of the admitted sanctions of the law, thus daily arraying the Individual in bitter hostility against that which experience and history teach us, is the only bulwark of man against the aggressions and oppressions of society.

The passion for reforming society at the expense of all proper regard for the individual, has been lately pushed in another direction, and the vast powers of the State and the machinery of Government have been invoked to aid in the accomplishment of objects laudable and proper in themselves, men unfortuately, in their zeal for humanity, never considering that they have called the State to trench upon the rights and principles of man.

"Public welfare" is always the ready excuse for any such inroad, and it has come to be considered (if indeed it was ever regarded differently), to mean anything which society may demand for her interest, it matters not at what sacrifice of the Individual.

For the "Public welfare" the State assumes the province of regulating the desires and appetites of the people, superintending their habits, directing the affairs of our families, invading by her agents our houses, quarterly it may be, or as often as it may suit the taste and fancy of some majority-made constable, making public journey with bailiff and posse, from garret to cellar, through parlor and pantry, prying into sideboards, overhauling wardrobes, uncorking bottles, and beating out barrel bungs, in a word, violating all the consecrations and sanctities of our homes. This surrender of natural right, this desecration of time honored privacy is claimed by society, in order to depopulate her alms houses, and deliver her jails, and I must submit to the exorbitant exaction, because another has been leading a life destructive to his own and his family's honor, and injurious to the interests of society. What account do your Maine Liquor Laws take of personal accountability? Do they thus keep ever before the Individual the idea of personal responsibility, address his manhood, appeal to his reason or punish him alone who has outraged decency or humanity? We ask the State by these means to police us, because our neighbor has degraded himself, Society finding it more convenient, like the pedagogue of old, to discipline the whole household than to search out the real offender. We ask the State by these means to protect us against ourselves, to assume the care and direction of our household appointments, of our personal foibles and weaknesses, interests which our forefathers in their simplicity thought belonged to each man for himself, and in the proper or improper conduct of which, even we, despite the *shifting of the responsibility*, still continue to regard ourselves entitled to honor or shame, as the case may turn out.

What is all this but a virtual surrender to the State of our own regards for ourselves, our personal dignity and accountability! What is it other than a dishonorable evasion of the high and solemn duties of prudence and temperance, which each man owes to himself and to his Creator? What but the cowardly resort of passion and appetite to disown the hideous deformities that gloat over an unmanly indulgence in their demands? And is it not, on the other hand, investing the State with an alarming power? Pushing her powers and operations far out beyond their legitimate sphere, and transforming her into the agent of society, to do her bidding by a flagrant outrage on the rights of the Individual, before which the genius and policy of our old common law must recoil in broken and shattered fragments. Should a Legislature at any time, when beset with petitions on such an subject, hesitate before it strike the brave old heart of that time-honored system of law, which has for ages so well and jealously guarded the rights of the Individual, which has existed as the bulwark of his safety and protection through centuries of peril and struggle; which has stood between him and the frowns of his tyrant and the lash of his despot, and lifted him out of the dust and blood of oppressive power; should any one hesitate on any such occasion, there will always be found some one who will quiet these compunctions by proposing yet another step in the process of social despotism, and refer the existence of some of the most valued rights and time-honored sanctities of the Individual to the test of a mere numerical majority of the people. With our gravest reflections we can recognize no difference in the principle assumed in such laws as these, with that which characterized the sumptuary laws of the Grecian tyrant and against which even the Grecian heart rebelled. It places too high an estimate on the interests of society, and tends to lessen the importance, and impair the dignity of the Individual by withdrawing from him the control and responsibility of his personal habits, and placing them under the protection of the State. It places the rights and privileges of the man too much at the mercy of the tastes and caprice of the multitude; gives us no assurance that that which is ours today, may not become the property of the community tomorrow, through the magic of "Public Welfare." It creates an uneasiness, lest from telling us what we shall not keep in our houses, what we shall not drink, what we shall not purchase, the State may go on and tell us what we shall not wear, or what we shall not read. It arouses the suspicion, that if the State is acting legitimately thus for the "Public Good," directing the economy of our homes, and the appointment of our families, she may some day adopt the fancy, as she did in Greece, of limiting the expenditure of our means, defining the color of our cloth, and establishing the style of our garments; or under the same false view, rob our hearts of some of their dearest objects of earthly affection and endearment.

But other influences, looking to an absorption of Individuality, and a concentration of power, are busy in our midst. Men talk and think more and more about popularizing our Institutions, of reducing Government more directly under the influences of majorities, of rendering it still more pliant to the voice of society, of defining the scope of its operations, marking the limitations of its power and departments more immediately by the *will of the people.* It has grown quite fashionable of late to regard government as the *agent of society*, to do her bidding in all things, as existing for her protection alone, and that its operations and measures are only legitimate when found to be in exact conformity with what society may deem to be her interests, which too often is but the suggestion of her passion or caprice. It rarely enters into the mind of such men to consider, that, in the establishment of government there was involved the idea of protecting the Individual from the injustice of society, or guarding him against the despotism of majorities. To assert that government exists as a restraint on the will of the majority, would be regarded by your blatant and reigning demagoguism, as the most unexampled hardihood; it would awake the howlings of the war-dogs of all parties, and open the whole artillery of the partizan press.

Majorities are quite too sacred to be spoken of in that way; they must control and limit government and law. "It would be monstrous if the people could not do what they like," was the sentiment of the Grecian slave, and is the motto of the American republican. True, majorities or the people, have outraged justice and liberty, destroyed the defences of life, and the protections of property, trampled down the rights of man and enslaved him, but then they were majorities, sacred and holy still. It is true, too, that our forefathers carefully and jealously guarded the Individual from encroachments arising from precisely such a quarter as this. They restrained society by fundamental laws, by solemn constitutions; guarded the citizen by bills of rights, which they fondly hoped would stand forever between the liberties of the Individual and the will of the majority, and thus established government, not as the agent of either, *but as a check upon the despotism of society or majorities, and the lawlessness of the Individual.* Yet all this is nothing before the supreme attributes with which the public mind has invested majorities. Government is established to ascertain, enforce and perpetuate the rights of the Individual; to secure his healthy and proper development; to promote all his interests by restraining his passions, and, at the same time, holding in check the passions of society. But there has ever been a tendency in *government itself* to encroach on the rights of both Society and the Individual. To guard against that, our forefathers carefully limited the action of government itself; they divided its powers, distributed them under distinct heads and separate departments, whose several operations were defined with the utmost accuracy and whose separate independence, one of the other, was thought to be carefully secured. They provided against centralization of power, by balancing against the accumulation of power in one department, a well adjusted co-equal power in another; they checked the operations of a third by its coördinate in a fourth. They divided the powers of the several departments themselves, and most carefully and explicitly defined the operations of the whole. But of what avail is all this, when majorities can sweep off the entire complex fabric at one blow? When if they cannot change the law, which has been placed beyond their reach, they can change the judge who is to interpret that law, or through the more popular departments of government remove an officer who stands between him and their passion. Of what avail are all these jealous and cautious provisions, if the genius that projected and pervaded them lies bleeding or lifeless on the stupendous altar of social despotism? Ever keeping in view the principle of Individuality, in thus, as we have seen, adjusting and framing the State governments, our forefathers went one step farther. They established one General Government, to guard the rights, preserve the existence, ensure the independence and promote the interests of the several State sovereignties, as well against the encroachments of majorities here, as against the assaults of foreign power. And into that Federal scheme they carried, with still more precision and care, the cautious divisions of power, of checks and balances, that distinguish the State sovereignties. They limited the scope of its operations most plainly by the views of security, peace, and protection to the State; in providing for the general good, its power was never intended to reach beyond the object of protecting the State sovereignty.

With these wise precautions, having reference to the sad lessons read in the history of other people, and the melancholy consequences of a concentration of power, this complex system of ours was established. Time admonishes us, that we cannot follow the course of history in examining the departures from the spirit and letter of this system, which have marked the practical operations of the Federal Government, and to eliminate the principle that controlled these departures. We can but give a general indication by presenting one example.

Under the very first Congress that assembled under the Constitution of the Federal Government, an Act, after a severe, protracted and bitter struggle, was passed, whose operations have tended, and are still tending, to a large degree, to destroy the relation of co-equals and co-ordinates between the Federal and State Governments, and to subordinate the sovereignty of the States to the very power projected to preserve them in all their force and vigor. The 25th section of the celebrated Judiciary Act of 1798, by which the Supreme Court of the United States was invested with an appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or decrees of the higher Courts of law or equity of the several States, in cases therein enumerated, is admitted, even by the friends of the measure, to have placed the highest Courts of the several States, so far as the cases extend, in the attitude of inferior tribunals to the Supreme Court of the United States, and to have established the same relations between them that exist between the inferior Federal Courts and the Supreme Court. This centralizing Act, which is believed to have violated the most solemn obligations of constitutional integrity, was sought to be excused, and is still defended on the ground of preventing a clashing of authority; of providing against the collision of diverse but co-equal powers; of preserving harmony between coördinate branches, and establishing uniformity of decisions. All this looks very fair and plausible, especially when put upon the footing of harmonizing the action of coördinate and co-equal powers.

The peace and prosperity of the country, the "Public Welfare," again demanded a sacrifice of Individual rights, and after a bitter, but unavailing struggle, that sacrifice was extorted. But how, in the case before us, was that harmony secured? What means were employed for its establishment? Only by weakening the vigor of one of the coördinate and co-equal departments. The clashing of authority was prevented by curtailing one of the separate, independent branches of its authority, and transferring its attribute of sovereignty to another. To prevent the collision of diverse powers, one of the powers was shorn of its strength, and subordinated to another. The case in hand proceded upon the assumption that the Federal Government was a supreme or superior power, and an utter disregard of the fundamental truth, *that divisions of power are necessary as protections to liberty*, and securities to law; and further that these divisions of power cannot be disturbed without violence to at least the spirit of the instrument that creates them. And it is already a question of no little magnitude, whether the advantages expected to be derived from an uniformity of decision, are not all counteracted by the mischievous tendencies and results, growing out of the precedent then established on the destruction, in an important particular, of the relations intended to be established between the State and Federal governments. True the liberties of no man was cloven down by that act, the iron hand of oppression grappled with no man's rights, but the solemn guaranties which the genius of the constitution threw around the sovereignty of the individual State were impaired, and the importance and authority of the State was lessened by the very power that had been created to protect it against the encroachments of others. The Federal government had triumphed in her first collision with the States, had gone off victor, crowned with a portion of their sovereignty, not granted in the distribution of powers. The forces of centralization had displayed themselves in their most seductive form, and left their traces on the topmost pillars of the whole fabric. The indignant protests and affectionate remonstrances of Individual right, were unavailing in the presence of the suggestions of "Public Welfare," or public selfishness.

The argument employed then is begining to be applied on almost every occasion, when there arises a dispute growing out of the relations we have been contemplating, and there is a growing sentiment adverse to the pretensions of the States. We are told, very plainly, that this division of power will not do; that this distribution of sovereignty, these limitations on the several departments, this diversity of authority is producing embarrassing checks on the salutary operations of the Federal government, that it tends to cripple and cramp its vigor, to weaken its resources, producing conflicts of sovereignty and clashings of interest. Men will have the whole scheme popularized, and simplified, never reflecting that the surest guaranties against the oppressions of power, or the march of despotism *lie in the divisions of that power* and the complexity of Government.

Practically we do popularize and simplify the system. In our thoughts and political habitudes we do destroy that admirable division of power, and distribution of sovereignty, projected by our forefathers, as great bulwarks, and a succession of defences, behind which they deemed that man, in all time to come, might entrench his Individuality, defend his rights, and be shielded from the aggression of power, coming from any quarter whatever. We have long since, as a people, ceased to regard the Federal government as even an equal power in our system, or to reflect on her character and meaning, as moulded and shaped by her derived or delegated powers. We associate her in our mind with the idea of vast power, invest her with some supreme and controlling attributes, beneath which the State governments must bend as subordinate powers. Her immense revenue, her splendid appointments, her seductive and queenly patronage, her dazzling honors, and lucrative positions, appealing as they do, to the reigning power of the national heart, wealth, are ever enlisting the affections and passions of the people ; exaggerating her importance in public interest, and exalting her power in the public mind. Her armies have vindicated our national honor, and illustrated our national might on the red field of battle ; her seamen have sustained them on the slippery decks of our vessels ; her commerce has carried our flag and name to every clime under the whole heavens, and brought us back the wealth of every country ; her jurisdiction spans a continent, its shadows are resting on the Isthmus, touching the neighboring isles of the ocean, and stretching northward are reaching beyond the St. Lawrence. Oceans limit her domain, her throne is high up in the adorations and affections of the people, her jewelry are the diadems of sovereignty. What is little Rhode Island, or Delaware in the presence of this exaggerated expansion and almost boundless stretch of power and patronage ; this dazzling, captivating display of government, whose seductive honors are ever intoxicating the public mind, and concentrating the passions of the people upon it. Co-equal and coördinate indeed under the constitution, but smaller, infinitely smaller in the hearts and estimation of the pople. In a conflict, need it be asked, which shall yield, before the irresistable pressure of public opinion ? The constitution indeed stands there, but alone, to guard them with its integrity against the supreme and alarming attributes with which popular favoritism has crowned the Federal government. But what shall that avail, when the demands of the ruling passion shall be gratified, by bringing that constitution still nearer to the majority, and placing it under that control; or what shall it avail even now, if the public mind is prepared, as on other occasions, to sanction the destruction of the divisions of powers, and the violations of constitutional guaranties. Let the people continue to bow down and worship the Golden Image, thus set up by the supreme power of public will; let the national heart withdraw its trust for the defences of life, peace and liberty, placed by our -orefathers in the State sovereignties; let this exaggeration of the importance of majorities, this blind passionate exaltation of their virtue and supremacy, let these influences go on unchecked, until rising higher and higher in the public mind, majorities shall overshadow even the constitution itself, and who will say that our own day shall not witness the triumphant march of *centralization* over the divisions of authority, the distributions of power, the checks and balances, the cautious modifications of power and well defined departments, projected far out by the jealous spirit of Individuality, to guard our several rights, and define and vindicate our several liberties.

It may take years before the sad results of the growing popular passions will display themselves in undisguised centralization. It may take years before they can occupy all the defences that stand distributed in such admirable perfection and order around the Individual; but unless checked they must sooner or later produce their bitter fruits. We may slumber on in the arms of our fancied security, like the strong man of old, in the embrace of his faithless mistress, "all unconscious that the fingers and shears of a Delilah are busy with the locks and tresses of our national strength." The ordinary exigencies of the national life may not for years demonstrate to the public mind the preserving energy, and protecting power which the stalwart vigor and manly developments of Individuality display; but there are times, and none may tell their coming in the rapid succession of events, ever rising around and about us, when the sternest and loftiest habitudes of Individuality, the purest instincts of *personal freedom* and responsibity, the severest convictions of *Individual duty* and the clearest apprehension and acknowledgment of *Individual accountability*, shall be necessary to the defences of the peace and liberties of the people. The mere forms of government will not be enough. *A pure and vigorous vitality must ever inform all its parts and shape all its actions.*

Behold the proud old oak! Ages have passed away, generations have come and gone like the shifting shadows of a summer's noon, since its dark green pulp first pierced the moulds of earth. The storms of a hundred winters have whistled through its branches, the droughts of a hundred summers have been round its roots, and their scorching suns on its leaves; it has battled proudly with the dashing fury and wild carnivals of a hundred tempests, and yet crowned with the green glories of its spreading leaves and majestic in the strength of its expanding branches, it stands the pride, the glory, the monarch of the forest. But silent decays have been steadily at work in its stout old heart, inconsiderable corruptions have been growing with its growth and eating away its strength, and when some driving tempest tosses its narled branches to the skies, and beats in wildness on its brave and aged trunk, it falls dishonored in the dust, with the decays and hollowness of its heart all exposed.

Hagerstown, Md. A. K. S.

ART. IV.—THE INCARNATION.*

JESUS CHRIST is the author and finisher of faith, the only but all-sufficient Saviour of mankind, yea, the Restorer of all things, both in heaven and on earth (Eph. 4: 10; Col. 1: 20). Too much attention can, therefore, not possibly be devoted to the study, which has for its object a correct, i. e., a scriptural view and knowledge of Him. If in other matters of faith the Bible ought to be the *highest* authority and *last appeal*, it must be in the case in question the *only* one. The Scriptures alone must be heard and interpreted by themselves. Taking the Bible, then, for our guide and our only guide, and fully aware of the infinite importance of the subject, we shall attempt to reproduce in our consciousness the picture which the Bible has drawn of Jesus Christ. We set out with or rather choose for our text the words of the disciple, whom Jesus loved, in which he sums up in the prologue to his gospel the very quintessence of Christian faith: the Word became flesh (*ο Λογος σαρξ εγενετο*). If we intended to treat this text analytically, we should probably say, 1) Who is *Λογος* here spoken of? 2) What is meant by the predicate nominative *σαρξ*? 3) How have we to understand in this connection the copulative verb *εγενετο* But premising, that on items 1 and 2 there is no real difference of opinion, we shall say only a few words on them and devote our whole attention to the third item, since we are of opinion, that the formulas of faith of the orthodox Churches of Christendom do not exactly teach on this subject, what we understand the Bible to teach.

We say, therefore, that we understand here by the *Λογος* spoken of as having become flesh, the *Λογος* spoken of as the subject in John 1 : 1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with (*προς*—toward) God and the Word was God. This language we understand to teach, that the Logos is true and eternal God, of the same substance with the Father. The article being applied, however, to the Father alone (*ο Θεος*), we infer therefrom, that there is some difference between the Father and the Son, not only hypostatically, but also ad rem. This *Λογος* being called in other passages of Scripture the Son of God (e. g., John 5 ; 26), in others the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person, yea not only the apostles, but Christ himself frequently calling the Father not only *his Father*, but also *his God* (1 Cor. 11 and 15, John 20: 17, etc.): we infer from this uniform language of Scripture, that although the Son is of *the same substance* with the Father, as all the terms applied to him clearly indicate, yet there must be a certain kind of dependence, which the Son sustains to the Father. In John 5: 26, Jesus tells us expressly, that it is the Father who gives to the Son to have life in himself, while there is, to the best of our knowledge, no passage in the whole Bible, which inverts this relation, saying that the Son gives to the Father to have life in himself. (Why we translate here the Greek aorist *εδιοκε* by *gives* instead of *gave*, will fully appear when we come to treat of the incarnation itself. Here we beg leave merely to say, that the Father's giving life to the Son and the reciprocal act of the Son, of receiving life from the Father, must necessarily be eternal, resting on the relation which Father and Son sustain to each other ; for to suppose, that the Father's giving to the Son to have life in himself, is a solitary, transient act, would introduce a change, over which he has no control, into the very being of the Son, subject him to time and make him in reality a creature. We can not look, therefore, upon this act of the Father's giving to the Son to have life in himself, as a mere act of his will and good pleasure (the Almighty can not *create* a being Almighty like himself, that is, undo himself), but we must view it as a physical act at the same time, i. e., as an act founded also upon his nature, as in God liberty and necessity, which in one conception exclude each other, are intimately united. If one more remark on this subject is necessary, we would merely say, that Jesus, speaking of his preëxistent state, always says, that he was with the Father, never, that the Son was with him (see John 17 : 5). The Lord ascribes to himself a relation to the Holy Ghost, different from his relation to the Father; he speaks of the Spirit as being sent by him; yea, he claims a joint relationship with the Father to the Spirit, which the Father *alone* sustains with regard to himself (the Son). Thus he says, (John 16: 15): "All things that the Father has, are mine, and he (the Holy Ghost) shall take of mine and show it unto you." This is the highest prerogative ascribed to the Son in the Scriptures, to wit: the joint breathing of the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son, on the strength of which act the Latin Church has always correctly maintained against the Greek Church, that the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son. Yet in that very connection the Saviour says (John 14 : 28) : "My Father is greater than I." (To refer this remark of Christ to his humanity, is to make him say simply what no one in his sound mind will doubt, nor can have doubted, for even a moment, that the *man* Jesus was inferior to the Supreme God!) We deem it scarcely necessary to add here, that on the strength of these grounds we ascribe *aseity* to the Father alone, consequently neither to the Son nor to the Holy Ghost. This God-Logos now, we are told, became flesh. By flesh we mean here not merely the material part of man, his body, but the form of human existence, the law of humanity, and John says, consequently the same thing that Paul means, when he says, (Phil. 2: 6, 7): He took upon himself the *form of a servant* and was made in the likeness of men ; and being found in the fashion of a man, etc.; in other words, the Logos became a man, a real and true man to all intents and purposes. He shared all the wants and peculiarities of human nature, sleep, hunger, food, rest, being circumscribed, the ignorance of a child, grief and joy, obnoxiousness to temptation, in short all the *ασθενεια* of our nature. It is not temptation itself, not the having of a natural will, but the following out of this natural will, which constitutes sin. Nor is this *ασθενεια*, exclusively the consequence of the sin of our progenitors ; many of its ingredients belong to the being of human nature, but have been fearfully increased by the introduction of sin into it. But sin itself is no ingredient of our nature ; it was wanting before the fall and is removed again by a perfect appropriation of the objective work of Jesus Christ. It is, for this reason, not at all necessary to assume, in order to constitute Christ the Saviour of mankind, that he took upon himself our *fallen* nature, while the whole tenor of the Scriptures concerning Christ forbids this assumption altogether. Jesus calls himself very often the *Son of man ;* this certainly means, that he was a man in a peculiar sense, in which no one else was; *he realized the idea of humanity*, and what the whole race is destined for, and what will be accomplished by its sanctified position, was accomplished by Jesus individually, to wit : He became the abode of the fulness of the Deity ; for even on earth he could say, that whoever saw him, saw the Father. God and man are, to a certain degree, reciprocal ; without the incarnation the idea of humanity would not have been fully realized, even not without the fall, by one idividual ; and God could not have given a complete revelation concerning himself to mankind without the incarnation. For these, and other reasons, we say, unhesitatingly, that the Logos in becoming man, took upon himself *our original nature*, which was, as we know from the Scriptures, and by experience, capable of sinning or resisting temptation.

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* As the MERCERSBURG REVIEW is designed to be a medium for the free expression of various shades of Theological opinion, we give place to this earnest and interesting discussion on The Incarnation; but think it proper at the same time to say, that we can not concur with the learned and respected author in some of his views on the christology of the Reformed Church and of orthodox creeds in general.—EDS.

Our Lord's divinity was systematically denied by Arius and his followers, on grounds, however, different from those on which the Ebionites had denied it ; in the days of the Reformation by the two Socini and their followers, who now pass by the name of Unitarians ; his humanity was denied in one form or other by the Gnostics, some of whom said, that Christ had no real body, consequently no really human wants,—could not, and did not suffer; others again maintained that if he had a real body, it was of an etherial nature, brought down from heaven, (so the knight Schwenkfeld,) since in the opinion of these men, matter is intrinsically evil and every contact with it corrupting; others, led by Cerinthus, taught, that Jesus was born like other men, was, indeed, not sinless, but wiser, and better than others, and as a reward of his moral excellency the high Aeon, Logos or Christ, descended upon him at his baptism, taught, wrought miracles through him, but left him again, before he expired on the cross. The true humanity of Christ is, in our days, admitted on all hands, theoretically at least —whether practically also, we may see in the progress of our investigation. We come, now, to our *third* and main point, the incarnation of the Logos.

On this point two views are held by the orthodox Churches of the present time, the Lutheran and the Reformed. The Roman Catholic Church has introduced so many heterogeneous elements into her christology, that her Christ has but little in common with the Christ of the Bible, for which reason no notice is here taken of her doctrine on this all-important subject. The Lutheran and the Reformed view admit two distinct natures in Christ, a really divine and a really human nature, but here the agreement ends; the Lutherans maintained,* that by the Communicatio idiomatum—the reciprocal action of the two natures—the properties of one nature can truthfully be predicated of the other. According to this view the God-Logos was born. Mary is truly the mother of God, and Luther says, that Mary made soup and pap for God, and it was unhesitatingly affirmed, that the divine attributes, omniscience, omnipotence, etc., were communicated by the Logos to the human nature of Christ, even in his mother's womb, so that we have an omniscient child, a man Jesus possessed of all divine attributes, but by a free will of his own, not calling them forth during his pilgrimage on earth.

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* We use the past tense, because most Lutherans of this country seem not even to know the true doctrine of their Church on this point, and of the eminent divines of that Church in Germany scarcely one accepts the teachings of the Formula Concordia on this subject as the exposition of his faith.

The Reformed view holds the two natures in Christ more apart, so that there is room left for a really human development of his human nature—growing in grace and in knowledge—which, however, is so intimately connected with the Logos, as to form one personality with him. Some of the Reformed standards express themselves on this point thus: "The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting from the Father, the very and eternal God, of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin of her substance; so that the two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ; very God and very man." We are told here, that each of Christ's two natures is perfect, the divine so as to constitute him very God, and the human so as to constitute him very man—and yet these two natures are said to constitute one personality, one person. Is this possible? Is not this a self-contradiction?

We are perfectly aware, that we are here on sacred ground; but it is not forbidden, reviewing, as we do, not the language of inspiration, but the language of men, that were, however learned and good, fallible. If each of these two natures is so perfect, as to constitute the one a perfect God, and the other a perfect man,—and this is insisted upon in order to avoid the error of Eutyches, who taught, that Christ's humanity was absorbed by his divinity, and thus made him an intermediate being, more than man and less than God—what, we ask, is the difference between *nature* and *person?* Is a man, a real man, not a person? What constitutes personality? Is it not self-consciousness, the subject knowing itself, being conscious of itself, as the object, the blending of the subject and the object into one? Now, without this human self-consciousness, Christ would not have been a man, as is admitted on all hands, and if he had a human self-consciousness, how, then, did his human nature not constitute a human person? When off guard, the followers of this view admit this natural and logical inference unhesitatingly. All passages, that speak of Christ as a man, ascribe human actions, human wants to him, as hungering, thirsting, sleeping, being fatigued, etc., are at once referred to his human nature, because, as is confidently asserted, the divinity can neither suffer, nor hunger, nor thirst. And does the divine nature of the Saviour not constitute personality? God being *the* personality, Christ would, of course, not be God, without personality. When Christ says: "Before Abraham was, I am," (John 8 : 58), it is unhesitatingly declared, that he speaks here of his divine, to the exclusion of his human nature. If now Christ can say of himself, *I* according to his divine, and *I* according to his human nature, one excluding the other, how, we ask, can *two persons* be *one person?* Again, Christ disclaims omniscience (Mark 13 : 32). Now granting for a moment the dualistic assertion, that Christ speaks here of his human nature, how can one and the same person know and not know a thing at the same time? What kind of a union, then, is left between the Logos and the man Jesus? Is there a specific difference betwen the relation of the Logos to the man Jesus and that of the Holy Spirit to the prophets of old? Again, omnipresence is claimed for the divine nature of Christ (John 3 : 13,) while his human nature is allowed to have been circumscribed; the Logos was, thus, the governor and upholder of the universe, while he was in the man Jesus on earth; but the Logos is in every man (John 1 : 9): was his being in Jesus specificially different from that in every other human being? But not only this; had the Logos in Jesus a Logos-consciousness or not, and had the Logos or part of the Logos out of Jesus the same self-consciousness too? and how many Logoi were there?

Again, when Christ suffered, his divine nature either suffered or did not. We are fully aware, what answer is given by the advocates of the system, which we are reviewing, to wit: that we are not aware of the amount of helps, which the Logos extended to the man Jesus in his sufferings—but does this suggestion meet the case? Was the Logos unable or unwilling to support the man Jesus, so that an angel had to come down from heaven to strengthen him? (Luke 22: 43); was the Logos unable to uphold the suffering humanity of Christ, so that he exclaimed: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Matth. 27: 46); or was it the Logos, who had forsaken the man Jesus? (So Cerinthus and his Gnostic followers taught.) Again, why did Jesus commend (deposit) his spirit into the hands of his Father? Was the Logos unable or unwilling to take care of it? And if the divinity had nothing to do with Christ's sufferings, or lent his human nature but so scanty a support, that an angel had to strengthen Jesus, that he had to complain of God having forsaken him, that he commended his spirit into the hands of his Father—what right have we to base upon his death the hope of the pardon of our sins? Now if these questions, which are neither sophistical, nor far-fetched, but natural and necessary results of earnest religious thought, should be answered satisfactorily, the greatest service will be rendered to the cause of religion; but if they are not, and cannot be satisfactorily answered, then it is not only lawful, but a sacred duty to examine the Scriptures closely, whether they really teach the premises of such conclusions. The cry: "Mystery, mystery," does not avail, as things may be mysterious, i. e., beyond our comprehension, without being contradictory to themselves or to sound reason. The necessary question then is: "Do the Scriptures really teach this personal or hypostatical union, this Christ's being made up of the Logos and the man Jesus; or is it an entirely different train of thought that is there presented to us?" The Logos *became* flesh—is this identical with: The Logos united himself personally or hypostatically with the man Jesus, conceived of the Holy Ghost and born of the

Virgin Mary? If a crown prince, says Dr. Ebrard, in order to secure the liberty of his imprisoned brother, goes for a certain length of time into voluntary slavery, becomes a slave to all intents and purposes, retaining, however, his right to the crown of his father unimpaired, he can truthfully be called a prince and a slave—for he is both;—but who would dream of saying, that this prince had united himself with a slave—and this Nestorianism does—or that this slave prince is less than a prince and more than a slave, say a chamberlaine, which Eutychianism does? If this simile is applicable, and it seems to us to be so, in all its parts, except that the condition of slavery will be laid aside, while the incarnate Logos will forever retain the form of human existence: it is apparant at once, that the great error underlying both the Nestorianizing Reformed and the Eutychianizing Lutheran view is, that the Saviour's *human* nature is taken for *a concrete*, for *an individual*, *while it is a generality*, *the law of humanity*, *the human form of existence*, the *μορφη δουλου* into which the Logos entered.

We feel ourselves by no means under any obligation to explain the mystery of the incarnation—this is a mystery, and may remain so, for created intelligences, for eons to come—but what the Scriptures teach on it, we are bound to examine and believe. While the term *God-man* is, indeed, not biblical, but can be understood so as to convey biblical ideas, the view which gives us in Christ *a God and a man*, is certainly not taught in the Bible. We can speak of the *incarnate-Logos*, *of the man-Logos*, *of God manifested in the flesh*—not manifest in the flesh—but not of the Logos mysteriously united with the man Jesus, without our pressing the fact here that such a man Jesus, with whom the Logos could have united himself, did not exist at all, the Logos himself becoming Jesus. That we are correct in charging the Reformed view, as widely interpreted, at least, with being but an ill-disguised modification of Nestorianism, appears also from the fact, that it allows no more than Nestorianism did, the term mother of God. The fact that some Episcopal divines insist on calling Mary *θεοτοκος*, by no means disproves our position, since they either use the term out of mere respect for antiquity and translate it: Bringer forth of God—thus making the term almost palatable to Nestorius himself,—or if they use the word in its natural sense, they abandon their own system.

The Lutheran view, however, is no better. If the child Jesus was omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, he was no human child, could not and did not grow in wisdom (Luke 2 : 52), and if not really human, he has not redeemed us; and even if this view is so modified as to involve the non-exercise of these divine powers or attributes, their mere possession in a quiescent state, so that Jesus could call them forth at any time, the case is not made any better, for it remains unintelligible, why Jesus prays to the Father, for the power of performing miracles, calls his doctrine his Father's doctrine, which he had been taught, etc. (see John 11 : 42, and especially Heb. 5 : 7). But if these divine attributes would not be called at any time into action, then they were suspended, for a time at least, and this nearly all Lutheran divines of Germany now admit in one way or other.

The Apollinarian view, which assigned to the Logos the place of the rational soul (*νους*) in the man Jesus, was for this reason false, because the Saviour without this *νους*, would not be a true and real man, consequently not our Redeemer.

By way of introduction to our development of what we conceive to be the doctrine of the Bible on this subject, we would say, that both the gospels and the epistles speak of Christ throughout as *one person*, leaving not the least room for any dualism, so that what is said of him will be applied by every unbiased mind to the whole Jesus, the Logos Incarnate. The favorite adage: This is said concerning the human nature of Christ, because, e. g., the Divinity cannot suffer—this of the divine nature, because, e. g., the human nature is younger than Abraham,—has no foundation in the word of God whatever.

In the next place we remark, that the New Testament speaks in unmistakeable terms of three periods of the existence of the Logos, which distinction is almost entirely overlooked or lost sight of by the present christological consciousness of the Church. These three periods are: His antemundane state, reaching down to the incarnation; his state of humiliation, reaching from that period till after his death; his exaltation beginning from after his death—prior to his resurrection—for he raised himself and was consequently in the possession of all divine attributes at that time—and lasting throughout eternity. Christ himself refers to these three periods in John 17: 5: "Father, glorify me with that glory, which I had with Thee before the world was." Christ here says in plain language, that at the time he offered the prayer, he was destitute of the glory which he once had had, and that he prayed to be clothed with it again. The main question here is, What was this glory, for which Christ prays? Was it merely the garment of light, in which the Deity dwells, or was it the form of divine existence—the *μορφη θεου*—implying divine glory and divine attributes?

Let us see what light the Scriptures throw on this subject. As soon as we know what this glory was, we know at once what Christ had laid aside, and what he was, in answer to his prayer, clothed with by his Father. In Hebrews 1: 3 we read: Who being the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person—and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high. After his resurrection Christ says: All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth (Matth. 28: 18). The government of the world was his, owing to his relation to the Father—in his earthly state he had not exercised it—after his resurrection he is clothed again with it: Does this authorize us to say, that the government of the world was part of the glory, which he had laid aside at his incarnation? In John 17: 22 the *δοξα* evidently means internal holiness and v. 24 his majestic life in light; both these attributes the Logos may be supposed to have laid aside at his incarnation, growing, indeed, every day more into this (divine) holiness, until he received it fully again at his exaltation. In Phil. 2, the Apostle inculcates the duty of humility: "Let the same mind be in you, that was in Christ Jesus," who although he was in the form of God, did not consider it αρπαγμον— res rapta (got by robbery, and, therefore, tenaciously to be retained) to exist in a manner equal to God ;* but he emptied himself, took the form of a servant and was made in the likeness of men. In what view did this κενωσις consist? We have seen above, that two perfect natures in Christ would constitute two persons, as each includes self-consciousness and self-consciousness personality. If his divine self-consciousness is, therefore, incompatible with both the incarnation and his true humanity, does it not follow, that this κενωσις was a temporary laying aside of his divine self-consciousness, the voluntary act of the Logos of suffering this self-consciousness to be suspended for a limited period of time? And if so, all his divine attributes, whose exercise depends on the divine self-consciousness, were, of course, also suspended, not to be called into action before the divine self-consciousness was entered into again.

On this view every christological passage of the Scriptures becomes intelligible and fully harmonizing with all others; we have now a natural meaning for the words: The Word became flesh. Whatever truth there is in the common view, is here retained, and the many self-contradictions, which it involves, as pointed out above, are avoided. The *Λογος κενωθεις* was, of course, as to his substance, God as much as ever, as a man remains the same man, although his self-consciousness is for some time suspended by one cause or another; the Logos becomes the son of man, i. e., *realizes* the idea of humanity, something that no other individual, even without the fall, could have accomplished; his Logos-substance exists for some time in the form of a rational soul, is developed in a really human way, and by leading a life of entire sinlessness becomes the abode of the Father, so that the man Jesus can say: He who sees me sees the Father. To this indwelling of the Father Jesus owes his power to perform miracles, his organic knowledge of divine things (comp. Matt. 11: 27 and John 3: 13.)*

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* Ισα Θεω ειναι does not mean to be equal to God, but to exist in a manner equal to God; the pl. of the adj. has the force of the adv. ισως.

Jesus' life being a truly human life, it was a life of faith as well as of knowledge; on this supposition we can understand his obedience, his learning from or being taught by his Father, and even that mysterious exclamation, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" The incarnate Logos loses sometimes the *knowledge* of his oneness with the Father, retains it, however, always by faith. In 2 Cor. 8: 9, we are told that Christ, who was—had been—rich, became poor for our sakes. This passage seems to us to be decisive on the meaning or extent of the *μενωσις*; for his humanity was never rich, could, consequently, not become poor, and his divine nature could not be said, without blasphemy, to be poor, as long as it was in the exercise or possession of a divine attribute; we say *an attribute*, as we conceive that one divine attribute implies all, and speaking of the Logos as having laid aside some of his prerogatives and attributes and retained others, is to say the least, unphilosophical; he must, consequently, since he was poor, have laid aside, for a certain length of time, his divine self-consciousness and together with it his divine attributes.

We could quote more passages to sustain our hypotheses, but deem it unnecessary—for if it is taught in one passage, it rests on a sufficiently firm basis; we will, therefore, refer to John 5 : 26, to which attention was called before. We have said above, that the process of the Father's giving to the Son, to have life in himself, must necessarily be an eternal, unchangeable act, if the Son is to be God, an eternal giving on the part of the Father, and an eternal receiving on the part of the Son must take place; but Christ here uses the aor. εδωκε, because at the time he spoke of it, this process was suspended (for a limited period). The whole ocean of the Father's life no longer flowed over into the Son, but only isolated waves, such as his human form of existence admitted. Thus we get the very relation of Christ to the Father, which he ascribes to himself (John 6: 57) : "As I live by the Father, so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me." The believer, now, is entirely dependent on his Saviour—lives only in and through him—so Christ on earth lived in and through the Father, was entirely dependent upon him. Passages which would seem to be in opposition to this view, as John 5: 25, must be understood as referring, as they really do, to the exalted Saviour, as Christ himself expressly says, John 11 : 41 and 12: 24. This exaltation of Christ took place between his death and resurrection, and 1 Peter 3: 18, probably refers to this event, where the dative πνευματι cannot be taken as dat. inst. *by the Spirit*, but as the dat. of dist. obj., *as to the Spirit, in the Spirit.* Here, then, we would say, the suspended self-consciousness of the Logos was restored (by the Father,) the flow of the Father's fulness commenced again, and the exalted Saviour raises at once his own body.

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* The part. *ων*, in the latter clause of this verse must be translated by the past tense; for by translating it as the present tense, we have either to understand by heaven God—and this is too forced a construction—or we make the human nature of Christ omnipresent, which is altogether inconsistent with the Reformed view, while it would, indeed, agree with the Lutheran view, which, however, is as little supported by the teachings of the Bible; then, in John 6: 62, we have almost the same phraseology, and the past sense is in perfect keeping with the whole tenor of the argument, assigning the reason why the Son of man came down from heaven, because he had been there before his incarnation; there is, therefore, no tautalogy in the passage thus translated, as Ohlshausen ad locum supposes.

This view will, as a matter of course, appear absurd to those who are persuaded beforehand that anything like a change in the Deity is impossible; their God is the God of the philosophers, that absolutely excludes all change, is far above the created world, has directly nothing to do with the creation or the government of the world, but attends to these matters through emanations, such as the Logos, Nous, Sophia and others—but this is not the Jehovah of the Old Testament, and much less the Father of our Lord Jesus

Christ. By making any change, that may take place in God, entirely dependent on God's own free will and purpose, we are of opinion that the Scripture doctrine of God's immutability and unchangeableness is fully adhered to. If this view is correct, and if the salvation of mankind and the restoration of the order of the universe, that had been disturbed by Adam's and Satan's sins, required this act of humiliation on the part of the Logos, and if the Logos was willing to submit to it, and the Father to accept it: he only can object to our view as impossible, that makes God's omnipotence less than his love. In Heb. 9 : 14, the Apostle tells us expressly, that Christ offered himself through the Eternal Spirit to God, and to offer himself is really the work of the spirit and not of the body—to hold still under God's judgments, to declare them righteous, even if it should come to a being forsaken of God, this is the nerve in the sacrifice, and not the mere bodily suffering. The objection, finally, that the government of the world, which was in the hands of the Logos anterior to his incarnation and which He laid aside at this act for about thirty-three years, must have stood still, according to the view presented here, rests on a mistaken notion of God's relation to the world and of that of the three persons of the Deity to each other. The Son's life is the Father's life; flows from the Father over into the Son, and by the same divine energy the world was governed during the suspension of that flowing over; and God the Father, must not be looked upon as being far above any contact with the world, as spending his time à la Epicureans, in enjoyment and idleness, since in Him we live, move and have our being—since he clothes the lilies and feeds the sparrows.

This, our view, on the central-mystery of Christianity as given in this article, may be wrong in some of its parts—its leading ideas we consider founded in the Scriptures; our objections against the Lutheran and Reformed views have undoubtedly some force; and the latter view, especially as it is generally understood, denies the incarnation, practically, at least; and for this reason we have ventured to call the attention of the theological world to it, that it may receive more of that attention to which it is so eminently entitled, than has been of late years the case in our country. To these remarks we would add, that the ideas developed in our article are by no means original, although we have adopted them as ingredients of our faith. In a work "Die Lehre von der Person Christi entwickelt aus dem Selbstbewusstsein Christi und den Zeugnissen der Apostel von W. Fr. Gess," Basel, 1857, which we have translated into English, with a few modifications, and which will soon appear in print, the views and their ground, which are here but touched upon, will be given at full length.

Trenton, Tennessee. J. A. R.

Art. V.—THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARABLE.

In the April number of the *Mercersburg Review* for 1856, we published an Article on the *Idea of the Parable*, and intended at the time to follow it by another on the *Interpretation of the Parable*; but other questions arising which seemed to claim prior attention at our hands, we were not able to carry out our purpose immediately. The subject was in consequence deferred. We proceed now to discuss it in the light of the *idea* of the parable unfolded in the previous article.

The parable is a figure of speech, which presents some divine or supernatural truth under the form of a human or natural transaction. The transaction is either actual or supposed; if supposed, it is neither arbitrary nor impossible, but both possible and probable. Such a union of the supernatural and the natural, of the divine and the human in language, implies a fitness or capacity in the lower order of life to be the medium through which the higher order, under one or more aspects, may reveal itself truly to the faith of the Christian. This fitness we call resemblance; *resemblance*, not identity. The natural is not the supernatural; the supernatural is not the natural. They are generically and infinitely different. But the one is *analogous* to the other: the natural is like the supernatural in such sense that the seen and known world may be taken as the living image of the unseen and unknown world.

The resemblance is real; not imaginary. It does not lie simply in the mind of the author of the parable. Nor is it arbitrary; it is not put upon these two orders of life at will, or contrary to their own nature in order to suit and serve some given transient purpose. But the resemblance of the natural to the supernatural, of the lower to the higher order of existence, is objective; it lies in the relation itself which these orders of existence sustain to each other. And because real and objective, it is fixed; it does not vary, but remains the same during successive periods of time; and is patent to the eye of faith now as it was when our Lord uttered His parables.

The analogy, for example, of the grain of mustard seed to the kingdom of heaven is *in* the relation of the one to the other; it was not something only conceived in the mind of our Lord and then forced upon the mustard seed in violation of that relation; but because the analogy was a reality and before the penetrating mind of Christ, He laid hold of it and used it to set forth a sublime spiritual truth. As, however, the analogy is objective and therefore permanent, it is before the mind of the believer now as truly as it was before the mind of Christ; and under the instruction of Christ that analogy may be seen and apprehended by the Church in every age of the world as certainly as it was seen and apprehended by the disciples who heard the parable of the mustard seed from the Saviour's lips. Thus in the parable, social life and the natural world are elevated to the position of a living visible teacher, that attends the believer from day to day and speaks to him of the things of the Spirit.

But how is the parable to be understood? What is the spiritual truth which, in any given case, it contains? And how is that truth to be ascertained and certified? These are necessary and important inquiries. For evidently the meaning of the parable is not the direct meaning of the language. The true meaning is different from the literal meaning; but though different, it is not uncertain or doubtful. There cannot be different and contradictory meanings, conveyed with equal propriety, and authenticating themselves with equal force. There must be one meaning, and but one, which is true to the exclusion of all others that contradict it; and this one must be accessible to the believing reason; it must be capable of authenticating itself as true to the exclusion of all other possible legitimate constructions. Hence arises the necessity of *interpretation.* And to ascertain and establish this true meaning is the *office* of interpretation.

The interpretation of the parable is regulated by the idea of its nature. If that idea be false or defective, the interpretation will be false or defective. If that idea be true, the interpretation will be true, provided the principles of interpretation be logically deduced from it, and these principles be applied consistently. With the application of a just method of interpretation, however, we are not now concerned, our design being merely to determine *the general principles* of a sound interpretation.

The true idea of the parable, which we have endeavored to state briefly, includes *three* main particulars. As it is important to keep these steadily before the eye in pursuing the present inquiry, we will state them separately.

1. The external *form* of the parable is a statement or narrative of some natural fact or natural event, supposed it may be, but not impossible nor improbable. Every sentence and word is to be taken literally in its bearing upon the natural fact or event; for the language is chosen to set

some such fact distinctly before the mind; and the mind must have a clear and definite conception of this fact, in order that, through it as a medium, the spiritual truth may be apprehended. All circumstances also as parts of the form, whether evidently essential or apparently incidental and trivial, are to be taken into account. No circumstance can justly be disregarded; for each one is really a part of the narrative, and therefore essential to its integrity. If any one be ignored, we get, not a true and complete, but a one-sided and imperfect view of the external *form* of the parable.

2. The *matter* of the parable, or its internal import, is a spiritual or supernatural truth. It is not the direct meaning of the language employed. It is not a proper conception of the fact or event which the language relates. Such conception belongs to the external form. Much less is it a proper conception of any one or more parts of the narrative, whether fundamental or merely circumstantial. The true meaning of the parable is one which a mere circumstance or the whole narrative as such, does neither express nor contain. The true meaning of the narrative as a narrative is one thing, and the true meaning of the parable of which the narrative is the external form, is another and a different thing. There is indeed a most intimate connection between the two things; yet in order to avoid confusion and error they must be accurately distinguished. The sense of the parable, or that which the parable is designed to teach, is the spiritual truth exhibited in the natural fact in virtue of a real analogy between them.

3. There is a *union*, in the parable, of form and matter, of the natural fact or event and the supernatural truth. The natural fact is not the parable; and the supernatural truth is not the parable; but the two taken together, the supernatural *in* the natural, constitute the parable. These constitutive parts may therefore not be torn asunder. The natural fact can not be considered without any reference to the supernatural truth, nor the supernatural truth without any reference to the natural fact. To do either is

to contradict the idea of the parable; just as the abstract study of the human body irrespective of the human soul, or of the human soul irrespective of the human body, must be fatal to a true idea of man. A true idea of the human soul, of its laws and manner of activity, can be acquired only when we reflect upon it as manifesting itself in its mysterious connection with the body. So too with the parable. The supernatural truth, as given in the parable, can be understood only in connection with the natural fact. A given truth may indeed be taught elsewhere in the Holy Scriptures, perhaps more clearly and fully; but the particular aspect of that truth as taught in a parable is peculiar to that parable, and can be seen and understood only through the medium of the natural fact in union with which the parable holds the supernatural truth. Form and matter are indeed not identical, but different; just as certainly, however, are form and matter not separable, but reciprocally essential, the one to the other, as constitutive parts of one sacred figure of speech.

These are the three fundamental particulars involved in the true idea of the parable, which determine its legitimate interpretation. They determine the *nature* of interpretation, and the *principles* upon which it must be conducted.

The nature of interpretation consists, according to this analysis, in ascertaining the matter of a parable—the supernatural or spiritual truth which it embodies—through the medium of the external form, that is, through reflection upon the whole natural fact in its connection with the context; and in exhibiting this truth under the peculiar aspect in which the natural fact presents it. There is room here for error. The parable may be taken literally, and its spiritual meaning denied or ignored. Or a spiritual meaning may be acknowledged to be in it, but instead of being drawn legitimately from the parable itself, it may be put into it by the imagination of the interpreter. Or a sincere endeavor may be made to draw the meaning from the parable; but the manner in which this is attempted may be in violation of its nature and design. In either case the true meaning remains concealed, or is perverted. Hence the necessity not only of interpretation, but of conducting interpretation, not according to arbitrary rules, but upon such fixed principles as are fairly deducible from the parable itself.

The first and most general requisite of all, is *a true faith in Jesus Christ*, as God manifest in the flesh, the antitype and fulfilment of Old Testament types, ceremonies and prophecies, and the substance of the entire New Testament revelation. Christ is the central reality of the first and of the second dispensation—of the first as the end towards which the entire system looked; of the second actually and substantially. As such He gives relative position, character and force to every doctrine of the Gospel, every ordinance of the Church, and to the peculiar methods by which the Gospel is taught and propagated. Thus the whole system of Christian truth, and in consequence also the ordinances in which it is exhibited, and the language in which it is taught, derive their significance from Him—from His person and work—as their fundamental principle. To know the Gospel either in its parts or as a whole, it is necessary, therefore, first of all, to know Christ; and to know Him it is necessary to receive Him from the heart in true faith, and obey Him in childlike simplicity. In virtue of such living faith, a man occupies a position which, more than any thing else, qualifies him to apprehend any part of Christian truth, in its true light, and form a correct judgment in relation to it. Then also is he prepared, if he possess other requisite though minor qualifications, to interpret the *language* in which the Gospel is taught. In the absence of true faith in Christ, however, he is not prepared to interpret the language of the Scriptures; no matter how acute and well-balanced his judgment, or how logical his discipline of mind, or how accurate and extensive his attainments in history and philology. For these resources, indispensable and important as they may be, are available only on one condition, namely, that the interpreter is qualified to know and appreciate the truth which the

Scriptures teach—a qualification that can exist in no man who, for want of living faith in Christ, does not really know Christ, nor see the relation of the different parts of the Christian system to Him as their principle. For, most certainly, if an interpreter does not know that which is emphatically *the truth* of the Scriptures,* if he does not live in the element of that truth, and if he is thus disqualified by his moral and spiritual position to understand the truth, it is simply impossible to interpret the language in which the truth is taught. Hence we maintain that Christ is both the principle of supernatural revelation or of all revealed truth, and the principle also of sound biblical interpretation—a principle, the necessity of possessing which, all other qualifications combined can not supersede.

Nor is this position singular. It is not claimed as applicable only to the Sacred Scriptures. It is equally valid in its bearing upon any work on science or art. A mathematician may interpret the language of Euclid, not an honest and intelligent farmer who has never studied any thing beyond the elements of Arithmetic. Chief Justice Story may write a trustworthy commentary on the Federal Constitution, but not a physician who knows little or nothing either of jurisprudence or of the formation of the organic law of the Union. A learned Professor of Medicine may understand Cuvier's Comparative Anatomy, but not an Attorney who does not even know the scientific name of a single bone in the human frame. Johnston may give us some excellent criticisms on Shakespeare, but not a mechanic who has never paid any attention to the cultivation of an aesthetic taste. So too in regard to any classical production. The principle is applicable to every scientific and literary work. A man must be prepared to understand the subject of which a book treats, to whatever department of knowledge it may belong, and be in cordial sympathy with the true principles which underlie the discussion, in order to give a just exposition of it. Otherwise the general judgment of the scientific world will pronounce his opinions unworthy of confidence.

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* "Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, and the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but by me." John 14: 6.

In maintaining, then, that a true faith in Christ is a primary and essential requisite to the interpretation of the Scriptures, in virtue of which alone natural endowments and the rich resources of scholarship can be made available, we are asserting a principle, which, by common consent, is acknowledged to be valid in its application to any literary production whatever. An American *mathematician* may interpret a French work on mathematics. None other. So may an American *Christian* interpret the Greek or Hebrew sacred Scriptures. None other. And there is no part of the Scriptures, in the interpretation of which this general principle must be more rigidly applied than the Parable; and for two reasons. First, because the literal meaning is not the true meaning; the true meaning can not be apprehended in virtue of the language only; and, secondly, because the true meaning in most cases pertains to the mysteries of the kingdom of God—a part of revealed truth which as much as, if not more than, any other, requires deep sympathy with the things of the Spirit, in order to be known and appreciated. "My doctrine is not mine," says our Lord, "but His that sent me. If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." (John 7: 16, 17.) By logical consequence the reverse is true also. If a man will not do His will, he shall not, or can not know the doctrine. He can not know any truth pertaining to God or man as revealed by Christ, because the things of the Spirit of God are spiritually discerned. (1 Cor. 2 : 14.)

That an interpreter possesses this general personal qualification must, therefore, be presupposed in the discussion of the principles on which the interpretation of the parable is to be conducted. Otherwise, for want of the capacity of spiritual discernment, the import of the parable can not be apprehended; and if not, there is no propriety in speaking even of the possibility of a trustworthy exposition. Particular principles may be understood, but they can not be applied to purpose. The validity of their application depends, in every case, upon their real and constant subordidation to the fundamental principle of all biblical interpretation.

These particular principles of interpretation we proceed now to unfold.

Assuming that an interpreter possesses this most general and essential qualification, the first step is to determine *the specific ultimate design* of the parable. Every parable was uttered at a particular time and place; was occasioned by some event or some prevailing false view in religion and morals; and was intended to effect some present practical purpose. The truth which it embodies comes to view thus, not as a general or abstract truth, but in a certain actual connection. It was spoken with direct reference to a case in hand. From the study of this actual connection, or of its direct application, we may learn what the main design of a parable is; in other words, we may learn what that particular aspect of a general truth is which it teaches. This main design, or particular aspect, becomes what may be called the *central truth* around which the sense of the whole parable revolves. It is the prominent part of the parabolic truth to which all other parts are subordinate; and bears a relation to those subordinate parts like that which a genus sustains to its species, or a general conception to the particulars which it includes. It may be compared to the pivot which holds in equilibrium all the forces of the balance-wheel of a watch. Poised on a point, the motion is regular and continuous. What the pivot is to the motion of the wheel, the main design of a parable is to those purposes which are merely accessory; or the central truth is to those truths which are relatively inferior and subordinate. The central truth, not of the Christian religion nor of any portion of the Word of God, but of the given parable itself must be regarded, accordingly, as the only light in whose reflection a correct conception of all subordinate truths can be formed. Of this central truth the interpreter must lay hold in order to unfold the true and entire spiritual meaning.

The interpreter may discover what this central truth is, in various ways. He may discover it by considering the immediate context; the general train of historical events in which it occurs; the special occasion on which it was spoken; the introduction to the parable; and its conclusion or application; but mainly by reflection upon the parable itself as a whole in all these relations. In some cases it may be learned from one of these particulars; in others from another; and often from a combination of several or of all. In some cases the main design becomes evident at a glance; in others it is the result of close and patient reflection. But in every case it must be certainly known; for only when known, can each radius and all the points of the circumference be known also. Error here, is error every where. A false view of what is central, is of necessity a false view of what is subordinate and accessory. Lisco says very beautifully and forcibly: "One may compare the entire parable with a circle, of which the middle point is the spiritual truth or doctrine, and of which the radii are the several circumstances of the narration; so long as one has not placed oneself in the centre, neither the circle itself appears in its perfect shape, nor will the beautiful unity with which the radii converge to a single point be perceived; but this is all observed so soon as the eye looks forth from the centre."

The central truth clearly and certainly known, must be held firmly and consistently throughout the whole interpretation. The parable is not a string of beads. It it not an accidental series of events. But it is a beautiful unity. Each part has its necessary place; bears a certain relation to other parts; and has a determinate connection with the whole. Having a fixed position and a bearing upon the main design, each part must be understood accordingly. There is no room for the play of an arbitrary imagination. Holding the central truth firmly, and looking at the organism of the parable as it is in itself, the interpreter ascertains the meaning of each part in the light of the central truth, determines its relative significance from a correct view of its connection with the unity of the whole, and thus advances step by step until he brings out an entire spiritual meaning of the narrative, all the details of which are consistent with each other and with the main design. If he shift his point of observation, whether consciously or unconsciously, he is led unavoidably into manifest inconsistencies; he fails to see the inward harmony of all the parts of the parable; he puts a meaning, the product of his own mind, into the narrative, instead of drawing out of it *the* meaning which it contains; and in consequence weakens the force, vitiates the merits, and shakes confidence in the propriety of the whole interpretation.

As the parable is the union of the spiritual with the natural, of a spiritual meaning with a natural transaction, the one being the matter, the other the form, we must distinguish not only between the matter and the form as such, but also between that on which a correct view of all the subordinate elements of the spiritual meaning depends, and that on which a correct view of all the subordinate parts of the natural transaction depends. For it must all ways be fatal to sound interpretation to identify these two distinct things. The one we have called the central truth; the other we may call the fundamental constituent of the natural fact. It is here that we must look for the point of direct resemblance. Resemblance between the spiritual and the natural is not general and perfect. It does not hold true at all points. In most cases it holds true only under one particular aspect. There is one point of contact between the external form and the internal meaning —one point in which the natural fact is *like* the supernatural truth. That point of resemblance in the spiritual meaning is the central truth of the parable; that point of resemblance in the outward form is the leading phase, or the fundamental constituent, of the natural fact. These two things correspond and are complemental to each other. The central truth is that which determines the manner in which all the elements of the spiritual meaning are to be understood. The fundamental constituent of the natural fact is that which determines the relative bearing of all the attending circumstances. The elements of the spiritual meaning do not correspond or bear a resemblance, each to each respectively, to the attending circumstances of the natural fact; but the relation of attending circumstances to the fundamental constituent of the natural fact, resembles the relation of the subordinate elements of the spiritual meaning to the central truth. The direct resemblance of the form to the matter of a parable, lies between the fundamental constituent of the narrative and the central truth. In virtue of this objective resemblance there is a union of the two things; of the spiritual and the natural in language; the one is in the other; the central truth receiving a legitimate expression under the form of the fundamental constituent, or leading phase of the narrative. Or we may say, the central truth is the fundamental constituent, and the fundamental constituent is the central truth; the one being the internal and spiritual side, and the other the external and natural side of one thing—the turning-point, or the *principle*, of the parable.

Looking at all the attending circumstances in their connection with the fundamental constituent, we get a true and comprehensive conception of the whole narrative. We see the principal and accessory circumstances as the manifold parts of one definite fact. The unity and fulness of the narrative rises in harmonious and beautful proportions before the eye of the mind. No trifling circumstance is thrust aside as unworthy of consideration; nor is any prominent circumstance exalted beyond its due measure of importance; but each one holds a place in the interpretation which is according to the determining influence of the main point, or principle, from which, as from a germ, the entire organism of the parable has grown forth.

This discussion leads us naturally to the recognition of another particular principle upon which interpretation must be conducted, one too that, like the first, is derived directly from the nature of the parable. It is *the necessity of a true and full conception of the natural event or fact.* The narrative of the natural fact being the external form of the parable, it is the embodiment and expression of what the parable teaches. It is the form of the spiritual truth; and the only form of that truth as set forth in any given instance. Being the form of the truth, the manner in which that truth is expressed, it is only through the medium of the form that the interpreter can ascertain what the particular aspect of truth is which the parable contains. And to know the matter by means of the form, the spiritual truth by means of the natural fact, it is self-evident that he must understand precisely what that natural fact is.

The natural fact unites various parts or circumstances all of which must be considered, in order to obtain a conception which shall be true and full. Here arises the vexed question as to the consideration of circumstances. Shall we seek for a spiritual meaning in every circumstance, or not? If not, how shall we determine which circumstances are to be pressed and which not? Trench gives a short historical account of the opposite theories which have prevailed on this subject in the ancient and modern Church. Some, like Chrysostom, Theophylact, Origen and Calvin, limit the spiritual meaning to the main features of the parable; whilst others contend for a particular import in every word and circumstance—such as Augustine, among the Fathers, who frequently "extends the interpretation through all the branches and minutest fibres of the narrative," and in modern times, the followers of Coccius who are "particularly earnest in affirming all parts of a parable to be significant." On a review of the whole controversy, Trench comes to the conclusion that both theories, being one-sided, lean towards error; the advocates of the first mentioned scheme of interpretation being too easily satisfied with their favorite saying: Every comparison must halt somewhere; whilst those who would press all parts of a parable to the uttermost, have been wont to extort from it almost any meaning that they pleased. But he does not settle the principle upon which the contradiction is to be removed. Assuming that some circumstances are essential and others non-essential, he says it will help us to determine what is essential and what not, "if, before we attempt to explain the particular parts, we obtain fast hold of the central truth which the parable would set forth, and distinguish it in the mind as sharply and accurately as we can from all cognate truths that border upon it; for only seen from that middle point will the different points appear in their true light."* The principle here laid down by Mr. Trench is undoubtedly true and all-important; yet it does not of itself suffice to meet the difficulties involved in the question. The question, we believe, may be met more satisfactorily from a different point of observation.

The question as to which circumstances have a spiritual meaning and should in consequence be pressed, and which not, proceeds upon an assumption which is not sustained by the nature of the parable. The assumption is that some circumstances are essential, whilst others are non-essential; and that essential circumstances have a spiritual meaning, and must be interpreted; whilst non-essential circumstances, having no special significance, should be passed by. Hence the great point to be settled in each case is: which are and which are not essential?

This assumption we can not regard as valid. Whether a circumstance is to be pressed or not, does not depend upon its relative importance. It depends upon the connection or sense in which it is considered. If regarded as a part of the narrative of the natural fact, or as a part of the external form of the parable, every circumstance, however minute and apparently trivial it may be, is to be considered; for each circumstance being part of a whole narrative, a true conception of the narrative can be formed only when every circumstance is included. Not any one or several prominent points, but all the circumstances taken together, those which are principal and those which are subordinate, those which are the turning points in the narrative and those which serve simply to fill out the details; all taken together as given in the parable, and each viewed in its relation both to the fundamental constituent and to all other subordinate parts, constitute the *form* of the parable. And it is the form as a whole, not one part or several parts to the exclusion of others, in which the spiritual meaning of the parable is expressed. To omit any details of the narrative is to mutilate its form; it is to have an incomplete view of the parable as given by our Lord; and an incomplete view of the parable is a bar to the correct understanding of its spiritual meaning; for there is no other medium of access to that meaning but the entire narrative. Hence, considered as parts of the narrative, we can make no distinction between essential and accidental circumstances in order to determine which are, and which are not, to be interpreted; but all must be taken into account and pressed, each in its due measure, that we may get a clear and full conception of the external form of the parable, without which a legitimate interpretation is impossible.

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* Notes on the Parables of our Lord, by Richard Chevenix Trench, p. 37.

In the parable of the Tares, the servants are directed to let the tares and the wheat grow together until the harvest, and are told that in the time of the harvest the householder will say to his servants, Gather ye together first the tares, and *bind them in bundles* to burn them: a little circumstance to which no part of the interpretation given by our Lord corresponds directly. Yet it is an integral part of the narrative; the true force of which may be distinctly traced in the interpretation: the Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall *gather* out of his kingdom all things that offend. (Matth. 13:41.) Without it the narrative, or the form of the parable, would be wanting in naturalness and completeness. It must, therefore, be duly considered in order to get a true and vivid conception of the whole natural fact in which a sublime truth pertaining to the kingdom of God is imaged forth.

In the parable of the Leaven, the woman hides the leaven in *three* measures of meal. In that of the Treasure Found, the man who finds the treasure, *hideth* it again, and sells all he has in order to buy the field. In that of the Net, the men *drew* the net, when full, to the shore, then *sat down*, and gathered the good into vessels and cast the bad away. In the parable of the Lost Sheep, the shepherd, when he had found the sheep, laid it on his *shoulders*, rejoicing. In that of the Lost Piece of Money, the woman lights a *candle*, *sweeps* the house and seeks diligently for the lost piece till she finds it. In that of the Good Samaritan, it is said that he bound up the man's wounds, pouring in *oil* and *wine*, and then put the wounded man on his own beast and brought him to an inn; and on the morrow when he departed he took out *two* pence and gave them to the host. In that of the Ten Virgins it is said, that while the bridegroom tarried they *all slumbered and slept.*—In each of these parables, we have one or more circumstances, apparently trivial, but really very significant—significant as parts of the external form of the parable. If significant as parts of the external form, they are also as parts of the parable itself; for matter and form, though they must not be confounded, must neither be violently separated and held asunder. These incidental circumstances are, therefore, to be regarded as necessary to the wholeness of the parable ; as much so as the tiny fibres are to the tap-root of the great oak; as the rough bark is to the majestic trunk; as the rind is to the luscious apple ; or as the handle is to the blade, or as the margin and interlinear spaces are to the printed page. To exclude the least one from view is to do violence to the symmetry and perfection of the parable as a whole.

Viewed, then, in this light, every circumstance is significant, and is to be pressed according to its relative position and importance. But when viewed with direct reference to the spiritual meaning of the parable, the case is very different. Then just the opposite is true. No circumstance, whatever be its fundamental or relative importance, is to be considered and pressed separately. A single constituent of the narrative, taken by itself or considered without proper reference to other constituents, has no significance at all. It has significance, in one sense, most certainly; all have without exception, as we have just maintained; but significance lies in a constituent or circumstance as an integral part of the narrative. Not under any other view of it. It is the *narrative as a whole* which is to be pressed; and to press the whole is to press each part according to the idea of the whole; but no part of the narrative is to be pressed at all, if separated from the whole, or considered singly, and then compared directly to some element of the spiritual meaning.

It is contrary, therefore, to the nature of the parable, and a violation of a necessary principle of sound interpretation, to take up all the circumstances one after another, consider each by itself, and thus seek to bring out some definite spiritual meaning corresponding to it; as though a series of circumstances in the narrative ran parallel to a series of elements in the spiritual meaning, each answering to the other respectively, and independently of the rest, from beginning to end. There is no such mechanical parallelism, a fact that has always been felt by interpreters whenever an attempt has been made to seek for spiritual significance in every circumstance. In the parable of the Widow and Unjust Judge, for example, which teaches the necessity of continual and importunate prayer, the relative position of the Judge corresponds to the relative position of God; but it is seen at once that certain circumstances can not be pressed; the Judge was unjust, and feared neither God nor man; and most certainly it can not be the design of our Lord even to imply that God is unholy and unjust. Christian consciousness repels the thought instinctively. Hence it is thought there must in every instance be a limit to the pressing of circumstances. We must stop somewhere. But where?

Thus we come back to the same question with which we opened our enquiry into this part of the general subject: How shall we decide which parts of the narrative have a spiritual meaning, and which not? We must answer in effect as we did before. If the idea of the parable, as we have unfolded it, be correct, it follows that the question itself is not valid. There is an error underlying it. It assumes that, whilst the parallelism, of which we have just spoken, is not complete, it nevertheless exists, and that there must consequently be some circumstances in the narrative, each of which runs parallel to, and is designed to express some corresponding spiritual meaning—some circumstances which are to be interpreted, not in strict subordination to the fundamental constituent, but each in a measure for itself. This method, however, can not, it is held, be pursued as regards every particular; it can not be applied to incidental circumstances; for it is undoubted that a spiritual meaning can not be found for every minute point in the narrative. This is the assumption which underlies the difficult question—an assumption that is contrary to what we believe to be the true idea of the parable; and therefore we must hold it to be unwarranted. And if unwarranted, there is no room for the question. The question can not consistently be put; for since it is the narrative *as a whole*, which embodies the spiritual meaning, it follows that no constituent has a meaning when considered irrespectively of its internal connection with the whole; but on the contrary, when regarded as an integral part of the narrative, and considered in its objective relation to the principle of the parable, every constituent or every little circumstance is significant.

The error underlying the question is accordingly of a two-fold character. On the one hand, it implies that some circumstances of the narrative correspond to some elements of the truth embodied, each to each respectively; and that the import of these circumstances is to be determined by tracing the direct resemblance between the two things, the outward and the inward, the natural and the supernatural. But if the view of the nature of the parable which we have unfolded be correct; and if it be true that there is a turning-point in the parable—a fundamental constituent in the narrative, and a central truth in the meaning, the two things being but different sides of the *principle* of the parable in the light of which all its subordinate parts are to be considered and understood; it must be conceded that the implication is unwarranted. No circumstances are to be subjected to such a method of interpretation. On the other hand, it implies that there may be some circumstances in every parable that have no meaning, and therefore have no bearing upon a sound interpretation. But if the parable be a whole; if all the parts are essential to an accurate and full conception of the narrative; and if the true meaning is to be drawn from the narrative *as a whole;* then this implication is unwarranted also. An interpretation will be incomplete to the extent that the modifying force of any one or more minute circumstances is disregarded. The leaves of a tree are a part of it as really as the trunk and the branches. No conception of a tree can be true that fails to include either attributes. So with the parable. To say of any thing in it: This has no meaning, is an arbitrary decision, and does violence to these gurgling fountains of heavenly wisdom.

It might now be asked, How shall interpretation be conducted on these principles? To answer the question fully would lead us into a longer discussion than we propose. A few general remarks instead must therefore suffice.—Bearing in mind that the parable is a unity developed from a two-fold principle, we must determine first of all what that principle is, namely, what is its external side or the fundamental constituent of the narrative, and what is its internal side or the central truth of the spiritual meaning. For both are essential parts of the principle. We proceed to consider each circumstance in the light of the fundamental constituent or main point, and in turn correct and complete our view of the main point according to the modifying force of *all* the circumstances, those which it is imagined can have no meaning at all having often a most important bearing on the sense of the narrative. The principle being two-fold, we lay hold of the central truth in the fundamental constituent, of the internal by means of the external side, and of necessity modify and complete our view of the central truth by whatever modifies and completes our view of the fundamental constituent. Then, looking at all the elements of the spiritual meaning in the light of the central truth, we aim at bringing out the meaning in its true proportions under the determinative influence of the whole narrative. The whole narrative, including every trivial circumstance, sustains a direct relation to the principle, and the principle governs the whole interpretation. Sustaining this relation as a part of the narrative, each circumstance has a bearing upon the unity and completeness of the spiritual meaning. Each one without exception, interpreted not by itself or in its own light, but as a part of the whole, serves in its objective connection with the principle to determine the precise and entire sense of the parable. Thus we get a distinct and comprehensive conception of the parabolic truth—a conception in which no subordinate part of the narrative either loses its modifying influence, or is raised beyond its proper relative position, but in which each possesses a degree of significance which is its due, and at the same time consistent with the controlling force of the central truth as apprehended through the organic unity of the natural fact—a conception in which no primary element of the spiritual import is depressed or too deeply shaded, and no secondary element is unduly elevated or seen in too strong a light, but in which the positive force of each element, or the distribution of light and shade, is normal, or according to the idea of the whole—a conception which is manifold yet one, a beautiful unity, the clear, accurate, full and true apprehension by the believing reason of a divine truth as revealed in a human figure of speech.

By way of illustration we may refer again to the parable of the Unjust Judge. The character of the judge is a circumstance which, some say, does not teach any thing; it can not be intended to set forth any attribute in the character of God ; and therefore an interpreter, it is thought, has nothing to do with it. This position would be correct on the assumption that the character of the judge must bear a direct resemblance to some corresponding element of the spiritual import. On the principles of interpretation however which we have laid down, the position is not tenable. Considered in its relation to the main point, namely, the pleading of the widow, the ungodly character of the judge is an important circumstance, and can not be disregarded without weakening the force of the parable. The purpose of the widow receives not the least support or encouragement from a judge who feared not God nor regarded man ; the tendency of his character, on the contrary, is to repel her from his presence and repress even the thought of approaching him. She comes nevertheless and pleads. Thus this circumstance serves to set forth in strong relief the fixed purpose of the widow to gain her end by a persevering importunity that would not be conquered or exhausted by repeated and stern refusals. The parable teaches, accordingly, that—assuming the matter prayed for to be according to the divine will—the resolution of true faith to be heard, and earnest perseverance in the repetition of the same prayer, are acceptable and available before Almighty God. Not only are faith, humility, submission and earnestness requisites in prayer ; but an unchangeable purpose and perseverance, that will listen to no denial, also constitute a necessary part of that effectual, fervent prayer ot a righteous man that availeth much. A remarkable instance of such sublime determination to be heard we have in the wrestling of Jacob. (Gen. 32 : 24–26.) Jacob was left alone ; and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day. And when he saw that he prevailed not against him, he touched the hollow of his thigh ; and the hollow of Jacob's thigh was out of joint, as he wrestled with him. And he said, Let me go, for the day breaketh. And he said, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me.

It would be in order now to pass to the consideration of the *third* particular principle of interpretation. But as we do not wish to exceed the usual limits of an article, we will conclude simply by stating the principle instead of discussing it. It pertains to the *immediate object* of interpretation, or to that upon which, strictly speaking, a legitimate interpretation of the parable must terminate. It is the office of an interpreter to lay out its import—*not its literal, but its spiritual meaning.* In the light of the true idea of the parable, this principle may be said to be self evident ; yet in view of the frequency with which it is violated by learned interpreters, it is important to state it formally and even to discuss it.

On these particular principles, which follow as postulates from the idea of the parable, a legitimate interpretation is required to proceed. If logically applied from beginning to end, the hidden spiritual import can be developed in all its depth and fulness. If not logically applied, a legitimate interpretation is impossible. The truth of the parable is but partially developed, or it is perverted, or remains concealed altogether as a necessary consequence.

E. V. G.

ART. VI.—THE ASCETIC SYSTEM.

BY asceticism * we mean, in general, a rigid outward self-discipline, by which the spirit strives after full dominion over the flesh, and a superior grade of virtue. It includes not only that true temperance and restraining of the animal appetites, which is a universal Christian duty, but total abstinence from enjoyments in themselves lawful, from wine, animal food, property, and marriage, together with all kinds of penances and mortifications of the body. In the union of the abstractive and penitential elements, or of self-denial and self-punishment the catholic asceticism stands forth complete in light and shade; exhibiting, on the one hand, wonderful examples of heroic renunciation of self and the world, but very often, on the other, a total misapprehension and perversion of Christian morality; the renunciation involving more or less a Gnostic contempt of the gifts and ordinances of the God of nature, and the penance or self-punishment running into practical denial of the all-sufficient merits of Christ. The ascetic and monastic tendency rests primarily upon a lively, though for the most part morbid sense of the sinfulness of the flesh and the irremediable corruption of the world; then upon the desire for undisturbed solitude and exclusive occupation with divine things; and finally, upon a certain religious ambition to attain extraordinary holiness and merit. It would anticipate the life of angels † upon the earth. It substitutes an abnormal, self-appointed virtue and piety for the normal forms prescribed by God; and not rarely looks

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* Ασκησις, from ασκεω, to exercise, to strengthen; primarily applied to athletic and gymnastic exercises, but used also, even by the heathens and by Philo, of moral self-discipline.

† Matth. 22: 30. Hence the frequent designation of monastic life as a vita angelica.

down upon the divinely-ordained standard with spiritual pride. It is a mark at once of moral strength and moral weakness. It presumes a certain degree of culture, in which man has emancipated himself from the powers of nature and risen to the consciousness of his moral calling; but thinks to secure itself against temptation only by entire separation from the world, instead of standing in the world to overcome it and transform it into the kingdom of God.

Asceticism is by no means limited to the Christian Church, though it there first developed its highest and noblest form. We observe kindred phenomena even long before Christ; among the Jews, in the Nazarites, the Essenes, and the cognate Therapeutae; and still more among the heathens, in the old Persian and Indian religions, especially among the Buddhists. Even the Grecian Philosophy was conceived by the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and the Stoics, not as theoretical knowledge merely, but also as practical wisdom, and frequently joined itself to the most rigid abstemiousness, so that "philosopher" and "ascetic" were interchangeable terms. Most of the apologists of the second century had by this practical philosophy, particularly the Platonic, been led to Christianity; and they on this account retained their simple dress and mode of life. Tertullian congratulates the philosopher's cloak on having now become the garb of a better philosophy. In the show of self-denial the Cynics, the followers of Diogenes, went to the extreme; but these, at least in their later degenerate days, concealed under the guise of bodily squalor, untrimmed nails, and uncombed hair, a common Cynic spirit and a bitter hatred of Christianity.

In the ancient Church there was a special class of Christians, of both sexes, who, under the name of "ascetics," or "abstinents,"* though still living in the midst of the community, retired from society, voluntarily renounced marriage and property, devoted themselves wholly to fast-ings, prayer, and religious contemplation, and strove thereby to attain Christian perfection. Sometimes they formed a society of their own,* for mutual improvement, an ecclesiola in ecclesia, in which even children could be received and trained to abstinence. They shared with the confessors the greatest regard from their fellow Christians, had a separate seat in the public worship, and were considered the fairest ornaments in the Church. In times of persecution they sought with enthusiasm a martyr's death as the crown of perfection. While as yet each congregation was a lonely oasis in the desert of the world's corruption, and stood in downright opposition to the surrounding heathen world, these ascetics had no reason for separating from it and flying into the desert. It was under Constantine, and partly in consequence of the union of Church and State, the consequent transfer of the world into the Church, and the cessation of martyrdom, that asceticism developed itself to anchoretism and monkery, and endeavored thus to save the virgin purity of the Church by carrying it into the wilderness. Yet the lives of the two first hermits, Paul of Thebes (†340) and Anthony of Egypt (†356), fall, at least partly, in the ante-Nicene age. At the time of Cyprian† there was as yet no absolutely binding vow. The early origin and wide spread of this ascetic life are due to the deep moral earnestness of Christianity and the prevalence of sin in all the social relations of the then still thoroughly pagan world. It was the excessive development of the negative, world-rejecting element in Christianity, which must precede its positive effort to transform and sanctify the world.

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*Ασκηται, continentes; also παρθενοι, virgines.

The ascetic principle, however, was not confined, in its influence, to the proper ascetics and monks. It ruled more or less the entire morality and piety of the ancient and mediaeval Church; though, on the other hand, there were never wanting in her bosom protests of the free, evangelical spirit against moral narrowness and excessive regard to outward works of the law. The ascetics were but the most consistent representatives of the old catholic piety, and were commended as such by the apologists to the heathens. They formed the spiritual aristocracy, the full bloom of the Church, and served especially as examples to the clergy.

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* Ασκητηριον.

† Epist. 62,

But we must now distinguish two different kinds of asceticism in Christian antiquity: a heretical and an orthodox.

The heretical asceticism, the beginnings of which are resisted in the New Testament itself,* meets us in the Gnostic and Manichaean sects. It is descended from Oriental and Platonic heathenism, and is based on a dualistic view of the world, a confusion of sin with matter, and a perverted idea of God and the creation. It places God and the world at irreconcilable enmity, derives the creation from an inferior being, considers the human body substantially evil, a product of the devil or the demiurge, and makes it the great moral business of man to rid himself of the same, or gradually to annihilate it, whether by excessive abstinence or by unbridled indulgence. Many of the Gnostics placed the fall itself in the first gratification of the sexual desire, which subjected man to the dominion of the Hyle.

The orthodox or catholic asceticism proceeds upon Christian views and upon a literal and overstrained construction of certain passages of Scripture. It admits, that all nature is the work of God and the object of his love, and asserts the divine origin and destiny of the human body, without which there could, in fact, be no resurrection, and hence no admittance to eternal glory. It therefore aims not to mortify the body, but perfectly to control and sanctify it. For the metaphysical dualism between spirit and matter, it substitutes the ethical conflict between the spirit and the flesh. But in practice it exceeds the simple and sound limits of the Bible, falsely substitutes the bodily appetites and affections or sensuous nature, as such, for the flesh, on the principle of selfishness, which resides in the soul as well as in the body, and thus, with all its horror of heresy, really joins in the Gnostic and Manichaean hatred of the body as the prison of the spirit. This comes out especially in the depreciation of marriage and the family life, this divinely appointed nursery of Church and State, and in excessive self-inflictions, to which the apostolic piety affords not the remotest parallel. The heathen Gnostic principle of separation from the world and from the body,[*] as a means of self-redemption, after being theoretically exterminated, stole into the Church by a back door of practice, directly in face of the Christian doctrine of the high destiny of the body, and perfect redemption through Christ.

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* 1 Tim. 4: 3., Col. 2: 16 sqq. Comp. Rom. 14.

The Alexandrian fathers first furnished a theoretical basis for this asceticism in the distinction, suggested even by the Pastor Hermae,[†] of a lower and a higher morality; a distinction, which, like that introduced at the same period by Tertullian, of mortal and venial sins,[‡] gave rise to many practical errors, and favored both moral laxity and ascetic extravagance. The ascetics, and afterwards the monks, formed a moral nobility, a spiritual aristocracy, above the common Christian people; as the clergy stood in a separate caste of inviolable dignity above the laity. Clement of Alexandria, otherwise remarkable for his elevated ethical views, requires of the Christian sage or gnostic, that he excel the plain Christians, not only by higher knowledge, but also by higher, emotionless virtue, and stoical superiority to all bodily conditions; and he inclines to regard the body, with Plato, as the grave and fetter[§] of the soul. How little he understood the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith, may be inferred from a passage in the Stromata, where he explains the word of Christ: "Thy faith has saved thee," as referring not to faith simply without good works, but to the Jews only, who lived according to the law; as if faith was something to be added to the good works instead of being the source and principle of the holy life. Origen† goes still further, and propounds quite distinctly the Catholic doctrine of works of supererogation‡; works not enjoined indeed in the gospel, yet recommended,‖ which were supposed to establish a peculiar merit and secure a higher degree of blessedness. He, who does only what is required of all, is an unprofitable servant;§ but he, who does more, who performs, for example, what Paul, in 1 Cor. 7: 25, merely recommends concerning the single state, or, like him, resigns his just claim to temporal renumeration for spiritual service, is called a good and faithful servant.¶ Among these works were reckoned martyrdom, voluntary poverty, and voluntary celibacy. All three, or at least the last two of these acts, in connection with the positive Christian virtues, belong to the idea of the higher perfection, as distinguished from the fulfilment of regular duties, or ordinary morality. To poverty and celibacy was afterwards added absolute obedience; and these three things were the main subjects of the consilia evangelica and the monastic vow.

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[*] Entweltlichung and Entleiblichung.

[†] Simil. V, 3 (p. 492 ed. Dressel): Si autem praeter ea quae mandavit Dominus aliquid boni adjeceris, majorem dignitatem tibi conquires, et honoratior apud Dominum eris, quam eras futurus.

[‡] Peccata irremissibilia and remissibilia, or mortalia and venialia.

[§] Ταφος, δεσμος.

The ground, on which these particular virtues were so strongly urged, is easily understood.

Property, which is so closely allied to the selfishness of man and binds him to the earth; and sexual intercourse, which brings out sensual passion in its greatest strength, and which nature herself covers with the veil of modesty;

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† In ep. ad Rom. C. III, ed. de la Rue IV, p. 507: Donec quis hoc tantum facit, quod *debet*, i. e., quae praecepta sunt, inutilis servus. Si autem *addas* aliquid ad praeceptum, tunc non jam inutilis servus eris, sed dicetur ad te: Euge serve bone et fidelis. Quid autem sit quod addatur praeceptis et *supra debitum* fiat, Paulus ap. dicit: De virginibus autem *praeceptum* Domini non habeo, *consilium* autem do, tanquam misericordiam assecutus a Domino (1 Cor. 7: 25). Hoc opus *super praeceptum* est. Et iterum *praeceptum* est, ut hi qui evangelium nunciant, de evangelio vivant. Paulus autem dicit, quia nullo horum usus sum: et *ideo* non inutilis erit servus, sed fidelis et prudens.

‡ Opera supererogatoria.

‖ Matth. 19: 21. Luke 24: 26. 1 Cor. 7: 8 sq. 25. Hence *consilia* evangelica, in distinction from *precepta*.

§ Luke 17: 10.

¶ Matth. 25: 21.

—these present themselves as the firmest obstacles to that perfection, in which God alone is our possession, and Christ alone our love and delight.

In these things the ancient heretics went to the extreme. The Ebionites made poverty the condition of salvation; the Gnostics either entirely prohibited marriage and procreation as a diabolical work, as in the case of Saturninus, Marcion, and the Encratites; or substituted for it the most shameless promiscuous intercourse, as in Carpocrates, Epiphanes, and the Nicolaitans.

The ancient Church, on the contrary, held to the divine institution of property and marriage, and was content to recommend the voluntary renunciation of these intrinsically lawful pleasures to the few elect, as means of attaining Christian perfection. She declares marriage holy, virginity more holy. But unquestionably even the church fathers so exalted the higher holiness of virginity, as practically to neutralize, or at least, seriously weaken, their assertion of the holiness of marriage. The Roman Church, in spite of the many Bible examples of married men of God from Abraham to Peter, can conceive no real holiness without celibacy, and therefore requires celibacy of its clergy without exception.

The recommendation of *voluntary poverty* was based on a literal interpretation of the Lord's advice to the rich young ruler, who had kept all the commandments from his youth up. "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me."* To this were added the actual examples of the poverty of Christ and his apostles, and the community of goods in the first Christian Church at Jerusalem. Many Christians, not of the ascetics only, but also of the clergy, like Cyprian, accordingly gave up all their property at their conversion for the benefit of the poor. The later monastic societies sought to represent in their community of goods the original equality and the perfect brotherhood of men. Yet on the other hand, Clement of Alexandria for example, in a special treatise on the right use of wealth,[†] observes, that the Saviour forbade not so much the possession of earthly property, as the love of it and desire for it; and that it is possible to retain the latter, even though the possession itself be renounced. The earthly, says he, is a material and a means for doing good, and the unequal distribution of property is a divine provision for the exercise of Christian love and beneficence. The true riches are the virtue, which can and should maintain itself under all outward conditions; the false are the mere outward possession, which comes and goes.

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* Matth. 19 : 21.

The old Catholic exaggeration of *celibacy* attached itself to four passages of Scripture, viz: Matth. 19: 12; 22; 30; 1 Cor. 7: 7, sqq; and Rev. 14: 4; but it went far beyond them, and unconsciously admitted influences from foreign modes of thought. The words of the Lord in Matth. 22: 30, Luke 20: 35 sq., which, however, expressly limit unmarried life to the angels, without setting it up as the model for men,—were most frequently cited. Rev. 14: 4 was taken by some of the fathers more correctly in the symbolical sense of freedom from the pollution of idolatry. The example of Christ, though often urged, cannot here furnish a rule, for the Son of God and Saviour of the world, was too far above all the daughters of Eve, to find an equal companion among them, and in any case cannot be conceived as holding such relation. The whole Church of the redeemed is his pure bride. Of the apostles some at least were married, and among them Peter, the oldest and most prominent of all. The advice of Paul in 1 Cor. 7, is so cautiously given and guarded that even here the view of the fathers found but partial support; especially if balanced with the Pastoral Epistles, where monogamy is presented as the proper condition for the clergy. Nevertheless he was frequently made the apologist of celibacy by orthodox and heretical writers. Judaism—with the exception of the paganizing

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[†] Τις ο σοζωμενος πλουσιος

Essenes, who abstained from marriage—highly honors the family life; it allows marriage even to the priests and the high-priests, who had in fact to maintain their order by physical reproduction, and it considers unfruitfulness a shame or a curse. Heathenism, on the contrary, just because of its own degradation of woman, and its low, sensual conception of marriage, frequently includes celibacy in its ideal of morality, and associates it with worship. The noblest form of heathen virginity appears in the six Vestal virgins of Rome, who, while girls of from six to ten years, were selected for the service of the pure goddess, and set to keep the holy fire burning on her altar, but, after serving thirty years, were allowed to return to secular life and marry. The penalty for breaking their vow of chastity was, to be buried alive in the campus sceleratus.

The ascetic depreciation of marriage is thus due, at least in part, to the influence of heathenism. But with this was associated the Christian enthusiasm for angelic purity, in opposition to the horrible licentiousness of the Graeco-Roman world. It was long before Christianity raised woman and the family life to the purity and dignity, which became them in the kingdom of God. In this view we may the more easily account for many expressions of the church fathers respecting the female sex, and warnings against intercourse with women, which to us, in the present state of European and American civilization, sound perfectly coarse and unchristian. John of Damascus has collected in his Parallels such patristic expressions as these: "A woman is an evil." "A rich woman is a double evil." "A beautiful woman is a whited sepulchre." "Better is a man's wickedness, than a woman's goodness." The men, who could write so, must have forgotten the beautiful passages to the contrary in the proverbs of Solomon and Sirach; they must have forgotten their own mothers.

The excessive regard for celibacy and the accompanying depreciation of marriage, date from about the middle of the second century, and reach their height in the Nicene age.

Ignatius, in his Epistle to Polycarp, expresses himself as yet very moderately: "If any one can remain in chastity of the flesh to the glory of the Lord of the flesh (or, according to another reading, of the flesh of the Lord), let him remain thus without boasting; if he boast, he is lost, and if it be made known, beyond the bishop,* he is ruined." What a stride from this to the obligatory celibacy of the clergy! Yet the admonition leads us to suppose, that celibacy was thus early, in the beginning of the second century, in many cases boasted of as meritorious, and allowed to nourish spiritual pride. Ignatius is the first to call voluntary virgins brides of Christ and jewels of Christ.

Justin Martyr goes further. He points to many Christians of both sexes, who lived to a great age unpolluted; and he desires celibacy to prevail to the greatest possible extent. He refers to the example of Christ, and expresses the singular opinion, that the Lord was born of a virgin only to put a limit to the sexual desire, and to show, that God could produce without the sensual agency of man. His disciple Tatian ran even to the Gnostic extreme upon this point, and in a lost work on Christian perfection, condemned conjugal co-habitation as a fellowship of corruption destructive of prayer. At the same period, Athenagoras wrote, in his Apology: "Many may be found among us, of both sexes, who grow old unmarried, full of hope, that they are in this way more closely united to God."

Clement of Alexandria is the most reasonable of all the fathers in his views on this point. He considers eunuchism a special gift of divine grace, but without yielding it on this account unqualified preference above the married state. On the contrary, he vindicates with great decision the moral dignity and sanctity of marriage against the heretical extravagances of his time, and lays down the general principle, that Christianty stands not in outward observances, enjoyments, and privations, but in righteousness and peace of heart. Of the Gnostics he says, that, under the fair name of abstinence, they act impiously towards the creation and the holy Creator, and repudiate marriage and procreation on the ground, that a man should not introduce others into the world to their misery, and provide new nourishment for death. He justly charges them with inconsistency, in despising the ordinances of God, and yet enjoying the nourishment created by the same hand, breathing his air, and abiding in his world. He rejects the appeal to the example of Christ; because Christ needed no help, and because the Church is his bride. The apostles also he cites against the impugners of marriage. Peter and Philip begat children; Philip gave his daughters in marriage; and even Paul hesitated not to speak of a female companion (rather only of his right to lead about such an one, as well as Peter). We seem translated into an entirely different, Protestant atmosphere, when in this genial writer we read: The perfect Christian, who has the Apostles for his patterns, proves himself truly a man in this, that he chooses not a solitary life, but marries, begets children, cares for the household, yet under all the temptations, which his care for wife and children, domestics and property presents, swerves not from his love to God, and as a Christian householder exhibits a minature of the all-ruling Providence.

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* *Εαν γνωσθη πλην του επισκοπου*, according to the larger Greek recension, c. 5., With which the Syriac (c. 2) and Armenian versions agree. But the shorter Greek recension reads πλεον for πλην, which would give the sense: "If he think himself (on that account) above the (married) bishop; si majorem se episcopo censeat."

But how little such views agreed with the spirit of that age, we see in Clement's own Stoical and Platonizing conception of the physical appetites, and still more in his great disciple Origen, who voluntarily disabled himself in his youth, and could not think of the act of generation as any thing but polluting. Hieracas, who also perhaps belonged to the Alexandrian school, is said to have carried his asceticism to a heretical extreme, and to have declared virginity a condition of salvation. Methodius was an opponent of the spiritualistic, but not of the ascetic Origen, and wrote an enthusiastic plea for virginity, founded on the idea of the Church as the pure, unspotted, ever young, and ever beautiful bride of God. Yet, quite remarkably, in his

“Feast of the Ten Virgins,’ the virgins express themselves respecting the sexual relations with a minuteness, which to our modern taste is extremely indelicate and offensive.

As to the Latin fathers, Tertullian, although himself married, placed celibacy above marriage as a higher degree of sanctity, represents marriage more as a concession which God made to the weakness of our flesh, and, in his Montanistic period, most vehemently combatted second marriage as a decent form of adultery and fornication. His disciple, Cyprian, differs from him in his ascetic principles only by greater moderation in expression, and, in his treatise De habitu virginum, commends the unmarried life on the ground of Matth. 19 : 12; 1 Cor. 7., and Rev. 14 : 4.

Celibacy was most common with pious virgins, who married themselves only to God or to Christ,[*] and in the spiritual delights of this heavenly union found abundant compensation for the pleasures of earthly matrimony. But cases were not rare, where sensuality thus violently suppressed, asserted itself under other forms; as, for example, in indolence and ease at the expense of the Church, which Tertullian finds it necessary to censure; or in the vanity and love of dress, which Cyprian rebukes; and, worst of all in a venture of asceticism, which probably often enough resulted in failure, or at least filled the imagination with impure thoughts. Many of these heavenly brides[†] lived with male ascetics, and especially with unmarried clergymen, under pretext of a purely spiritual fellowship, in so intimate intercourse, as to put their continence to the most perilous test, and wantonly challenge temptation from which we should rather pray to be kept. This unnatural and shameless practice was probably introduced by the Gnostics; Irenaeus at least charges it upon them. The first trace of it in the Church appears, though under rather innocent allegorical form, in the Pastor Hermae, which originated from the Roman Church.[‡] It is next mentioned in the Pseudo-Clementine Epistles ad Virgines. In the third century it prevailed widely in the east and west. The worldly-minded bishop Paulus, of Antioch, favored it by his own example. Cyprian of Carthage came out earnestly, and with all reason, against the vicious practice, in spite of the solemn protestation of innocence by these sorores, and their appeal to investigations through midwives. Several councils, at Elvira, Ancyra, Nice, &c., felt called upon to forbid this pseudo-ascetic scandal. Yet the intercourse of clergy with "mulieres subintroductae" rather increased than diminished with the increasing stringency of the celibate laws, and has at all times more or less disgraced the Romish priesthood.

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[*] Nuptae Deo, Christo.

[†] Αδελφαι, sorores (1 Cor. 9: 5); afterwards cleverly called γυναικες συνεισακτοι, mulieres subintroductae, extraneae.

[‡] Simil. IX. c. 11 (in Dressel, p. 627.)

It is not our intention here to follow the further development of the ascetic system through the Nicene and the Middle ages; for this would imply a whole history of anchoretism, monasticism, and the celibacy of the clergy in the Greek and Roman Church. We merely intended to trace its origin and to exhibit it in its primitive form under its good and bad aspects.

With all its morbid excesses and corruptions, the ascetic system must be admitted by the impartial historian to have fulfiled a great and important mission in the past. It asserted the uncompromising antagonism of Christian morality against the awful corruption of the old heathen world as centring in its absorbing worldliness and sensuality; it developed the negative aspect of this morality, its intense capacity of self-denial and abstinence; and it was used by Providence as one of the most efficient means to prepare the barbarian nations of the middle ages for Christianity and civilization.

This mission accomplished, the Church had to enter upon the higher duty of transforming and sanctifying all the divinely appointed relations and conditions of man, by the positive principle of Christian ethics and to penetrate the whole lump of society by its leaven-like power. This is the Protestant evangelical system of morality which we are bound to hold fast and to carry out untempted by the allurements of the artificial show of ascetic hypo-holiness. It agrees with the inmost spirit of the New Testament, which every where goes hand in hand and in the vane of the westward and onward march of the Protestant religion. It agrees likewise with an enlightened moral philosophy, which is most extensively cultivated in the bosom of Protestantism. Christianity, we should never forget, starts with the regeneration of the soul and ends with the resurrection of the body; it is in its inmost nature, not law and work, but gospel and faith, not letter and slavery, but spirit and freedom, not irrational and unnatural, but superrational and supernatural. The God of grace is also the God of nature; the Head of the Church is also the Ruler of the world; Christ is not a hermit and a saint of the desert, but the absolute ideal of human perfection, the eternal priest and king of the regenerate race, and the living centre of the moral universe.

P. S.

Mercersburg, Pa., Sept., 1858.

ART. VII.—THE INFLUENCE OF THE EARLY CHURCH ON THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY.

HEATHENISM, even under its most enlightened form, has no idea whatever of the general and natural rights of men. The ancient republics of Greece and Rome consisted in the exclusive dominion of a minority over a hopelessly oppressed majority. Both the Greeks and Romans regarded only the free, i. e., the free-born rich and independent citizens as men in the full sense of the term, and denied this privilege to the foreigners, the laborers, the poor, and the slaves. They claimed the natural right to make war upon all foreign nations, without distinction of race, in order to subject them to their iron rule. Even with Cicero the foreigner and the enemy are synonymous terms. The barbarians were taken in thousands by the chance of war (above 100,000 in the Jewish war alone) and sold as cheap as horses. Besides, an active slave-trade was carried on, particularly in the Euxine, the eastern provinces, the coast of Africa, and Britain. It may be safely asserted that the greater part of mankind in the old Roman empire was reduced to a hopeless state of slavery, and to a half brutish level.

Attica numbered, according to Ctesicles, under the governorship of Demetrius the Phalerian (309 B. C.) 400,000 slaves, 10,000 foreigners, and only 21,000 free citizens. In Sparta the disproportion was still greater. As to the Roman empire, Gibbon estimates the number of slaves, under the reign of Claudius, at no less than one half of the entire population, i. e., about sixty millions.* But according to Robertson there were twice as many slaves as free citizens, and Blair† estimates over three slaves to one freeman, between the conquest of Greece (146 B. C.) and the reign of Alexander Severus (A. D. 222–235). The proportion was of course very different in the cities and in the rural districts.

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* I. 52 ed. Milman, N. Y., 1850.

† In his work on Roman slavery, Edinb., 1833. p. 15.

Athaenaeus, as quoted by Gibbon, (p. 51) boldly asserts that he knew very many (*παμπολλοι*) Romans who possessed, not for use, but ostentation, ten and even twenty thousand slaves. In a single palace at Rome four hundred slaves were maintained, and were all executed for not preventing their master's murder.‡ The legal condition of the slaves is thus described by Taylor on *Civil Law*:‖ "Slaves were held *pro nullis, pro mortuis, pro quadrupedibus;* nay, were in a much worse state than any cattle whatsoever. They had no head in the state, no name, no title, or register; they were not capable of being injured; nor could they take by purchase or descent; they had no heirs, and therefore could make no will; they were not entitled to the rights and considerations of matrimony; and therefore had no relief in case of adultery; nor were they proper objects of cognation or affinity, but of quasi-cognation only; they could be sold, transferred, or pawned, as goods or personal estate, for goods they were, and as such they were esteemed; they might be tortured for evidence, punished at the discretion of their lord, and even put to death by his authority; together with many other civil incapacities which I have no room to enumerate." Gibbon (p. 48) thinks that "against such internal enemies, whose desperate insurrections had more than once reduced the republic to the brink of destruction, the most severe regulations and the most cruel treatment seemed almost justifiable by the great law of self-preservation." It is but just to remark, that the philosophers of the first and second century, Seneca, Pliny, and Plutarch, entertain much milder views on this subject than the older writers, and commend a humane treatment of the slaves; also that the Antonines improved their condition to some extent, and took the oft abused jurisdiction of life and death over the slaves out of private hands into those of the magistrates. But at that time Christian principles and sentiments already freely circulated throughout the empire, and exerted a silent influence even over the educated heathens. This unconscious atmospheric influence, so to speak, is continually exerted by Christianity over the surrounding world, which without this would be far worse than it actually is.

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‡ Tacit. Annal. XIV. 43.

‖ As quoted in Cooper's *Justinian*, p. 411.

This evil of slavery was so thoroughly interwoven with the entire domestic and public life of the heathen world, and so deliberately regarded, even by the greatest philosophers, Aristotle, for instance, as natural and indispensable, that the abolition of it seemed to belong among the impossible things.

Yet from the outset Christianity has labored for this end; not by impairing the right of property, not by outward violence, nor sudden revolution ; this, under the circumstances, would only have made the evil worse ; but by its moral power, by preaching the divine character and original unity of all men, their common redemption through Christ, the duty of brotherly love, and the true freedom of the spirit. It placed slaves and masters on the same footing of dependence on God and of freedom in God, the Father, Redeemer, and Judge of both. It conferred inward freedom even under outward bondage, and taught obedience to God and for the sake of God, even in the enjoyment of outward freedom. This moral and religious freedom must lead at last to the personal and civil liberty of the individual ; since Christianity redeems not only the soul but the body also, and the process of regeneration ends in the resurrection and glorification of the entire natural world.

In the early Church, however, the abolition of slavery, save in isolated cases of manumission, was utterly out of question, considering only the enormous number of the slaves. The question was not agitated at all, and hardly referred to by the fathers. From this an abolitionist of the modern stamp would at once be disposed to infer that the early Church silently acquiesced in and sanctioned an institution which he honestly abhors as a fruitful source of innumerable evils. But such a conclusion and charge would be manifestly unfair and unjust. It must be remembered that it takes time to cure any evil of society, and that a gradual and silent cure is always the most safe and radical in the end. The world, at that time, was far from ripe for such a step, as a general emancipation. The Church, in her persecuted condition, had as yet no influence at all over the machinery of the State and the civil legislation. And she was at that time so absorbed in the transcendant importance of the higher world and in her longing for the speedy return of the Lord, that she cared very little for any earthly freedom or temporal happiness. Hence Ignatius, in his epistle to Polycarp, counsels servants to serve only the more zealously to the glory of the Lord, that they may receive from God the higher freedom; and not to attempt to be redeemed at the expense of their Christian brethren, lest they be found slaves to their own caprice. From this we see that slaves, in whom faith awoke the sense of manly dignity and the desire of freedom, were accustomed to demand their redemption at the expense of the Church, as a right, and were thus liable to value the earthly freedom more than the spiritual. Hence the apostolic father's admonition, which seems to be rather inconsistent with the advice of St. Paul: "If thou mayest be free, use it rather; for he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman."* Tertullian declares the outward freedom worthless without the inward, without the ransom of the soul from the bondage of sin. "How can the world," says he, "make a servant free? All is mere show in the world, nothing truth. For the slave is already free, as a purchase of Christ; and the freedman is a servant of Christ. If thou takes the freedom which the world can give for true, thou hast thereby become again the servant of man, and hast lost the freedom of Christ, in that thou thinkest it bondage." Chrysostom, in the fourth century, was the first of the fathers to discuss the question of slavery at large in the spirit of the apostle Paul, and to recommend, though cautiously, a gradual emancipation.

But the church before Constantine labored already with great success to improve the intellectual and moral condition of the slaves, to adjust inwardly the inequality between slaves and masters, as the first and efficient step towards the final outward abolition of the evil, and to influence the public opinion even of the heathens, as may be seen in the milder view of a Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, and the latter legislation concerning the treatment of this unfortunate class of men.

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* 1 Cor. vii. 21, 22.

It is here to be considered, first of all, that Christianity spread freely among the slaves, except where they were so extremely rude as to be insensible to all higher impressions; and that they were not rarely the instruments of the conversion of their masters, especially of the women and children, whose training was frequently intrusted to them. Not a few slaves died martyrs, and were enrolled among the saints; Onesimus, for example, Eutychus, Victorinus, Maro, Nereus, Achilleus, Potamiaena, and others. An ancient tradition makes Onesimus, the slave of Philemon, bishop of Beroea, in Macedonia.* According to the account of the author of the "Philosophoumena" even a Roman bishop, Calixtus I., in the early part of the third century, was originally a slave. Celsus cast it up as a reproach to Christianity, that it let itself down so readily to slaves, fools, women, and children. But Origen justly saw an excellence of the new religion in this very fact, that it could raise this despised and, in the prevailing view, irreclaimable class of men to the level of moral purity and worth. If, then, converted slaves, with the full sense of their intellectual and religious superiority, still remained obedient to their heathen masters, and even served them more faithfully than before, resisting decidedly only their immoral demands (like Potamiaena, and other chaste women and virgins in the service of voluptuous masters),—they showed, in this very self-control, the best proof of their ripeness for civil freedom, and at the same time furnished the fairest memorial of that Christian faith, which raised the soul, in the enjoyment of sonship, with God and in the hope of the blessedness of heaven, above the sufferings and the conflicts of earth. Euelpistes, a slave of the imperial household, who was carried with Justin Martyr to the tribunal of Rusticus, on being questioned concerning his condition, replied: "I am a slave of the emperor, but I am also a Christian, and have received liberty from Jesus Christ; by his grace I have the same hope as my brethren." Where the owners of the slaves themselves became Christians, the old relation virtually ceased: both came together to the table of the Lord, and felt themselves brethren of one family, in striking contrast with the condition of things among their heathen neighbors as expressed in the current proverb: "As many enemies as slaves."* That there actually were such cases of fraternal fellowship, like that which St. Paul recommended to Philemon, we have the testimony of Lactantius, at the end of our period, who writes in his Institutes,† no doubt from life: "Should any say: Are there not also among you poor and rich, servants and masters, distinctions among individuals? No; we call ourselves brethren for no other reason, than that we hold ourselves all equal. For since we measure everything human not by its outward appearance, but by its intrinsic value, we have, notwithstanding the difference of outward relations, no slaves, but we call them and consider them brethren in the Spirit and fellow-servants in religion." The same writer says: "God would have all men equal.‡ . . . With him there is neither servant nor master. If he is the same Father to all, they are all with the same right free. So no one is poor before God, but he who is destitute of righteousness; no one rich, but he who is full of virtues."

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* According to the Apost. Constitutions VII. 46, St. Paul himself ordained and installed him as bishop over that congregation But the Roman Martyrologium makes him successor of Timothy at Ephesus.

Such views must lead us to presume, that even in this early period instances of actual manumission among Christian slave-owners were not rare. And we read, in fact, in the Acts of the martyrdom of the Roman bishop Alexander, that a Roman prefect, Hermas, converted by that bishop, in the reign of Trajan, received baptism at an Easter festival with his wife and children and twelve hundred and fifty slaves, and on this occasion gave all his slaves their freedom and munificent gifts besides.|| So in the martyrology of St. Sebastian, it is related that a wealthy Roman prefect, Chromatius, under Diocletian, on embracing Christianity,, emancipated fourteen hundred slaves, after having them baptized with himself, because their sonship with God put an end to their servitude to man.* In the beginning of the fourth century St. Cantius, Cadtianus, and Cantianilla, of an old Roman family, set all their slaves, seventy-three in number, at liberty, after they had received baptism.† These traditions may indeed be doubted as to the exact facts in the case ; but they are nevertheless conclusive for our purpose as the exponents of the spirit which animated the Church at that time concerning the duty of Christian masters. It was felt that in a thoroughly Christianized society there can be no room for despotism on the one hand and slavery on the other. Since the third century the manumission became a solemn act, which took place in the presence of the clergy and the congregation. The master led the slave to the altar; there the document of emancipation was read, the minister pronounced the blessing, and the congregation received him as a free brother with equal rights and privileges. Constantine found his custom already established, and African councils of the fourth century requested the emperor to give it general force.

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* Totidem esse hostes, quot servos.—Seneca, Ep. 47.

† Lib. v. c. 15 (ed. Fritzsche. Lips. 1842, p. 257).

‡ Inst. v. 14 (p. 257): Deus enim, qui homines generat et inspirat, omnes aequos, id est pares esse voluit; eandem conditionem vivendi omnibus posuit; omnes ad sapientian genuit; omnibus immortalitatem spopondit, nemo a beneficiis coelestibus segregatur. . . Nemo apud eum servus est, nemo dominus; si enim cunctis idem Pater est, aequo jure omnes liberi sumus.

Mercersburg, Pa. P. S.

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* Acta Sanct. Ian. tom. ii. p. 275. † Acta Sanct. Maj. tom. vi. p. 777.
|| Acta Sanct. Boll. Maj. tom. i. p. 371.

ART. VIII.—TERTULLIAN.

TERTULLIAN, the father of Latin theology and one of the most remarkable men of the early Church, was the son of a Roman officer and born about the middle of the second century, or fifty years after the close of the apostolic age, at Carthage in North Africa, the ancient rival city of Rome. Of his life we know nothing beyond what we can infer from his own works in connection with a few notices of Eusebius and Jerome. He received a liberal education; his writings manifest an extensive acquaintance with historical, philosophical, polite, and antiquarian literature, and with juridcial terminology and all the arts of an advocate. He seems to have devoted himself to politics and forensic eloquence, either in Carthage or in Rome. Eusebius calls him "a man accurately acquainted with the Roman laws," and many regard him as identical with the Tertyllus or Tertullianus, who is the author of several fragments in the Pandects.

To his thirtieth or fortieth year he lived in heathen blindness and licentiousness. Towards the end of the second century he embraced Christianity, we know not exactly on what occasion, but evidently from deepest conviction and with all the fiery energy of his soul; defended it thenceforth with fearless decision against heathens, Jews and heretics; and studied the strictest morality of life. His own words may be applied to himself: "Fiant, non nascuntur Christiani." He was married, and gives us a glowing picture of Christian family life; but in his zeal for every form of self-denial, he set celibacy still higher, and advised his wife, in case he should die before her, to remain a widow, and he afterwards put second marriage even on a level with adultery. He entered the ministry of the Catholic Church first probably in Carthage, perhaps in Rome, where at all events he spent some time; but like Clement of Alexandria and Origen, he never rose above the rank of presbyter.

Some years after (about 202), he joined the puritanic, though orthodox sect of the Montanists. Jerome attributes this change to personal motives, charging it to the envy and insults of the Roman clergy, from whom he himself experienced many an indignity. But Tertullian was inclined to extremes from the first, especially to moral austerity. He was no doubt attracted by the radical contempt for the world, the strict asceticism, the severe discipline, the martyr enthusiasm, and the millenarianism of the Montanists, and expelled by the growing conformity to the world in the Roman Church. This Church, we now accurately know from the Philosophoumena of Hippolytus, just at that period, under Zephyrinus and Callistus, openly took under its protection a very lax penitential discipline, and at the same time, though only temporally, favored the Patripassian error, which Praxeas, an opponent of the Montanists, brought to Rome. Of this man Tertullian therefore says, in his sarcastic way: He has executed in Rome two works of the devil, has driven out prophecy (the Montanistic) and brought in error (the Patripassian); has turned off the Holy Ghost and crucified the Father. Tertullian now fought the Catholics, or the psysicals, as he frequently calls them with the same inexorable sternness, with which he had combatted the heretics. The departures of the Montanists, however, related more to points of morality and discipline, than of doctrine; and with all his hostility to Rome, Tertullian remained a zealous advocate of the Catholic faith, and wrote, even from his schismatic position, several of his most effective works against the heretics, especially the Gnostics. Indeed, as a divine, he stood far above this fanatical sect, and gave it by his writings an importance and an influence on the Church itself, which it certainly would never otherwise have attained.

He labored in Carthage as a Montanist presbyter and an author, and died, as Jerome says, in decrepit old age, according to some, about the year 220, according to others, not till 240. His followers in Africa propagated themselves, under the name of "Tertullianists," down to the time of Augustine in the fifth century, and took perhaps a middle place between the proper Montanists and the Catholics. That he ever returned into the bosom of Catholicism, as Hippolytus, according to the later story of Prudentius did, is an entirely groundless opinion. Nor has the Roman Church ever received him into the number of her saints and fathers.

Strange, that this most powerful defender of old Catholic orthodoxy and the teacher of the high churchly Cyprian, should have been a schismatic and an antagonist of Rome! But with the Roman spirit he united in his constitution the acerbity of the Punic character. The same bold independence played in him, in which his native city, Carthage, once resisted, through a more than a hundred years' war, the rising power of the seven-hilled city on the Tiber. But in this he truly represents the African Church, in which a similar antagonism continued to reveal itself, not only among the Donatists, but even among the leading advocates of Catholicism. Cyprian died at variance with Rome on the question of heretical baptism; and Augustine, with all his great services to the Catholic system of faith, became at the same time, through his anti-Pelagian doctrine, the father of evangelical Protestantism and of semi-protestant Jansenism.

Tertullian was a rare genius, perfectly original and fresh, but angular, boisterous and eccentric; full of glowing fantasy, pointed wit, keen discernment, polemic dexterity, and moral earnestness, but wanting in logical clearness, calm consideration, and symmetrical development. Like almost all great men he combined strong contrarieties of character. He reminds one in many respects of Luther; though the Reformer had nothing of the ascetic gloom and rigor of the African father, and exhibits in stead, with all his gigantic energy, a kindly serenity and child-like simplicity altogether foreign to the latter. Tertullian dwells enthusiastically on the divine foolishness of the gospel and has a noble contempt for the world, for its science, and its arts, and for his own; and yet are his writings a mine of antiquarian knowledge and novel, striking, and fruitful ideas. He calls the Grecian philosophy the patriarch of all heresies, and scornfully asks: "What has the Academy to do with the Church? What has Christ to do with Plato? Jerusalem with Athens?" And yet reason does him invaluable service against his antagonists. He vindicates the principle of Church authority and tradition with great force and ingenuity against all heresy; yet when a Montanist, he claims for himself, with equal energy, the right of private judgment and individual protest. He has a vivid sense of the corruption of human nature and of the absolute need of moral regeneration; yet he declares the soul to be born Christian, and unable to find rest, except in faith. "The testimonies of the soul," says he "are as true as they are simple; as simple as they are popular; as popular as they are natural; as natural as they are divine." He is just the opposite of the equally genial, less vigorous, but more learned and comprehensive Origen. He adopts the strictest supernatural principles, and shrinks not from the "Credo quia absurdum est." At the same time he is a most decided realist, and attributes body, that is, as it were, a corporeal, tangible substantiality, even to God and the soul; while the idealistic Alexandrian cannot speak spiritually enough of God, and can conceive the human soul without and before the existence of body. Tertullian's theology revolves about the great Pauline antithesis of sin and grace, and breaks the road to the Latin anthropolgy and soteriology afterwards developed by his like-minded, but clearer, calmer and more considerate countryman Augustine. For his opponents, be they heathens, Jews, heretics, or Catholics, he has as little indulgence and regard as Luther. With the adroitness of a special pleader he entangles them in self-contradictions, pursues them into every nook and corner, overwhelms them with arguments, sophisms, apothegms, aud sarcasms, drives them before him with unmerciful lashings, and almost always makes them ridiculous and contemptible. His polemics every where leave marks of blood. His style is exceedingly characteristic, and corresponds with his thought. It is extremely condensed, abrupt, laconic, sententious, nervous, figurative, full of hyberbole, sudden turns, legal technicalities, African provincialisms, or rather antiquated Latinisms, Latinized Greek words, and new expressions; therefore abounding also in roughness, angles, and obscurities; sometimes like a grand volcanic eruption, belching precious stones and dross in strange confusion, or like the foaming torrent tumbling over the precipice of rocks and sweeping all before it. His mighty spirit wrestles with the form, and breaks its way through the primeval forest of natures' thinking. He had to create the Church language of the Latin tongue.

In short, we see in this remarkable man both intellectually and morally the fermenting of a new creation, not yet quite set free from the bonds of chaotic darkness in clear and beautiful order.

The writings of Tertullian are mostly short; but they are numerous, and touch almost all departments of religious life. They present a graphic picture of the Church of his day. The earlier ones which were written in Greek, are entirely lost, or extant only in Latin reproductions.

Most of his works according to internal evidence, fall in the first quarter of the third century, in the Montanistic period of his life; and among these many of his ablest writings against the heretics; while on the other hand, the gloomy moral austerity, which predisposed him to Montanism, comes out quite strongly, even in his earliest productions. His works may be grouped in three classes: apologetic, polemic or anti-heretical, and ethic; to which may be added as a fourth class, the expressly Montanistic tracts against the Catholics. We can here mention only the most important.

1. Pre-eminent among the apologetic works against

heathens and Jews is the Apologeticus, which was composed probably in the reign of Septimus Severus, about A. D., 200, and is unquestionably one of the most beautiful monuments of the heroic age of Christianity. In this work Tertullian enthusiastically and triumphantly repels the attacks of the heathens upon the new religion, and demands for it legal toleration and equal rights with the other sects of the Roman Empire;—the first plea for religious liberty.

2. His polemic works are occupied chiefly with the refutation of the Gnostics, particularly of Marcion (A. D. 208) and the Valentinians. In the ingenious and truly catholic tract "On the Prescription of Heretics," he cuts off all errors and neologies at the outset from all right of legal contest and appeal to the Holy Scriptures which belong only to the Catholic Church as the legitimate heir and guardian of Christianity. His forensic argument, however, turns also against Tertullian's own secession; for the difference between heretics and schismatics is really only relative, at least in Cyprian's view. Tertullian afterwards asserted, in contradiction with this book, that in religious matters not custom nor long possession, but truth alone, was to be consulted.

The works "On Baptism," "On the Soul," On the Flesh of Christ," "On the Resurrection of the Flesh," "Against Hermogenes," "Against Praxeas," are concerned with particular errors, and are important to the doctrine of baptism, to Christian psychology, to eschatology and christology.

3. His numerous practical ascetic treatises throw much light on the moral life of the early Church, as contrasted with the immorality of the heathen world. Among these belong the books "On Prayer," "On Penance," "On Patience,"—a virtue, which he extols with honest confession of his own natural impatience and passionate temper, and which he urges upon himself as well as others,—the consolation of the confessors in prison (Ad martyres), and the admonition against visiting theatres (De Spectaculis),

which he classes with the pomp of the devil, and against all share, direct, or indirect, in the worship of idols (De idololatria).

4. His strictly Montanistic writings in which the peculiarities of this sect are not only incidentally touched, but vindicated expressly and at large, are likewise of a practical nature, and contend, in fanatical rigor, against the restoration of the lapsed (De pudicitia), flight in persecution, second marriage (De monogamia, and De exhortatione castitatis), display of dress in females (De cultu feminarum), and other customs of the psysicals, as he commonly calls the Catholics in distinction from the sectarian pneumatics. His plea, also, for excessive fasting (De jejuniis), and his justification of a Christian soldier, who was discharged for refusing to crown his head (De corona militis), belong here. Tertullian considers it unbecoming the followers of Christ, who, when on earth wore a crown of thorns for us, to adorn their heads with laurel, myrtle, olive, or with flowers or gems. We may imagine what he would have said to the tiara of the pope at the height of his mediaeval power.

Mercersburg, Pa. P. S.

ART. IX.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. GERMANY.

IN Germany several works have appeared during the present year, which deserve attention.

DR. I. P. LANGE, Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn, has commenced, in connection with several other scholars, a Bible-work, under the title *Theologisch-homiletisches Bibelwerk,* which promises to become one of the richest and most valuable depositories of exegetical knowledge for Biblical students and especially also for ministers. It is intended to embrace gradually the whole New and Old Testaments, and to take the place of the well known extensive synopsis of Starcke, now long out of print and superseded by the labors of the present age. Each book, however, may also be bought separately. So far, the Gospel of St. Matthew only has appeared from the pen of Dr. Lange himself. It contains 458 large pages in double column, exclusive of thirty pages of introductory matter. The plan of the work combines the verbal, theological, and homiletical exegesis. First, we have a short analysis of the contents of each chapter, in small type; then a new translation of the text; next follows an explanation (*exegetische Erläuterungen*) of the several verses; then a succint statement of the doctrines or leading theological ideas of each section from the christological point of view (*dogmatisch-christologische Grundgedanken*); and finally homiletical hints (*homiletische Andeutungen*) for the practical application of the text, including skeletons of sermons of distinguished pulpit orators. The first part betrays an immense amount of labor. Dr. Lange is well prepared for such an undertaking by his preceding works on the Life of Christ, the Apostolic Age, and on didactic theology. He has a mind of unusual fertility and freshness and is thoroughly imbued with the Christian spirit. His exuberant imagination occasionally leads him astray into fanciful views, which cannot bear close examination; but he is never dull and always stimulates, even where the more sober reader must differ from him.

There is a prospect, that this important contribution to Biblical Literature will be translated into English by a minister of the German Reformed Church in this country, already well known to the public by a number of religious works. He will have an arduous journey before him, but one which promises to secure him the gratitude of Biblical students. As far as we know, there is no English commentary on the same plan and combining such a large amount of exegetical, doctrinal and homiletical information. If the book were not already sufficiently large, the homiletical part might be considerably improved by reference to eminent English sermonizers. But as it is, the question arises, whether a judicious condensation would not be preferable and more sure of success than a full translation.

Simultaneously with Lange's Commentary, we have the beginning of another large Bible-work by the celebrated Dr. BUNSEN, under the title: *Die Bibel, oder die Schriften des Alten und Neuen Bundes nach den überlieferten Grundtexten übersetzt und für die Gemeinde erklärt.* Erster Theil. Das Gesetz, Leipzig, 1858. It is calculated for eight large volumes. The first half of the first volume, the only one which has appeared thus far, contains a long Introduction of 394 large and splendid pages, and a new translation and commentary of the first 11 chapters of Genesis. Dr. Bunsen, formerly Prussian ambassador successively at Rome, Berne and London, and now living in literary retirement near Heidelberg, is, like Humboldt, unquestionably one of the most extensive scholars and interesting men of the age. He is almost an universal genius, having written largely on philology and criticism, Roman, Egyptian and Christian antiquities, history, philosophy, theology, politics, and passing questions of the day. The present work, on which he has been engaged more or less for the last forty years, is of such a character as necessarily to attract a great deal of attention, but also to solicit opposition from almost all the theological schools of Germany, with none of which it falls in. As we have received it but a few days ago from the kind hands of the author, it would be presumptuous to pass judgment on the merits of such a work before a more thorough examination. It is obvious, however, that from its size, its philosophical tone, and discussion of intricate, critical, hermeneutical and chronological questions, it will never be a book for the congregation according to the intention of the author, while it may have an important mission among the higher and educated classes in Germany, which have been so extensively alienated from the Christian faith in consequence of the late rationalistic apostacy. We sincerely hope it may rouse them from their religious indifferentism and apathy and lead them to the fresh fountain of eternal truth and life.

Dr. Herzog's *Protestant Theological Encyclopaedia* makes as rapid progress as the nature of such a work permits. The letter M is now nearly completed. But it will require, I should think, at least five more volumes to bring it to a close. The articles, as is the case in all encyclopaedical works by various authors, are of unequal merit, both as to scholarship and style. But with all its defects it is an invaluable depository of modern theological learning and will not soon be superseded.

Dr. Bomberger's condensed translation follows fast in the track of the original, the first volume, embracing about three of the German, being now finished. We are glad to see from the periodical press that it is so well received in all the leading denominations of the country.

The Paedagogical Encyclopaedia (*Encyclopaedie des gesammten Erziehungs-und Unterrichtswesens*) edited by Rector Schmidt of Ulm, and now in course of publication by the publishers of Herzog's work, is a very instructive and valuable book of reference to all who are interested in the subject of education in its various branches. We have received thus far four numbers of it. The first contains under "America," quite an intelligent and favorable account of the educational tendencies and institutions in the United States.

Dr. S. E. Osiander of Göppingen in Würtemberg, has published a *Commentary* on the *Second Epistle* of St. Paul to the *Corinthians,* Stuttgart, 1858. As far as we have examined it, it is quite a thorough critical work, and one of the very best on this difficult and important espistle.

Hefele's *Conciliengeschichte,* is a very valuable contribution to Church history, based upon the original sources and imparting solid and reliable information. The author is a Roman Catholic of the school of Möhler, and his successor as professor at Tübingen, but well versed in the recent German Protestant theology, to which he frequently and respectfully refers. He is known by his convenient and useful edition of the Apostolic Fathers. The Conciliengeschichte embraces also a full account of all the doctrinal and disciplinary controversies which occasioned the councils of the Church, and were decided by them. The first two volumes complete the history of the early Synods down to the fifth ecumenical Council in 553. The next two volumes which have not yet appeared, are to treat of the mediaeval councils including those of Pisa, Constance and Basel; and a fifth and last volume is to be devoted to the Council of Trent, which fixed the Roman Catholic system in its present shape and form and in its antagonism to Protestantism. Although the author is frequently biased by partiality to his own Church, still the influence of Protestant historiography is every where visible in the critical and comparatively liberal tone and in his frequent dissent from Baronius and the elder Roman Catholic historians.

From Dr. NITZSCH in Berlin we have a new work: *Academische Vorträge über die Christliche Glaubenslehre*, Berlin, Wiegandt & Grieben. 1858. It seems this venerable divine has occasionally delivered a course of lectures on Christian dogmatics to a mixed auditory of students from all faculties. The small volume before us is published from the notes taken by one of the hearers and revised by the author. It treats, therefore, the subject in more popular, yet original and vigorous style.

Dr. F. W. KRUMMACHER has commenced to issue a new series of pulpit discourses under the title "*Des Christen Wallfahrt nach der himmlischen Heimath*. Berlin. Wiegandt & Grieben. 1858.

The same publisher has issued this year a second and enlarged edition of Dr. *Schaff's* book on *America*, including the author's recent report to the Berlin meeting of the Evangelical Alliance on the state of religion in America.

2. AMERICA.

Essays in Biography and Criticism. By PETER BAYNE, M. A. Second Series. Boston. Gould & Lincoln. 1858.

Mr. Bayne, the successor, since 1857, of the lamented Hugh Miller, as editor of the "Edinburg Witness," the well known organ of the Free Church of Scotland, attracted first attention as an author by a work on "The Christian Life, Social and Individual," which had the good fortune of being favorably noticed by Hugh Miller in 1855. Since that time he has come out with two series of Essays and taken rank among the ablest essayists of the rising generation. The style of literary composition which is now technically called *essay*, may be said to be peculiarly English; just as the *memoir* is peculiarly French, and the scientific *dissertation* or *treatise* is German. It may be dated from Joseph Addison, but has been brought to perfection in the present century by the leading stars of the Edinburg Review, in its early and brightest days. We understand by it a finished literary miniature-picture of a particular subject, in its connection with the general spirit or movements of the age to which it belongs, presenting the results of thorough study without the apparatus and pedantry of scholarship in a manner at once attractive and instructive to the cultivated reader. Mr. Bayne has neither the dramatic vivacity and dazzling brilliancy of Macaulay, nor the genial grasp grasp and caustic vigor of Carlyle, nor the keen and sprightly wit of Sidney Smith, nor the penetration and illustrative imagery of Jeffrey; but a happy analytical faculty, a just and kindly appreciation of men and things, refined taste, an easy flow of language, and above all a truly Christian spirit, which animates and directs his judgment. The second series contains essays on Charles Kingsley, Lord Macaulay, Sir Archibald Alison, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Wellington, Napoleon, Plato, Christian Civilization, the Modern University, the Pulpit and the Press, and a defense of Hugh Miller's "Testimony of the Rocks." They will all repay a careful perusal.

On the *Authorized Version* of the *New Testament* in connection with some recent proposals for its revision. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Dean of Westminster. Redfield. New York. 1858.

This is one of the most judicious contributions to the question of Bible revision which is now extensively discussed in England and America. The exegetical studies of the author of the "Parables" and "Miracles of the New Testament," and his researches in the philosophy of language in general, and the English language in particular, of which his books on the "Study of Words," the "Lessons in Proverbs," the "Synonymes of the New Testament," and "The English Language, past and present," furnish ample evidence, give him a right to speak on this important question with a certain degree of authority. His object in the book before us is neither to advocate nor to dissuade a revision, but mainly to discuss the actual merits and defects of the Common English version, and thus to guard against a hasty and radical new version, as well as to prepare the way for a wise, careful and conscientious revision which should retain all the inimitable beauties of the version of 1611, and adapt it at the same time to the present state of Biblical scholarship. Such a revision, he is convinced, ought to come and will come, although not for some time yet. We may make this suggestive little volume the occasion for a separate article in some future number of the Review.

The Literary Attractions of the Bible, or a Plea for the Word of God, considered as a classic. By LE ROY S. HALSEY, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1858.

The object of this book is to exhibit the *human* beauty and greatness of the Bible, its poetry, eloquence, science and wisdom, its influence upon literature and art, legislation and morals, etc. The writer is a firm believer in the divine inspiration and infallible truth of the Scripture. But he justly thinks that the due appreciation of the human side leads to the higher point of view and forms an unbroken and cumulative argument for the superhuman character of the Bible. As the perfection of Christ's humanity, rising infinitely not only above the usual style of man, but above the wisest and best that ever lived, is an evidence of his divinity, so is also the human excellency of the Bible to be accounted for only on the ground of its being the book of God. Dr. Halsey modestly disclaims the credit of originality; but he has made a useful compilation and presented his subject in a popular style rising occasionally to eloquence and warmed by a profound reverence for that word whose "every ine is marked with the seals of high divinity, and every leaf bedewed with drops of love divine."

Mr. Scribner has recently issued an elaborate commentary of Rev. Dr. J. ADDISON ALEXANDER, of Princeton, on the *Gospel of St. Mark,* in uniform style with his recent commentary on Acts. It opens with a lucid introduction on the independent authority and relative completeness of the second Gospel, which he seems to regard with several German critics (Wilke, Weisse, Thiersch, Meyer, etc.,) and Mr. Smith of Jordanhill, Scotland, as the oldest. We expect to return to this valuable exegetical work more fully hereafter.

Mr. Scribner has announced as under press, a *Tabular Church History* by Prof. HENRY B. SMITH, of the Union Theol. Seminary of New York. It will contain fourteen tables, following the periods of Gieseler. From the specimen we have seen, it promises to be the very best work of the kind and will be a useful companion to a regular Church history, especially the author's revised translation of Gieseler.

The same publisher will issue, in a few weeks, SCHAFF'S *Church History of the first three centuries*, (till 311), embracing about 500 pages roy. oct. It is intended to be a separate and complete work on ante-Nicene Christianity, and at the same time the first volume of a General History of the Christian Church, which the author hopes, with God's blessing, to bring down to the present time in three or four more volumes. Of the merits of the work, he must, of course, let others speak. He will be quite satisfied, if it meet with the same favor as his History of the Apostolic Church.

In this connection we may be permitted to quote from the last number of the "Independent" the following notice of Mr. Scribner's new book store, 124 Grand street, corner of Broadway, N. Y. "This is the most commodious, convenient, and elegant book store in the city, surpassing even that of the Messrs. Appleton in the perfection of its arrangement, though less imposing in its *coup d'oeil.* Mr. Scribner confines himself to the sale of his own publications, and to the business of the English Publisher's Depot, in which he is associated with Mr. Charles Welford, under the name of Scribner & Co. . . In the English department may be found the latest issues of nearly all the prominent publishers of Great Britain. It is the aim of Mr. Scribner and Welford to make their establishment a centre of Literary Intelligence." We take the liberty of adding, from our own recent experience, that Mr. Welford has perhaps a better knowledge of English bibliography than any publisher or bookseller in America.

P. S.

A Plea for the Lord's Portion of a Christian's Wealth, in Life by Gift; at Death by Will. Chambersburg, Pa.: M. Kieffer & Co.

A neat little volume of 128 pages on the subject of Christian Benevolence, prepared and issued by a Committee appointed for this purpose by the Synod of the German Reformed Church.

It is addressed particularly to "ministers and members whom God has blest with wealth;" not so much to the poor, therefore, as to the wealthy; and for the simple reason that the poor belonging to the Church of Christ, not beset by the same temptations to hoarding and sinful indulgence, are generally ready to contribute according to their ability. As the title imports, it aims at setting forth the duty of the wealthy to contribute freely and systematically during life, and by will at death. The discussion is thorough and Scriptural; the style good; the appeal direct, well sustained and forcible; and the ruling *animus* of the book breathes the lofty spirit of the New Testament.

This little book on the "Lord's Portion" merits a careful perusal by all to whom the Lord has entrusted earthly goods—by all particularly who desire to be conscientious and faithful stewards of the manifold favors of God. Ministers and elders of the Church should use their influence to give the work a general circulation.

E. V. G.

TO THE READER.

The undersigned must apologize for taking up so much room himself in the present number. The simple reason is the want of contributions from others, and the unexpected absence of Dr. Gerhart from home, which made it necessary for the second editor, at a late hour, to fill out the October number.

With the coming year the financial management of the Review, as will be seen from a notice on the cover, passes from the hands of the Rev. Prof· Apple, who has devoted much time and disinterested labor to it for several years past, into those of the Rev. George B. Russell of Pittsburg, Pa., to whom, therefore, all business letters should be directed hereafter.

In the editorial management no change will take place for the present. The undersigned, believing that he had contributed, as editor ot the Kirchenfreund, his full share to theological journalism, and desirous of concentrating his literary labors on works already commenced or projected, has entered with considerable reluctance into the co-editorship of the Review. But he has seen no reason thus far to regret that he yielded in this case to the urgent request of friends, and is willing to keep his post at least for another year.

He desires to return, in this public way, his cordial thanks to all who have kindly contributed to this periodical during his editorial connection with it, and would respectfully bespeak their continued favors, as well as the patronage of all its friends, that the Mercersburg Review may be continued, both as an organ of the theological and literary life of the German Reformed Church in this country, and as a medium for the free and independent discussion of important questions connected with the general interests and progress of Protestantism, especially those which relate to the doctrine and mission of Christ and his Church.

Mercersburg, Oct. 1, 1858. P. S.

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